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Transliteration and Convention  
 
I have used the ICAO Passport (2013) version, except where there is a standard 
alternative already in widespread use, so Dostoevsky rather than Dostoevskii.  
When referring to clergy I have generally used their most recent titles 
throughout the text, except where this would compromise the meaning in the 
context. Thus, with Father Hilarion Alfeev, Bishop Hilarion Alfeev, Archbishop 












At Easter 2006, a schism occurred in the Russian Church in the UK when 
approximately one-third of clergy and parishioners left the Moscow 
Patriarchate and were received under the omophorion of Constantinople. The 
tensions that gave rise to the schism were a mixture of ethnic, generational, 
class, linguistic, theological, cultural and worldview differences. The catalyst 
was the arrival in the diocese of large numbers of Russophone émigrés 
following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc (1989) and the Soviet Union (1991). 
At first a trickle, by the late 1990s it had become a flood, and pre-existing 
parishioners eventually found themselves greatly outnumbered. Differences in 
practice and attitudes between the new arrivals and many of those who had 
grown up under the fifty-year care of Metropolitan Anthony Bloom (1914–
2003) seemed irreconcilable. The more liberal or open Orthodoxy being 
practised in the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Sourozh of the Moscow 
Patriarchate in London (henceforth ‘Sourozh’ or ‘Sourozh Diocese’) did not 
seem to match that of the post-Soviet Motherland from which the new arrivals 
had come. Tensions started to rise.  
The conflict became polarised, with those who looked to the Moscow 
Patriarchate for help and guidance (henceforth ‘pro-Moscow’) set against 
those who wanted the diocese to continue its trajectory outside Moscow’s 
more conservative influence (henceforth ‘anti-Moscow’).1 The diocesan 
authorities requested, and were sent, bilingual clergy from Moscow to 
administer to the new arrivals, but this only seemed to deepen, or rather 
reveal, the crisis. The final weeks before the denouement were extremely 
tense. Numerous petitions, open letters and the growth of internet polemic 
 
1 These are the standard terms used throughout this study. The author recognises that this terminology is 
unsatisfactory, but necessary for the sake of brevity. 
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escalated the confrontation. Some parishioners of the cathedral related 
episodes of unruly behaviour including shouting and jeering and there was 
even the perceived threat of violence in church. In addition, there was the 
involvement of the Russian Ambassador and numerous reports in the Russian 
and British media (including on the BBC).2  
In the end, the then presiding bishop administrator of the diocese, 
Bishop Basil of Sergievo, wrote to Patriarch Alexis in Moscow asking to be 
released from the Moscow Patriarchate. Shortly afterwards, he requested to 
be received under the omophorion of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the 
British Vicariate (later Deanery) of the Exarchate of the Russian Tradition, a 
self-governing part of the Russian Church in the Russian diaspora under 
Constantinople, with a complex jurisdictional history. Moscow rejected Bishop 
Basil’s request, instead forcibly retiring him, and appointing a temporary 
administrator in his stead. Conflict then broke out between Moscow and 
Constantinople and a major schism in World Orthodoxy was only narrowly 
avoided after a year and following intense negotiations. Approximately one-
third (the numbers are disputed) of the members of the Sourozh Diocese left 
the Moscow Patriarchate and with it the cathedral and churches in which they 
had worshiped in for decades. Three years later, the British High Court decided 
in favour of the Moscow Patriarchate as the rightful continuation of the 
Sourozh Diocese, allowing it to retain all the diocesan property, the new British 
 
2 OCAD at https://www.robertbenedictcollins.co.uk/ . Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Statement from 
Bishop Basil re Divine Liturgy at the Cathedral on Sunday 14 May 2006, published on his now deleted website 
www.dioceseinfo.org. ‘Bishop Basil wishes to make it clear to everyone that he does not wish there to be any 
disturbance during or after the Liturgy at the Cathedral of the Dormition and All Saints, London on Sunday 14 
May – or thereafter. Nor does he wish for anyone to go to the cathedral who would not normally worship 




Vicariate of Bishop Basil having been deemed to have voluntarily left the 
diocese.  
While these events were occurring within the Sourozh Diocese, the two 
long-estranged parts of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Russian diaspora – 
the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCOR) and the Moscow Patriarchate – 
finally signed, in 2007, a decree of canonical union in Moscow. The events in 
Sourozh were not unrelated to this development, as this study will analyse.  
 Though appearing somewhat as an exotic sideshow to the British public, 
the Sourozh crisis had macrocosmic significance and ramifications. It 
represented one piece of a puzzle being played out across the global Russian 
diaspora, everywhere involving the same East–West tensions, claims and 
counterclaims. Widely reported on the BBC and in the British press, the crisis 
came at a watershed moment in Anglo-Russian relations, closely followed by 
the Litvinenko affair. The more cautious relationship with the West under 
Vladimir Putin, along with the ‘consolidation’ in the Russian Church, were still 
relatively recent political phenomena. As the millennium turned, the policies of 
the Russian State and Church towards the Russian diaspora started to align 
with a sense of urgency, inspired by neo-Slavophile thought. Both sought to 
shore up the ‘new national idea’ against capitulation to ‘western 
permissiveness’, after the perceived shame and chaos of the Yeltsin years. 
 At the same time, the Russian-speaking diaspora in the UK swelled with 
new, mostly economic migrants from Russia and the Baltic States, changing 
almost overnight the demographic make-up of the Sourozh Diocese. The 
diocese had been in many respects the creation of one man, the charismatic 
bishop Metropolitan Anthony Bloom, and the ethos that had evolved under 
him was thought to be less ‘rigid’ and more ecumenical. Above all, there was 
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an attempt to operate according to the decrees of the Russian Church Sobor of 
1917–18, placing greater emphasis on a democratic and localising 
interpretation of collegiality (sobornost’) and increasing the role of women and 
the laity. Meanwhile the Mother Church (along with the Mother State) seemed 
to be retreating from such emphases into a more centralising, vertical, 
conservative, and authoritarian modus operandi.  
 The crisis that developed in the Sourozh Diocese therefore represents 
the convergence of several developing strands of conflict. As such it is a 
climactic event foreshadowing greater shifts in geopolitics, which offers a 
contained example in which both the grassroots events themselves and the 
larger themes and forces that often lay behind them can be studied. The 
established assessment of the crisis in the western media and academia was 
(and is) rather black and white. According to this analysis, the Sourozh crisis 
was just one example of the Erastian and power-hungry Moscow Patriarchate 
seeking to reign in and control its diaspora parishes. The western media mostly 
portrayed the Sourozh crisis as that of an aggressive, conservative, statist and 
nationalist Mother Church attempting to take over (and even destroy) the 
liberal, indigenous Russian Orthodoxy that had grown up in Britain over the 
twentieth century. The newly resurgent Russian Church and the Russian State, 
both influenced by a rise in neo-Slavophile thought and a new conservatism, 
were keen, it was argued, to centralise and control all aspects of Church life, 
both in the diaspora and at home. In addition, the State had rediscovered the 
Church as a soft-power tool to reach and consolidate the diaspora. In the 
words of Maria Haemmerli, ‘As Eastern Orthodox churches were the only 
institutions that took care of national diasporas, soon the respective states 
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realised that they could reach these diasporas via the church’.3 As a result, far-
flung parishes in Western capitals were proclaimed to be ‘beacons’ and 
‘islands’ of Holy Rus. What these new ‘windows in the West’ presented to the 
world became more important to both Church and state. Anomalous practices 
which had grown up in the Soviet years came under more scrutiny from the 
ecclesiastical authorities in the Motherland. From Moscow’s perspective, this 
was merely a correction of divergences which had developed when the 
diaspora Church was beyond the reach of the Motherland, and a reclamation 
of rightful ownership. 
Partly as a result of subsequent geopolitical developments, there has 
been an exponential rise in academic interest in the Russian Church and its 
relation to the Russian State. In addition, various thinktanks and quasi-
governmental institutions regularly publish studies of the Russian Church  and 
its relation to Russian foreign policy.4 The Sourozh crisis has often formed part 
of these analyses to exemplify the Church’s ‘neo-Slavophile agenda’ and 
consolidationist policies vis-à-vis the Russian diaspora. Articles by Professor 
Blitt, Xenia Dennen, and Daniel Payne in the West, and Fr Alexander Shramko 
and Sergei Chapnin in the Russian-speaking world, have described this 
narrative in varying degrees.5 Professor Blitt focused on the geopolitical 
 
3 Haemmerli, M., ‘Multiple Dimensions of the Integration Process of Eastern Orthodox Communities in 
Switzerland’, Université de Neuchâtel, National Research Programme 58 (March 2011), p.21 
http://www.snf.ch/SiteCollectionDocuments/nfp/nfp58/NFP58_Schlussbericht_Hainard.pdf [Accessed 
02.05.20]  
4 Cf., for example, Curanovic, A., ‘The Religious Diplomacy of the Russian Federation’, Russie.Nei., Reports 12, 
06.12. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifrirnr12curanovicreligiousdiplomacyjune2012.pdf 
[Accessed 02.05.20]  
5. Payne, D.P., ‘Nationalism and the Local Church: The Source of Ecclesiastical Conflict in the Orthodox 
Commonwealth’, Nationalities Papers 35 (2007). Dennen, X., ‘Who controls Russian Orthodoxy in Britain?’, 
18.03.09. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/who-controls-russian-orthodoxy-in-britain/ [Accessed 
27.03.20]. Blitt, R.C., ‘Russia’s Orthodox Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church 
in Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad’, 33 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 363 (2011). Shramko, A. ‘Russkie idut’, Russkii Zhurnal, 
(October, 2007). Chapnin, S., ‘Kak RPTs demonstriruet tserkovnoe nasledie russkoi emigratsii’, 06.16. 
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/66170. [Accessed 02.05.20]  
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‘culture wars’ aspect, presenting the crisis as a ‘clash of civilisations’ related to 
Moscow’s cultural turn to the right. Xenia Dennen, a long-time opponent of 
the Moscow Patriarchate, focused on the secular power interests of the 
Russian Church. Fr Alexander Shramko’s more philosophical Russian-language 
article related events more specifically to developments in Russian 
messianism.  
In addition to renewed academic interest in the Church, there has been 
an explosion of literature relating to neo-conservative or neo-Slavophile 
Russian thinkers such as Alexander Dugin. The Church often forms part of 
these analyses. Writers who were previously little known in the West, such as 
Konstatin Leontiev and Ivan Ilyin, have been accorded much importance as 
providers of the intellectual framework for the new Russian Idea. Ultimately, 
the role of Russian messianism/nationalism has been seen as pivotal in driving 
the foreign policies of both Church and State.  
Such a brief foray into the literature on the crisis cannot do any justice to 
these and other articles that have analysed the events at Sourozh. I mention 
them here only to highlight that there is an emphasis in western academia on a 
single narrative at the exclusion of other nuances. Other studies have analysed 
events from a more sociological and theological aspect, notably that of Maria 
Haemmerli of Friboug University in her book Orthodox Identities in Western 
Europe.6 The author has a deep understanding of Orthodox Church history, 
theology and praxis, offering an insider’s perspective that is unusual for a 
western academic. The book analyses the crisis from the broader perspective 
of diaspora studies, and in terms of ‘Orthodox diasporas’ (which, in 
 
6 Haemmerli, M. and Mucha, E., ‘Innovation in the Russian Orthodox Church: The Crisis in the Diocese of 
Sourozh in Britain’ in Haemmerli, M. and Mayer, J.-F. (eds.), Orthodox Identities in Western Europe: Migration, 
Settlement and Innovation (London, 2014)  
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Haemmerli’s view, is a problematic description). Haemmerli focused her study 
on the tensions between innovation and tradition, concluding, ‘when 
deterritorialised, the Orthodox Church is faced with the need to innovate in 
order to adapt to a new social and cultural setting’ and that this generates the 
tensions that were seen in Sourozh.7 She is sceptical about the ultimate 
success of ‘innovation which occurs under the cover of a traditionalist 
discourse and in the name of staying faithful to the spirit of the living 
tradition.’8 It should be said that many articles questioning the narrative of 
Dennen, Chapnin, Schramko and Blitt emerged from within Church circles, but 
these voices did not penetrate western academia (and did not intend to do so).  
The aim of the present study is an ambitious one. It seeks to act as a 
corrective to the rather one-sided narrative of the Sourozh crisis prevailing in 
western academia. This polarised and problematic narrative must be 
reassessed, and this will entail relating both anti-Moscow and pro-Moscow 
positions. The polarised view, as it has been repeated in academia, is an over-
simplification that fails to answer some basic questions about the crisis, and in 
presenting a rather bland, black-and-white picture also robs the story of its 
most compelling aspects. If what is claimed by authors such as Dennen is the 
whole picture, why was the principal agitator for Moscow not a priest from 
Russia but instead a lay Ukrainian Jewish convert?9 If it was an ethnic divide 
between the English versus the new ex-Soviet Russians, why were there so 
many English in the Moscow camp, to the extent that the trial and supporting 
documentation for Moscow was conducted by English lay parishioners? Why 
 
7 Ibid. p.302 
8 Ibid.  
9 Interviews 2Ea and 2Eb 
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did many of the English clergy in the provinces not only support Moscow but 
publicly condemn the treatment of Bishop Hilarion?  
There is a real gulf between the way Church historians write about 
ecclesiastical events, and the approach of western academics, who are 
resolutely secular and liberal leaning in their methodology and ideology. The 
secular liberalism of western academia itself constitutes a worldview, and this 
in turn has a serious impact on historiography, especially for religious and 
cultural histories. The result of a worldview unconscious of its own hegemonic 
pretensions is both an ‘assumptive cynicism’ and certain lacunae, in which 
divergent views are side-lined or remain unexplored.  
In brief, what is meant by such terms as ‘assumptive cynicism’ and 
‘unconscious hegemony’? The German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (1947–) 
was the first to outline the pervasiveness of ‘enlightened cynicism’ as the 
default modus operandi – and thus communication – of the so-called ‘post-
value world’ (and especially academia). Regarding the history of religion, this 
meant, for example, that only mercenary motives could be ascribed to 
historical agents, even if these were unconscious.10 While it is true, of course, 
that mercenary motivation is often a factor in religious history, as in any other, 
it is not the only one. Similarly, in the secular sphere, both pragmatism and 
idealism jostled for position as the new Russia emerged from the 1990s. Such 
historiography is displayed most evidently in its assumption of values and 
mindsets, and a consequent failure to appreciate real motivations. It could be 
noted that this is an academic blind spot which has affected much recent 
analysis of Russian Church–State relations by western-based academics, who 
are not always familiar with the nuances of the theology and history of the 
 
10 Sloterdijk, P., Critique of Cynical Reason (Minn., 1988), p.28 
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Orthodox Church. As Petr Kasatkin notes in his thesis, ‘The fact must be noted 
that the majority of the present literature concerning the presence of religious 
persons in world politics today is written by political scientists, sociologists, 
lawyers and philosophers who are not only “variously acquainted” with the 
role of the Orthodox Church in the modern world, but who also are not always 
familiar to the same extent with her canonical arrangements and internal life, 
history and contemporary problems and achievements.”11 Despite its large and 
growing importance in world geopolitics, the Orthodox Church remains an 
obscure and impenetrable entity to many historians. The Washington-based 
strategist John Stilides noted how this was the case even for someone like 
himself, born into Greek Orthodox culture. As a result, he made it his mission 
to promote greater understanding of Orthodoxy and its impact on the world 
stage.12  
More controversially, I would also posit that there exists a much older 
and more subtle thematic and conceptual prejudice in western historiography 
towards the East as a whole. Some historians more sympathetic towards the 
East have seen the long shadow of Gibbon as the promoter of this imbalance.13 
For many, concealed disdain is summed up in the word ‘Byzantium’, and as a 
result the term has been under much scrutiny in recent times, although 
alternatives seem unlikely to take hold soon. The word is deeply problematic. 
Firstly, it is inaccurate, to the extent that no one in the (Eastern) Roman Empire 
 
11 Kasatkin, P., Rol’ russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v sovremennikh mirovikh politicheskikh protsesakh states 
(Moscow, 2010) (author trans.). Cf. also Osborne, Bishop B.,‘Orthodoxy in a United Europe: The Future of our 
Past: The EU is expanding into Slavic lands’ in Sutton, J.& Van Den Bercken., W (Eds) Orthodox Christianity and 
Contemporary Europe (Leuven, 2003). 
12 Cf. Geopolitics, Foreign Policy, and the Orthodox Church. An interview with John Stilides. 
https://www.ancientfaith.com/podcasts/faithencouragedlive/geopolitics_foreign_policy_and_the_orthodox_c
hurch [Accessed 05.01.20]  
13 McGuckin, J.A., ‘Orthodoxy and Western Christianity: The Original European Culture War?’, in Hotchkiss, V. 
and Henry, P. (eds.), Orthodoxy and Western Culture: A Collection of Essays Honouring Jaroslav Pelikan on his 
Eightieth Birthday (2005), pp.85–107 
13 
 
would have called themselves by this term, as it was only invented in its 
current form in the sixteenth century, and in the West.14 Secondly, the word 
carries with it a host of negative connotations that are observable in its 
adjectival equivalent. Such linguistic proclivities cannot but effect 
historiography in some form. These problems are compounded by the fact that 
Russian writers and historians themselves often seem to promote the cruel, 
naïve, despotic and exotic in Russian history, following in the line of Blok’s 
famous poem, The Scythians.  
 A second aim of this study is to critique the established understanding of 
Russian nationalism as a driver for events in Sourozh. This does not mean that 
Russian nationalism had no role to play in events, indeed it did. But neo-
Slavophile religious nationalism, based on universalism, is subtly different to 
western conceptions. In addition, Russia’s liminal and imperial status was key 
to how her ‘imagined community’ was perceived, and this is further explored 
in this study15. It might seem extravagant to propose that such arguments lay 
at the base of tensions in the Sourozh crisis but I am convinced that East–West 
dissonance (both misconceptions and truths) played a major role in the 
development and escalation of the crisis.  
To understand the neo-Slavophile rhetoric surrounding the crisis, it is 
necessary to take into consideration changing attitudes to the role of the 
Orthodox diaspora with regards to the Motherland. How could it be (as it was 
claimed) that the diocese was ‘freer’ from central control when Moscow was 
under the Soviets than it was at the time of the crisis? How has the Church 
driven policy towards the diaspora since 1991? Where is the confluence of 
 
14 The term was introduced into historiography by Hieronymus Wolf in Corpus Historiae Byzantinae (Bayern, 
1557). 
15 Cf. Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983, 
new edn. 2006)  
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ideas about the ‘new national idea’ and those about the role of the Church? 
What role (if any) did the long-hoped-for reunion of the Russian Orthodox 
Church Abroad (ROCOR) with the Moscow Patriarchate play in both neo-
Slavophile thinking and the Sourozh crisis? How did centralising forces in both 
Church and State affect the outcome in Sourozh? Much space is given in this 
study to dealing with these questions and the ones that arise from them.  
Finally, it can be said that the aim of the present study is to take a 
holistic and dispassionate approach to a rather polemicised subject. It is the 
author’s contention that the crisis was an expression of a coalescence of forces 
and circumstances whose struggles seemingly resurface again and again in our 
current volatile and uncertain era: enculturation versus transnationalism, East 
versus West, conservatism versus liberalism, localism versus centralism, and so 
on. But to understand both sides in each of these dichotomies, a suspension of 
disbelief might at times be required. At the risk of controversy, it is necessary 
to lay aside some of the preconceptions and moral imperatives that are now 
almost built into western academic discourse if one is fully to understand the 
casus belli of either side. This is especially timely and important at the time of 
writing (2019), when there is again talk of a ‘new Cold War’. The distinction is 
often made between the post-war divide, which was primarily ideological 
(communism versus capitalism) and the present state of affairs, which, it is 
claimed, is characterised by a more traditional balance-of-power struggle. 
Small-scale and peripheral though the events in Sourozh may seem, the 
language, allegiances and passions aroused show that there was indeed an 
15 
 
ideological element to the conflict, and one that ran very deep and was, 
perhaps, also very ancient.16  
 A brief word needs to be said about the structure of this study. Chapters 
1 and 2 deal first with the history of the crisis and then its place in the broader 
history of the Orthodox Church. All the undercurrents and themes that 
surfaced during the events are highlighted throughout these two chapters. An 
understanding of how things happened and why is essential when moving on 
to questions concerning East–West dichotomies and Russian nationalism. 
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse how broader and deeper tensions played out on the 
ground at the grassroots level. Chapters 5 and 6 represent an in-depth analysis 
of neo-Slavophile thought as it has affected the policies of the Russian Church 
and State towards the diaspora, considered by many as a prime driver behind 
the crisis.  
 
Sources and Methodology  
That these events are so recent is both an advantage and a hindrance when 
writing their history. On the negative side, some might doubt that any 
meaningful analysis can be conducted when barely a decade has passed, while 
on the positive, it means there is a vast plethora of information to draw from 
(something which in itself can become a negative as the researcher encounters 
feelings of being overwhelmed).  
Oral history formed a broad base for this study and a way of checking 
and countering some of the published material. Interviews were conducted 
 
16 For the contrary position that the present crisis is not at all ideological, see Khudoley, K., ‘Russia and the 
West: Is a New Cold War Possible?’, BASEES lecture, St. Petersburg State University (Cambridge, 2015).  
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with clergy and laypeople both in the UK and in Russia. Not everyone who was 
contacted was willing to provide an interview, but a substantial amount of 
material was collected from fifteen main participants, with several other less 
important interviews. There was a fairly equal spread across the pro-Moscow 
and anti-Moscow sides. Most interviews were conducted in person and 
recorded. Some interviewees preferred not to be recorded and so notes were 
made. Other interviews were conducted by Skype and one was carried out via 
email Q&A. Details of the individual interviews and their categorisation can be 
found in the Bibliography and are available on the author’s website listed 
there.  
In addition to oral sources were many collections of online sources. 
These fall broadly into three categories: internet chat forums and published 
articles, and blogs. In the first group, the most important were the discussions 
which took place in Russian on the Russian site www.kuraev.ru. The debate 
was subsequently transferred to the site www.cirota.ru. Several threads or 
тема concerned the events unfolding in Sourozh, and to give the reader some 
idea of the scale of this material, just a single тема [Смута в Сурожской 
епархии: Тема: #58412] when printed out in A4 reaches over 500 sheets. If 
one were to print out all this material it would run to many thousands of 
pages. The online forums have been a hugely important source material for 
this study, and it might seem unusual that this material has been accorded 
such an important role. But it is sobering to note that digital resources such as 
this will provide to future generations the main (and perhaps in some cases the 
only) sources for the history of our times. The crisis came at a point of rapid 
growth of the internet and such material provides an almost daily commentary 
on the events by participants and onlookers from all angles. Details of all the 
web forums (both English and Russian) can be found in the Bibliography.  
17 
 
 Online publications and articles are simply too numerous to mention 
individually here. All newspapers today exist in online format as do newsletters 
and even church bulletins. Where possible the website link is given. 
Occasionally websites have been moved, renamed or deleted along with the 
material they contained. In this respect I was fortunate to obtain several 
private archives relating to the crisis. Among these were invaluable printouts 
of long-deleted sites from The Times Online and www.dioceseinfo.org, the 
website of Bishop Basil Osborne. Details of these personal archives can be 
found in the Bibliography.  
In addition to online and personal archives were traditional archives 
such as the Bodleian Library, Oxford (papers of Nicholas Gibbes), the Lambeth 
Palace Archive (including file OC 325, relating to foreign relations), the 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn House of the Russian Emigration, Moscow (including 
papers relating to Fr Sophrony), the State Archives of the Russian Federation or 
GARF (papers relating to Metropolitan Anthony and the Galytsin family, among 
others), the National Archives at Kew and the Mitrokhin Archives in 
Cambridge. All such archives are detailed in the Bibliography. Many archives 
are now digitised and invaluable material can be found in such collections as 
the Metropolitan Anthony archive www.mitras.ru and the archive of the 
Orthodox Church in America http://archive.ocl.org/.  
Official published reports and statements were also examined. These 
range from the official Russian Church report of the investigative committee 
into the crisis to statements by the DECR and the Holy Synod. A small collection 
of such documents relating to the crisis was also published in Russian in St 
Petersburg; it was rather selective in its approach.17 Most such documents are 
 
17 Khronika Sourozhskoi Smuty (Saint Petersburg, 2006)  
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available online and where possible an actual weblink is provided. The most 
important sites are those of the Moscow Patriarchate, the DECR and the World 
Russian People’s Council (all site details can be found in the Bibliography). In 
relation to the 2009 property trial, which took place after the actual crisis and 
provided its final conclusion, the author was very fortunate to receive from the 
British High Court a recording of the entire three-day trial. Finally, it should be 
said that the literature surrounding Sourozh, such as the articles mentioned 
above by Prof Blitt et al, also provides a source. In analysing such recent 
events, the analysis itself becomes a part of the historiography.  
19 
 
Chapter 1: The Sourozh Crisis   
The vast population shifts that occurred in Europe in the first half of the last 
century and continued in smaller waves of migration up to the present day 
resulted in sprawling, interconnected and sometimes mutually hostile 
diasporas the world over. Perhaps none of these shifts was so cumulatively 
expansive and complex as the series of migrations from Russia following the 
Revolution (1917), the Soviet and Allied victory (1945) and the collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc and then the Soviet Union (1989–91). The very geographical size 
of Russia meant that after 1917 émigrés spilled out across a wide swathe of 
the world: in the Far East they created huge, thriving diasporas in such places 
as Harbin in China; many departed to the UK from the Russian north following 
the collapse of the British Expeditionary Force; and great numbers also fled 
into eastern Europe (especially Serbia) and Constantinople following the final 
collapse of the White forces in Crimea. To these émigré communities were 
added refugees following World War II, and finally, and most notably for this 
study, the huge influx of ethnic Russian economic migrants from the CIS and 
eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of 
its satellite states.  
The size of this diaspora is difficult to define with any certainty, with 
figures ranging from twenty to thirty million ethnic Russians living beyond the 
borders of the present Russian State. This is second only in size to the Chinese 
Diaspora.1 In the UK alone, estimates of the Russian population range from 
about 35,000 to 300,000, and evaluations of the size of each wave of migration 
have been wildly disparate. The UN International Organisation for Migration 
 
1 Ryazantsev, S.V., ‘The Modern Russian-Speaking Communities in the World: Formation, Assimilation and 
Adaptation in Host Societies’, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Vol. 6, No. 3, S.4 
(Rome, May 2015) 
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mapping exercise of 2007 noted that the 2001 census put the number of 
Russian citizens in the UK at 15,644, but that by December 2006, unofficial 
estimates put the figure at 300,000 with 100,000 of those arriving within the 
previous two years (i.e. during the finale of the Sourozh crisis).2  
 The story of the Russian Church in the diaspora does not represent one 
monolithic institution concerned only with the spiritual care of a scattered 
flock. Instead, all the vicissitudes that had existed before the Revolution were 
exacerbated by the new climate in which the Church now found herself. This 
experience was similar to that of other diaspora churches, with Khachig 
Tololyan writing of the Armenian Church that its role in the Armenian diaspora 
became, ‘... the arena in which the disputes and conflicts of Armenian life were 
to be fought out’.3 The Armenian Church was, like the Russian Church, to 
experience the pressures and influences of a supremely national Church that 
now found herself competing in the religious marketplace of the West. 
Differences of opinion arose within the diaspora Church as to how to 
deal with its new predicament. Those exiled intellectuals who had returned to 
the Church under the influence of the Slavophile movement of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were often at odds with more 
conservative strands within the Church. Splits also occurred over the 
relationship between the diaspora Church and the Church in the Soviet Union. 
But the experience of all the national Orthodox churches with flocks spread 
beyond the Orthodox heartlands was far more complex than the pre-existing 
internal tensions between conservatives and liberals. This was particularly true 
for the Russian Church, for multiple reasons that are analysed in this study. 
 
2 IOM International Mapping Organisation, Mapping Exercise: Russia (London, July 2007) 
3 Toloyan, Khachig, ‘The Role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the Diaspora’, Armenian Review, Vol. 41, 
Nos. 1–161 (Spring 1988), pp. 55–68 
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Churches that had previously been national and in many respects ethnic 
institutions, associated above all with a people’s history, culture and national 
struggle, now found themselves attracting converts among the population of 
the host country. Moreover, they and their children were subject to all the 
influences of modern secular life in countries where their national Church 
appeared insular and parochial. Such jurisdictions were often subject to 
senescence as they struggled to maintain a ‘home from home’ in a foreign 
land. In this environment the Russian Church above all others rose to the 
challenge of this new ‘applied universalism’ of diaspora life – a concept with 
which Slavophiles had been struggling with for decades. This was in part 
because the route home was blocked for Russian Christians in a way that it 
largely was not for members of other Orthodox diasporas, and in part also 
because of the Russian Church’s more developed sense of a multi-ethnic, 
universal mission. The development of the Sourozh Diocese under 
Metropolitan Anthony Bloom should be seen in this light.4  
 
Anthony Bloom: A Controversial Figure  
Related to the composer Alexander Scriabin on his mother’s side, Metropolitan 
Anthony was born into the Russian intelligentsia in 1914. He was brought up in 
Paris, where he qualified as a surgeon at the University of Paris. His dramatic 
conversion from convinced atheism to Orthodoxy whilst reading the gospels in 
 
4 The term ‘Orthodox diasporas’ is as controversial for secular as for Church historians, as it can be seen to 
imply that there are ‘Orthodox lands’ and ‘Non-Orthodox lands’. By contrast, one does not speak of a ‘Catholic 
diaspora’. Nevertheless, the description has been retained in this study for the sake of brevity. Cf. Haemmerli, 
M., ‘Orthodox diaspora? A Sociological and Theological Problematisation of a Stock Phrase’, International 
Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 10(2–3) (2010), pp.97–115 and Thorbjørnsrud, B., ‘The Problem of 
the Orthodox Diaspora: The Orthodox Church between Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Universality’, 




his teens affected the whole of his subsequent mission. It could be said that 
from this moment, his interpretation of Christianity was that of a faith that 
must be lived through a personal meeting of man with God. He was drawn to 
the religious life and was secretly tonsured a monk in occupied Paris in 1943, 
taking the name of Anthony. Despite having little knowledge of English (but 
fluent in Russian, German and French), he was sent in 1948 to care for the 
parish of the Moscow Patriarchate in London, with its shared church on 
Buckingham Palace Road.  
Over the next half-century, Metropolitan Anthony was to become one of 
the best-known Orthodox bishops in the world, inspiring hagiographic 
adulation in some as much as suspicion in others. There is already a vast 
literature about Metropolitan Anthony, which increases year on year. 
Conferences devoted to his work take place internationally and several 
charities and archival foundations have been set up in his name. Metropolitan 
Anthony is not the subject of this thesis, and studies of the man and his 
teaching can be found elsewhere, but it is useful to say here a few words about 
him, especially regarding the widely divergent assessments of him.  
 Most accounts of his life and work were written by his spiritual children 
and many of these consider him to be a saint. On the other side, criticism 
ranges from scandalous accusations concerning his moral integrity to 
accusations of heresy and milder critiques of his manner. Until the appearance 
of the recent work by Avril Pyman, the main account of his life was a book by 
Gillian Crow with the enigmatic title This Holy Man.5 Although penned by a 
disciple of Metropolitan Anthony, Gillian Crow’s book is not a hagiography and 
 
5 Crow, G., This Holy Man: Impressions of Metropolitan Anthony (London, 2005) and Pyman, A., Metropolitan 
Anthony of Sourozh: A Life (London, 2016) 
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speaks rather openly of his shortcomings. She describes what she refers to as 
his ‘darker side’ and how he was not afraid to isolate and discard people. 
Perhaps more importantly for this study, she also describes his inability to deal 
with difficult situations and confrontation, locating its cause in the innate 
shyness that would lead him to ‘act despotically’ or lapse into silence.6 Several 
interviewees spoke of a kind of personality cult that had developed around 
Metropolitan Anthony.7 For them, the poverty and simplicity displayed by the 
bishop contained its own ostentation.8 For another, the ‘exoticism’ that 
surrounded him was a result of ‘his good looks and exotic and exaggerated 
Russian-Parisian accent’.9 Also, and importantly for this study, is the emphasis 
placed by several people (and not only by those opposed to him) on his 
supposed need to be the centre of attention.10 Fr Andrei Kordochkin, a priest 
who was present in the diocese at the time of the troubles, wrote on the tenth 
anniversary of Metropolitan Anthony’s death in 2013, ‘It was hard for 
Archbishop Anthony to live alongside other gifted people … in the sky of 
Sourozh only the one sun could shine’.11 According to another interviewee, 
there was a ‘London-Oxford-Sourozh group’.12 Many provincial parishes rarely, 
and sometimes never at all, received a visit from their diocesan bishop, and 
this was to create problems later.13  
 
6 Crow, p.198ff and p.224 
7 ‘Kommentaria: Surozhskaia Eparkhia: vsgliad iznutri’, Tserkovnyi Vestnik, Nos. 1–2 (278–279) Ian. 2004. Also 
Interview 1C  
8 Interview 2Ea 
9 Orthodoxengland.org.uk, Phillips, Fr. A., ‘The Situation of English Orthodoxy and a Vision for the Future of 
Russian Orthodoxy in Europe’ 24.07.15, http://www.events.orthodoxengland.org.uk/the-situation-of-english-
orthodoxy-and-a-vision-for-the-future-of-russian-orthodoxy-in-europe/ [Accessed 24.03.20] 
10 Interview 2Ea 
11 Kordochkin, A., ‘Nastoiatel’ Madridskogo prikhoda RPTs o. Andrei Kordochkin o Surozhskoi Smute’ 
(02.06.13). https://d-st75.livejournal.com/506036.html [Accessed 24.03.20]  
12 Orthodoxengland.org.uk, Phillips, Fr.A., ‘Sourozh: Russian traditions without the Russian Orthodox Faith’ 
http://www.orthodoxengland.org.uk/sourozh1.htm [Accessed 24.03.20] 
13 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Letter from a Provincial Parishioner, posted 05.06  
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 The conflict surrounding the person of Metropolitan Anthony did not 
finish with his death, but in some respects intensified. One memoir stated, ‘For 
the West he was a welcome figure, but he was a polarising figure in the 
Russian Emigration and in Russia itself. In general, he was more supported by 
the laity and married, parish (white) clergy, whilst monastics were more 
opposed to him’.14 It was indeed true that Metropolitan Anthony had over the 
years become distanced from several figures, most notably from Father 
Sophrony Sakharov, whose monastery in Essex had moved in 1965 from the 
Moscow Patriarchate jurisdiction to Constantinople.15 The many who were 
devoted to him were opposed by a less vocal number who were uneasy with 
his direction,16 and these diverging opinions are still visible today. The patristic 
scholar Metropolitan Kallistos, known for discretion in matters of Church 
politics, nevertheless made statements to the effect that Metropolitan 
Anthony had, ‘allowed certain people (particularly women) to become 
dependent upon him in a rather unhealthy way’.17  
After his death, there was much talk among the anti-Moscow group 
about ‘preserving the legacy’ of Metropolitan Anthony. For the anti-Moscow 
group, this meant the preservation of the ‘open and sincere’ form of 
Orthodoxy based on love that had been preached by Metropolitan Anthony. To 
others, however, the ‘legacy of Metropolitan Anthony’ had many negative 
connotations. A blogger wrote that ‘all the talk about the legacy of 
Metropolitan Anthony’ was ‘exactly how sects are born’.18  
 
14 Tugarinov, E.S (ed), Mitropolit Antonii Syrozhskii: Biografia v svidetel’svakh sovremenikov (Moscow, 2015), 
pp.166–7 
15 Cf. Papers relating to Sophrony Sakharov in the Dom Russkogo Zarubezh’ia Imeni Aleksandra Solzhenitsyna, 
Moscow. Cf. Interview 1F 
16 Cf. Metropolitan Mark of Germany’s memoir of Metropolitan Anthony in Tugarinov, Mitropolit Antonii 
Syrozhskii, op.cit. p.166ff 
17 Ibid., p.135 
18 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2163204, 01.07.06 [Accessed 09.05.20]  
25 
 
What exactly the legacy of Metropolitan Anthony comprises is 
complicated by the fact that his statements, if not contradictory, often left 
open questions – for instance, his sometimes-ambiguous remarks concerning 
the ordination of women.19 Similarly, he made no public pronouncements 
about leaving the Moscow Patriarchate and many apparently loyalist 
comments exist, yet several private conversations in which he stated an 
opposite view have been reported publicly. Radio Radonezh wrote that 
faithfulness to the so-called ‘Sourozh tradition’ and the legacy of Metropolitan 
Anthony meant bearing witness to the truth of Christianity in a secular society 
and not ‘gradually accommodating the Church to the liberal spirit of the 
century, in which the main problem of Church life is the question of whether a 
lesbian can be a bishop’.20 Within Russia, Metropolitan Anthony remains a 
popular figure and his books can be found in most Church bookshops. For 
many of the grassroots faithful in Russia he is considered a counterweight to 
the perceived politicisation of the official Church – a cause of unease for many 








19 Cf. ‘Metropolitan Anthony Bloom – Men and women in the Church’ http://otelders.org/theology-and-
spirituality/metropolitan-anthony-bloom-men-women-church/ [Accessed 09.05.20] 
20 ‘O vernosti “surozhskoi traditsii”’, Radio Radonezh, 16.05.06. Available at cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, 
Soobshchenie: #2082349, 24.05.06 [Accessed 09.05.20] 
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Building Tensions (1991–2002)  
When Metropolitan Anthony arrived in the UK, there existed two separate and 
mutually wary jurisdictions of the Russian Church: the Moscow Patriarchate 
and the Russian Church Abroad (ROCOR). A more detailed analysis of their 
relative histories is given in the following chapter; suffice it to say at this stage 
that the Moscow parish in London tended to represent those in the liberal 
intelligentsia who had returned to the Church, while ROCOR attracted White 
Russian émigrés and post-war refugees fleeing the Red Army.  
The euphoria of victory in post-war Britain was accompanied by a strong 
pro-Soviet feeling, which was to quickly descend into the hostility of the Cold 
War. This affected the Church as any other diaspora organisation, and the 
Moscow parish became still further depleted of parishioners. Realising that the 
diocese would eventually die out if it continued to maintain a strict ethnic 
policy in accommodating only elderly Russian émigrés, Metropolitan Anthony 
increasingly saw his role as that of an ‘Orthodox witness to the West’.21 He was 
media friendly (he was often on the BBC), good-looking, multilingual, learned 
and able to communicate in a contemporary way that showed he understood 
people’s real day-to-day problems. He could speak with equal ease about his 
arrest by the Gestapo while he served in the French Resistance as about the 
pastoral problems facing Christians in the West. Under his care, the diocese 
started to attract indigenous converts. By the late 1980s, the converts 
outnumbered the Russian émigrés and their descendants by a ratio of about 
4:1,22 and many of the Russians had themselves been swayed by the new ethos 
that developed under Metropolitan Anthony. And what was that ethos? A 
 
21 Tugarinov, Mitropolit Antonii Syrozhskii, op.cit. p.155 
22 Collins, R., ‘Demographics and the Russian Orthodox Church in London’, Chapter 11 in The Desecularisation 
of the City (London, 2019) 
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picture will develop as the study progresses, but it is useful to summarise here 
several key points. 
 In essence, there was a relaxation of the emphasis on maintaining 
tradition and Church rules in favour of what was felt to be the simplicity and 
‘spirit of love’ of the early Christian Church. Metropolitan Anthony himself 
focused on two aspects of the Christian message: the personal encounter 
(meeting) with God and love of one’s neighbour. Under Metropolitan Anthony, 
the Sourozh Diocese was to take its guiding principles from its interpretation of 
the decrees of the all-Russian Sobor of 1917–18. The influence of the Great 
Sobor on the ecclesiology of Sourozh will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5. 
Here it is sufficient to say that Metropolitan Anthony and his entourage sought 
to enact many of the decrees of the Sobor which of necessity remained 
dormant in the Soviet Union. The Sobor laid emphasis on a ‘horizontal’ 
ecclesiology, increasing the role of the laity, women and the white clergy. In 
practical terms this was developed into the administrative Sourozh Diocesan 
Statutes (1979), a document many years in gestation.23 Tolerated by Moscow, 
if never formally ratified, the statutes gave greater powers to the local clergy 
and parishioners of the diocese in the election of their bishop and in the day-
to-day running of affairs. There was also a greater emphasis on sobornost’ as a 
decentralising tendency that devolved powers to all the members of the parish 
and diocese and to the elected diocesan and parish assemblies and councils. 
Most importantly, the Sourozh Statutes were not considered by its authors to 
be a dry legalistic document, but were described as, ‘a framework in which we 
 
23 The ecclesiological influence of the Sobor of 1917–18 on Sourozh and the development of the new diocesan 
Sourozh Statutes is discussed in Chapter 5. The Sourozh Statutes can be found in OCAD. Official Documents. 
Statutes of the Diocese of Surouzh (Metropolitan Anthony).  
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can create life, a life which may not as yet be perfect, for it must follow the 
course of its own, natural, free development’.24  
Another key aspect of Sourozh Diocese as it developed under 
Metropolitan Anthony was its openness and ecumenism. This was in contrast 
to the national-ethnic policy of most other Orthodox churches in the diaspora, 
some of which would actually turn away curious enquirers if they did not 
belong ethnically or at least linguistically to their Church.25 Through the Society 
of St Alban and St Sergius in Oxford, the diocese formed strong links with the 
Anglicans and was involved with other inter-Christian dialogue. With regards to 
the daily life of the diocese, rules concerning dress (such as the obligation for 
women to wear headscarves in church), fasting and other practices were 
relaxed. In the liturgy, there was a downplaying of the formal majestic 
ceremony of episcopal services and, most important of all, the vernacular was 
introduced into certain parts. The requirement of confession before every 
communion was also abrogated. All of this was not unaccompanied by 
controversy both within and without the diocese. Several years before the 
crisis, Metropolitan Antony conceded, ‘Here in London a certain group (not 
very large) reproaches me for “betraying Russian Orthodoxy” and accuses me 
of “building up a church that is not Russian”’.26  
 Over time, the collapse of the Soviet Union was to alter radically the 
ethos created under Metropolitan Anthony, as new migrants flocked into the 
West, and communication opened with the Church inside Russia. The changes 
in the parish and diocese occurred so gradually that even by 1999, a 
parishioner gave an account of a diocese that was little changed from its 
 
24 Report to the Diocesan Conference at Effingham on the Meeting of the Diocesan Assembly, 27.05.79 
25 Bartholomew, Patriarch, ‘Has Christ been divided?’, The Messenger, 08.11.08 
26 ‘Iz lichnoy besedy s mitropolitom Antoniem 8 iiunia 2000’, Russkaia Mysl’, 20–26 (July, 2000)  
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earlier incarnation.27 He described the diocese from the perspective of a recent 
Russian émigré and posited it as a counterweight to the increasingly 
‘nationalistic’ and ‘inward-looking’ Church inside Russia. He lauded 
Metropolitan Anthony’s bravery in downplaying the ethnic and ‘folk cultural’ 
link of Orthodoxy and instead emphasising its universality, ‘In order to 
proclaim the very universality of Orthodoxy, its openness to all peoples and 
cultures, it was necessary to weaken or at least downplay the established and 
much-cherished link between Russian Orthodox tradition and Russian culture, 
and this was made one of the most creative operating principles in the Diocese 
of Sourozh.’28 
Perhaps more controversially, one might add that in the 1990s, the 
Church inside Russia was only just emerging from its long dark night and as 
such there were neither the resources nor the appetite to consolidate diaspora 
parishes. The Church instead struggled to enchurch vast numbers of people on 
its own soil. Moreover, Yeltsin’s government, although very quickly allowing 
the Church to reclaim property and annulling anti-religious discrimination, was 
not aligned with it in the same way that it gradually became under Putin. In 
addition, the Church at home was facing a plethora of new and unforeseen 
battles, as large numbers of foreign missionaries entered the country along 
with all the unbridled temptations and chaos of modern free-market 
capitalism. It also had to deal with internal struggles and schisms as ROCOR 
attempted to set up a parallel Church within the country, and previously 
hidden differences between liberals and conservatives started to emerge. All 
of this meant that the 1990s were in effect the calm before the storm in 
 
27 Filonenko, A., ‘The ROC in Twentieth Century Britain: Laity and Openness to the World’, Religion, State & 
Society, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1999)  
28 Ibid., p.63 
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Sourozh, but the world described by the Sourozh parishioner above was rapidly 
coming to an end.  
The collapse of communism brought greater ease of communication 
between the gradually recovering Mother Church and the diaspora. As ethnic 
Russians started to pour into long-isolated parishes in the far abroad, the 
Mother Church started to show renewed interest in these communities. 
Seeking something familiar in the foreign capital, the first port of call for many 
of the new Russian arrivals in London was the cathedral of the Moscow 
Patriarchate in Knightsbridge. As the 1990s progressed it became apparent 
that the large demographic shifts in the diocese were creating tensions 
between recent Russian migrants and many in the existing communities. At the 
millennium, Metropolitan Anthony stated in an interview, ‘I have a very clear 
or rather gloomy feeling that as we enter the third millennium we are entering 
some obscure and complex and, in a certain sense, unwelcome period.’29 
These were prescient words indeed. 
 
The Hilarion Affair (2002)  
The spark that was to cause the underlying tensions in the diocese to flare up 
was the short but intense residency therein of bishop Hilarion Alfeyev from the 
Department of External Church Relations (DECR) in Moscow. Many of the 
themes and conflicting interests of this thesis are encapsulated in the persona 
of Bishop (now Metropolitan) Hilarion Alfeyev. Described by some hardliners in 
Russia as mitropolit zapadnik, he was nevertheless felt by the anti-Moscow 
group to be a conservative. Thus, to liberals he was a traditionalist, and to 
 
29 Russkaia Mysl’, op. cit. 
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conservatives a dangerous liberal.30 The head of the DECR was and is seen by 
secular Western academics and the media as the epitome of the new ‘Russian 
International’ in its desire to counter Western liberal secularism. But 
Metropolitan Hilarion is also one of Russia’s most famous contemporary 
composers, whose music is performed in the great concert houses of the 
world, as well as a master of several ancient languages who completed his PhD 
in ancient Syriac patrology at Oxford in a record two years. He is an intellectual 
whose addresses are delivered in fluent Russian, Lithuanian, German, French, 
English and Greek, and whose books and articles run into the hundreds, yet the 
conservative wing of the Russian Church is wary of him. In truth, the 
polarisation surrounding Metropolitan Hilarion is more revealing of the times 
than of the man himself.  
 Bishop Hilarion’s presence in the Sourozh Diocese was as a result of a 
direct request from Metropolitan Anthony, who was keenly aware of his own 
age and frailty.31 He knew that after his death the diocese would be left with 
two bishops, one of whom, the Anglo-American Bishop Basil Osborne (whom 
many expected to be his successor) did not speak Russian, while the other, the 
Russian Bishop Anatoly, was seventy-two and nearing the end of his active 
tenure. Metropolitan Anthony felt the diocese needed a young and energetic 
Russian bishop/priest who could minister to the new arrivals. He requested 
one of the most talented men in the Russian Church, a man who had also been 
his protégé and spiritual son: the then Father Hilarion Alfeev. Prior to his 
 
30 E.g. inform-religi.ru, ‘Pravoslavnii narod idet 100-tysiachnym krestnym khodom, mitr. Ilarion brataetsia s 
katolikami’,  http://inform-
relig.ru/news/detail.php?month=06&year=2015&ID=10753&sphrase_id=14772283& [Accessed 09.05.20]. Also 
‘Interv’iu ep. Ilariona (Alfeeva) ofitsial’nomu saitu kievo-pecherskoi lavry’, 21.09.03 http://www.kiev-
orthodox.org/site/meetings/239/ [Accessed 09.05.20] 
31 OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Two Statements of Metropolitan Anthony. ‘Father Hilarion … has 
been appointed at my request to our Diocese as a young suffragan bishop’. Also, Letter from Metropolitan 
Anthony asking Moscow to send M.H. to the diocese, patriarcha.ru, 20.11.00. 
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/134490.html [Accessed 09.05.20]. Also Interview 2Ea.  
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arrival in the UK, Father Hilarion was consecrated to the episcopate and there 
is some disagreement at whose behest this was done.32 Bishop Basil Osborne, 
Metropolitan Anthony’s second-in-command in the diocese, attended the 
consecration in Moscow on 14 January 2002.33 During his consecration 
address, the Patriarch spoke at length about the difficulties and challenges of 
being an ‘Orthodox witness in the West’ and of the need to focus particularly 
on the trials and tribulations of the new Russian immigrants.34 The language 
used by the Patriarch was filled with allusions to the ‘Russian World’, but also 
strangely echoed the (in)famous words of Metropolitan Sergius Stragorodsky 
in his ‘submission’ to the Soviet State:35 ‘But give especial attention to those 
countless children of our Church who have found themselves in a strange land 
and for whom the Church remains almost the sole connection which unites 
them to the Motherland. Be for them a Pastor and a Father, Governor and 
Teacher, let their joys be your joys and their sorrows be your sorrows.’36 
 Bishop Hilarion’s 130 days in Sourozh were to reveal all the hidden 
tensions in the diocese.37 The young bishop set out on a tour of all the far-flung 
parishes of Britain and Ireland. Along the way he met with, and listened to the 
 
32 OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Dean, T. and Adrian, Dr S., Reply to Prot P. Scorer's Letter in Response 
to the Petition to Metropolitan Anthony, 22.01 03  
33 Cf. also the email of Bishop Basil to diocesan clergy in Jan 2002, revealing his discontent at the consecration 
of Bishop Hilarion on his return to the UK. ‘However, they did not want to send him to England as a simple 
priest, as he is one of their most suitable bishop candidates. As a result, he was sent here as a vicar bishop of 
Metropolitan Anthony with the condition that from time to time they would give him certain assignments’. 
Online Archive: old.hilarion.ru. old.ilarion.ru 05.05.2019 http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 
25.04.18] 
34 The full texts of both long speeches by the Patriarch and the newly ordained bishop are available in the 
Mospat Archive, ‘Svyateishii Patriarkh Aleksiy II sovershil khirotoniu arkhimandrita Ilariona vo episkopa 
Kerchenskogo’, 11.02.02, https://mospat.ru/archive/2002/02/nr201141/ [Accessed 25.04.18] 
35 ‘The Soviet Union … whose joys and successes are our joys and successes, and our failures are our failures’, 
‘deklaratisa 1927’, pravenc.ru, ‘DEKLARATSIYA’ 1927 g. https://www.pravenc.ru/text/171618.html [Accessed 
14.09.20]  
36 Op.cit. (author’s emphasis)  
37 Alfeev , Metropolitan H., Appeal from Metropolitan Hilation to the Diocese, Jan-02. Online Archive: 
old.hilarion.ru http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 05.0./2019]. Also, Alfeev, Metropolitan H., 
‘Surozhskaia Smuta’, 20.08.02. 
http://hrampm.org/userfiles/library/autors/%5Balfeev_ilarion%5Dsurozhskaya_smuta.pdf [Accessed 05.0.19] 
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grievances of, all parties, but especially attended (as the Patriarch had 
instructed him) to the newly arrived Russians. By the anti-Moscow side, he was 
criticised for visiting the Russian embassy and was labelled an ‘auditor’ and ‘an 
agent of Moscow’, who had come to ‘reclaim the Diocese for the Russian 
State’.38 Even one of the most active and influential lay-members of the pro-
Moscow group related how ‘it was obvious’ that Metropolitan Hilarion was in 
‘constant contact with Moscow’, which had given him clear instructions ‘to sort 
out the Diocese’.39  
 The Department for External Church Relations (DECR) was a constant 
target of the anti-Moscow parishioners, and often the focus of theories of 
western academics in their studies of the ‘Russian World’. Following the victory 
in 1945, the Soviet regime had realised the potential of the Church as a key 
influencer on the international stage. Metropolitan Nikodim of Petrograd was 
sent to London in June of that year, and the DECR was set up the following 
year with the Metropolitan Nikodim as its head. It is now one of the most 
influential synodal departments and acts in close cooperation with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Russian Federation. It has been responsible for 
key documents such as the Social Concept of the ROC (2002) which laid out the 
post-communist Church’s position on important social issues, along with its 
relationship to the state.40 Anti-Moscow commentators have consistently 
drawn attention to the Soviet origins of the DECR,41 but despite its portrayal as 
an arch-conservative think-tank, the DECR has a reputation within the Russian 
 
38 The oft-repeated words ‘auditor from Moscow’ were from the well-known Sourozh priest Sergei Gakkel, 
apparently from a phone conversation with Bishop Hilarion. Cf. ‘Interviu ep. Ilariona Alfeeva ofitsial’nomu saitu 
Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavry’, 21.09.03. http://www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/meetings/239/ op. cit.  
39 Interview 2Eb 
40 ‘The Basis of the Social Concept of the ROC’, mospat.ru. https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/ 
On the DECR, cf. Curanovic, A., ‘The Religious Diplomacy of the Russian Federation’, Report IFRI Centre 
(Brussels, June 2012), p.13, and Leustean, L., Eastern Christianity and the Cold War 1945–91 (London, 2011) 
41 Struve, N., Interview with Vladimir Volynskii, portal-credo.ru, Lenta Novostei, 21.06.06. http://www.portal-
credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=545 [Accessed 09.05.20]  
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Church for ecumenism, innovation and rapprochement, especially with the 
Roman Catholic Church.  
 While Bishop Hilarion was touring the country, Bishop Basil Osborne 
convened a meeting of the diocesan clergy to discuss the crisis with a view to 
‘getting rid of this new bishop’.42 Events took a grimly farcical turn when 
Bishop Hilarion himself turned up at the meeting, having been informed about 
it by one of the attendees. The conflict was now out in the open. After the 
meeting proved a failure for Bishop Basil, he turned to the diocesan council 
which was largely (if not wholly) controlled by the anti-Moscow faction. The 
council issued a statement which was read in Bishop Hilarion’s presence after 
the Sunday liturgy in the London cathedral. It was heavily critical of the Bishop 
Hilarion, alleging that he had stoked up tensions in the diocese and had come 
as an ‘auditor’ from Moscow to bring the diocese back into line. For many, this 
event was a new low in the crisis. A commentator wrote that the sight of the 
newly arrived bishop standing silently while accusations were read out was 
‘reminiscent of the Soviet show trials’.43  
Metropolitan Anthony’s position in the affair appears to have been 
ambiguous. On the one hand he did, at least passively, acquiesce in the 
accusations against his protégé, while at other times he resolutely defended 
Moscow. He often spoke of the loyalty of the Diocese of Korsun (the Moscow 
Patriarchate’s tiny diocese in mainland Europe) to the Moscow Patriarchate in 
Soviet times. He also spoke about the concept of control, a term used so often 
by the anti-Moscow group: ‘Many were then frightened at the thought that 
through the Church, the Soviet government could seize emigration: not 
 
42 Jillions, Fr J., ‘Bishop Hilarion (Alfeyev) in England 2002’,  http://www.ocanews.org/news/Jillions11.7.08.html 
[Accessed 02.04.18] and Interview 1A 
43 Lambouras, M., Letter to Metropolitan Anthony, 06.02. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240. [Accessed 
09.05.18]   
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materially, but spiritually’.44 But he went on to describe how this did not deter 
them in their loyalty to the suffering Mother Church.  
The pro-Moscow group responded to Bishop Hilarion’s difficulties with 
an increasing number of petitions and open letters addressed to Moscow and 
to the clergy of the diocese. They also started to circulate more literature on 
the internet and in printed form. Bishop Hilarion himself, in his later account of 
the crisis, bore witness to the fact that the turmoil was about much more than 
him, being directed at the Russian State and Church ‘which has supposedly 
taken the wrong course in emphasising episcopal power, which supposedly 
Russifies foreign dioceses and which supposedly seeks, via the DECR to “seize” 
the Sourozh diocese (as if this diocese is somehow unrelated to the Russian 
Church), and together with the diocese the whole Russian Diaspora in the 
West’.45 Many of those interviewed for this study (from both the pro- and anti-
Moscow groups) confirmed that Bishop Hilarion had been the catalyst that 
exposed underlying tensions created by Russian immigration,46 and also that 
there did exist (for good or for ill) a desire of the Mother Church to ‘reign in’, 
or rather ‘consolidate’, its diaspora parishes.47 Thus, it is the subtle differences 
between ‘seizure’ versus ‘consolidation’ that colour the analysis of the crisis 
depending on one’s viewpoint. This thesis is an attempt to unpick those 
differences, as well as the misunderstandings that often accompany such 
analysis.  
 On 17 July 2002, Bishop Hilarion was finally transferred from the diocese 
to be the Russian Church’s representative to the EU in Brussels. The crisis 
 
44 Conversation with Parishioners in the Cathedral, 28.11.02. 
http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=151’ [Accessed 09.05.20] 
45 Alfeev, Metropolitan Hilarion., ‘Otvet na zaiavlenie eparkhal’nogo soveta surozhskoi smuti’, 09.97.02 (author 
trans.). Available at cirota.ru, Tema: #14548, 15.08.02.  
46 Interview 1C 
47 Interview 1B 
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continued following his departure. In August 2002, Metropolitan Anthony and 
Bishop Hilarion exchanged intense open letters about their understanding of 
the events, which were published in the Russian newspaper supplement NG 
Religii. 48 There have been questions over Metropolitan Anthony’s authorship 
of this letter, but at any rate he did not publicly disavow it.49 The letter was 
personally critical of Bishop Hilarion, accusing him of financial greed and of 
sowing division as a deliberate move to enable a DECR takeover of the 
diocese.50 Metropolitan Hilarion’s lengthy response largely laid the blame for 
the problems at the feet of a small group of anti-Moscow parishioners and 
clergy centred around Bishop Basil and the diocesan council.51 He countered 
the ‘KGB auditor’ accusations with similar insinuations of his own, alleging that,  
from the moment of his arrival he had felt ‘under surveillance’. He added that 
he felt as if all his conversations were ‘overheard’, recorded and commented 
upon, stating that it felt like being ‘inside a totalitarian sect with very strict 
rules’. Metropolitan Hilarion stressed in several pronouncements that for him 
at least the crisis was not an ethnic one, and his supporters were equally 
divided between English and Russians.52 A particular assessment of the sojourn 
of Bishop Hilarion is worth quoting at length. The interviewee was an active 
member of the pro-Moscow party, and later a member of the parish council. 
Interestingly, he laid emphasis on the developing structures in the diocese as 
partly responsible for events:  
 
48 NG Religii No. 6, 21.08.2002  
49 One interviewee stated, ‘Metropolitan Anthony's letter is genuine. More than that, I myself heard, with my 
own quickly reddening ears, Metropolitan Anthony saying: "when you arrived, you came to me for confession, 
and said: '...and I have POWER'" (the words quoted in the letter were introduced simply: 'you told me'). What? 
Break the secrecy of confession? In order to hit the man you've kept asking to join the diocese for years?’ 
Interview 2Eb 
50 Ibid.   
51 An abridged version of Metropolitan Hilarion’s text was published in NG Religii, 21.08.02. 
http://www.ng.ru/ng_religii/2002-08-21/4_ilarion.html?print=Y [Accessed 28.04.18]  
52 Credo.ru, ‘Interv’iu s episkopom Venskim i Avstriiskim Ilarionom, ‘Bog porugaem ne byvaet’.  
https://credo.press/66398/ [Accessed 30.03.20] 
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Metropolitan Anthony was reported saying in 2002, at the height 
of the crisis over Bishop Hilarion: 'had I been fifteen years younger, I 
would have fought for him'. The leadership of the parish and diocese 
was predominantly Russian-speaking in 1950s and 60s, and 
overwhelmingly English-speaking in the 1990s. He managed to persuade 
the former to accept people very different from themselves (many times 
I heard him mentioning this with pride), but his job was relatively easy, 
as there were few, if any, administrative structures. By the 1990s there 
was a number of these, with people making decisions in the name of 
their bishop, so having a young Oxford-educated, but Moscow-trained 
bishop with his own ideas was threatening the established order. To my 
mind even a fifteen-years younger Metropolitan Anthony would have 
failed.53 
 The petitions, internet blogs and open letters increasingly generated by 
the pro-Moscow group54 were often perceived by the anti-Moscow group as 
‘bad form’ and unsuited to church life.55 It is known that Metropolitan Anthony 
did not welcome this form of activism.56 What was less reported by the 
mainstream media was that the anti-Moscow parishioners also indulged in it to 
a lesser degree. An interviewee recalled how people would hand out leaflets 
calling on women ‘not to wear headscarves’ in church.57 The discontent of the 
 
53 Interview 2Ea 
54 These petition letters are convincing evidence of the great volume of grassroots support for the pro-Moscow 
faction. Cf. Letter to Patriarch Alexei from the Parishioners of Sourozh. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 
[Accessed 28.04.18]. This petition in support of M.H., after the statement from the Ambon, gathered 279 
signatures – a large proportion of the London cathedral churchgoers. Cf. Letter to Patriarch Alexei from the 
Parishioners of Sourozh. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 First petition (in support of M.H., after the 
statement from the Ambon). Cf. also Letter to Metropolitan Kirill (DECR), Petition in Support of M.H. from the 
Parishioners of SS Peter and Paul, Dublin. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [All accessed 28.04.18]   
55 OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Scorer, Prot. P., Open Letter to Adrian Dean  
56 Petrov, S., cirota.ru, Tema: #53307, Soobshchenie: #1908908, ‘Budushee russkogo Pravoslavia za rubezhom’, 
03.07.06. http://www.cirota.ru/forum/view.php?subj=53307&order=desc&pg=10 [Accessed 05.05.19] 
57 Interview 2D  
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pro-Moscow parishioners stemmed in part from their perception of exclusion 
from many of the administrative organs of power in the diocese (such as the 
diocesan and parish councils).58 The vocal role of the laity in the pro-Moscow 
campaign was criticised by the anti-Moscow group, which was paradoxical 
considering the latter’s promotion of the laity in other arenas. An open letter 
from the pro-Moscow group laid out the reasons for the use of petitions and 
noted the long historical tradition in the Church of the laity affirming or 
protesting (even rioting) against the hierarchy, concluding, ‘This popularism is 
still (thanks be to God) with us. We, the people, want our Church. Many of the 
laity now feel shut out of their own Church’.59 It could be noted that the use of 
petitions and direct appeals from the laity to the Patriarch has a peculiarly 
Russian history. When Vera Shevzov wrote her study of Orthodoxy on the eve 
of the Revolution, she used hundreds of similar letters as a principal source.60  
 
Interregnum  
On 8 December 2002, Fr John Marks from the Devon parish published 
his ‘Suggestions from Presbyters for the More Efficient Working of the Sourozh 
Diocese’. The document collated a series of statements by parishioners and 
clergy against the Moscow Patriarchate,61 and contained accusations of 
Russification, politicisation, nationalism, xenophobia and even anti-Semitism. It 
 
58 http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/parish council minutes, 15.01.03 [Accessed 06.05.19]: ‘we are not 
represented on the governing bodies – we have 2/3rds of parishioners but only 5 of 17 seats on parish council.’ 
And also, Sarni, M. and Peregudov, M., ‘Surozhskaia Eparkhia: vzgliad iznutry’, Tserkovnyi Vestnik, Nos. 1–2 
(278–9), 15.01.04. http://www.tserkov.info/numbers/commentary/?ID=828 [Accessed 28.03.20]: ‘Of the 14 
members of the parish council in London there are only three Russians, one Georgian and an English woman 
with Russian roots.’ 
59 OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Thomas, Dr S. and Dean, A., Open Letter, Reply to Prot P. Scorer's 
Letter 22.01.03, Ibid.  
60 Shevzov, V., Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution (Oxford, 2004), p.8  
61 OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Fr John Marks, Suggestions from Presbyters for the More Efficient 
Working of the Sourozh Diocese   
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was published on the portal Orthodox Christian Laity, and despite several 
requests for it to be removed, the website refused to take it down.62 Despite 
all these upheavals, Metropolitan Anthony remained committed to the ethos 
of the diocese as non-ethnic and open to all. One of his last interviews shed a 
light on why he remained so committed to the path of indigenous Orthodoxy.63 
The parish had grown incrementally and very slowly, with decades of labour 
and commitment. To see this life’s work start to crumble at the end of his long 
life must have been a hard and tragic cross to bear.  
 On 4 August 2003, Metropolitan Anthony died. He had overseen the 
London parish for over fifty years, and many could not imagine how parish life 
would continue without him. It seems that with Metropolitan Anthony’s death 
there was a brief lull in conflict, at least on the surface. In the words of the 
Commission of Inquiry which was sent by Moscow at the end of the crisis, 
‘Witnesses call the period between July 2002 and December 2005 relatively 
calm. All the witnesses noted that Metropolitan Anthony's funeral was an 
extremely significant event for the Diocese, which spiritually united all its 
members.’64 However, it seems there was also at that time an attempt by the 
supporters of Moscow to create a separate stavropegic parish ‘out of despair 
from being heard’, it was claimed.65 After Metropolitan Anthony’s death 
Moscow would not confirm Bishop Basil as the new ruling bishop. Instead, he 
was named ‘temporary administrator’ of diocese, pending the appointment of 
a new bishop. This situation disempowered the anti-Moscow group who had 
proposed Bishop Basil’s appointment through the diocesan council. It also gave 
 
62 OCL Archive. Letters to Editor, 19.12.02  
63 Interview with Metropolitan Anthony, Tserkovnyi Vestnik, No. 23 (Dec, 2002)   
64 The Commission of Enquiry into the Sourozh Crisis, published in full in English: http://www.interfax-
religion.com/?act=documents&div=90 [Accessed 05.05.19] 
65 Letter of Metropolitan Kirill to Sourozh Parishioners, 01.01.04. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/care/?ID=2 
[Accessed 07.04.20]    .  
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hope to the pro-Moscow parishioners who increasingly gathered around 
Bishop Anatoly and the parish in Manchester. Yet in 2005, Bishop Basil was still 
writing positively about the new arrivals from abroad and the changes in the 
parish, stating that, ‘attendance on a Sunday has probably quadrupled’ and 
that ‘[the diocese] has been strengthened by the influx of new immigrants’.66  
 
The Road to Schism (2005–2006)  
In 2005, Father Andre Teterin arrived in the diocese from Russia with the 
intention of providing pastoral care to the new Russophone parishioners. As 
with other incoming Russian clergy before him, his sojourn was at the request 
of the diocese, as he was known to be multilingual and intellectual.67 On 3 
December 2005, he gave a talk in the cathedral to the Russian Christian 
Movement.68 This was to be the catalyst of the final denouement.  
The talk was given in Russian and Fr Andrei later admitted that, because 
of this, he perhaps spoke ‘more freely’ than normal. The Russian Christian 
Movement had ecumenical connections and was suspicious in the eyes of 
conservatives, not least for the absence of the word ‘Orthodox’ in its name. Fr 
Andrei would have been aware of his audience and he took the opportunity to 
criticise various practices in the diocese and the perceived exaggerated focus 
on Metropolitan Anthony. He followed the talk up with a letter to a Russian 
 
66 Osborne, Bishop B., ‘Twenty Five Years and One Hundred Issues’, Sourozh Journal, Issue 100, 05.05  
67 Letter from Bishop Basil to Metropolitan Kirill (DECR), requesting Fr Andre Teterin be sent to the diocese as 
an ‘ideal candidate’, 22.12.03. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/134490.html [Accessed 05.05.19] 
68 Teterin, A., ‘“Sobornost’”: konferentsia ‘Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia v Velikobritanii”’ (tekst 
raspechaten s audiopici), 03.12.05. http://sourozh.tserkov.info/sobornost/?ID=7 [Accessed 26.03.20]  
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website which, if anything, was even more critical, attacking the way the 
services were performed.69  
Bishop Basil responded by imposing a ban on Fr Andrei and forbade him 
even to enter the cathedral until he had repented. In response, Fr Andrei 
wrote to the Patriarch and the Russian Ambassador in London, while his 
supporters organised petitions and open letters.70 On 26 December, Fr Andrei 
made a short visit to Moscow to meet with the DECR; he came back (in the 
words of Bishop Basil in his interview with the BBC) ‘in high spirits’.71 He 
agreed to apologise if he would then be reinstated. There followed another 
campaign of letters and petitions from his supporters among the pro-Moscow 
group.72 At the Sunday liturgy on 1 January 2006, Fr Andrei was finally back in 
the cathedral. Bishop Basil announced the lifting of the ban and cries of ‘We’ve 
won!’ were heard in Russian coming from the congregation.73 Fr Andrei 
thanked his supporters from the microphone.  
After this episode, several of the anti-Moscow clergy wrote an open 
letter to Bishop Basil stating, ‘we are outraged by his [Fr Andre’s] attempt to 
involve the Russian Ambassador who, as the representative of a foreign power 
has no jurisdiction in this country.’74 In addition, some people in the Russian 
Christian Movement in Great Britain also issued an open letter attacking Fr 
 
69 https://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/print [Accessed 26.03.20]. Cf. Collection of letters and texts relating 
to the events around Fr Andre Teterin: http://yakov.works/spravki/5_russia_ukaz/21_ru_bio/Teterin.htm 
[Accessed 26.03.20]  
70 ‘Pis’mo prikhozhan sobora v sviazi s otstranieniem prot. Andreia Teterina ot sluzhenia’, Open Letter with 209 
signatures, 13.12.05. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sobornost/?ID=12 [Accessed 07.04.20]  
71 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Transcript of Bishop Basil interview on the BBC, ‘Vera i Vek’  
72 Open Letter with 200 signatures Cirota.ru. Tema: #53307, Soobshchenie: #1875888, ‘Budushee russkogo 
Pravoslavia za rubezhom’, 20.02.06., [Accessed 05.05.19] 
73 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Bishop Basil Osborne, Open Letter to the Members of the Diocese 
of Sourozh, 16.05.06  
74 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Letter from the Deans of the Diocese of Sourozh to Bishop Basil of 
Sergievo, 01.01.06. Two Letters from the Clergy of Sourozh Diocese to Bishop Basil of Sergievo. 
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Andre’s speech.75 The letter criticised Fr Andre’s ‘Soviet mentality’ (‘the desire 
for the authoritarian control of everyone and everything’) and claimed that he 
misunderstood the term sobornost’, which they stated was much wider and 
more philosophical than he had assumed.76 The letter also noted that Fr 
Andrei's written statement to the parish council was full of ‘false accusations in 
the Spirit of the Soviet Era’ and that his speech represented in effect ‘a call to 
schism’. It claimed, ‘The very vocabulary … suggests that its author relies on 
the intervention of non-church authorities’77. It also pointed out that he had 
called on the Russian Ambassador to intervene with the leadership of Sourozh 
and to ‘unite the diaspora’. Fr Andre’s use of politicised language was also 
critiqued, citing his description of Sourozh as an ‘island of Russianness in the 
capitalist world’.  
At the end of the crisis in June 2006, Fr Andrei penned a long open letter 
about the events, in which he stated that he was ‘getting ready to leave for 
Russia. With joy and thanksgiving to God!’ He went on to criticise the diocese 
in strong language, speaking of ‘the transformation of Surozh from the school 
of Christian love, and one of the centres of the Orthodox preaching, into a 
totalitarian sect with a personality cult, a ban on freedom of speech, cultivated 
by a consciousness of imaginary exceptionalism.’ He concluded that, ‘With 
difficulty and mistakes, the Russian Church is rising from slumber and moving 
forward – but Sourozh is rotting’.78 
 Tensions between Fr Andrei Teterin and Bishop Basil continued, and in 
March Bishop Basil excluded six pro-Moscow members from the parish council. 
 
75 ‘Otkrytoe pis'mo Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia v Velikobritanii’. 
http://www.religare.ru/2_25805_1_21.html 07/02/2006 [Accessed 28.09.19] 
76 For a longer analysis of how sobornost’ related to the ecclesiological debate in Sourozh, see Chapter 5.  
77 Otkrytoe pis'mo’ op.cit.  
78 Op. cit. http://yakov.works/spravki/5_russia_ukaz/21_ru_bio/Teterin.htm [Accessed 17.09.20].Cf also 
Interview 1A, “[the Deanery] is like a little sect.” 
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This last action was extremely controversial and far from relieving the tension 
only served to increase it. Throughout Great Lent 2006 (6 March–23 April), 
many petitions and open letters were organised by the pro-Moscow group, 
now calling themselves the ‘Laity Initiative’. There were even strikes, as pro-
Moscow parishioners declared ‘a withdrawal of labour’ during Holy Week.79 In 
any case, many of the most pro-Moscow parishioners had already ceased to 
worship in the cathedral, instead preferring to travel to the stavropegic parish 
in Manchester where Bishop Anatoly served.80 The question of loyalty to the 
Motherland was raised in many open letters, one such addressed to Bishop 
Basil complained that some of the Russian-speakers themselves ‘were not very 
loyal to the country in which they were born and raised’.81 For Bishop Basil, a 
parting of the ways now seemed inevitable. He did not believe that there could 
be any reconciliation while Moscow was supposedly undermining him.  
On 24 April 2006, Bishop Basil wrote to the Patriarch asking to be 
allowed to move the Sourozh Diocese from under the omophorion of Moscow 
to that of Constantinople (to be under the Parisian Exarchate of the Russian 
Tradition).82 He set out his reasons for coming to his decision, noting the huge 
demographic shifts in the diocese and claiming that the situation was now 
‘unbearable’. He complained that the DECR had interfered in the diocese, 
supporting those elements who were seeking to undermine his authority.83 He 
 
79 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Two Letters from Bishop Basil of Sergievo, Open Letter, 01.05.06 
80 Interview 2Eb 
81 Cirota.ru, Tema: #53307, Soobshchenie: #1995088, 13.04.06. Not all the open letters were from the pro-
Moscow side. E.g. OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Two Letters from the Clergy of Sourozh Diocese to 
Bishop Basil of Sergievo, 06.02.06. The letter was signed by six presbyters. ‘Firstly we are deeply concerned at 
the conduct of Archpriest Andrey Teterin in the London cathedral parish during the past two months in that he 
publicly showed his disrespect for you, the Administrator of the Diocese.’,  
82 The Parisian Exarchate of the Russian Tradition had a complex history and at the time of the Sourozh crisis 
was under the omophorion of Constantinople. Its relationship to Sourozh is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
2.  
83 Mospat.ru, ‘On the situation in the Sourozh diocese Information by the Communication Service of the 
Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations’, 15.05.06  
https://mospat.ru/archive/en/2006/05/31304/ [Accessed 30.04.20]  
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described the non-ethnic policy pursued by Metropolitan Anthony, which he 
claimed was being eroded with direct help from Moscow through financial 
control and control of liturgical language, and he noted that these problems 
were ‘structural and endemic’ within the Moscow Patriarchate.  
On 2 May, Bishop Basil wrote to the Ecumenical Patriarchate asking for 
the diocese to be received into its jurisdiction. He did this without being given 
permission from Moscow. On 5 May, the Patriarch of Moscow wrote to Bishop 
Basil refusing his request, claiming, with some justification, that the move 
would result in further splits within the Orthodox diaspora. He addressed 
Bishop Basil’s implied accusations of Russian nationalism, stating, ‘The history 
of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in America, as well as our 
experience of participation in pan-Orthodox discussion of the problem of the 
diaspora, are clear witness to the absence in our Church of any selfish 
ambitions or nationalist prejudice’.84  
The Patriarch invited Bishop Basil to Moscow for talks. However, when 
he heard of the letter to Constantinople, and of Bishop Basil’s refusal to attend 
a meeting in Moscow, he forcibly retired him as the Administrator of Sourozh. 
Archbishop Innokenty of Korsun was appointed as temporary administrator in 
his place and hastily despatched to the diocese along with a Commission of 
Inquiry whose job it would be to get to the bottom of what had occurred in the 
troublesome provincial diocese.85 
 Bishop Basil then issued backdated ‘letters of release’ from Moscow to 
all the clergy of the diocese. The British media at this time started to pay 
 
84 Ibid.  
85 The diocesan council initially refused to accept the decision of the Patriarch to retire Bishop Basil: ‘We find it 
impossible to accept, as contrary to the Statue of the Diocese of Sourozh the decision of the Patriarch on the 
removal of Bishop Basil …’. Declaration of Members of the Diocesan Council, quoted in Open Letter of Fr 
Raphael Armour. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=43754,  [Accessed 11.06.20]  
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attention to the crisis.86 Bishop Basil appeared in a long interview on BBC Radio 
4 and issued an open letter in which he set out his case as to why he had acted 
as he had.87 He wrote that it was clear that ‘the agenda of the Moscow 
Patriarchate is to make Sourozh conform to their idea of a “normal” diocese 
outside Russia. That is, one which is under the direct control of the DECR’.88 He 
described his difficulties in working with the elderly Russian bishop Anatoly 
and Father Andrey Teterin, who had ‘launched a public attack’ on him and ‘on 
the Diocese itself’.89 He alleged that Fr Andrey was being secretly encouraged 
and backed by Moscow, and also discussed the pro-Moscow group, the Laity 
Initiative and its connections with the Russian State in the form of the Russian 
Ambassador. He complained that, ‘a campaign was now being waged on the 
internet in Russian’ by his opponents and that such people were receiving 
direct support and encouragement from Moscow. He went on to explain his 
actions, ‘The reason, then, that I decided to act was that I could see myself 
being gradually worn down by the pressure of the opposition, which was 
supported by Archbishop Anatoly from within the Diocese and the DECR 
without. At the same time morale among those whom Metropolitan Anthony 
had brought into Orthodoxy and the Russian Church was plummeting day by 
day. The longer I waited, the less would be the chance of successfully releasing 
the followers of Metropolitan Anthony’s vision from the grip of a Patriarchate 
that seemed determined to “bring them under control” and thereby stifle their 
 
86 Cf. Petre, J., The Telegraph, 30.05.06. Mimo, C., The Independent, 18.05.06. Walters, P., Church Times, 
26.05.06. Interview 1C.  
87 OCAD, Selection of Documents uploaded to the Kuraev Forum, Open Letter from Bishop Basil to the 
Members of the Diocese of Sourozh, 16.05.06. Cirota.ru, Tema: #58558, Soobshchenie: #2070221, 18.05.06. 
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. Cf. OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org Docs. Transcript of Recording of Talk by Archbishop Anatoly 
in the London Cathedral, 11.12.05. Cf. also OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Two Letters from the 
Clergy of the Diocese of Sourozh to Bishop Basil of Sergievo. Archpriests John Lee, Benedict Ramsden, 
Alexander Fostiropoulos, also ‘Pis’mo v podderzhku Arkhiepiskopa Kerchenskogo Anatolia’, 10.06.06. 
http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=34,  [Accessed 07.04.20]. Cf. also OCAD. Untitled document 
of the Commission and the Conference, 07.06.06 
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life and activity’.90 Finally, Bishop Basil explained the need for secrecy stating 
that if ‘word had got out’ about his intentions he would have been 
immediately and forcibly retired. 
 The Ecumenical Patriarchate asked Bishop Basil to ‘reapply’ for 
admission, changing the justification for this move to that of Canon 28 of the 
Council of Chalcedon, which he duly did.91 After a meeting of the Synod of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, on 8 June 2006 he and his new jurisdiction were 
accepted into the Ecumenical Patriarchate as part of the of the Parisian 
Exarchate (Russian Tradition).92 The crisis thus entered its final stage in which it 
broadened out into world Orthodoxy and in the process very nearly resulted in 
a major schism between Constantinople and Moscow. In response to 
Constantinople’s acceptance of Bishop Basil, Moscow again issued a summons 
for him to appear before the Holy Synod of the Russian Church to account for 
his actions, and when he did not comply, he was suspended and banned from 
serving. The ban of course had little practical effect as Bishop Basil was no 
longer within the Russian Church. The ecclesiastical and jurisdictional 
wrangling between Moscow and Constantinople was only settled finally in 
Geneva almost a year later, in March 2007, and the property battle was only 
concluded (in favour of Moscow) in April 2009, this last date marking the end 
of the crisis.  
While this power struggle was in progress at the top of the Church, the 
events in the cathedral caused some upheaval and confusion in the provinces. 
Some parishes opted to vote on whether to leave Moscow with Bishop Basil or 
not, while others went with the decision of their priest. As many of these 
 
90 Open letter from Bishop Basil, 26.05.06, op. cit.  
91 Cf. Chapter 2 for a discussion of Canon 28.  
92 Cf. Chapter 2 for a discussion of the Exarchate.  
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parishes were small, close-knit communities, the schism was particularly 
unsettling. Initially, eighteen parishes went to the Exarchate (about two-thirds 
of the total), although some later returned to Moscow.93 In terms of bodies, 
however, the slant was probably in the opposite direction, as new arrivals so 
outnumbered the ‘old guard’ within the London cathedral, by far the biggest 
parish in the diocese.  
A final twist at the time of writing (2019) was the dissolution of the 
Russian Exarchate itself (and with it the Deanery founded by Bishop Basil) by 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate. As a result of this decision, the majority of 
Exarchate parishes again returned to the Moscow Patriarchate, thus closing 
the circle after a long series of splits.94 Subsequent also to these events was 
the momentous schism between Moscow and Constantinople in late 2018 





93 News statement, 27.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=168 [Accessed 07.04.20] 





The Commission of Inquiry 
The Moscow-organised Commission of Enquiry into the crisis was composed of 
clerics of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the Russian 
Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCOR). The work of the commission took place in 
two sessions, one held in Oxford in late May and the other in mid June 2006. 
During these sessions, the commission gathered oral evidence along with 
written submissions to be considered alongside all the legal and official 
documentation. The commission did its best to encourage input from the anti-
Moscow faction, but from the start the composition of the commission’s panel 
was seen as biased in favour of Moscow.95 Despite numerous invitations to 
attend, Bishop Basil refused to meet with the commission and advised his 
supporters to likewise boycott it. A long statement appeared on his (since 
deleted) website conceding the ‘very high level of competence’ of the 
commission’s members but singling out particularly members of the DECR as 
people who ‘might not be impartial in examining complaints against their own 
employer.’96  
Bishop Basil was further ‘puzzled’ by the appointment of Archbishop 
Mark of Berlin, overseer of the ROCOR jurisdictions in western Europe. He was 
concerned that discussions surrounding the imminent reunion of ROCOR and 
Moscow would influence the commission’s findings. Perhaps he was also 
concerned that ROCOR’s conservatism would be a negative influence on the 
investigation. Bishop Basil praised the choice of Bishop Innokenty of Korsun 
(the Moscow Patriarchate diocese in western Europe), but also singled out for 
criticism Father Mikhail Dudko.97 The statement concluded that the 
 
95 Interview 1A, ‘The Russians tend to know what the answer is before they start’  
96 OCAD. Untitled document of the Commission and the Conference, 07.06.06 
97 Ibid. [Fr Mikhail Dudko was the son of Fr Dmitry Dudko, a famous Russian dissident priest who later aligned 
with Russian nationalists. Bishop Basil was aware of Fr Mikhail’s conservative lineage. Fr Dmitry is the subject 
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commission was ‘a missed opportunity’ to ‘hear the voice of the people’,98 but 
in late May the commission began its work, making it clear that this would 
proceed with or without the participation of Bishop Basil and his followers.99  
The commission’s first session was timed to coincide with the diocesan 
conference scheduled for 26–29 May 2006. The commission had been hoping 
to use the diocesan conference to gather testimonies from the anti-Moscow 
group, but the conference was boycotted by Bishop Basil and most of his 
supporters. Some anti-Moscow parishioners (including some of the speakers) 
did attend, while refusing to take part in the inquiry. From all accounts the 
atmosphere was extremely tense, with those in the anti-Moscow group who 
did speak making emotional pleas to the conference to support Bishop Basil. 
Some asked robust questions of Archbishop Innokenty, querying why the 
hierarchy had supported the pro-Moscow group in ‘their lack of proper 
discipline, their violence and their lies’.100 The answer was always the same – 
pleas for ‘love and unity’ – but it was far too late in the day for such general 
appeals to have any effect.101 
 Bishop Innokenty had the unenviable role of mediator. Interestingly, the 
previous year he had published an article in the journal Sourozh in which he 
had praised the multi-ethnic character of the Russian Church, concluding, ‘Thus 
one cannot say that the Russian Church ignores the birth of local Orthodoxy 
and is characterised, as one can hear from time to time, by a new ecclesiology 
founded on national and ethnic principles’.102 Most of those interviewed for 
 
of a recent book in English, The Last Man in Russia: And the Struggle to Save a Dying Nation by Oliver Bullough 
(London, 2013). Such realignments of allegiances have been a common theme in recent Russian history.] 
98 Ibid.  
99 Ibid.  
100 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Sourozh Conference. Innokentii Korsun.  
101 Ibid.  
102 Innokenty of Korsun, Bishop, ‘The Unification of the Russian Orthodox Church in Western Europe’, Sourozh 
Journal, Issue 102, 11.05  
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this study suggested he did as good a job as was possible, with one stating, ‘He 
was just what was needed, he was a born diplomat!’.103 Soon after the 
conference, the Diocesan Assembly and a group of lay supporters wrote a 
letter to the Patriarch that stated bluntly that they did not recognise the 
commission and that ‘even if it were legitimate, its findings can have no real 
validity’.104 The letter claimed that such a body could not be independent. It 
also noted the disregard of the Diocesan Statutes and the lack of leadership 
after the death of Metropolitan Anthony, stating that the diocese had in effect 
‘been abandoned’.105 The authors of the letter admitted that the commission 
had invited their input (‘implored us even’) but that the offer had been 
rejected because of a refusal to answer basic questions. The letter went on to 
describe what was perceived as the commission’s rather chaotic modus 
operandi, with ‘no real understanding of the role of Chairman’.106  
 As participation in the commission from the anti-Moscow group faded 
away completely, several long ‘testimonies’ were posted on Bishop Basil’s 
website by laymen who had no confidence in the commission’s neutrality. 
 The commission’s report was published on 9 September 2006.107 The 
basic findings were as follows:  
• The crisis was the result of a long build-up of tension in the diocese and 
not a purely recent development. 
• Metropolitan Hilarion’s sojourn in the diocese was a catalyst for the 
surfacing of discontent.  
 
103 Interview 1A 
104 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Letter from Parishioners to Patriarch, 30.05.06 
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid.  
107 OCAD. The Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
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• There was no evidence of any desire on the part of Metropolitan 
Anthony at any time to move the diocese out of the Moscow 
Patriarchate, but there was evidence that Bishop Basil and his 
supporters were preparing for this eventuality in 2002.  
• Critical events, according to the commission, ‘concerned only the 
Cathedral in London. There was no tension in other parishes of the 
Diocese’. 
• The ban imposed by Bishop Basil on Fr Andrei Teterin was ‘excessive’ 
and ‘uncanonical’. 
• The DECR did not support one side over the other in the crisis.  
• There was no evidence to support Bishop Basil’s claims, expressed in his 
open letter of 16 May 2006, that it was Moscow’s intention to ‘Russify’ 
the diocese and to seize control of it in line with a Russian nationalist 
agenda. 
• There were many canonical irregularities in the way Bishop Basil had 
issued backdated and uninvited ‘letters of dismissal’ to only some of the 
Sourozh clergy.  
• The timing of Bishop Basil’s decision to take Sourozh Diocese out of the 
control of the Moscow Patriarchate could be linked to the changing 
demographics of the parish council, where recent, pro-Moscow migrants 
would soon outnumber the anti-Moscow group.  
• The commission categorically denied the accusations of Russian 
nationalism on the part of the pro-Moscow faction, citing the testimony 
of numerous witnesses. 
The Commission conceded that its findings were necessarily incomplete as a 




The Property Trial (June 2009)  
The great unresolved issue of the schism was the property of the diocese and 
the battle over this dragged on into 2009. On 5 June 2009, three years after 
the schism, the case finally went to the High Court for a three-day trial. On the 
one side were representatives of Bishop Basil’s Vicariate (the British part of the 
Parisian Exarchate under Constantinople) and on the other, representatives of 
the Sourozh Diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate. Although Bishop Basil and his 
supporters had vacated the cathedral following the schism, they still claimed to 
be its rightful owners, and on 23 June 2007 the diocesan assembly of the 
Vicariate (later Deanery) passed a resolution to this effect. The Vicariate then 
sought a decision from the Charity Commission, but the matter remained 
unresolved. The pro-Moscow claimants then mounted a legal challenge which, 
as we shall see, succeeded on the basis that the Sourozh Diocese still existed 
and continued to worship in the cathedral. Bishop Basil and his supporters 
were deemed to have voluntarily left it and therefore had no claim to pass 
resolutions concerning the trust deeds.  
 Property had played a central role in the crisis, and indeed there was 
much at stake. The value of the parish property alone, excluding the cathedral 
itself, was put at £2.8 million, while the value of the diocesan property was 
estimated at up to another million.108 Ten years on, these valuations have 
increased fourfold. The London cathedral had been bought from the Anglican 
Church by the diocese in 1978 without any funds from Moscow, the money 
being raised from local parishioners and from Orthodox of all jurisdictions in 
the diaspora. 
 
108 Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 11 
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 The case of the claimants (pro-Moscow) was to rest heavily upon the 
interpretation of a technicality in the trust deeds, i.e. whether there could be 
said to have been any real ‘doubt’ as to the ‘continuation and identity of the 
diocese and parish of Sourozh’ following the schism of 2006. The Russian 
cathedral in London had a long pre-history as an embassy church and the 
original parish (as it was, prior to any splits) had been founded in 1919. 
Following the Russian Revolution there were struggles between various émigré 
factions and the new Soviet Union as to the ownership of diaspora real estate. 
This is explored in the following chapter but explains the reason why many 
diaspora parishes were keen to regularise their status at that time. It was 
assumed that church governance and jurisdictional matters remained under 
Church (canon) law, whilst the legal institution of the parish was principally ‘to 
regulate in financial matters’.109 
In the 1920s, the Russian Church in the diaspora experienced multiple 
schisms between the Moscow Patriarchate, the Synodal Church (later ROCOR) 
and the Parisian Exarchate, which was also called the Evlogian Exarchate after 
its founder, Evlogy Giorgievsky (1868–1946).110 It is the Evlogian parish that 
concerns us here. Throughout its history the Evlogian Exarchate moved several 
times between Moscow and Constantinople, and this is discussed in more 
detail in the following chapter. At the time that the original parish trust deed 
was approved on 20 July 1944, the parish was under the jurisdiction of 
Constantinople. On 4 October 1946, the parish voted unanimously to move 
back to the Moscow Patriarchate.111 No one doubted the legality of this move, 
 
109 NA. RG8/292.26 
110 The history of these early schisms is related in the following chapter.  
111 Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 23  
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although Bishop Basil noted during the crisis that it had been against the 
Church canons.  
 On 13 May 2002, at the height of the Hilarion affair, an attempt was 
made by members of the diocesan council to modify the cathedral’s property 
trust deed, to enable ‘property to be removed from the control of the parish 
council and handed over to the exclusive competence of unelected members 
of the committee of Trustees of the Parish’.112 Metropolitan Hilarion wrote in 
his memoirs:  
The ownership document was reissued so that the board of trustees 
ceased to be accountable to the parish council and could independently 
make all decisions regarding the use and sale of church property. Thus, 
the board of trustees, which consists exclusively of the British and 
friends of Fr. Alexander Fostiropoulos [one of the main opponents of the 
Moscow Patriarchate], prepared the ground for all real estate to be left 
to them in case of transfer to another jurisdiction.113  
There had been several rumours of attempts to make changes to the property 
protocols of the diocese, and open letters had been written concerning this.114  
In fact, all such attempts were unsuccessful, but they highlighted the 
long-term goals (or fears) of the anti-Moscow group. Following the schism in 
2006, a vote was taken by the acting diocesan assembly (of the Vicariate) 
stating that it was the sole legitimate successor of the Diocese of Metropolitan 
Anthony (Sourozh).115 It was unanimously passed. Attempts to convene full 
 
112 Cf. Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 2, 24.04.09: 11:00–12:00. ‘It was an attempt by Bishop Basil or those 
associated with Bishop Basil to give greater power to the trustees.’ 
113 Alfeev, Metropolitan H. Statement, 08.02. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 06.05.19]  
114 OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Letters to the Editor, Update from Adrian and Tanya Dean, 25.01.03. 
Also, interview 1C 
115 Court 56 Trial Recording Trial, Day 2, 24.04.09: 14:00  
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quorum meetings of the parish council and diocesan assembly were repeatedly 
postponed and it was not until May 2007, almost a year after Bishop Basil had 
broken with Moscow, that the diocesan assembly (as constituted on 2 May 
2006) finally convened a meeting that took place on 23 June.116 This meeting 
passed a resolution which stated, ‘For the purposes of the said Trust Deed, the 
Episcopal Vicariate of Orthodox Parishes of Russian Tradition in Great Britain 
and Ireland is the successor to the Diocese of Sourozh’.117 It was this action 
which ultimately provoked the legal challenge from the pro-Moscow 
supporters who continued to worship in the London cathedral.  
In April 2008, the case went before the Attorney General. The 
defendants (the Vicariate under Bishop Basil) indicated that they would rely on 
the decision of the Attorney General to support their position, but the opinion 
expressed by the Attorney General on viewing the resolution and the deeds 
was in favour of the claimants (the Moscow Patriarchate). When the matter 
came to court the following year, the defendants described the Attorney 
General as ‘siding with one side against the other’ and stated that the case 
‘risked compromising the role of the Attorney-General in the protection of 
charities’. They claimed that such a decision was prejudicial, especially where 
‘one party [ie Moscow] has limitless means’.118  
 The claimants focused their attention firstly on the legality of the 
meeting of the diocesan assembly that had passed the resolution and 
secondly, and more importantly, on the legality of the resolution itself (even if 
the meeting which passed it had been validly convened). The necessity of 
calling such a meeting rested on Clause 4 of the parish trust deed, which called 
 
116 News statement, 20.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=170 [Accessed 07.04.20]  
117 Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 7 
118 Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 115 
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for resolution in the event of the creation of a ‘doubt’ as to the continuity 
and/or identity of the parish or diocese.119 The wording was as follows, ‘all 
subsequent occasions upon which any doubt shall or may arise relating to the 
continuity of the life of the Parish and the identity or the body community or 
congregation which shall be entitled to the benefit of this deed’.120  
 When the matter came before the High Court in April 2009, the judge 
agreed to hear the claimant’s evidence relating to Clause 4 of the trust deed on 
the understanding that if this ‘should be in his favour on the questions of 
construction there would be no need to go into that further evidence resulting 
in saving in time and costs’.121 This meant in effect that all, or most, of the 
evidence relating to the build-up to the schism was relegated to a secondary 
role. The purpose of the trial was to decide whether in fact a ‘doubt’ had arisen 
as to the continuity and/or identity of the parish and diocese, and, if not, then 
the resolution of the diocesan council (as convened by the Vicariate) would be 
deemed invalid.  
 This put the defendants in a very awkward position because many times, 
and even in their witness statements, they had conceded that the parish and 
the diocese of Sourozh still existed at the cathedral. In fact, it was plain for all 
to see that a large and flourishing parish of ‘Russian Orthodox Christians’ (in 
the words of the trust deed) continued to exist at the cathedral and in other 
buildings. The defendants then focused on whether there was a doubt in the 
‘identity’ of the parish, in an effort to broaden the remit of the trial, but this 
was also largely unsuccessful. The claimants repeatedly countered to the judge 
that, ‘if a construction approach is adopted’, then ‘there was no reason to be 
 
119 Throughout the trial the reference was constantly to both the parish and diocesan trust deeds, but the two 
were almost identical.  
120 Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 41 
121 Case No. HC07C03107, Court Judgement, Section 93  
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concerned with what has been happening between 2001 and 2006 and 
questions of theology and to what if anything the Russian State has been doing 
…’.122 The claimants proposed that the idea that ‘the niceties of theology’ (can 
women wear headscarves?) can create a doubt as to the identity of the 
congregation resulted in ‘all sorts of problems’ in the creation of legal 
precedent, and this was indeed a route which the judge was not inclined to go 
down.123  
 The judge had seen witness statements about the build-up to the schism 
and was sympathetic to the plight of Bishop Basil’s supporters. He did allow, 
and even encouraged, the defendants to put their case to him, even though 
the claimants refused to cross-examine or engage with this process, deeming it 
irrelevant. At this point the hearings did broaden out into the wider issues of 
Russian nationalism and the related topics discussed in this study. The 
defendants claimed they had been ‘constructively dismissed’ by the pro-
Moscow ‘cuckoos’.124 There had been, it was stated, a Russian ‘invasion’ into 
the parish and moreover, Clause 4 of the original trust deed had been drawn 
up precisely with such a problem in mind.125 The defendants claimed that there 
had always been unease about the possibility of ‘a Moscow takeover’ and that 
the reference to doubt arising in the identity of the parish had been 
deliberately inserted in anticipation of such an event.126 The defendants 
concluded, in language now familiar to the reader, ‘The reasons for the dispute 
are because there were campaigns which were in favour of the will of the what 
 
122 Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 10:00–11:00 
123 Ibid.  
124 Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 12:00–13:00 
125 Ibid.  
126 Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 15:00–16:00. Defendants: ‘[Clause 4] is obviously drafted with a 
view to expecting trouble. It is not a very ordinary clause to find in a parish deed. And trouble is exactly what 
this unfortunate parish has suffered …[it] must refer to “the very type of trouble” which was to be expected. 
Metropolitan Anthony for a long time was able to maintain autonomy of development from Moscow.’ 
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the Moscow Patriarchate was intent upon, namely the expansion of its 
canonical territory in western Europe … This is part of a movement that is 
going on all over western Europe. And there are huge divisions which are 
building up. It is not a one-off. It is part of a pattern of assertion of power.’127 
Such wider issues were deemed relevant enough for the claimants to feel the 
need to counter them on day three of the trial. They pointed to the repeated 
occasions when Moscow had acquiesced to the wishes of the diocese (for 
instance, in the appointments of clerics from Russia) and concluded that there 
was ‘a complete lack of any evidence that there has been anything along the 
lines of the slightly paranoiac suggestions that Moscow is trying to extend its 
tentacles over the diocese and parish here. There wasn’t any evidence and 
there isn’t any evidence that this was a take-over by Moscow and indeed the 
contrary is the case.’128  
 In the end, such arguments were academic as the judge decided that 
there was in fact no doubt as to the continuation of the parish and diocese and 
hence no reason to trigger the meetings and resolutions. In his own words, 
‘they are at each other’s throats, but the parish is still definable.’129 Whether or 
not this can be considered a fair decision rests to some extent on one’s 
affiliation in the debate. What is without doubt is that the Bishop Basil’s 
supporters did not put forward a particularly compelling case. Firstly, it was 
clear that they had delayed the convention of meetings to pass the resolutions 
which should have been taken immediately after the schism. Secondly, there 
was the confused appeal/response to the Charity Commission and the 
Attorney General. Thirdly, they do not seem to have foreseen the claimants’ 
 
127 Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 12:00–13:00 
128 Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 10:00–11:00 
129 Court 56 Trial Recording, Day 1, 23.04.29: 12:00–13:00  
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reliance on the construction argument [the continuity or not of the 
parish/diocese] and so did not adequately prepare for it.  
In the context of a much-formalised legal argument (the arising of a 
doubt), the arguments concerning Russian nationalism were rejected. The 
judge concluded that the parish worshipping within the diocesan cathedral in 
London in 2007 was the same as the parish that had been there in 2005 (or in 
1944). The supporters of Bishop Basil had in fact left this parish and jurisdiction 
to create another one. It is possible that, in today’s more polarised geopolitical 
world, the judge might have arrived at a different decision. It is hard to know, 
but what is interesting is the subtext of the defendants’ response. It was 
presumed that Russian nationalism and the consequent interference from the 
Motherland was so great as to actually ‘destroy’ the existing parish and to 
create something completely new with little or no identity to that which had 
been there previously. It was a precarious argument as, in order to win, the 
implication would have been that there was doubt as to whether those who 
continued to worship in the cathedral were ‘Russian Orthodox Christians’ [as 
defined in the deeds]. Moreover, it was suggested that such events were 
happening all over the world, not just in the UK. This was largely the argument 
of those who viewed such events as the outcome of the rise of a neo-
Slavophile (nationalist) imperative in the Russian Church and State and its 
movement into the diaspora. This argument will be analysed in Chapters 5 and 
6.  
 It might be presumed that the conclusion of the property trial would 
have put an end to the whole affair. The pro-Moscow side had won in the 
sense that they retained the legal continuity with and the property of the 
Sourozh of old. But the crisis left a bitter taste and regrets that rumble on to 
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this day. Hardliners might have crowed at the demise of Bishop Basil and his 
subsequent laicization,130 but not everyone was triumphant in victory. ‘They 
would do anything to get those people back,’ as a priest on the Moscow side 
said in an interview.131 When Fr Mikhail Dudko of Sourozh spoke at the 
Moscow Congress of Compatriots in 2009, he still emphasised the missionary 
aspect of the diocese along the lines of Metropolitan Anthony, saying, ‘The 
Russian Church is not only a national Church, but a missionary Church, which is 
why the range of its activities abroad is very wide’.132 But the truth was that 
both jurisdictions were now less diverse, and the fact that nationalism 
remained a regular theme of official Sourozh publications shows some unease 
with the situation. An issue of the diocesan journal from 2009 contained an 
article entitled ‘Orthodoxy and Ethnicity’ which related the following 
interesting story concerning Fr Sophrony: 
I might mention what Father Sophrony used to say about nationalism in 
the Church, which divides people, as when people say, ‘Oh, you are a 
different nationality. What are you doing here? This is our church.’ 
Father Sophrony could never become reconciled to such statements. 
Once he was told by a priest, ‘It’s impossible to overcome nationalism in 
our church’, and the thought came into Father Sophrony’s mind at that 
moment, ‘Then salvation is impossible’. In his talks, Father Sophrony 
said, ‘You must know that if you are a nationalist, you believe in 
 
130 Soon after the trial, Bishop Basil decided to marry and was laicised. The Vicariate was subsequently 
transformed into a Deanery.  
131 Interview 1D 
132 ‘V ramkakh III Vsemirnogo kongressa sootechestvennikov sostoyalos' zasedaniye sektsii «Rol' Russkoy 
Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi i drugikh traditsionnykh konfessiy v ukreplenii yedinogo dukhovnogo prostranstva 
Russkogo mira», 02.12.09. https://mospat.ru/ru/2009/12/02/news9603/ [Accessed 17.04.20]  
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superiority over others, and then you are in darkness and Christ is not 
with you.133  
The preceding narrative represents a very concise account of a highly complex 
crisis, with events often happening on a daily basis. It is not intended to be a 
comprehensive account but to serve as a foundation for further exploration 
into the causes of the tensions. For those unfamiliar with the history of the 
Russian Church in the last century, these events now need to be set in context, 
because at least part of the explanation for the tensions lies within that story. 
This will be covered in the next chapter. 
 
133 Sakharov, Hieromonk N., ‘Orthodoxy and Ethnicity’, Sourozh, No. 105, 2009. Another interesting article in 
the same journal proposed that nationalism also affected the British convert and was not solely a Russian 
phenomenon, relating it to the proposals to establish an insular ‘British Orthodox Church’ reflected that. Cf. 
Papavassiliou, Archimandrite V., ‘For the Healing of the Nations’, Sourozh, No. 105, 2009.  
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Chapter 2: The Sourozh Crisis in Context 
 
The Jurisdictional Genesis of Sourozh 
 
To understand fully the complexities involved in the Sourozh crisis, it is 
necessary to be aware of the genesis of the diocese. This entails a detour into 
the jurisdictional fragmentation of the Russian Church following the 
Revolution. It is a story that has been told elsewhere, so the emphasis here is 
upon the peculiarities of the English situation, and on how Church history fed 
into neo-Slavophile thought.  
The various strands of the Russian Idea were explored most creatively in 
the various jurisdictional branches of the Church outside the Soviet Union. 
Religious philosophers from the Evlogian jurisdiction (Skobtsova, Berdiaev, 
Kartashev) explored the Russian Idea with an intense focus on the meaning of 
the diaspora situation.1 In the more conservative Synodal (ROCOR) jurisdiction, 
the Russian Idea was central to the Weltanschauung of the Church, which 
represented history as a titanic struggle between East and West / Good and 
Evil (Ilyin). This attitude hardened in the post-war years, although at the same 
time softening to some extent towards the USA. In the Moscow Patriarchate 
both abroad and, later, at home there was a concentration on the ‘Russian 
character’ as seminal, in the lineage of Dostoevsky. A grasp of the jurisdictional 
framework, and its causes and passions, is therefore central to understanding 
both the crisis itself and the theories concerning it.  
 
1 It is a peculiarity of Russian messianism, or Russian philosophy in general, to use multiple terms whose 
meanings often bleed into each other. Neo-Slavophiles often use such terms as the Russian Idea (popularised 
by Berdiaev), the Russian World, Holy Rus and others, all with subtle differences of emphasis. This is explored 
more deeply in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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 The post-Revolutionary Russian diaspora was not created by one 
monolithic White emigration, but rather represented all the turmoil of the pre-
revolutionary period. As a result of the ideological ruthlessness of the 
Bolsheviks, the range of refugees was broad, from left-wing SRs through liberal 
Kadets to hard-line monarchists. The splits that occurred in the Church outside 
Russia reflected the demographic of their congregations.2 Many of the liberal 
religious intelligentsia gravitated to Paris and London, while the Synodal 
Church was initially based in Karlovac in Serbia. The Evlogian jurisdiction from 
which Sourozh emerged was rather different in style to both the Synodal (and 
later ROCOR) jurisdiction and the Moscow Patriarchate.  
It is necessary to explain how the famous ethos of Sourozh emerged and 
that it was not the solely the creation of Fr Anthony Bloom. In 1921, 
Metropolitan Evlogy (Giorgievsky) had been appointed by Patriarch Tikhon as 
temporary administrator for the Church in Western Europe.3 He fulfilled this 
role as part of the reformed synod of Russian bishops who had gathered in 
Karlovac in Serbia following the White defeat in the Civil War. Patriarch Tikhon 
died in 1925 and a sobor to elect his replacement was not possible in the new 
Soviet State. After this time, Metropolitan Evlogy’s relationship with the 
Karlovac Synod, which had become rather strained, became openly hostile. 
Metropolitan Evlogy favoured a policy of conciliation towards the Church in 
the Motherland, aiming to maintain links wherever possible. The Karlovac 
Synod, however, which was dominated by monarchists, started to condemn 
those who attempted what they considered to be appeasement with the 
Bolsheviks.  
 
2 Cf. Tsypin, Prot. V., Istoria russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi: sinodal’nyi i noveishii period (1700–2005) (Moscow, 
2012), p.749ff 
3 Cf. Ukaz No. 423, 26.03.1921, 
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After Patriarch Tikhon’s death in 1925, the Church was governed by a 
series of locum tenens. When these were imprisoned, so-called ‘acting’ locum 
tenens took their place. In March 1927, Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) of 
Nizhny Novgorod emerged from prison and controversially ‘assumued 
leadership’ of the Church.4 As he was only the acting locum tenens (the 
position being occupied by the imprisoned Metropolitan Peter of Krutitsy), the 
assumption of control was doubly questionable. Moreover, a cloud hung over 
Metropolitan Sergius in the eyes of the (Synodal) Church Abroad and many of 
the faithful due to his (albeit brief) participation in the schismatic Living Church 
(the doomed attempt by the left in the Church to create a ‘Red Church’ 
acceptable to the Soviets).5 Nevertheless, in March 1927, and with the 
permission of the secular authorities, he organised a synod of hand-chosen 
hierarchs over which he presided.  
The schism finally came when, on 29 July 1927, he issued his now 
(in)famous decree declaring the Church’s support for the new Soviet State.6 
More divisively, Sergius’s declaration was followed by a new oath that required 
all parishes within the Motherland and abroad to swear allegiance to the 
Soviet State. Close to one-third of the remaining bishops within the Soviet 
Union issued condemnations or failed to support Metropolitan Sergius in other 
ways. On 5 September 1927, the Bishops’ Council of the Church Abroad 
(Karlovac) resolved to cease administrative contact with the Moscow Church. 
So began the seventy-year struggle between what was to become the Russian 
 
4 On Sergius’s ‘assumption’ of power and subsequent actions, Cf. Regelson, L., Tragedia Russkoi Tserkvi, 
(Moscow 1977, 2017 ed) pp. 46ff. Regelson’s thesis is that many of the problems of the Moscow Patriarchate 
today are a result of Sergius’s secularist approach – the division of the ‘mystical’ from the ‘worldly’ direction of 
the Church.  
5 The Living Church schism is discussed briefly in Chapter 6.  
6 The document contained the famous lines advising the faithful that the ‘joys and sorrows’ of the new Soviet 
State should also be their own. An in-depth discussion of the document can be found here: pravenc.ru, 
‘Deklaratisa’ 1927, http://www.pravenc.ru/text/171618.html [Accessed 15.05.20]  
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Church Abroad (ROCOR) and the Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow 
Patriarchate (ROC – MP).  
Émigré parishes the world over were now thrown into turmoil and 
London was no exception. An open letter of appeal from those opposing 
Metropolitan Evlogy shows how tense the situation had become by 1926 in the 
London parish, which was on the brink of division.7 The document is interesting 
for multiple reasons. Firstly, allusion was made to the intense and difficult 
situation between political factions which up until then the parish had been 
able to contain: ‘In spite of the differences of opinion in political and other 
relations, we were peaceful and united, joined together by our Orthodox 
parish’.8 Secondly, the style of accusations was eerily similar to those seen 
eighty years later during the Sourozh crisis. The appeal claimed that supporters 
of Metropolitan Evlogy were bent on dividing the parish, utilising such 
methods as refusing to donate to the parish collections. Thirdly, criticism was 
levelled at the ‘disrespectful and malevolent’ behaviour of Metropolitan 
Evlogy’s supporters towards the synodal clergy. Fourthly, the letter accused a 
small and determined group of seizing control of power and dividing the 
parish: ‘And now, some parishioners – all in all 11 people … have seized the 
cathedral, divided the parish, changed the property rights … and dictates to us 
with all the power at their disposal”.9 Finally, the letter showed the underlying 
influence of the control of assets as a major driver of tensions. Like the appeals 
of 2006, the letter was signed by ten members of the parish council, who 
called on all parishioners to reject the temptation of smuta i raskol instigated 
by a small group of activists. 
 
7 NA. RG8/292.26 ‘Obrashchenie k’ prikhozhanam’ russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v’ London’ 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
66 
 
In 1927, the parishes under the care of Metropolitan Evlogy in Western 
Europe decided to remain with Moscow and to accept the so-called ‘Sergian 
Compromise’. As a result there were further splits in the diaspora. Although 
Metropolitan Evlogy painstakingly altered the wording of the oath to be 
acceptable to both parties, it was still unacceptable to some in his jurisdiction. 
In London, Fr Basil Timofeev left the Evlogian Diocese for the Synodal 
(Karlovac) Church. Following his decision to remain under Moscow (and 
Sergius), Metropolitan Evlogy was ejected from the Synod of the Church 
Abroad. In 1924, a similar jurisdictional crisis had occurred in the USA, where 
Archbishop Platon (Rozhdestvensky) declared the autocephaly of the North 
American Diocese, also later splitting with both Moscow and ROCOR. 
Metropolitan Evlogy’s ejection by the Synodal Church was the culmination of a 
struggle that had continued throughout the 1920s and which is recounted in 
detail in his memoirs.10  
Metropolitan Evlogy’s continued tenure under Moscow was itself short-
lived because in 1930 tensions flared once again. On 15 February 1930, an 
article appeared in the Soviet press purporting to be an interview with 
Metropolitan Sergius and the synod over which he presided.11 In answer to the 
question, ‘Is it true that there is persecution of religion in the USSR, in 
whatever form it might appear?’, Metropolitan Sergius replied, ‘There is not 
and never has been persecution of religion in the USSR’.12 In answer to a 
question about the huge numbers of churches that had been closed, the 
archbishop was supposed to have replied that this was because the people no 
longer wanted them open. We now know that the interview was a fake and in 
 
10 Evlogy, Mitropolit G., Put’ moei zhizni. https://predanie.ru/evlogiy-geogievskiy-mitropolit/book/74547-put-
moey-zhizni/  
11 Omolenko.com, ‘Interviu s mitropolitom Sergiem Stragorodskim i ego Sinodom’, 15.02.30, 
http://omolenko.com/otstuplenie/stragorod1.htm [Accessed 16.05.20]  
12 Ibid.   
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fact a concoction by Stalin, Molotov and Yaroslavsky, but Sergius did not 
publicly contradict it.13 The publication of this supposed interview, occurring as 
it did in the most tragic years (with the exception perhaps of the Great Terror) 
of the Russian Church, plunged the Evlogian churches into further chaos. 
Metropolitan Evlogy vividly describes in his memoires how priests who 
continued to name Archbishop Sergius in the liturgy suffered abuse, threats 
and even physical violence, the laity accusing them of being ‘commissars’ and 
‘cowards’.14 Despite widespread awareness that Sergius had been under 
impossible pressure to reach some kind of concordat with the Soviet State, the 
opinion of many was that he had not had enough faith in the ultimate 
‘indestructibility of the Church’ and that he should have ‘gone to Golgotha’ 
along with all the other faithful who rejected the Bolsheviks. Metropolitan 
Evlogy himself stopped naming Sergius in the liturgy for fear of causing a riot.15  
In Great Lent of 1930, a huge ecumenical demonstration of sympathy for 
the Russian Church culminated in a pan-denominational event in St Paul’s 
cathedral in London. Metropolitan Evlogy presided at this and was 
subsequently ejected from the Moscow Patriarchate by Metropolitan Sergius. 
However, he did not return to the Karlovac Synod, but instead sought 
canonicity with World Orthodoxy by coming under the omophorion of 
Constantinople, who were ever ready to recognise autocephalous jurisdictions 
in the West. This was a hugely important decision and in many ways the root of 
the 2006 Sourozh crisis. When Metropolitan Evlogy left Moscow for 
Constantinople in 1930, he carried with him most of his parishes, including 
 
13Cf. Kurliandskii, I., ‘Kak Stalin, Yaroslavskii i Molotov v 1930 godu napisali “interviu” Mitropolita Sergiia’, 
15.03.13, http://www.pravmir.ru/kak-stalin-yaroslavskij-i-molotov-v-1930-godu-napisali-intervyu-mitropolita-
sergiya/ An analysis by an expert of the handwriting of Stalin and other Politburo members, in which Stalin’s 
personal and careful amends can be traced. [Accessed 16.05.20] 
14 Op. cit. Evlogy, Mitropolit G., Put’ moei zhizni 
15 Ibid  
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London. Thus in London, from 1930 onwards, many archival records refer to 
the two parishes by the names Evlogian (rather than Patriarchal) and Synodal 
(or Anastassian, after Metropolitan Anastassy Gribanovsky, then head of the 
Synodal Church, or émigré Church). Rather unusually, the two communities in 
London agreed to share the cathedral for use on alternate Sundays. This 
arrangement was to last until the mid-1950s.  
Not all Metropolitan Evlogy’s parishes in Western Europe decided to 
follow him to Constantinople in 1931. Some joined to Karlovac (later ROCOR), 
and a tiny group remained loyal to the (as they saw it) suffering Church in 
Moscow. The newly created Diocese of Korsun (which is the name of the 
Moscow Patriarchate Diocese of Western Europe to this day) was small in size 
– Metropolitan Anthony subsequently recalled it consisting of only about 80 
individuals spread across the whole of western Europe – but included some 
highly respected and influential figures, the most prominent being the talented 
philosopher and theologian Vladimir Lossky. As with Metropolitan Evlogy’s 
exarchate, the group was centred in Paris but remained virtually penniless. 
About his decision to join neither ROCOR nor the Evlogian Exarchate, 
Metropolitan Anthony wrote, ‘we had no illusions whatsoever, we knew that 
Moscow was captive and did not have the freedom to speak or to do what it 
wanted, but under those limited and harsh conditions, beyond what we could 
know, it was true to the faith’.16 Metropolitan Benjamin, who had been 
General Chaplain to the White Forces, also left the Evlogian Exarchate in order 
to remain with Moscow. When questioned about the paradox of a ‘White 
Russian supporting a Red Church’, the archbishop replied, ‘Firstly, the Church is 
not red! Then, even if my mother became a prostitute, I would not renounce 
 
16 Metropolitan Anthony, interview, December 1999. The Foundation of the Three Holy Hierarchs. 
http://iconeorthodoxe.free.fr/en/textes/fondation_en04.html [Accessed 16.05.20] 
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her – and the Russian Church did not become a prostitute, she became a 
martyr!’17  
These complex jurisdictional shifts are important because they 
foreshadow the events in Sourozh in 2006 and reveal the longer-term forces at 
work. Metropolitan Evlogy’s decision to go under the omophorion of 
Constantinople in 1931 was regarded as ‘high treason’ by the Karlovac Synod. 
It was deemed to be especially serious considering the long-standing rivalry of 
the ‘Second Rome’ (Constantinople) with the ‘Third Rome’ (Moscow) and 
Constantinople’s brief but notorious support of the Living Church schism 
against Patriarch Tikhon. Metropolitan Evlogy was declared by some bishops 
‘to have left the Russian Church’ to the point of almost going into schism and 
leaving World Orthodoxy.18 A similar sense of betrayal was felt in 2006, but at 
that time the accusations of denying the Motherland came from pro-Moscow 
supporters.  
Over time, Metropolitan Evlogy himself came to represent the liberal, 
democratic, intellectual wing of the Church in opposition to the peasant, 
aristocratic and monarchist wing (which later became ROCOR). These two 
aspects of the Russian Church had been on a collision course even prior to 
1917 and the subsequent mass emigration.19 In the diaspora, the jurisdiction of 
Metropolitan Evlogy, with its centre on the Rue Daru in Paris, developed a 
reputation for mystical religious philosophy (rather than strict theology) and 
attracted famous names in this field: Nicholas Berdiaev, Sergei Bul’gakov, John 
Meyendorff and Alexander Schmemann. The Evlogian Exarchate was 
ecumenist, fostering relations especially with the Anglican Church through 
 
17 Ibid. The story was also related by Metropolitan Antony in Glenny, M. & Stone, N., The Other Russia 
(London, 1990), p.188 
18 Evlogy, Put’, op. cit., Chapter 23.  
19 Cf. Shevzov, V., Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution (Oxford, 2004), pp.51–3 
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Nicholas Zernov and the Society of St Alban and St Sergius in Oxford. This 
institution came to be viewed with suspicion by the Synodal Church (ROCOR), 
which at various times sought to exercise control over it. In the 1930s, Fr Sergei 
Bul’gakov’s new theology of Sophiology was condemned as heresy by the 
Karlovac Synod, a decision that was subsequently confirmed by other 
Orthodox Church jurisdictions. The struggle between the Rue Daru (as it came 
to be called) and the Karlovac Synod was not only one of theology but 
encompassed deep cultural and political allegiances.20  
At the end of his long life, Metropolitan Evlogy addressed accusations 
that he had drifted towards liberalism from a previous position of conservative 
Russian nationalism. His answer was that the paramount commitment of his 
life was towards ‘the freedom of the Church’ against all political and worldly 
concordats.21 Had he been alive to witness the Sourozh crisis of 2006, one 
wonders whether he would have accepted the accusations of the anti-Moscow 
group that it was precisely the freedom of the Church from worldly interests 






20 For Metropolitan Evlogy, the essence of the problem was that he felt the Synod to have acquired an aura of self-
importance and authority beyond its remit. It was, in his opinion, simply a temporary institution necessitated by tragic 
circumstances. He felt that the real authority of the Motherland had never been abrogated, yet the Synod had proclaimed 
itself the only Russian Church authority in the diaspora. A key moment was when the Synod voted on whether to recognise 
the tenure of Metropolitan Peter of Krutitsy as locum tenens – Metropolitan Evlogy’s response was, ‘they can recognise us 
but we can’t recognise them!’. He wrote later in his memoirs, ‘The Hierarchical Council [of the Synod] had dug a deep and 
impassable pit between us, for it illegally appropriated supreme authority in the Russian Church, capable of modifying and 
even repealing canonical directives of Patriarch Tikhon, and in this way creating our unfortunate church schism.’ Evlogy, 
Put’, op. cit.  
21 Ibid.  
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The Cold War and the Diaspora Church 
At the outbreak of World War II, there were (as there still are) three Church 
jurisdictions of Russian origin in Europe: the Synodal Church, which had broken 
from Moscow in 1926 at the time of the proclamation of Metropolitan Sergius 
and later became the Russian Church Abroad (ROCOR); the Exarchate of 
Metropolitan Evlogy, which had broken from Moscow in 1930 and was under 
Constantinople; and the tiny Diocese of Korsun, the European branch of the 
Moscow Church. World War II and the Soviet victory complicated the situation 
in the diaspora Church still further. Many ethnic Russians now found 
themselves trapped in the West and unable, or unwilling, to return home. 
Among these were thousands of captured Soviet soldiers and citizens who had 
been sent to work as slave labour in Germany and now faced an uncertain 
future upon returning to the Soviet homeland, even though many had fought 
bravely in the Red Army. There were also those who had fought alongside the 
Axis Powers for ideological reasons (Cossacks and members of Vlasov’s Free 
Russian Army) and who had a deep hatred of the Soviet state, as well as the 
many refugees who had simply fled before the advancing Red Army, such as 
ethnic Russians who had settled in Yugoslavia and the Baltic States, and now 
were refugees for a second time.22  
In 1945, in the euphoria of the imminent Soviet victory, Metropolitan 
Evlogy decided to return the Exarchate to the newly established Patriarchate of 
Moscow, but this return was short-lived and the great majority of parishes 
 
22 Cf. Harwood, J., ‘Orthodoxy in Britain 50 Years Ago’, ROCOR Studies (18 April 2010): ‘Many Russian 
Orthodox, however, were not of the old emigration but had come to Britain in the wave of upheavals in 
Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War. These actually outnumbered the old émigrés, though 
they were in decline in the 1960s as many moved to the Americas, and most lived in the industrial Midlands 
and North rather than in London. Almost all of this group adhered to the Russian Church Abroad (whose clergy 
in Germany had often helped them to come to Britain) or to the already-mentioned Polish Orthodox Church. 
They were largely of peasant origin and a surprisingly large number came from the Kiev region.’ 
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voted to return to Constantinople after his death in 1946. The London parish, 
however, decided to remain with Moscow, and this was how the Russian 
Church in the UK became split between the Moscow Patriarchal Church and 
ROCOR. What is important for the purposes of this study is that the London 
parish, though with Moscow by the time of the young Fr Anthony Bloom’s 
arrival, had emerged from the Evlogian Exarchate. As such, its roots and core 
were quite different to those of the Synodal Church or even the ‘mother 
Diocese’ of Korsun which had remained with Moscow in 1931. This is why such 
seemingly distant events were so important to the crisis of 2006. An 
interviewee stated in forthright terms:   
‘The ultimate historical roots of the Sourozh schism lay in the Diaspora 
schism between the minority of Russophobic, liberal, politicized elements in 
the Diaspora (in Europe called Evlogians and based in Paris) and the majority of 
the Diaspora in ROCOR. This schism took place in London in the 1920s, as 
elsewhere in Europe. (Though the roots of this schism lay in turn in the 
liberalism, modernism and fringe Orthodoxy of pro-Revolutionary intellectuals 
and aristocrats in Saint Petersburg before the Revolution. It was these 
individuals who emigrated to Paris after 1917). After 1945 the London 
Evlogians returned to the Patriarchate, but mainly without enthusiasm.’23  
It was to the ‘Evlogian’ Exarchate (intellectual, liberal, open) that Bishop 
Basil claimed he had in fact returned in 2006.  
It was not for the first time that ROCOR and Moscow were sharing a 
church, as this had also been the case during Metropolitan Evlogy’s brief 
tenure under Moscow from 1927 to 1930, but 1945 was not the 1920s. Over 
the next fifty years, the animosity between the Moscow Patriarchate and 
 
23 Interview 1C.  
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ROCOR would reach fever pitch, although an actual canonical schism between 
the two churches was narrowly avoided. 
The Synodal Church, having given open support to the Axis war effort 
and helped with the renovation of parishes in the territories occupied by the 
Germans, suffered a massive blow with the Axis defeat. In addition, wishing to 
show support for the Soviet war effort, the Anglican Church softened its 
attitude towards the Soviet Union and embarked on a propaganda mission on 
behalf of the Moscow Patriarchate. Copies of The Truth About Religion in 
Russia, a book published by the Moscow Patriarchate in English in 1944, were 
circulated in vast numbers to the Anglican Church and exchange visits were 
organised.24 All of this boded ill for the Synodal Church,  in the words of 
Daniela Kalkandjieva, ‘After the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the emigres 
lost control over the debate on Moscow’s canonical jurisdiction and 
authority’.25 As a result of the Moscow Patriarchate’s propaganda drive 
following the 1945 victory, twenty-one Russian hierarchs and 285 parishes 
abroad were ‘reunited’ with the Motherland Church. Daniela Kalkandjieva goes 
as far as to write, ‘The Soviet victory in the war called into question the future 
of the Karlovci-Synod’.26  
The saviour of the Synodal Church proved to be the influx of virulently 
anti-Soviet refugees from Russia and Ukraine. In Bavaria alone there were, 
‘about twenty prelates, hundreds of priests and nearly a million laymen’.27 
From huge refugee camps, such as Fischbek near Hamburg, these people 
spread out to Britain, the USA and Australia, carrying with them the deep 
 
24 Kalkandjieva, D., The Russian Orthodox Church 1917–1948: From Decline to Resurrection (London, 2015), 
p.162ff. 
25 Ibid., p.3  
26 Ibid., p.241 
27 Ibid., p.241  
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hatred of communism and the Soviet State that was to become the hallmark of 
ROCOR in the world of the Cold War28. The Synodal Church was renamed as 
the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCOR) and at the same time ROCOR’s 
anti-Western rhetoric was softened, becoming pro-American as well as anti-
communist.29  
Moscow delegates to the World Council of Churches and other bodies 
consistently supported Soviet foreign policies and the so-called ‘peace 
movement’. An attempt by the Moscow Patriarchate to extend this control 
into the diaspora parishes was less successful, however, with Lucian Leustean 
concluding, ‘Moscow sought to dominate the Russian Diaspora; its delegation 
led by Metropolitan Nikolai went to London in June, to Paris in August, and the 
US in September 1945, failing however to bring these communities under its 
control. Soviet interest in employing the Church in its foreign policy was 
evident through the fact that the church Department of Foreign Affairs which 
was established in 1946 had the largest headcount of all the Patriarchate’s 
departments’.30 The paradoxical point was often made during the Sourozh 
crisis that the grip of the ‘long arm of the Soviet (Russian) State’ was weaker 
under the communists than it became after 1991. One priest noted that 
Sourozh was even further removed from Soviet Moscow’s control than other 
diaspora parishes, due to its insular location.31 
The church at Buckingham Palace Gate to which Father Anthony Bloom 
was sent in 1948 was at that time operating a rota system shared between the 
Synodal Church and the Moscow Patriarchate. As the Cold War deepened, this 
 
28 Cf. Tsypin, Prot. V., Istoria russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi: sinodal’nyi i noveishii period (1700–2005) (Moscow, 
2012), p.772 
29 Tsypin, Prot. V., ibid., p.782 
30 Leustean, l., Eastern Christianity and the Cold War (London, 2011), p.3.  
31 Interview 1C.  
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situation became highly anomalous, but the unusual arrangement continued 
until 1956 when the church was forcibly requisitioned by the British state and 
demolished to make way for an extension to Victoria coach station. The 
ensuing debates are recorded in detail in the archives of Lambeth Palace and 
offer a fascinating insight into politico-religious allegiances in the post-war 
Russian diaspora and the important role of the Anglican Church in the 
negotiations. The documents attest to the role of the Anglican hierarchy in the 
transfer of the large and desirable church in Ennismore Gardens not to ROCOR, 
to whom it had originally been promised, but instead to the Moscow 
Patriarchate. A 21 Sept 1954 letter from one of the negotiators of the deal, Fr 
Waddham, states:  
One of the difficulties of the situation is that the church which would 
have suited their parish very well [Ennismore Gardens] has apparently 
been offered to the Anastasy group [ROCOR]. It will therefore look to the 
outside world as though the good church is being offered to the 
Anastasy group by the Church of England whereas the representatives of 
the Moscow Patriarchate in London are being banished to the City 
where no one lives. This may have rather unfortunate consequences 
especially since we are in good ecclesiastical relations with the 
Patriarchate of Moscow, and the Anastasy group have no ecclesiastical 
status which is recognisable as canonical. What has happened in fact is 
that the better church has been offered to the non-conformists while 
the official church is offered something very inferior.32  
 
32 Lambeth Palace Archives. OC 325 / 1 (1948–56) Council of Foreign Relations. Article 19, Letter from Fr 
Waddham to Hodgins 21.09.54. The letter added, ‘the arrangements at present proposal, if pressed might 
leave a very unfortunate taste in the mouths of these Russians and might have a deleterious effect on the 
relations of the CfE with the Russian Orthodox Church.’ 
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The Anglicans decided to resolve the issue by offering the church at Ennismore 
Gardens to both jurisdictions with the proviso that they share the church on 
alternate Sundays. The offer failed to take into account the depth of mistrust 
that now existed between the two sides. A letter from the Synod to the 
Archbishop of Canterbury on 11 February 1956 stated, ‘the difference between 
the two parties is much deeper now than it was before World War II’.33 
Metropolitan Anthony recalled, ‘I remember I once asked him [the priest of 
ROCOR] personally, “What do you think of me?” He replied, “Since you are an 
honest man, I’ll give you a straight answer. If I wanted to be polite, I would say, 
“You are not a priest.” But I will give you a straight answer: “If you are under 
Moscow, you are a priest of Satan!”’34  
After a spirited public debate, the ROCOR parish decided to give up any 
claim to the church at Ennismore Gardens and therefore was left without any 
church in which to worship. Metropolitan Nikodem, head of the ROCOR parish 
in London, wrote to the Anglican Church authorities, ‘the fact remains that it is 
impossible to ask refugees who even in this country have been subject to a 
campaign of threats and intimidation by agents of the Soviet Government, to 
share a church which owes allegiance to the Patriarch of Moscow.’35  
Conversely, those in Father Anthony Bloom’s Moscow parish did not at 
all see themselves as ‘KGB agents’ but as expressing solidarity with the 
suffering Church in the Motherland. The Church Warden, Dr V. Korenchevsky, 
wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury, ‘We are in this jurisdiction not only for 
 
33 Lambeth Palace Archives. OC 325 / 1 ibid.  
34 Glenny, M. and Stone, N., The Other Russia (London, 1990), p.189 
35 Lambeth Palace Archives. OC 325. Letter from Nikodem to Hodgins, 29.03.56. Cf. also Lambeth Palace 
Archives. OC 325. Letter from Nikodem to Hodgins, 01.03.56. This letter outlines the disappointment felt by 
ROCOR at being ‘gazumped’ by Anthony Bloom. ‘You told me that the CfE has no desire to go into our 
differences, but unfortunately, in spite of this, they exist; perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that 
these differences are so important that they have divided, and may well devastate the whole world; so they 
cannot be brushed aside as trivialities.’ 
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canonical reasons. The Patriarch’s Church in the USSR represents the only 
resisting power to the anti-God Soviet government. This peaceful but 
unbreakable resistance to the Soviet government is a miracle’.36 It was this 
stance that came to dominate the trajectory of the Sourozh Diocese as it 
developed under Metropolitan Anthony, who did not shrink in his criticisms of 
religious persecution in the USSR. His support of the dissident movement and 
his relationship with the anti-Soviet Keston College were also well-known. 
Because of this, Metropolitan Anthony became a hero within the Soviet Union 
to many in the Church, especially within the Orthodox dissident-intellectual 
movement. A commentator, writing at the time of the crisis, stated, ‘It is not 
surprising that the few intellectuals who came to the Church under the 
conditions of the Soviet stagnation were grouped around Sourozh, as around 
their church ideal, and every visit of Metropolitan Anthony (Bloom) to Russia 
became a triumph of "Surozhskoy spirituality"’.37  
As the Cold War progressed and the Moscow Patriarchate increasingly 
became (or was viewed by ROCOR as) a soft-power arm of the Soviet State 
abroad, the opposition of the hierarchy of ROCOR became ever more 
intransigent.38 At the same time, the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) 
started to gradually lose its Russianness, due to enculturation and indigenous 
conversions. As a result, many ethnic Russians left for ROCOR, further adding 
to the jurisdiction’s reputation as ‘a Russian ghetto’.39 To the charges of 
complicity with the Soviets (Sergianism), ROCOR added accusations of 
liberalism, modernism and especially ecumenism, reaching an apogee of 
 
36 Lambeth Palace Archives. Letter from Dr V. Korenchevsky (Church Warden of MP) to Archbishop of 
Canterbury), 29.06.56  
37 Maliutin, A., ‘Surozh ostaetsia sobornym’, 09.06.06. https://credo.press/67626/ [Accessed 03.03.20] 
38 Cf. Psarev, A., ‘Looking Toward Unity: How the Russian Church Abroad Viewed the Patriarchate of Moscow, 
1927–2007’, Greek Orthodox Theological Review 52: 1–4 (2007)     
39 Tsypin, Prot. V., ibid., p778 
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traditionalist and anti-communist opposition to Moscow under the leadership 
of Metropolitan Philaret Voznesensky (1964–85). Under his tenure ROCOR 
broke off relations with almost any Orthodox jurisdiction that recognised the 
Moscow Patriarchate.40  
Over time, this policy led ROCOR into the canonical backwaters as 
almost all of World Orthodoxy was to come to friendly relations with Moscow. 
By the time of Metropolitan Philaret’s death and Mikhail Gorbachev’s election 
as General Secretary of the Communist Party, ROCOR was dangerously 
isolated.41 This aspect of the 2007 reunion between Moscow and ROCOR is 
often overlooked; as the historian Fr Mitrofanov put it, the union was not only 
with the Moscow Patriarchate but ‘with the whole Orthodox world’.42 By 2007, 
ROCOR retained amicable links with only the Jerusalem Patriarchate, the Sinai 
Monastery and a fragile link with the Serbian Church. It was in this 
environment that Metropolitan Philaret penned his three famous ‘Sorrowful 
Epistles’ in condemnation of Moscow (‘Sergianism’), Ecumenism and 
liberalising trends.43 To some in ROCOR, the joining to ‘world Orthodoxy’ was 
not an attractive prospect. It meant not only joining with Metropolitan 
 
40 Cf. Balashov, Fr N., ‘Five Years of the Reunified Russian Church’, 17.05.12. ‘In the past there had been years 
when it seemed impossible to imagine that we would ever be fully reconciled with the Russian Orthodox 
Church Outside of Russia, such was the level of polemics, mutual accusations, and intolerance.’ 
http://www.pravmir.com/five-years-of-the-reunified-russian-church-reflections-of-fr-nikolai-balashov/ 
[Accessed 03.03.20]. Cf, also Interview 1F 
41 Cf. Kallistos., Metropolitan., Interview, 28.07.10: ‘I saw that the Russian Church in Exile was becoming 
increasingly cut off from worldwide Orthodoxy, and that troubled me.’  
https://journeytoorthodoxy.com/2010/07/strange-yet-familiar-my-journey-part-3/ [Accessed 27.03.20] 
42 Cf. Mitrofanov, Prot. G., Tragedia Rossii: zapretnye temy istorii xx veka (SP, 2009)  
43 It would be an interesting thesis to trace the change in language that ROCOR and the émigré church in 
general used in relation to the Motherland. Less and less was the focus on ‘Sergianism’, and more and more on 
liberalising tendencies and theological errors in the Orthodox World in general, which were perceived to have 
‘infected’ the Moscow Patriarchate. As we shall see, this became important because of the developments in 




Anthony’s Sourozh, but in the words of one priest, the problem was that 
‘joining with Moscow meant joining the whole caboodle.’44 
 
ROCOR and Moscow: uniting the two Russias 
A particular event remained at the epicentre of the post-1991 drive for 
continuity with Russia’s past and consolidation of the Russian World – and that 
was the reunification of the two estranged parts of the Russian Church. In 
Chapters 5 and 6 we analyse the reasons for this imperative, but as the 
ROCOR–Moscow union is such an important feature of the backdrop to the 
Sourozh crisis, it is necessary to explore the event in some detail here.  
There can be no doubt that the union was as deeply important to the 
Russian regime as to the Church.45 To secular western academics, the event 
might appear as a footnote in post-Soviet history, yet it was marked with huge 
coverage in the national media. During an interview at the time on Russian TV, 
the then Father Tikhon Shevkunov noted:  
And of course it is a great social event: the consolidation of the 
people, the consolidation of the country. The very possibility that we in 
the present (probably not the best years for Russia), can not only ruin 
and divide but also unite and create our country, including our people 
scattered about the globe – this is undoubtedly not only a religious but a 
social and public event.’46  
 
44 Interview 2G 
45 Cf. Shumilo, V., ‘Putin uskoryayet tempy po prisoyedineniyu RPTSZ ’MP’ Tserkovnykh Vedomostei, 23 (2005) 
46Narochnitskaia, N., ‘Ob’edineniye tserkvei — ob"yedinenie naroda’ (author trans.). Interview reprinted in 
Narochnitskaia, N., Russkii Mir., (SP, 2007)  
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His co-panellist, the neo-Slavophile Russian diplomat Natalia 
Narochnitskaia, added, ‘the reunification of the nation in such a “hypostasis of 
the spirit” [ипостаси духа] is the most important thing and can, perhaps, help 
the consolidation of the national community around the State. It means the 
strengthening of the State.’47 Negotiations between ROCOR and Moscow were 
unfolding at the same time as the Sourozh crisis and in the same interview, Fr 
Tikhon claimed that Bishop Basil’s announcement of his departure to 
Constantinople was deliberately timed to disrupt these negotiations.48 Both 
sides claimed that the Sourozh crisis was actually a ‘sub-plot’ of the greater 
relationship between Moscow and the Russian diaspora (ROCOR).  
 The union of ROCOR with the Moscow Patriarchate is a truly vast topic 
and one that is still awaiting a thorough and dispassionate analysis. More than 
any other event, the Act of Canonical Union was seen by the Putin regime as 
the means by which the trauma of the Revolution would be healed – the ‘two 
Russias’ would finally be reunited and for the State, above all, continuity with 
the pre-revolutionary past would be affirmed. At least, such was the hope. But 
how could the two Russias, which had gone to war with each other on two 
occasions in a most bitter brother-against-brother struggle, ever be united? 
For the state,  with its secular agenda, the unification of the Church 
jurisdictions provided a key to the re-establishment of the national 
consciousness, but in order to achieve this, the huge barrier erected through 
seventy years of enmity would have to be dismantled and for many in the 
Russian Church Abroad this was a step too far.  
 
47Ibid, p.78 (author trans.). Similarly, Patriarch Kirill spoke how in 2007, ‘Everyone felt a great upsurge, a hope 
for the unity of the Russian World’, Tserkov i Vremia, No. 4 (49) (2009) 
48 Ibid. Narochnitskaia. Cf. Interview 1C  
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The paradoxes thrown by the union into daily life of the diaspora can be 
illustrated with just one example out of thousands. In 2015, an issue of Vestnik, 
the church magazine of the German ROCOR diocese, marked seventy years 
since the Soviet victory.49 On the cover was a picture of the memorial service 
at Linz to mark the anniversary of the massacre of Cossacks, who were handed 
over to the Soviets at the end of the war in one of the darker pages of British 
history.50 The Cossacks had fought on the Axis side in a misguided effort to 
liberate their homeland from the atheistic state that they abhorred. Like the 
annual service in New York to commemorate General Vlasov and his Russian 
Liberation Army, this occasion could be described as a traditional ROCOR 
event, attended by monarchists, Cossacks and émigré and local Bavarian 
nobility and veterans. Inside the magazine was an article on the Cossack 
memorial service. A few pages further on was another article about a different 
memorial event, this one marking the seventieth anniversary of the Soviet 
victory in the World War II. The latter event was similarly marked by a 
procession and a speech by Archbishop Mark.  
During World War II, the Synodal Church (ROCOR), then based in Serbia, 
proclaimed support for Hitler’s invasion of 22 June 1941. In Soviet Russia, 
Archbishop (soon to become Patriarch) Sergei was one of the first public 
figures to issue a call to arms to repel the invader from the Motherland, doing 
so on the very day of the invasion, whereas Stalin, reeling from Hitler’s 
betrayal of the Nazi-Soviet pact, would take several weeks to issue his 
proclamation. The two sides of the Russian Church were then in a real sense at 
 
49 Vestnik Germanskoi eparkhii Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi za granitsei, 03.15  
50 The tragedy was described in detail in Count Tolstoy’s The Victims of Yalta (London, 1977), which led to a 
famous libel case between Lord Aldington and Count Tolstoy. The trial itself was the subject of a book by David 
Mitchell, The Cost of a Reputation: Aldington Versus Tolstoy: The Causes, Course and Consequences of the 




war with one another. Thus, the reunion of ROCOR and Moscow was for some 
a highly controversial occasion, accompanied as much by despair in those who 
rejected it as by triumph in those who supported it. The ex-KGB officer and 
anti-Moscow historian Konstantin Preobrazhensky wrote that the union 
signified nothing less than ‘the export of Putin’s “vertical power” beyond the 
borders of Russia, spreading it to the Russian Diaspora.’51 He added that Putin 
would thus receive, ‘bastions of Russian political influence in all the main cities 
of the world’ and that such churches would become recruiting grounds for the 
FSB abroad.52 The motivation of the regime in seeking to reunite the two 
Russias differs widely depending upon one’s convictions. For Vladimir Ilyin, 
writing in the anti-Moscow ROCOR journal Vernost’, the reburial of the White 
general Denikin in Moscow, the desired union of the Church and ‘the surge of 
interest in the Russian Diaspora’ simply confirmed ‘the fact that the present 
government is desperately searching for legitimacy’.53 For Vladimir Ilyin, the 
greatest attempt to found a united Russia came with the sixtieth anniversary 
celebrations of Victory Day, and he pointed out that this could only be a victory 
for those who considered the Soviet State to be their Fatherland, noting that 
Denikin and Ivan Ilyin had been reburied while Stalin and Lenin remain in Red 
Square.  
 In 2006, Fr Grigoriev, a professor at the ROCOR Jordanville monastery, 
levelled an attack on the union that ended with the following words:  
 
51 Preobrazhenskii, K., KGB v russkoi emigratsii, op. cit. (author trans.). Cf. Shramko, A., ‘Russkie idut’ Russkii 
Zhurnal (2007). Preobrazhenskii makes claims for the ‘reclamation’ of diaspora parishes such as Sourozh, ‘The 
very existence in other countries of a certain circle of people who are in some sense “devoted” and interested 
in being connected to the motherland opens up considerable possibilities to influence these countries and 
counteract them. It is understood that the new field of Russian Statehood is being constructed no longer based 
on the communist international, but that the sole suitable means for the formation of foreign agents is 
Orthodoxy connected with Russian tradition.’ (author trans and emphasis.) 
52 Preobrazhenskii, K., KGB v russkoi emigratsii, op. cit. (author trans.)  
53 Cf. Vladimir Ilyin in Vernost’, No. 20 (2005) (author trans.). The reburial of Denikin is discussed in Chapter 5.  
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That is why now, more than ever, they need to acquire the ROCOR by hook 
or by crook, not only to silence ‘the witness that got away’ but to reinforce 
the illusion of direct and legitimate historical continuity of the modern day 
‘Russian Federation’ with traditional pre-revolutionary Russia that ROCOR 
represents to them. This new self-image and vision of the Soviet 
government has naturally been extended to its Moscow Patriarchate 
department. Once the Patriarchate acquires the ROCOR, all questions of its 
legitimacy as the Russian Orthodox Church and the heir to Patriarch Tikhon 
will finally be put to rest.54  
The writer Dimitri Gontscharov compared this ‘whitewash of history’ to the 
Soviet cleansing of history,55 while another commentator, writing again in 
Vernost’, stated, ‘We also cannot see unification with a church in a state which 
still keeps the emblems, signs, names, customs, melodies, statues, legal norms, 
etc., of the accursed communist past. These manifestations … are openly 
allowed and accepted by the Moscow Patriarchate.’56  
The 1990s were characterised by a polarised war of words between ROCOR 
and Moscow, a time when the Moscow Patriarchate started its policy (if it can 
be described as such) of seeking to reclaim all property abroad that had 
previously belonged to the Tsarist state. Two of the most notorious cases 
occurred in Palestine, often a focal point of inter-jurisdictional strife, in which 
ROCOR nuns barricaded themselves inside their monastery. As Moscow grew 
 
54 Grigoriev, Fr. N., ‘ROCA/MP History’, 25.10.2006, http://rocorhistory.blogspot.co.uk/2009/03/rocamp-
history-by-fr-nikita-grigoriev.html [Accessed 27.03.20] 
55 Gontsharov, D., Vernost’, No. 16 (2005). The situation was extremely polarised, and this in itself became 
problematic. For Archpriest Nicholas Dalinkiewicz, who wrote a thoughtful rejoinder to Fr Grigoriev, it was too 
easy to portray the historical situation as black and white and he saw that as a temptation to be avoided. 
Dalinkiewicz, Archpriest N., Response to: Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, The Beacon of Light (Revised) by Fr 
Nikita Grigoriev, 10.01.07, available at saintjonah.org 
http://www.saintjonah.org/articles/beacon_response.htm [Accessed 27.03.20] 
56 Vernost’, No. 14 (2005) 
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in status as the Russian Church, both at home and in the diaspora, ROCOR was 
sinking into marginalisation for the second time. But the disputes between 
ROCOR and Moscow in the diaspora were small compared to those that 
occurred as a result of ROCOR’s opening of a ‘parallel Church’ on Russian soil.57 
In 1990, the Free Russian Orthodox Church was founded with the following 
announcement from ROCOR’s Synod, ‘The free Russian Orthodox parishes 
have opened due to the absolutely paralyzed, unrepentant state of the 
hierarchy and clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate, who have fallen away from 
pure Orthodoxy through the acceptance of the declaration by Metropolitan 
Sergius (who usurped the power of the Church in Russia) in 1927 of loyalty to 
the militantly atheistic communist Soviet power.”58 An exploration of the 
schisms that occurred within Russia and in the diaspora on the road to the 
2007 union are beyond the remit of this study. But the significance of that 
event and its relation to the Diocese of Sourozh were of prime importance59  
Similar fears and motivations were at work in Sourozh in 2006, and of 
particular importance was the perceived role of the Russian state, especially as 
one of the key accusations against Moscow had always been of Sergianism. 
Broadly, the accusations made by ROCOR anti-unionists against Moscow fell 
into three categories:  Sergianism and overly close Church–State [Erastian] 
relations; ecumenism and modernist, liberal practices; and of the canonisation 
 
57 Statement of the ROCOR Synod, 03.2000: ‘We did not try to actively open parishes and foist ourselves on 
them from abroad, but merely “accepted” those Russian people who learned more about the history of the 
Church and its life and yearned for ecclesiastical communion with us.’  
58 ‘Polozhenie o prikhodakh Svobodnoi Rossiyskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, priniatoye Arkhiereiskim Soborom 
Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi Zagranitsei 15 maia 1990 goda’, Pravoslavnaia Rus'. 1990, No. 12, pp.1-2.  
59 An important schism appeared at the turn of the millennium when the aged and frail ROCOR primate 
Metropolitan Vitaly declared that the Moscow Patriarchate was ‘a pseudo-patriarchate with a pseudo-
patriarch at its head …The Moscow Patriarchate has lost Apostolic Succession, which is to say, it has lost the 
Grace of Christ. We have not the slightest intention of taking part in a Bishops’ council, or Sobor, jointly with 
the Moscow Patriarchate.’ Metropolitan Vitaly, ‘Letter to a Priest’, Vertograd-Inform, No. 1 (November 1998), 
p.17 (English edition) 
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of the New Martyrs – in particular the Royal Martys and the Josephite 
martyrs.60  
 Of these three areas, the one where Moscow’s policy had most visibly 
altered was regarding the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia, especially the 
Royal Martyrs. The Moscow Patriarchate started the slow process of the 
canonisation of the New Martyrs in 1992 and even eventually included several 
of those bishops and clergy who had been repressed by the ‘Sergian’ Church.61 
To the wary in ROCOR, this was a cynical exploitation of Russian nationalism, 
and it was also the easiest of ROCOR’s three accusations to counter. 
ROCOR’s accusation of ecumenism and liberalism was directed not only 
at Moscow, but more widely at World Orthodoxy, the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople being far more liberal in attitude than Moscow.62 During the 
1990s, a repositioning of Moscow with regard to the liberal-ecumenical 
currents within Orthodoxy meant that many of ROCOR’s denunciations started 
to ring hollow. In 1970s and 1980s, many dissident Orthodox intellectuals had 
expressed liberal and ecumenical tendencies, much as had their counterparts 
at the turn of the century, but this was always going to be, by its very nature, a 
fringe movement based mostly in the intelligentsia of Moscow and St 
Petersburg. As Russia started again to turn away from the West, so too did the 
Church and a new conservatism, critical of the World Council of Churches and 
reform, spread through the rank and file of the Church. By the end of the 
 
60 Josephites became a generic term for all those who resisted Metropolitan Sergius in the Soviet Union. 
Initially large in number, they were heavily repressed and persecuted to extinction. Cf. Shkarovsky, M., ‘The 
Russian Orthodox Church versus the State: The Josephite Movement, 1927–1940’, Slavic Review (Boston), Vol. 
54, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp.365–84 
61 Kostriukov, A.A., Lektsii po istorii Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–2008 (Moscow, 2018), p.340. Cf. also Interview 2G. 
Some in ROCOR actually criticised the speed with which the canonisations took place.  
62 Interview 2G 
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1990s, the Moscow Patriarchate was one of the most conservative jurisdictions 
within World Orthodoxy, bar ROCOR itself.  
It was the accusation of Sergianism that Moscow found (and finds) most 
difficult to counter, partly because a total rejection of the ‘Sergian 
compromise’ would mean attacking the very foundation on which the current 
Moscow Patriarchate is based. Militants within ROCOR wanted the incumbent 
Patriarchate itself abolished as a fake creation of Stalin and several 
collaborationist bishops. Instead, they argued, there should be a general 
Church Sobor which would be tasked with the election of a new patriarch, 
untainted by KGB affiliation. For these hardliners in ROCOR, nothing less than a 
complete rupture with the past of the Soviet Church would do, and it became 
obvious that a schism in ROCOR was inevitable.  
When the union was finally concluded in 2007, two small but historically 
important communities in the UK left ROCOR, and with it World (Canonical) 
Orthodoxy. These were the Convent of the Annunciation in Willesden and the 
monastery of St Edmund the Martyr in Brookwood, Surrey.63 A paradox of the 
two schisms that occurred in quick succession (in 2006 and 2007) in the 
Moscow and then ROCOR parishes in Britain was that often the same 
accusations were levelled, but for very different reasons. For example, ROCOR 
priests sometimes quoted dissidents with contacts in Keston College, such as Fr 
Gleb Yakunin, who they considered to represent the opposite, liberal end of 
the Church. For the Sourozh-based anti-Moscow group, Moscow – with its 
public stand against LGBT – was to the right of World Orthodoxy; and yet for 
the anti-unionists in ROCOR, Moscow was steeped in ecumenism and 
liberalism. Both sides were united in their dislike of the Putin regime, but again 
 
63 Cf. Interview 2G 
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for different reasons. The position of the anti-unionists in ROCOR was clear: 
the Putin regime was simply the successor to the communist regime and its 
new conversion to the Church was a politically convenient façade. The 
archpriest Mikhail Ardov, writing in the conservative ROCOR journal Nasha 
Strana, criticised the presence of Putin on the ambon at the concelebration 
between the two primates. In his view, a layman – even the Tsar – would never 
normally have assumed such a position and he wrote, ‘The presence of Putin 
was glaring proof that the Lubyanka had finally defeated the last bastion of 
Orthodoxy – ROCOR.’64 Meanwhile, the anti-Moscow liberals abhorred Putin’s 
conservatism and heavy critique of Western liberal values.  
 Fig 1.65 
 The role of Putin was extremely important to the anti-Moscow faction in 
ROCOR, who viewed the whole unification process as a project driven by the 
KGB, or rather, its successor the FSB. Similar accusations were levelled or 
implied during the Sourozh crisis by Moscow’s critics both within and without 
the Church. Even those who accepted that the KGB may have changed in terms 
 
64 Ardov, M., ‘Putin na podpisanii akta: znak torzhestva Lub’ianki’, Nasha Strana, No. 2822 (June 2007) (author 
trans.)  
65 Fig 1.The Reunion of ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate. Source: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vladimir_Putin_Alexey_and_Laurus.jpg. Attribution: Kremlin.ru 
[Accessed 16.05.20]  
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of its ideology (from communism to Russian nationalism) still regarded the 
organisation as essentially anti-Church. The monthly The Shepherd magazine, 
published by the Brookwood monastery, carried many articles critical of Putin 
whom they saw as ‘one of the prime movers in the whole process’.66 ROCOR, in 
their opinion, was being wooed by ‘a misguided Russian nationalism’ which 
‘seemed to have played such a major part in the whole process’.67 The liberal 
press within Russia also noted the importance that Putin placed on the union, 
becoming ever more personally involved in driving it forward.68 It noted the 
many meetings that Putin held in the USA with ROCOR hierarchs and stated 
that these, ‘showed that Vladimir Putin was in fact the initiator of the process 
in 2003 and continues to control it. In stimulating the Church authorities to 
search for a compromise, Putin is literally being reborn in the eyes of Orthodox 
émigrés in the West as the image of the Gosudar – Protector of Orthodoxy’.69 A 
ROCOR priest-monk who later left ROCOR stated in interview that it was, ‘quite 
incredible how much time and energy he did spend on it [the Union], he must 
have been quite worried about the witness of ROCOR.’70 
It was the issue of Russian patriotism, which Putin had captured so well, 
that the anti-unionists found so difficult to counter. In August 2000, the 
Moscow Patriarchate finally canonised the Royal Martyrs along with hundreds 
of other victims of the Bolsheviks. Icons of the Royal Martyrs started 
immediately to appear across Russia and Ukraine in a new outburst of Slavic 
nationalism – and the parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate abroad were no 
exception. The devotion to the murdered Tsar and his family had once been 
one of the defining differences between ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate 
 
66 The Shepherd, July 2007  
67 Ibid.  
68 Nezavisimaia Gazeta, ‘ob’edinitel’ russkogo pravoslavia’, 16.09.05 (author trans.) 
69 Ibid. 
70 Interview 2G 
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parishes, but that difference had disappeared almost overnight. For all the 
messiness of its history, for all its compromises and failures, the Moscow 
Patriarchate could claim at least to have lived and suffered with the Russian 
people under the communist yoke. It was hard for ROCOR to counter this. How 
could small, émigré ROCOR claim to be ‘more Russian’ than the vast and 
reviving Moscow Patriarchate Church within Russia itself? The explosion of 
Church building and renovation occurring in Russia was on an epic and 
seemingly miraculous scale. For tiny ROCOR to dismiss all this seemed 
mistaken to many, and in the end the purist position of the anti-unionists 
started to look increasingly like navel-gazing.  
 What did the union and the build-up to it mean for Sourozh? Of course, 
it meant that the two jurisdictions could now concelebrate and work together 
more constructively. But relations between the two jurisdictions had not 
always been easy, as was displayed by ROCOR’s refusal to share the church at 
Ennismore gardens in the 1950s. For some in ROCOR, Sourozh was still viewed 
with suspicion.71 The worldview expressed in Metropolitan Philaret’s Sorrowful 
Epistles was diametrically opposed to the ethos developed under Metropolitan 
Anthony in London at the same time. How could the two dioceses come 
together, even after the fall of communism? An open letter from 
Archimandrite Alexis in the Brookwood monastery near London expressed 
concern not so much with the Moscow Patriarchate as with Sourozh. It is an 
important document that is worth quoting at length:  
There are a number of points which perhaps pertain only to the situation 
in Britain. Joining with Moscow, with or without autonomy, would put us 
in full communion with the Sourozh Diocese, which in many ways is 
 
71 Interview 2G, ‘There is still animosity between Sourozh and ROCOR in the UK, but it doesn’t seem to be 
based on anything theological’ 
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completely different from other eparchies of the Patriarchate. It is to all 
intents and purposes the creation of the late Metropolitan Antony 
Bloom and thus reflects many of his eccentricities. Its character is 
essentially Evlogian rather than Muscovite; there is a strong anti-
monastic bias among the majority of its clergy and people; feminism in 
various shades is prominent among its intellectuals and Met. Antony 
even came close to endorsing the acceptance of women priests … and in 
general it reflects the most ‘liberal’ trends within ‘Orthodoxy’ … even if 
all other things were equal as regards the Patriarchate as a whole, one 
would not want to be in full communion with Sourozh. Visiting clergy 
from Russia (MP) have often told us that they see it as something like 
the ‘Living Church.72  
In the end, the story of the 2007 union appears to be one of small groups 
attempting to hold back the wheel of history. The statement made by 
Archbishop Mark of Berlin (ROCOR) in 2004 is important in showing how those 
in the diaspora had misunderstood the reality of the situation in Russia: 
The Russian people has made its choice. It has recognized the present 
Russian Orthodox Church in Russia (Moscow Patriarchate) and its 
hierarchy. We must take account of this in spite of possible objections 
from members of the Church Abroad. At the beginning of the 1990s we 
still could not see the processes that were happening in Russia as the 
people there saw them. Life in Russia went by a different path from how 
the émigrés presented it …73  
 
72 Letter of Archimandrite Alexis to Metropolitan Laurus and all faithful children of ROCOR, December 2003. 
http://rocorrefugees.blogspot.co.uk/2010_03_01_archive.html [Accessed 16.05.20] 
73 Archbishop Mark interview, 26.01.04. Author trans.  http://www.russianorthodoxchurch.ws/Novosti-
2003/vlmark_2004.html [Accessed 16.05.20] 
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These words of Archbishop Mark were foreshadowed in an open letter written 
by Solzhenitsyn to ROCOR in 1974. He wrote, ‘The supplanting of the real 
Russian nation with an image of a catacomb church is not what we need today. 
We must not do as I have noticed in some of your publications: we must 
neither ignore, nor avoid through closed-mindedness the resurgent and 
strengthening Orthodoxy in our country. Our task today is much more 
complicated, more complex, but also more joyous than mere solidarity with 
come secret, sinless – but also bodiless – catacomb church"74. The ROCOR 
leadership of the late eighties and early nineties had believed that as soon as 
communism was overthrown, the Russian people would reject the 
compromised Moscow Patriarchate and flock to their jurisdiction, which had 
preserved its ‘crystalline purity’.75 In hindsight, this looks like an error of 
judgement not dissimilar to that made by other dissidents and émigrés. 
Likewise, Solzhenitsyn had enthusiastically expected Russians to reject 
Western capitalism as well as communism and return to Russia’s core spiritual 
values (Orthodoxy, simplicity, the commune, and so on). They had both 
become trapped in a romanticised view of the country they so loved, and as a 
result had drifted out of touch with the day-to-day hopes and fears of the 





74 Solzhenitsyn, A., Open Letter to the Third Council of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad 1974, ROCOR 
Studies Archive. https://www.rocorstudies.org/2012/12/12/letter-to-the-third-council-of-the-russian-
orthodox-church-abroad/ .To counter this, cf. Nun Tatiana, ‘Bestelesny li bezgreshnye katakomby: zapadnye 
publikatsii o pravoslavnom podpol'e v SSSR’, Lesna Convent Archive 
https://www.monasterelesna.org/dokumenty-i-stati/katakomb-cerkov/katakomby/ [Accessed 16.05.20]  
75 Tsypin, Prot. V., op. cit., p.785ff.  
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The Question of Property  
Sourozh was just one diaspora diocese of the Church that had experienced 
arguments over property after the Revolution. The anti-Moscow parishioners 
pointed to many examples in which Moscow had sought to ‘reclaim’ foreign 
parishes at the expense of local wishes. As this was a key accusation from anti-
Moscow groups, it is necessary to understand its genesis in more detail. The 
question of Church property, and its restitution and rightful ownership, has 
been a painful and complex one both within Russia and abroad. In Russia, the 
various post-communist regimes have facilitated the handing back of churches 
as well as, more controversially, land and non-church urban properties.76 In 
most cases, in Russia and abroad, it is the Russian State that facilitates 
ownership of property by handing it over to the Church for lifelong use for 
free. However, because the most recent (2007) law (‘On Transferring the 
Property in Federal Ownership to the Church Institutions’, a development of 
laws of 2002 and 1990) leaves much decision making at the federal level, this 
can mean there is in practice a great discrepancy in outcomes.77 In addition, 
the State can (and by law should) hand over land use for free for the 
construction of new churches.  
This legal situation has created problems between the Church and the 
civil and secular authorities in Russia, the most recent notable case being the 
demolition involved in the construction of the huge church of the new martyrs 
in the grounds of the Sretensky Monastery in Moscow. Such matters became a 
continual source of tension in Russia (and have even been the subject of films 
 
76 Köllner, T., ‘On the Restitution of Property and the Making of “Authentic” Landscapes in Contemporary 
Russia’, Europe Asia Studies (June 2018) 
77 Cf. multiple authors, International Conference on Research Paradigms Transformation in Social Sciences 
Property and Land Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church and State in Russia, Conference Paper (2018) 
Available at https://www.futureacademy.org.uk/  
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and books) because, since regaining its freedom, the Church has been involved 
in a massive building and restoration programme. Since 1989, the number of 
churches has quadrupled from 9,700 to almost 40,000 – a quite staggering 
increase. The Church has been criticised even from within for pouring vast 
sums into ever more grandiose constructions at the expense of social 
projects.78 Such debates are not new: similar criticisms were made in the late 
nineteenth century, when the Church was involved in an even bigger 
expansion.79 For the purposes of this study, it is significant only to note that 
the property battles in the far abroad were not exclusive to the diaspora, but 
represented a core imperative of the Russian Church as she attempted to 
regain property believed to be rightfully hers and to expand her presence on 
the Russian landscape and beyond.  
 Unlike most Orthodox churches, the ROC has a large number of parishes 
beyond the borders of the current Russian Federation, particularly in Ukraine. 
Even today, perhaps as much as half of its property is located abroad. This is of 
course a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire and its successor the 
Soviet Union, and it is also a result of the huge waves of emigration across the 
globe. All of this makes the cross-border property concerns of the Church 
paramount.80  
Leaving aside the question of Church property in the near abroad, which 
is beyond the remit of this study, in general the history of Russian property in 
the diaspora was complicated from 1917 by the sudden collapse of the 
Provisional Government, the ceasefire, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the 
subsequent German defeat in the war. The German government recognised 
 
78 Burgess, J.P., Holy Rus: The Rebirth of Orthodoxy in the New Russia (Yale, 2017), pp.187–9 
79 Shevzov, V., op.cit., p.70  




the Soviet government de facto in the armistice of December 1917 and soon 
after de jure in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Great Britain declared her 
recognition de facto in the Anglo-Russian trade agreement of 16 March 1921; 
Italy did so in a commercial treaty of 7 February 1924. The United States 
recognised the USSR de jure only in 1933. In Britain, the 1923 general election 
produced a hung parliament followed by the formation of the UK’s first Labour 
(minority) government, led by Ramsay MacDonald. He granted Moscow formal 
diplomatic recognition almost immediately upon coming to office on 1 
February 1924.81 The ‘year of recognitions’,82 1924, was a huge blow to the 
White cause in the diaspora.83 In practical terms, it meant that the White 
opposition had to vacate property, such as embassies, and hand it over to the 
new Soviet owners. This created great unease for the émigrés who retained 
their Tsarist-era churches. It was the threat of expropriation by the Soviets 
that, among other reasons, had moved the London congregation in forming a 
proper parish (using the Parish statutes adopted by the Council of 1917-18) in 
1919 - although the funds came from the Omsk government of Gen. Kolchak 
up to its collapse.84 In Paris, by contrast, the pre-revolutionary embassy church 
was viewed by the Soviets as part of state property abroad, and as a result 
they laid claim to it. Fortunately for the émigrés they were able to keep hold of 
it after judicial proceedings, but the Russophile author Stephen Graham 
described how a 24-hour watch was necessary to prevent Soviet agents from 
storming the building.85  
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In London, the Labour government instituted legal proceedings against 
the White Russian chargé d’affairs E.V. Sablin, demanding that Chesham 
House, the Russian embassy building, be handed over to the Soviets.86 The 
period from the Bolshevik coup to diplomatic recognition of the Soviets had 
been one of uncertainty in the British Russian diaspora, with the government 
oscillating between dealing with Litvinov (the Bolshevik representative, the so-
called ‘people’s plenipotentiary’), and with Sablin. As recognitions came 
through, the Bolsheviks tried to take over the assets of the Whites, in London 
as in all other diaspora communities. This is important because in the long view 
of diaspora–Motherland relations, the Bolshevik seizures of the 1920s are seen 
by some as no different to those of more recent times. 
 But where did this leave Russian Church property abroad? The answer is 
not straightforward, for two reasons. Firstly, although in 1924 no part of the 
Russian Church in the diaspora had formally split with Moscow, it soon would 
(1927). Secondly, pre-Revolutionary property ownership was itself complex, 
with some real estate owned directly by the State, some by the Church and 
some privately owned. The cathedral in Paris again provides a useful example. 
The Tsar had given 200,000 francs for its construction, the Holy Synod 200,000 
francs, and 600,000 francs were collected popularly. In this case, the émigrés 
later claimed that none of these donations had been ‘state money’; the reality, 
however, was that even at the time of Alexander III, when the church was 
built, the Tsar’s private finances and the state budget were closely 
intertwined.87  
 
86 Zakharov, Vasilii, No Snow on Their Boots: The First Russian Emigration to Britain (London, 2004), 
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These factors came to prominence once again as the Moscow 
Patriarchate sought to ‘reclaim’ its property in the far abroad post-1991. In 
most cases, this involved legal disputes with either ROCOR or the Evlogian 
Exarchate parishes under Constantinople, or a mixture of these, as well as 
battles with the local secular powers. In the British case, there was no Tsarist-
era church in continued ownership and use by any party, so a property dispute 
with ROCOR could be avoided. In addition, the capital had two cathedrals: one 
for the Church Abroad (in Chiswick) and one for Moscow (in Knightsbridge), 
which Moscow fought to retain and won, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter. In a sense, this was the second occasion in which Moscow had fought 
for the use of the Ennismore Gardens church (and won), the first being the 
previously described post-war wrangling with the Church of England.  
The property reclamations were used by the anti-Moscow group as 
examples to illustrate a policy (if such existed) of Russian state revanchism, in 
which Moscow infiltrated local parishes and agitated for union with her. 
Property concerns were thus linked to accusations of Russian nationalist 
geopolitics, as Sebastian Rimestad noted, ‘All these projects make the 
Patriarchate of Moscow appear intent on achieving dominance in the capitals 
of Western Europe. The intimate link between Russian ethnicity and the 
Orthodox faith also seems to confirm the fear that Moscow influence means 
Russification.’88 The argument, put forward by academics such as Struve and 
Blitt, is that property reclamation is part of the Moscow Patriarchate’s 
deliberate worldwide policy to increase her global presence while at the same 
time diminishing the relevance of rival jurisdictions.89  
 
88 Rimestad, S., ‘The Russian Orthodox Church in Western Europe: One or Many?’, Religion, State and Society, 
43:3 (October, 2015), pp.228–243  
89 Cf. Blitt, ‘Russia’s Orthodox Foreign Policy..’op.cit, pp.415ff 
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Each property battle represents a unique case, of course, but overall 
Moscow’s great investment of time, effort, and money in fighting these is 
without doubt. In very many instances, Moscow came out the winner (as in 
Sourozh), but where that was not possible, a new – and even grander – church 
was sometimes constructed in the same city, to the chagrin of their opponents. 
In Paris, the beautiful Tsarist-era cathedral on the Rue Daru had been under 
the Exarchate since the 1930s, while Moscow for many years worshipped in a 
small suburban church. Moscow never tried to claim ownership of the 
cathedral, but instead built a new and massive complex not far from the Eifel 
Tower. There seems to have been particular animosity in Paris because of the 
importance of the city in the history of the diaspora. In 2011, as plans for the 
new cathedral were being unveiled, the academic Nikitra Struve attacked 
Moscow’s plans in an interview in the Russian press, stating; ‘The state funded 
a new cathedral in Paris … and the state coveted the cathedral in Nice. In pre-
revolutionary Russia, the Church could only dream of freeing the Synod from 
state control. However, in exile, particularly here in France, it was beyond the 
reach of any state control’.90 He went on to accuse the Moscow Patriarchate of 
Erastianism and the now familiar accusation of having ‘a Soviet mentality’. 
Patriarch Kirill made overtures to the Parisian Exarchate, but they were not 
reciprocated and instead, the doors of the Rue Daru cathedral were closed to 
him.  
There were long-lasting property wrangles between the Exarchate and 
Moscow in the south and west of France. The dispute in Nice had started in a 
similar way to that in Sourozh, although with the parties in opposing roles as 
the church at the time was not under the jurisdiction of Moscow. As in 
 
90 Struve, N., ‘”Khristianstvo - ne vlast” RPTs beret Parizh. Chto dumavut ob etom nastuplenii russkikh 
emigrantov? Beseda Ol'gi Allenovoi', Ogonok, No 29 (25.07.11) p. 13 
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Sourozh, demographic changes in the parish after 1991 meant that recent 
émigrés came to outnumber the descendants of the old White aristocracy. 
Many of the new arrivals desired full reunion with the Church in Russia, 
although this was disputed by existing Exarchate clergy who claimed that 
‘flying pickets’ of ‘new Russians’ from neighbouring regions, even Spain, had 
been brought in to ‘pack the parish council’ during voting.91 Similarly again to 
Sourozh, a key parish council member claimed that the ‘takeover’ was ‘part of 
a broader effort to consolidate the authority and legitimacy of the present 
Russian state, an effort close to the heart of President Vladimir V. Putin’.92 The 
Patriarchate of Constantinople also issued a statement saying that Russia, ‘was 
trying to open yet another Embassy [ie the church takeover] in France’.93 When 
the French courts finally decided in favour of Moscow in 2011, there was a 
further wrangle about handing over the keys.94 The matter was not finally 
settled until 2013, when the order was enforced by the French Court of 
Appeal.  
The Nice church had previously been the property of the Tsarist state, 
making the decision relatively straightforward. In Biarritz the case was less 
clear, owing to disputed pre-revolutionary ownership. It is interesting that 
Moscow seemed in public statements to lay claim to the church as the rightful 
owner, arguing, ‘For it should not be forgotten that the Russian church in 
Biarritz was torn away from the Moscow Patriarchate only temporarily, when, 
following in the steps of Metropolitan Evlogy, it stopped its subordination to 
 
91  Tagliabue, J., A Cathedral Resists the Label 'Property of Russia', New York Times, (09.01.08)  
92 Ibid. 
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the Russian Church in 1931’.95 Had this argument prevailed in court, it would 
have called into question all the property rights of the Parisian Exarchate. The 
French courts eventually overturned a decision to move the church to Moscow 
and the church was handed back to the Exarchate. Supporters of Moscow then 
founded their own parish in the town under the omophorion of Moscow’s 
European Diocese of Korsun. The Exarchate complained about this venture but 
there was essentially nothing they could do to stop it.96  
The Exarchate was not alone in coming into conflict with Moscow over 
properties in the far aboard. ROCOR was also in possession of many pre-
revolutionary churches and other properties, and the period leading up to the 
2007 union saw several disputes, with the deepest crises taking place in 
Palestine. The battles between Moscow and ROCOR in Palestine are interesting 
because many of the claims made mirrored those of the Sourozh crisis. There 
were two flashpoints: in 1997 at the convent in Hebron and in 2000 at the 
Metochion of St John the Baptist in Jericho. Several embarrassing incidents 
were used as justifications by the Palestinian government for the transfers to 
Moscow. Patriarch Alexei and his entourage were refused entry to several holy 
sites under the care of ROCOR, which then led to claims about the similar 
treatment experienced by Russian pilgrims to these monasteries on the 
grounds (as in Sourozh) that they were not Russians but people with ‘a Soviet 
mentality’ - ‘new Russians’.97 These claims were vigorously denied by Sister 
Anastasia Stephanopoulos, a ROCOR nun in Jerusalem, who claimed that 
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thousands of pilgrims from the new Russia passed through their sites every 
year. Sister Anastasia was to find herself at the epicentre of another crisis a 
few years later, when she barricaded herself into her convent in Jericho to 
avoid its transfer to Moscow. As she was the sister of one Bill Clinton’s chief 
advisers, the story made international news.98  
At the time of these crises, the ‘new Cold War’ was in its infancy, but the 
statements of Russian commentators were forthright. The head of the 
(refounded) Imperial Palestine Society stated, ‘The Holy Land has always been 
important for the Russian Orthodox people. We want to try to recover as much 
as possible of our properties, and especially to resume our school activities. If 
before we helped just the Orthodox, now we want to help all the Christians in 
the Holy Land and the Middle East and the entire population.’99 ROCOR would 
have found this imperative of Moscow’s difficult to resist, even without the 
secular support of Moscow given by the Palestinian Authority. In 2000, the 
ROCOR Synod issued a statement that ‘these latter days have witnessed a new 
wave of forcible seizures by the Moscow Patriarchate of churches and 
monasteries from ROCOR in various countries – or attempts to seize them – 
with the help of the secular authorities (foreign and Russian), whenever such is 
possible – in Italy, Israel, Germany, Denmark, Canada.’100 Nevertheless, some 
forces within ROCOR continued to pursue a line of dialogue with Moscow in 
Palestine, though this was heavily criticised by some.101 Thus, the accusations 
against Moscow from ROCOR were similar again to the anti-Moscow voices in 
Sourozh. The implication was that the main objective was a mercenary 
 
98 Religionnews.com, ‘West Bank Monastery Dispute Centers on Russian Revolution Split’, 21.03.00, 
https://religionnews.com/2000/03/21/news-feature-west-bank-monastery-dispute-centers-on-russian-
revolution-spli/, [Accessed 11.11.18]  
99 Speech by Sergei Stepashin, President of the Imperial Russian Orrthodox Palestine Society.  
http://en.lpj.org/2014/09/05/the-imperial-russian-orthodox-palestine-society/ [Accessed 11.11.18] 
100 Statement of the Synod of Bishops of ROCOR, Russkii Vestnik, Nos. 3–4 (2000)  
101 ‘Jericho, a second Gorny by consent?’, Church News, Vol. 12, No.3 (85) (March 2000), p.6  
101 
 
property grab by Moscow. A ROCOR priest noted how there was an ukaz put 
out before the union which proclaimed that ‘all properties should belong to 
the Synod’, he noted that this was probably an attempt at ‘gathering in’ real 
estate in preparation for the final act. The ROCOR monastery in Willesden, 
which he served, had a clause in the trust deed stating that they should not be 
in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, which prevented any transfer.102  
ROCOR’s union with Moscow in 2007 resulted in some communities 
breaking off and forming small ‘True Orthodox’ groups in Palestine and 
elsewhere. Bishop Agafangel, of one such splinter group, wrote of the crises in 
Palestine, ‘The government in the Moscow Kremlin, under the guise of the 
“Russian World,” carried out a political seizure of the property of the Russian 
Church Abroad’103 – similar language to that used against Moscow in Sourozh 
and elsewhere. As in the UK, the post-union situation saw ROCOR and Moscow 
working closely together in Palestine, with a huge investment of materials and 
personnel from the Motherland. As in Russia, so also in the UK and Palestine: 
the emphasis was on bricks and mortar, renovation, and new construction – a 
public display of the power of Russia’s resurgent Church.  
 
Constantinople versus Moscow 
We will examine the universalist impulse of the Russian Church in chapters 5 
and 6, but the ROC was not the only Church with such pretensions. 
Constantinople’s universalist claims were of a different nature to Moscow’s, 
but the resulting competitive relationship between the two sees has 
dominated Orthodox ecclesiology for well over two hundred years, or more. 
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The Constantinople/Moscow disputes of the 1990s and 2000s (Estonia 1996 
and Sourozh 2006) now appear as the precursors of the much bigger Ukrainian 
crisis of 2018 and ongoing. In many respects, the battlelines drawn in Ukraine, 
Surozh and Estonia were similar, with churches having become entangled as 
arenas of the global culture wars. Although each crisis and each property battle 
were unique, with their own ethnic-linguistic and historical issues, the hidden 
tensions were often the same or similar. Thus, some commentators placed the 
rivalry between Constantinople and Moscow at the epicentre of the crisis, 
claiming that this was the real cause and driver of the events.104 Both 
jurisdictions could be said to be the victims of what might be called ‘the 
globalisation of polarity’. In this schema, to be ‘for Constantinople’, implied to 
be for progressive, western, liberal Orthodoxy, while to be ‘for Moscow’ 
implied the opposite. In Sourozh, as in Estonia and other areas, churches 
divided along such lines.  
Both sides looked deep into history to bolster their claims and Bishop 
Basil and others made frequent reference to both the early ecumenical 
councils and the Church Fathers. As a result, some knowledge of the history of 
this rivalry is essential if one is to understand the crisis in broader terms. For 
the past five hundred years, Moscow’s claims to dominance in World 
Orthodoxy have been countered by Constantinople’s ancient claims as ‘first 
among equals’, viewed by the sceptical as an ongoing attempt to construct a 
kind of Eastern Papacy – a claim virulently rejected by Constantinople.105 The 
radical reduction in actual jurisdictional territory of Constantinople over the 
last century has been accompanied by claims (which remain disputed by other 
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jurisdictions) to be the leader of the whole Orthodox Church, with the unique 
ability to grant autocephaly and call councils, and with an authority that 
traverses jurisdictional boundaries: ‘As Archbishop of Constantinople-New 
Rome, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew occupies the First Throne of the 
worldwide Orthodox Christian Church … Transcending national and ethnic 
borders, the Ecumenical Patriarch is spiritual leader to 300 million Orthodox 
Christians worldwide.’106  
Much of Constantinople’s claims to primacy derives from Canon 3 of the 
Second Ecumenical Council (Constantinople 381): ‘Because it is new Rome, the 
bishop of Constantinople is to enjoy the privileges of honour after the bishop 
of Rome.’107 They derive also from Canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon in 451 
(an insertion that was rejected by the Pope of the time, Leo I), which sought to 
elevate the see of Constantinople to second only to Rome because of her 
imperial status: ‘reasonably judging that the city which is honoured by the 
imperial power and senate and enjoying privileges equalling older imperial 
Rome, should also be elevated to her level in ecclesiastical affairs and take 
second place after her.’108 In the words of Archdeacon John Chryssavgis, the 
worldwide promoter of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, both these canons, ‘cast 
the die for Constantinople to inherit by default the role of leadership after the 
Schism of 1054’.109  
No Orthodox jurisdictions, even today, cast doubt on the primacy of 
Rome in terms of status and importance, though not of jurisdiction, in the first 
 
106 Patriarchate.org, ‘Bartholomew: Archbishop of Constantinople-New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch’, 
https://www.patriarchate.org/-/e-a-th-panagiotes-o-oikoumenikos-patriarches-k-k-bartholomaios [Accessed 
16.05.20] 
107 Canon 3, 1st Council of Constantinople. https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum02.htm [Accessed 
16.05.20] 
108 Council of Chalcedon – 451 A.D, https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum04.htm [Accessed 
16.05.20] 
109 Chryssavgis, op.cit. p.148 
104 
 
millennium.110 The (albeit controversial) Ravenna Document of 2007, issued as 
a joint statement between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches, stated plainly 
that, ‘the bishop of Rome was therefore the protos among the patriarchs’.111 
From the Orthodox side, the Ravenna Document was largely the work of 
Constantinople and sought to subtly elevate that see above all others, which 
was controversial for many national churches. During discussions at draft 
stage, a Russian delegation headed by Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev objected to 
the implication in Section 39 that an Orthodox Ecumenical Council would be 
represented by those churches ‘in communion with the See of 
Constantinople’.112 In practical terms, at time of writing (2019), this would put 
the Russian Church outside the Orthodox Communion.  
 The ecclesiological path taken by Constantinople has been heavily 
connected to the collapse of the Greek world in the Levant over the last 
century. It is difficult today to appreciate fully the seismic shifts in populations 
that occurred throughout the Ottoman Empire (and indeed Europe as a whole, 
especially in the east) in the aftermath of the First World War. The census of 
1885 shows that Constantinople (as it was still largely called at the time) was 
then a majority Christian town. Even after the World War II, the population of 
the city had a significant Greek Christian minority, which was only finally lost in 
the emigration following the 1955 anti-Christian pogroms. The Greek Christian 
population of the city is now just some two thousand in comparison to some 
fifteen million Muslims. This dramatic change, which happened within living 
memory, has had a traumatic impact on the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an 
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institution. As its own direct territory (or rather subjects) has decreased, it has 
sought out new lands across the globe to maintain its status and fragile base in 
Istanbul. On 1 March 1922, Constantinople made formal her claims to the 
whole Orthodox diaspora, claiming jurisdiction over all lands not included in 
the previous boundaries of the Roman Empire and Slavic lands.113 Over the 
following century, this led to independent recognitions worldwide of 
autocephaly. In the words of Serge Keleher, ‘The largest groups of Orthodox 
Christians under the direct jurisdiction of the ecumenical patriarch are 
however the Greek Orthodox of the diaspora: in Western Europe, North and 
South America, and Australia. These include several million faithful. The 
Patriarchate of Constantinople is therefore very careful to retain and assert its 
rights with regard to the diaspora.’114 After the loss of most of her Greek 
subjects, Constantinople recognised breakaway autocephalic churches in 
Finland (1923), Russia (Living Church, 1924), Estonia (1923), Poland (1924) and 
western Europe (Parisian Exarchate, 1931).115 The Russian Church could do 
little to counter these recognitions as they came during years of intense 
government persecution.116 The most recent, and by far the most controversial 
recognition of all – Ukraine (2018) – came at a time when the Russian Church 
was not so weak, with dramatic results.  
 Constantinople has based most of her claims as the dispenser of 
autocephaly on a controversial interpretation of Canon 28 of the Council of 
Chalcedon. The canon allowed for the Patriarchate’s jurisdiction over ‘the 
barbarians’ on the fringes of the Eastern Empire (‘the bishops of these dioceses 
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who work among non-Greeks, are to be ordained by the aforesaid most holy 
see of the most holy church in Constantinople’).117 It was precisely this canon 
that Constantinople required Bishop Basil Osborne to mention in his transfer 
request that he was asked to rewrite.118 Moscow responded to Bishop Basil’s 
letter with a lengthy refutation of Constantinople’s ‘papal pretensions’ and 
misinterpretations of the canons: ‘A concept that the authority of the throne 
of Constantinople is extended to all territories that are not part of one or other 
Local Church is a new and unrecognised, by the Plenitude of the Orthodox 
Church, interpretation of the canon’.119 Moreover, Moscow focused on the 
misuse (as they saw it) of Canon 28. Patriarch Alexei wrote in a letter to the 
Ecumenical Patriarch, ‘there is no doubt that this refers not to provinces but to 
peoples’ and went on to state that the title primus inter pares had been given 
only because Constantinople was the imperial city, second only to Rome. He 
concluded that the Byzantine empire was no more and so there was no 
justification for ‘constant recourse to this canon’.120  
Much has been written for and against the Constantinopolitan 
interpretation of Canon 28. One of the most thoughtful recent papers, by 
Archimandrite Grigory (2009), noted that part of the problem is that such an 
interpretation ultimately ignores the previous jurisdiction of the Roman 
Patriarch (the Pope) over the Western lands.121 The disputes concerning 
jurisdiction in the Orthodox Church look set to become only more labyrinthine, 
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especially if one considers the rather unusual ‘gentleman’s agreement’ for 
non-proselytization between the Catholic and Orthodox lands – no Orthodox 
jurisdiction is likely to install an Orthodox ‘Roman Patriarchate’ or even 
Metropolitan at any time in the near future.  
For Bishop Basil, the role of Rome was the key to understanding the role 
of Constantinople in Western Europe (and hence the diocese of Sourozh). 
Whilst he did propose that Constantinople had a certain authority over the 
Orthodox in the UK and elsewhere, this was only as locum tenens in lieu of the 
re-establishment of the Roman Patriarchate (the Papacy). It is interesting that 
Bishop Basil did not claim that it was the mention of ‘the barbarian lands’ in 
Canon 28 which gave Constantinople rights over Western Europe, but only her 
pre-eminence in the taxis following the Great Schism. Perhaps this was why he 
was reluctant to use Canon 28 in his first appeal to Patriarch Bartholomew. 
Bishop Basil proposed that, ‘From a missionary point of view the world has 
been divided between the four [ancient] patriarchates’ namely Rome (West), 
Constantinople (North), Antioch (East) and Alexandria (South).122 These 
reflected the four corners of the globe and the four points of the compass. 
They included both the ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ world. Speaking of the 
situation in the UK, he said, ‘it is unreal for an Orthodox to pretend that the 
Patriarchate of Rome does not exist.’ Thus, it can be said that although Bishop 
Basil was seen by some supporters of Moscow to be a ‘stooge’ of 
Constantinople, in fact his elevation of that see contained huge caveats and 
limitations.  
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 These canonical claims of Constantinople to primacy have been explored 
in depth elsewhere, but her more recent ideological-theological universalism 
has been less discussed. The claims of Constantinople are different both 
canonically and ideologically-theologically to those of the Russian Church, 
which are rather hinted at and based more on the universalist (imperial) 
history of Russia. It is the contention of this study that there has developed a 
subtle but important difference between the universalism of these two 
jurisdictions and that these now represent opposing poles in the so-called 
culture wars as they are played out between East and West. Patriarch Kirill has 
often noted Russia’s ability to build bridges between cultures and religions, 
with an emphasis on the traditional or conservative values that they share in 
common. But what is not questioned is Orthodoxy as the repository of 
absolute truth. Any hint of religious or interfaith syncretism is far from the 
Russian Church of today; Russian Orthodoxy is a ‘totalising’ Christianity in 
much the same way as Catholicism is or was, prior to Vatican II at least.  
It is controversial to mention it but much evidence is now available that 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate came under the internationalist and syncretistic-
universalist influence of Freemasonry in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.123 For conservatives in Orthodoxy, the ecumenical 
movement pioneered by Constantinople in the last century was a direct result 
of this influence. The goal of this current was not, it is claimed, Christian unity 
so much as a universal union of all the world’s major faiths. While the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate would shy away from stating this overtly, it is difficult 
to avoid seeing syncretistic-universalist tendencies in many of the 
 
123 Cf Zissis, Hieromonk Seraphim,  ‘Some preliminary notes on the influence of Freemasonry on early Greek 




patriarchate’s official pronouncements. In addition, Patriarch Bartholomew has 
at times stated that the ‘God of Muslims and Christians’ is ‘the same God’; ‘Of 
course God is but one, independently of the name we give him: Allah or 
Yahweh and so on. God is one; and we are his children’.124 In 2016 he caused 
further scandal to conservatives in Orthodoxy by appearing in an interfaith 
video with Pope Francis and representatives of Muslim and Buddhist 
religions.125  
 This is a universalism very different from Patriarch Kirill’s ‘brotherhood 
of peoples’ in the Russian World. It was not by chance that Russia’s 
universalism survived – and indeed flourished – during the Soviet epoch. At 
that time, communism was the new totalising state religion that could be 
violently imposed on all nationalities and religions in a way that Orthodoxy 
could not. Indeed, as late as the mid 1980s, Professor Norman Stone 
‘confessed’ that he was still teaching his students that the Soviet Union had 
‘solved the nationality problem’,126 just a couple of years before ethnic 
conflicts would break out across the fringes of the Soviet Union. At the risk of 
oversimplification, it can be stated that Patriarch Kirill’s call to ‘brotherhood 
and unity’ is profoundly secular. The emphasis is on ‘traditional peoples’ of the 
world uniting with Russia in a global anti-globalist resistance to exactly those 
syncretistic policies and universal values that Constantinople promotes. Some 
in the Church who oppose both Constantinople’s and Moscow’s universalisms 
posit that they are on the way to proposing a kind of universal Christian 
culture, or rather a cultureless Christianity. In the words of J. Buciora, ‘because 
national identity and culture belong to a specific people, the cosmopolitan idea 
 
124 ‘Charlie Rose Interview with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew’, 17.04.10, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sf9GZIvvEDk [Accessed 04.01.19] 
125 ‘This innovative “video of the Pope” is causing a sensation’, 06.01.16, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vI0tiN88ldE [Accessed 04.01.19] 
126 Stone, N., The Atlantic and its Enemies (London, 2010), p.571 
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of culture, or universal “Christian culture” is not an option’.127 Thus one cannot 
(or should not) speak of ‘Orthodox culture’.  
 The idealistic universalism of Constantinople also stands accused – just 
as that of the Russian Church is – of concealing Hellenisation and nationalist 
self-aggrandisement. Constantinople has sought to limit the number of non-
Greek monks on Mount Athos to 10 percent or less, in order to try to stem a 
Slavic ascendency in this vital part of World Orthodoxy, and has also pursued a 
policy of reigning in diaspora parishes previously granted autonomy or even 
autocephaly.128 Of particular relevance to this study, the Parisian Exarchate to 
which Bishop Basil Osborne and his followers moved in 2006 was disbanded by 
Constantinople in 2018, with the requirement that its parishes move under the 
local Greek (Constantinopolitan) diaspora jurisdictions. As a result, most of the 
jurisdiction moved back to Moscow. ‘Hellenisation’ has also been given as one 
of the reasons for the rapid break-up of the new Ukrainian jurisdiction founded 
on the tomos of Constantinople in 2018. When the architect of Ukrainian 
autocephaly himself, Philaret Denisenko, went into schism following the 
jurisdiction’s first council, he complained that it was not autocephaly but 
rather a ‘Greek take-over’; the Council had been convened ‘by Greeks’, the 
statute was written ‘by Greeks’ and the diaspora parishes of the new 
jurisdiction were to be ‘under the Greeks’.129 But to view this as a question of 
pure Hellenisation is to misunderstand the complex tensions that surround the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate even within the Hellenic world itself.  
 
127 Buciora, J., ‘Ecclesiology and National Identity in Orthodox Christianity’, Orthodox Christianity and 
Contemporary Europe (International Conference) (2003), pp.27–42  
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The issue is that many conservatives in the Greek Church resist 
Constantinople on the grounds of its liberal-ecumenical stance rather than 
territorial claims – although the two can occasionally coincide. The Greek 
Church is home to some of the most conservative voices in World Orthodoxy, 
such as Metropolitan Seraphim of Pireus. In addition, Mount Athos itself has 
been at the epicentre of resistance to the liberal-ecumenical policies of 
Constantinople. There is support for Constantinople on the peninsula, but 
opposition is more apparent and vocal. In one of Putin’s several visits to the 
largely Greek Mount Athos, he was given the unusual honour of standing in the 
‘place of the Emperor’, while the Greek prime minister’s proposed visit was 
cancelled, and black flags were hung from the monasteries stating ‘Keep the 
Antichrists off the Holy Mountain’. Esphigmenou monastery, which took a 
defiant stand against Constantinople, was excommunicated in 2002. At various 
times since, the Greek government and Constantinople have attempted to take 
back the monastery. At the latest attempt, the monks threw Molotov cocktails 
at the police and representatives of Constantinople, for which they received 
long prison sentences in absentia, as the monastery remained in the hands of 
the rebellious monks.  
 Thus it can be said that the Moscow and Constantinople jurisdictions 
represent two very different universalist approaches. Russia does not claim 
jurisdictional territory over the earth but only within her existing canonical 
borders, even if the Russian diaspora is a global phenomenon. However, she 
does represent a universalist aspiration of Orthodoxy for the whole world, 
which will be explored in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. In contrast to Russia, 
Constantinople’s territorial base is weak, even precarious, and she could in a 
sense be said to be at the mercy of various much stronger forces: the Turkish 
government, the USA, Russia and so on. Several memos leaked in 2009 from 
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the US consulate in Istanbul spoke of Constantinople’s ‘vulnerability’ and 
anxiety in the face of the Moscow Patriarchate’s power and rise in the 
Orthodox world, even expressing the concern, ‘that Russia would like nothing 
more than to see the Ecumenical Patriarchate based in the "third Rome" of 
Moscow’.130  
 This weakness or vulnerability of Constantinople is viewed by her 
supporters as a source of credibility today, in contrast to what might be 
considered archaic visions of temporal power. Bishop Basil emphasised that it 
was Constantinople, alone among the ancient patriarchates, who had shown 
humility in granting autocephaly in her ‘region’.131  In this regard, he noted the 
direct jurisdictional claims of the Patriarchate of Alexandria over the African 
continent. As Constantinople has lost (or ceded) territory it is interesting that 
she has sought to reinvent the term ‘symphonia’, originally coined by Justinian 
to denote the relationship between the secular and spiritual empires. As we 
shall see, the term is much used by the Russian Church today to denote the 
relationship between the State and the Church, but Constantinople is seeking 
to give it a new meaning, broadening it out from Orthodoxy to all religions and 
even non-religious moral codes, such as universal human rights.132 In these 
roles, both jurisdictions are sought after as ‘soft-power’ tools in the struggle 
between East and West and today’s culture wars. Russian clergy often accuse 
Constantinople of being a tool of the declared enemies of Orthodoxy: the CIA, 
the EU, the promoters of a secularist-liberal western agenda. Likewise, 
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Constantinople clergy refer to the Russian Church’s Erastian tendencies and 
proximity to a corrupt regime. As secular societies started to polarise into 
traditionalist versus progressive camps, the Orthodox Church proved no 
different. The troubles in Sourozh, manifested both in the minutiae of praxis, 
and in the ecclesiastical geopolitics of Constantinople versus Moscow, were a 
representation of this conflict. All of the above discussion should be borne in 
mind when considering Bishop Basil’s decision to move under Constantinople.  
 Throughout the twentieth century, there had been friction between 
Moscow and Constantinople.133 With the breakup of the Soviet Union, two 
new canonical problems emerged simultaneously: new independent states 
appeared in the previous jurisdictional territory of autocephalous national 
churches (usually Russia, but not always); and a vast influx of Orthodox 
migrants into non-Orthodox lands (the so-called Orthodox diaspora), of which 
Constantinople considered herself the spiritual administrator. The first major 
flashpoint came in Estonia in 1996, when Constantinople unilaterally 
recognised a small, largely indigenous breakaway movement of the Estonian 
Autonomous Church. Moscow regarded this as an aggressive incursion into her 
canonical territory, but a letter of Patriarch Batholomew was also revealing. 
Turning the tables, he accused Moscow of, ‘trespassing in countries under the 
spiritual jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (ie. the so-called 
“diaspora”) – namely, Estonia, Hungary and elsewhere’.134  
 The battleground between Moscow and Constantinople in the Orthodox 
diaspora (i.e. the entire world outside Russia, Africa, the Middle East and 
Eastern Europe) is still something relatively new in the longue durée of Church 
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history. In the Sourozh crisis, Constantinople claimed that the UK, as part of 
this diaspora, formed part of her vast area of jurisdiction: ‘What had not gone 
unnoticed was how much attention was being paid [by Moscow] to the Russian 
Diaspora, who lived in lands that comprised the canonical privilege of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate”.135 Although the Moscow/Constantinople struggle 
was relatively new, Bishop Basil located such jurisdictional rivalry at the very 
epicentre of Christianity and even the Old Testament.136 In the new globalised 
world, tensions between Constantinople and the rest of the ancient hierarchies 
seem only set to increase. 
 There appears little doubt that Metropolitan Anthony himself would 
never have taken a unilateral decision to move under Constantinople. In 2001, 
he wrote a letter to Moscow asking for the appointment of the then Father 
Hilarion Alfeev to the diocese, stating that, ‘His appointment would allow us to 
seize a new victory over the pretensions of Constantinople to hegemony in 
World Orthodoxy’.137 As the crisis surrounding Bishop Hilarion developed, 
Metropolitan Anthony stated at a parish council meeting, ‘[what has been said] 
is a deep insult to all my beliefs and feelings. Namely that, in the event of 
discrepancies between ourselves and the DECR that I would take our Diocese 
out from the Moscow Patriarchate to one of the other Churches. I have never 
thought about it and in addition I will say that the thought is so unacceptable 
for me that I would rather leave than allow it to happen’.138  
At the same time (April 2002) in Moscow, Patriarch Alexei, doubtless 
inspired by the contemporaneous wrangling in London, chose to pen what was 
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at that time the longest and most strident statement against Constantinople’s 
diaspora policies. This letter was later published in full in the journal Sourozh 
on 1 February 2005, the very eve of the final crisis. It was a point-by-point 
critique of Constantinople’s universalist claims.  He started with Canon 28 of 
Chalcedon and a long discussion about its phrase en tois barbarikois (‘among 
the barbarians’). Patriarch Alexei managed a convincing deconstruction of 
Constantinople’s arguments on this point, concluding that the council fathers 
could never have intended that Constantinople would, by extension, have 
jurisdiction over the then-unknown Australia and North and South America 
and – even more contentiously – the lands previously under the Western 
Patriarchate (Rome): ‘As regards Orthodox jurisdiction in the canonical 
territories that belonged to the Church of Rome before the schism of 1054, no 
authoritative pan-Orthodox decision has ever been taken’.139 In particular, 
Patriarch Alexei emphasised the recency of Constantinople’s claims, linking 
them to the universalist-expansionism of Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios IV in 
the 1920s who, ‘developed the theory of the subordination of the whole 
Orthodox diaspora to Constantinople’.140 Patriarch Alexei then went on to 
claim the ‘provisional’ character of the Russian Exarchate and indeed of ROCOR 
as temporary historical accommodations as a result of the Revolution. He 
concluded: ‘We continue to be saddened to see that the legitimate and natural 
desire to bring together again our own people, who live dispersed for historical 
and political reasons, is the object of such harsh and unjust attacks on the part 
of the primate of a Church that has experienced a similar tragedy.’141 In effect, 
the two rather different universalisms of Russia and Constantinople had come 
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into conflict in lands over which neither had jurisdictional control. Russia and 
other Orthodox heartlands have claimed that they are not seeking 
jurisdictional territory, but only jurisdiction over souls. Such a policy is 
extremely contentious as it potentially allows Russia to build Russian churches 
wherever there are Russians, even in other Orthodox lands.  
 The earliest concrete signs that the ground was being laid for a move of 
jurisdiction in Sourozh was the attempt to alter the charitable trust deeds, 
conducted in camera by members of the diocesan council. Bishop Hilarion 
publicised this in his account of the crisis, stating that such an attempt, 
‘prepared the ground for all real estate to be left in case of transfer to another 
jurisdiction’.142 When the move was finally announced by Bishop Basil in 2006, 
it immediately produced a storm of debate ‘for and against’ Constantinople. 
Part of the focus was on the familiar canonical disputes, but of more interest to 
this study were the ideological arguments. An article published on the Russian 
portal Credo.ru was typical of the prevailing pro-Moscow view. Sourozh was 
portrayed as just a pawn in the much bigger conflict between Constantinople 
(the West) and the Moscow Patriarchate (the Slavic East). The actions of 
Constantinople were simply the sensible actions of any combatant – create 
facts on the ground and argue later: ‘Actually, exactly this has happened. The 
Ecumenical Patriarchate strives at once for victories and then immediately 
writes these in as the “legal precedent”, having thus established herself as the 
highest legal judge of World Orthodoxy’.143 In fact, Bishop Basil himself used 
this argument of appealing to the ‘higher court’ of Constantinople for 
resolution to the conflict.144 Another article, by Vladimir Mozhegov, put 
 
142 Online Archive of Metropolitan Hilarion, 08.02 (author trans.). http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 
[Accessed 04.01.18] 
143 Grigori, I., ‘Global'noe Protivostoianie’, portal-credo.ru, 14.06.06 (author trans.). http://www.portal-
credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=44208 [Accessed 04.01.19]   
144 OCAD. Letter of Bishop Basil, 15.05.06 
117 
 
forward the theory that all such ‘clash of civilisations’ rhetoric was ‘a spiritual 
temptation’ encouraged by Constantinople (the West) to polarise the situation 
against Russia.145 The author neglected to account for the fact that both sides 
indulged in such rhetoric, which invoked Huntingon and the culture wars. The 
anxiety of pro-Moscow parishioners at the thought that they might be moved 
under their arch-rival Constantinople appears deep and genuine. Archbishop 
Innokenty of Korsun referred to the decision of Archbishop Evlogy to leave 
Moscow in the 1930s and go to Constantinople. He related how Metropolitan 
Benjamin (Fedchenkov) had ‘fasted and prayed for forty days to see what 
decision to make’, and in the end he had stayed with Moscow and founded the 
diocese of Korsun.146  
 The theory that Constantinople had by some means instigated the whole 
crisis in order to extract jurisdictional benefit seems unlikely. Despite all the 
hyperbole, there was little evidence of direct agitation by Constantinople (or 
indeed by Moscow) prior to 2006. It was true, as we have seen, that the 
diocese was born out of, and to some degree characterised by, the Evlogian 
Exarchate that had existed previously under Constantinople, but it was also 
true that Metropolitan Anthony was deeply loyal to the Russian Church and 
had no such feelings towards Constantinople. Bishop Basil would have been 
aware that Constantinople would welcome his request to transfer the diocese, 
and after the death of Metropolitan Anthony, the main obstacle to this was 
removed. Perhaps more important than the events themselves were the 
geopolitical interpretations of the events. Despite a war of words, communion 
between Moscow and Constantinople was maintained and the dispute was 
 
145 Mozhegov, V., ‘Tri glubyny odnogo raskola’, Agentstvo Politicheskikh Novostei, 19.07.06. 
https://www.apn.ru/publications/article10050.htm [Accessed 04.01.19]  
146 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2075235, 20.05.06. ‘Slovo arkhiepiskopa Korsunskogo Innokentia, 
vremenno upravliaushchego Surozhskoy yeparkhiei, posle liturgii’, 14.05.06     
118 
 
eventually resolved, but for the Moscow Patriarchate it was simply another 
aggression in a campaign against her jurisdictional unity that had started with 
Constantinople’s (albeit short-lived) recognition of the Renovationists in the 
1920s. For Constantinople’s supporters, she was fulfilling her role of 
recognising the aspirations of small, indigenous Orthodox communities against 
the wishes of powerful national churches. 
This is not the place to begin analysing the Ukrainian schism of 2018 in 
detail, other than to point to certain ideological trends that were at the base of 
these geopolitical frictions and which this thesis has sought to uncover. Official 
and semi-official pro-Moscow statements consistently attacked Constantinople 
for ‘liberalism’, being captive financially and ideologically to the USA (and 
NATO) and promoting moral and dogmatic relativism. It is notable that pro-
Moscow voices have sought to draw Metropolitan Epiphanius of the newly 
founded Ukrainian jurisdiction under Constantinople into the culture wars. Any 
statements by anti-Moscow clerics which might seem to support western 
values, LGBT and cultural relativism would be unpopular in socially 
conservative Ukraine.147 On the other hand, anti-Moscow believers, and some 
Orthodox hierarchs from other jurisdictions, criticise Moscow for rigid 
traditionalism, being politically and financially captive to the Russian regime 
and promoting Russian nationalism, xenophobia and homophobia. These 
ideological divisions run right through the Orthodox Church as they do through 
the Catholic Church. To put it concisely, but rather controversially: it is not so 
much the case that the various diaspora schisms were the result of geopolitical 
tensions (e.g. Russian revanchism), but rather that the geopolitical tensions 
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themselves were the result of ideological divergence reflected on the national 
and religious level.  
How was and is this rivalry to be viewed by the rest of the Orthodox 
world? It seems that universalist and primacy claims made by any jurisdiction 
cause anxiety because of the path taken over history by the Papacy. The 
Western Church’s slide into universalist absolutism is seen in the East as a 
lesson in ‘mistaken hubris’. Thus, while many jurisdictions might align 
themselves with either Moscow or Constantinople out of necessity, they are 
unlikely to fully support the pretensions of a New or Third Rome to being 
master of the Orthodox World. It must be remembered that many of these 
churches (re)gained their independence from both Russia and Constantinople 
only comparatively recently. Bulgaria regained autocephaly from 
Constantinople in 1945 after a long struggle against Hellenisation, only to find 
herself within Moscow’s ‘sphere of influence’ during the Cold War. Thus, it can 
be understood that satellite jurisdictions in the diaspora, far from the defined 
canonical territories of either Moscow or Constantinople, can be wary of the 
ascendancy of either. G.P. Fedotov, writing in 1928, noted how one aspect of 
Russia’s universalism was that Russians themselves remained ignorant of other 
Orthodox churches and their cultures and traditions, which were generally 
much more ancient than her own. This is a problem for the Russian Church 
today as she seeks to make allies in her struggle with Constantinople. 
Romanians, Bulgarians and Georgians are all familiar with Russification in 
church and secular affairs and have no desire to encourage it.148  
It should be said that the drive for autocephaly (if such it can be called) is 
also a comparatively recent phenomenon, connected with the emergence of 
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European nationalism – the newly formed countries needed their own state 
church as part of the ‘national package’. This Erastian tendency had filtered 
through from the West by indirect as well as direct means, such as the 
(uncanonical) foundation of the new Church of Greece in 1830 under the 
tutelage of the new state’s German king. Because of this, the language of many 
of these more recent autocephalous jurisdictions is different from that of 
Russia or Constantinople. The Hellenic rhetoric from the Greek Church is more 
ethnic than universal; Archbishop Christodoulous, for example, did not shrink 
from talk of the ‘survival of the Greek race’ and Orthodoxy as an essential 
component of that.149 
The geopolitical rivalry between the two sees has taken place not only in 
terms of jurisdictional conflict and the global Culture Wars, but also at the level 
of political pre-eminence. An example of this was the much-vaunted 2016 
meeting in Cuba between Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow. Despite 
objections from hardliners in the Russian Church, the meeting was a 
propaganda coup for the Moscow Patriarchate. Not only did the Pope travel 
into the Russian sphere of influence to meet the Patriarch, but Moscow 
appeared to all the world as the most important leader in World Orthodoxy 
(which her supporters would argue she is). Whatever will be the outcome of 
this long-standing rivalry, it shows no sign of abating soon. It might be 
suggested that Constantinople is playing the long game. Present unpopularity 
in the Orthodox world versus popularity in the western secular world will 
eventually bear fruit as local Orthodox churches take root and western liberal 
values also start to take hold even in Orthodox lands. 
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Chapter 3 Enculturation and Preservation: Macrocosmic Themes 
The roots of the Sourozh crisis were connected to both ancient and more 
recent developments and divergences between East and West. References to 
‘the Russian soul’ and sobornost’ opposing western ‘individualism’ implied 
deep dichotomies with long theological genealogies. Moreover, such 
pronouncements pointed to the fact that, for many, the absolute dichotomy of 
East and West was a self-evident article of faith.1 The following two chapters 
will analyse how these undercurrents played out in the day-to-day life of the 
diocese. It may seem rather ambitious to locate the feelings of distrust and 
anxiety that emerged during the crisis to the shift from the immanent theology 
of the Eastern Fathers to the analytic, solution-driven theology of 
scholasticism, but the roots of the divisions between the East and West 
worldviews go back many centuries. Christos Yannaras located all the problems 
that increasingly torment the modern world in ‘the theological differences that 
once provoked the “Schism” dividing Christendom in two. Today’s 
individualism and absolute utilitarianism appear to have theological origins.’2 
 
Theme 1: Culture Clash 
The Sourozh troubles have been variously described as a political, 
generational, ethnic and class conflict. Before we analyse the various claims to 
each argument in detail, it is pertinent to view them all under the umbrella 
term ‘culture clash’. One of the Information Sheets published by Bishop Basil 
during the crisis stated openly, ‘This is not a question of personalities but a 
 
1 Plested , M., ‘Dispatches from Russia’, First Things (Jan. 2018) 
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clash of cultures’.3  While the ‘locals’ (and it is necessary to be careful 
delineating the faction along these lines) experienced the behaviour of the 
new arrivals as ‘rude’ and ‘arrogant’,4 the new arrivals spoke repeatedly of 
British ‘coldness’ and the condescending aloofness of the locals.5 Certainly, 
there was much in the practices of the new arrivals that seemed at odds to the 
anglicised norms of Sourozh. These included; talking in church, clapping and 
exclaiming in parish meetings, pushing and other tactile behaviour, and a 
general ‘lack of manners’. One commentator noted that the problems were 
exacerbated by the fact that the English would speak ‘coolly and calmly’ about 
an issue, whereas a Russian would ‘rip his shirt’.6 This divergence in social 
comportment had even been noticeable to the first-wave émigrés, many of 
whom were from the nobility. The Zernovs, who had such an influence on the 
development of Orthodoxy in Britain after the revolution, noted how, ‘The 
English were inclined to tolerance and not inclined to extremes’.7 In defence of 
the new arrivals, Fr Mikhail Dudko, who had been sent to Sourozh in order to 
investigate the troubles, spoke of, ‘This crowd of thirsting, bewildered and 
discouraged people who wanted someone to talk to – and then this quiet and 
reverent prayer at the altar, it was a terrible contrast … these were Russian 
people who came to a Russian Orthodox Church and found themselves 
unwelcome there.’8  
Because these differences resonated with deep cultural dichotomies, 
they touched the minutiae of daily church life. A cathedral parishioner 
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mentioned how, in the ‘rarefied atmosphere’ of Sourozh, taunts were received 
for such ‘Russian superstitions’ as the blessing of Easter cakes and eggs.9 
Another wrote that the locals seemed not to grasp the childlike faith of the 
Russians, which involved prostrations, kissing the hands of priests and other 
tactile practices. He stated, ‘It was exactly by such means, that Christianity had 
helped Russia survive countless trials – which means that it is related to the 
very essence being Russian'.10 He went on to compare the meeting of the 
Russians and English to the meeting of Indians and colonisers in the New 
World, stating that the Russians were not ‘dumb Indians’ whose simple faith 
and loyalty could be bought with ‘firewater’.11  
The meeting of East and West in everyday social praxis was indeed 
fraught with conflict and misunderstanding. An English parishioner inferred 
that the problems on the ground in Sourozh were endemic and went right to 
the top of the Church: ‘It seems to me that with the best will in the world it 
would be extremely difficult for the Moscow Patriarchate to understand the 
West and the diverse cultures included in the term “Western” because of lack 
of sustained contact and a totally different background and experience.’12 
Likewise, Bishop Basil complained about the noise and agitation which had 
accompanied the new arrivals, upsetting the peace that had previously reigned 
in the cathedral.13  
In Sourozh, the emotional directness of Russians came as a shock to 
parishioners. In turn, the mannered and labyrinthine social mores of the 
English middle classes seemed to the Russians not only incomprehensible but 
 
9 Raba, M.B., Statement, 20.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=4  
[Accessed 28.03.20]   
10 Kabakov, V., ‘Otdelenie, a ne razvod’, 20.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=36 
[Accessed 02.01.20]  
11 Ibid. 
12 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Statements of Parishioners  
13 Interview with Basil Osborne, BBC, Vera i Vek, 19.05.06 
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also designed to ‘hold the other at arm’s length’ in a manipulative way.14 Many 
of the new arrivals found the behaviour of the locals to be cold and snobbish. 
Others thought the new arrivals were winning the battle because they were 
not afraid to be rude and persistent.15 An interesting account from a new 
arrival stated, ‘after some years of Orthodox experience, I was quite stunned 
by Sourozh. Because Sourozh is cold, freezing cold … colder and less 
accommodating than any other parish I had seen before’.16 The author noted 
that he had converted to Orthodoxy while at university in the US, having 
previously experimented with Buddhism, and was far from being a ‘Russian 
nationalist’. For many of the new arrivals, the shy, academic persona of Bishop 
Basil was perceived as ‘coldness’ and superiority.17  
The seemingly defensive and aggressive behaviour of Russians can 
quickly give way to jovial and candid friendship once all-important trust has 
been gained.18 Anyone relatively familiar with Russian culture will recognise 
this immediately. For the English especially, this open directness can be 
unnerving, especially when something critical is being transmitted. The tone of 
the open letters to the Patriarch came as a surprise to the indigenous 
parishioners – they were at turns pleading and complaining, swearing ‘undying 
 
14 Cf. Badmaeva, S.V. and Timofeeva, E.K., ‘Vlianie rossiiskogo mentalityta na stil’ rossiiskogo menedzhmenta’, 
Psikhologicheskaia nauka i obrazovanie, No. 5 (2010). ‘Relations between people are informal and the concept 
of friendship is valued very highly. Russian candidness: personal questions never cease to amaze foreigners. 
For Russians, it is quite normal to relate intimate personal details to complete strangers on a train. Worldly 
formal conversations are foreign to them and little understood.’ (author trans.) 
15 Baumov, A., Russkii Newsweek, Prikhod po-angliskii, 22.06.06. http://www.religare.ru/2_30732.html 
[Accessed 20.01.20] Quotes from parishioners: ‘It’s unpleasant for an Englishman to get involved in something 
ugly. If someone behaves in an ugly way, the Englishman will not argue and scream, he just frowns, holds his 
nose, says, “Oh my God, what is this?” and goes away. And so, we are losing control, step by step.’ And ‘if the 
“activists” immediately got repulsed in their own style, things wouldn't have come to the current crisis.’ 
(author trans.)   
16 Leonidov, Dr I., Statement, 23.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=1 [Accessed 28.03.20]  
17 Cf. Interv’iu s Nikolaem Kul’manom, Surozhskie nestroenia: vzgliad iznutri, 05.09.06. 
http://www.pravoslavie.ru/4693.html [Accessed 20.01.20]  
18 Cf., Cross, A., A People Passing Rude: British Responses to Russian Culture (2013), and Rathmayr, R., 
’Intercultural aspects of new Russian politeness’, WU Online Papers in International Business Communication, 
Series One: Intercultural Communication and Language Learning (2008). Also Kelly, C., Refining Russia: Advice 
Literature, Polite Culture, and Gender from Catherine to Yeltsin, (Oxford, 2001) 
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loyalty’ to the Motherland combined with impassioned hyperbole.19 On the 
other side, one priest spoke of, the ‘Anglican-style clique/club which the rulers 
of the ‘Sourozh Diocese’ by the early 2000s largely were’.20 Even the English 
themselves realised that there was an unhealthy tendency to ‘keep everything 
under wraps’ in the hope that ‘somehow the troubles would blow away’.21 
Trying to muddle through, instead of facing the crisis head on, prolonged the 
pain and meant that divisions grew deeper and trust weakened. 
 
 
Theme 2: Becoming Russian, Becoming Western 
A pro-Moscow parishioner wrote of Bishop Basil that ‘he does not understand 
the Russian Soul’ and that perhaps ‘he should simply go and read Dostoevsky, 
and then he will understand that we are very complicated people and that he 
cannot be our leader’.22 The comment implied that the anti-Moscow 
parishioners were all non-Russians, which in fact was not the case, many being 
descendants of the White emigration. Such accusations were, therefore, 
doubly offensive to such people. In his study of the Russian Soul, Dale Pesmen 
narrates how this concept was crystallised in the nineteenth century by the 
Slavophile intelligentsia rather than the peasantry. The Russian Soul was 
conceptualised in contrast to western ‘precision’. It was expressed by ‘strong 
feelings, the inexpressible, the unlimited, the hyperbolic, the spontaneous, the 
unpredictable, the immeasurable and the unmannered’.23 This is the ‘Natasha’s 
dance’ that was said to be at the heart of every Russian – aristocrat or peasant, 
 
19 Cf. Chisholm, Y., Tserkovnyi Vestnik, 25.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=14 [Accessed 
20.01.20]  
20 Interview 1C 
21 Interview 1A 
22 ‘Interv’iu s Nikolaem Kul’manom’, op.cit.  
23 Pesmen, D., Russia and Soul: An Exploration, (Cornell, 2000) p.16 
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sophisticated western émigré or forest dweller. It is a leitmotif in Russian 
culture even today; one example is the scene of Glasha’s dance in Klimov’s 
wartime epic Come and See, which united multiple Russian mythologies: 
nature, spontaneity, naivety, passion, authenticity. It was one thing to point to 
this absence in a westerner, but for a Russian it could be deeply hurtful.  
Interestingly for Sourozh, Pesmen concludes, ‘Indifference or coldness 
are the greatest offences as well as the prime signs of dusha affliction or loss, 
more so than rudeness, anger or even brutality, which still show that a person 
is interested, partial, cares’.24 Patriarch Kirill has made much use of this 
terminology, and his borrowing of the term passionarnost’ from the Soviet 
Slavophile Lev Gumilev should also be mentioned in this context. The Patriarch 
Christianised the term that Gumilev had used to emphasise the passionate 
nature of the Russian people, and which expressed itself in self-sacrifice, 
openness and anarchy of spirit, speaking of Russia’s ‘ancient, Christian passion’ 
(drevniaia khristianskaia passionarnost’). Rephrasing Gumilev, he continued, 
‘the higher the passionarnost’, the higher the civilisation, when passionarnost’ 
goes out of human life, then a civilisation and a people will die’.25  
The pro-Moscow new arrivals sometimes objected with the claim that 
the old White émigré supporters of Bishop Basil could only claim connection to 
a distant and idealised Motherland, in which many of them had never even set 
foot. A blogger wrote that, ‘Of course they loved Russia’, but that this was a 
‘fairy-tale Russia with golden domes and fantastic towers’.26 The anti-Moscow 
parishioners argued that the New Russians (and their English supporters) could 
 
24 Ibid. p.272  
25 Kirill, Patriarkh, Zhizn’ i mirosozertsanie, (Moscow, 2009) pp.392–3 
26 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2167220, 03.07.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]. This accusation was untrue 
for many of the old white émigrés, several of whom were involved with charitable work within the new 
Russian Federation, such as the St Gregory’s Foundation. http://stgregorysfoundation.org.uk/. Cf. also 
Kudriakova, E.B., Rossiskaia Emigratsiia v Velikobritanii v Period mezhdu Dvumia Voinami (Moscow, 1995), p.5 
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claim little continuity with pre-revolutionary Russia and so had no great claim 
to be arbiters of true Russianness. This standoff was important as it led to a 
belief in a deep culture gap between the two groups, with one side claiming 
the other had become ‘westernised’, and the other that their opponents had 
been ‘sovietised’.27  
So it was that both sides stood to accuse the other of lack of 
Russianness. The pro-Moscow new arrivals accused the old émigrés of 
nostalgia and an inability to love the newly resurgent Russian Church that was 
emerging from the catacombs. A deacon, who came from an émigré 
intellectual background,28 felt deeply hurt at accusations from pro-Moscow 
supporters that his criticisms of the Russian Church were founded on a lack of 
patriotism. He replied that his family had fought against Bolshevism for three 
generations, that his wife’s father had died as a new martyr and that it was not 
for others to teach him how to love the Motherland. He wrote that love 
‘sometimes obliges us to criticise the dark side that we also love’.29  
The arguments were further complicated by the deep association of 
Orthodoxy with ‘nationality’ in Russian history. It has been argued that Russian 
nationality is a relatively new phenomenon, rather akin to the emergence of 
Italian nationality following the Risorgimento in the nineteenth century. Nicolai 
Petro noted in his study on Russian democracy that, ‘As late as the early 
twentieth century a peasant —and the vast majority of Russians were peasants  
then – would speak of himself not as a “Russian” but as “Orthodox” 
(pravoslavnyi). Russian was his language; Orthodoxy was his identity.’30 It 
 
27 Interview 2A. The interviewee was a long-standing member of the pre-war Russian émigré community. She 
viewed the new arrivals as very ‘other’ in terms of their supposed Russianness – as sovietised rather than 
Russian. The notion of a Soviet mentality is discussed in the following chapter. Cf. also interview 2G. The 
interviewee relates stories of white émigrés who do not wish to return, ‘for fear of being disappointed.’  
28 His grandfather was the eminent émigré Orthodox philosopher Simeon Frank.  
29 Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2167405, 04.07.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]  
30 Petro, N., The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture (Harvard, 1995)  
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follows, then, that a non-Orthodox Russian is an oxymoron, but also that 
someone who becomes Russian Orthodox can, and perhaps should, also 
become Russian.31 As Anna Pechurina noted in her study of the British Russian 
diaspora, ‘Thus, it can be observed that Orthodoxy is considered to be one of 
the main identifying markers of Russian-ness. In other words, those who speak 
Russian and feel comfortable in the church might be regarded as Russians.’32 
This ‘becoming Russian’ goes beyond the religious sphere. A person can be 
deemed to have become Russian through exhibiting a love for Russian culture 
combined with the Russian character-traits mentioned in this study: passion 
over reason, community over individualism and so on.  
 Less attention has been given to such people in the Sourozh crisis – 
English converts whose love of Russia had made them honorary Russians. Their 
presence further complicates the us/them ethnic narrative. Such people were 
by no means small in number or simply inactive fellow-travellers – they were 
the husbands and wives of Russian activists.33 When the crisis reached the 
British High Court in 2009, the representation was carried out by two English 
parishioners. Metropolitan Hilarion later himself wrote of the ‘myth’ that the 
reason for the conflict was the English/Russian divide, noting how many letters 
to the Patriarch supporting his cause were from the English.34 For the anti-
Moscow group, these people were also to some extent motivated by 
misplaced Slavophilia. An article in the Russian daily Trud about the crisis 
 
31 Cf. Verkhovsky, A., ‘Kirill’s Doctrine and the Potential Transformation of Russian Orthodoxy’, Tolstaya, K., 
(ed.) Orthodox Paradoxes Heterogeneities and Complexities in Contemporary Russian Orthodoxy (Leiden, 2014) 
p.73. ‘If Orthodox people denotes both ethnic and political nationality, then everyone who belongs to the ROC 
should be considered Russian.’ 
32 Pechurina, A., ‘Creating a Home from Home: Russian Communities in the UK’, PhD Thesis (Manchester, 
2010), p.96 
33 Cf. Chabakuri, Statement, 26.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=3 [Accessed 28.03.20] 
and Raba Bozhia Maria, Statement, 20.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=4 [Accessed 
28.03.20] 
34 Cf. Hilarion, A., ‘Surozhskaya Smuta’ (2003), 
http://hrampm.org/userfiles/library/autors/%5Balfeev_ilarion%5Dsurozhskaya_smuta.pdf [Accessed 28.03.20] 
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stated, ‘Russian Orthodoxy in England has become attractive for people of 
many nationalities. And not only thanks to the gifted personality of 
Metropolitan Anthony, but moreover thanks to Russian Orthodoxy itself and 
its incomparable spirit. And not only in England. The cтремление верить по-
русски is now popular.’35 The Sourozh priest Maksim Nikolskii wrote in his 
memoirs on Sourozh, ‘Some of the English try to learn Russian in order to be 
able to pronounce the prayers in Church Slavonic and to understand the 
Church services … some of those who convert to Orthodoxy take this decision 
so seriously that they change their name from English to Russian and prefer to 
attend Slavonic services to English ones. Such is this strange phenomenon!’.36 
This was all rather counter to the ethos of Metropolitan Anthony, who stressed 
that ‘Orthodoxy was more important than Russianness’.37 
The anti-Moscow parishioners tended to raise the issue of ‘Russianness’ 
in narrower terms than the multinational, universal concept promoted by neo-
Slavophiles.38 This was countered by one parishioner who wrote that part of 
the problem was that the anti-Moscow supporters of Bishop Basil imagined 
that the Russians were a single unit like the Jews or the Kazaks, and that in fact 
the Russians were only able ‘to unite at Kulikovo Field’.39 These two conflicting 
ideas of Russianness offer insight into the roots of the crisis. For the pro-
Moscow group, an indigenous English convert who loved Russia, was learning 
Russian, supported Moscow and followed the traditions of the Church was 
more ‘Russian’ than a pure Russian émigré (even a first-generation one) who 
had become westernised and criticised the Motherland from afar. This latter 
 
35 Konovalov, V., ‘Surozhskii Paradoks’, Trud, 27.06.06 (author trans.)  
36 Cf. Tugarinov, E., Mitropolit Antonii Surozhskii, op.cit. , p.192. Cf. ‘A Collection of Anonymised Letters to 
Metropolitan Hilarion from Parishioners and Clergy of Sourozh’, 06.02. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 
[Accessed 28.03.20]  
37 Cf. Maidanovich, E., ‘O Surozhskoi eparkhii’, Foma, No. 3 (17) (2003) 
38 Cf. Chapter 5  
39 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2076496, 21.05.06 [Accessed 28.03.20] 
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group, caricatured as ‘rootless cosmopolitans’, was a key target for criticism 
from the pro-Moscow group. The situation, however, was complex40. An article 
by Seraphim Rebinder that appeared in Sourozh magazine in August 2005, just 
before the final crisis, is worth quoting at length:  
 
Attitudes to Russia and the Russian Church, however, differ enormously 
not only amongst local converts to Orthodoxy but also among 
descendants of the Russian emigration. Some feel themselves to be 
Russian, or very close to Russia; others think that on the whole it is 
better not to have too much to do with Russians because of what they 
see as the Russian tendency to messianism or imperialism. Moreover, 
many descendants of émigrés are highly critical of the Russian Church, or 
rather, of the Moscow Patriarchate. They consider that although 
holiness is of course to be found within the Russian Church, the Moscow 
Patriarchate – as one representative of that persuasion put it – is ‘a sick 
organism’; what is more it seeks to be close to the State and to serve the 
State’s interests; and it is riddled with clericalism and extreme 
traditionalism.41  
 
The émigrés who were considered by the pro-Moscow group to have lost their 
Russianness were, firstly, the descendants of the White Emigration who were 
usually either aristocratic or from the intelligentsia, and, secondly, recently 
arrived liberal-minded Muscovites or ex-Soviet intelligentsia. Both groups were 
already far from the narod in term of culture and upbringing well before 1917. 
Such people were typified in the early parishioners of Sourozh. The Zernovs in 
 
40 For more on cosmopolitanism versus localism, see Chapter 6.  




Oxford and the writer Iulia de Beausobre were in this lineage.  The latter 
provides an interesting case. She was an aristocrat who had ‘converted’ to 
Orthodoxy in the Gulag (she had of course been baptised Orthodox as a child) 
where she had been repeatedly tortured by the NKVD. She survived, and on 
her escape from Soviet Russia, she was to write some insightful texts on 
Orthodoxy as well as some of the first Gulag memoirs to be published in 
English.42 In England she developed a more ‘contemporary’ understanding of 
Orthodox practice than perhaps she might have had she remained in the USSR. 
She came to England in the 1920s and became an active layperson in the 
Russian church in London.43 Asked about the use of icons in prayer, Iulia 
described them as ‘aids to prayer for beginners’,44 a response that would 
horrify the average churchgoer in Russia, both then and now.  
Those new arrivals who had ‘lost Russianness’ were critiqued by one 
pro-Moscow parishioner, who wrote, ‘The situation is complicated by the fact 
that they welcome only those Russian-speakers who are either unchurched or 
who are not aware of, or feel no loyalty towards, the Mother Church. Such 
people often feel hostility towards the Russian Orthodox Church and towards 
Russians. An occasional characteristic of theirs is a spirit of dissent and 
cosmopolitanism.’45 In the polarised situation that developed, such 
parishioners came to support actions deemed deeply offensive by the pro-
Moscow group, such as the NATO bombing of Orthodox Serbia, or at least they 
supported Bishop Basil’s refusal to read the Patriarch’s condemnation of it.46 
 
42 Iulia de Beausobre (1893–1977). Cf. de Beausobre, I., The Woman Who Could Not Die (London, 1938) 
43 Cf. Babington Smith, C., Iulia de Beausobre: A Russian Christian in the West (London, 1983)  
44 Ibid., p.121  
45 Cirota.ru, Tema: #53307, Soobshchenie: #1907853, 07.03.06, ‘Otkrytoe Pis’mo’ [Accessed 05.05.19] 




Once accusations had been made, people had no choice but to fall into 
separate camps, and arguments from both sides appeared disingenuous. For 
example, one priest pointed out that if the treatment of Metropolitan Hilarion 
Alfeev had taken place in Russia, it would have raised a cry of disapproval from 
liberal anti-Moscow parishioners.47 It was a perceptive comment that 
remained unanswered. Likewise, the DECR might have appealed to the 
generous spirit of Russian universalism, but they were resolute in excluding 
liberal-leaning Orthodox and those warier of the Moscow Patriarchate from 
such ‘universalism’. An open letter to the Patriarch ended typically, ‘We are 
not afraid of anything – we have an Orthodox country and an Orthodox 
president, and we want to keep our connections to our own roots!’.48  
 
 
Theme 3: Russification and Russophobia 
The treatment of the new arrivals was considered by some to be close to 
discrimination.49 But the pro-Moscow parishioners fought back, and in a way 
that was perceived by the anti-Moscow side as aggressive. Perhaps the most 
frequent accusation levelled at the pro-Moscow camp was their desire to 
Russify the diocese and eject from it the English converts and their anglicised 
émigré confreres.50 There were allusions to the new arrivals as ‘cuckoos’ who 
had forced out the rightful owners.51 From all the evidence available it does 
seem that Metropolitan Anthony, though a lifelong devoted son of the 
Moscow Patriarchate and Russian Church within Russia, towards the end of his 
 
47 Jillions, Fr J., ‘Bishop Hilario’, op.cit.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Cf. Blagon.ru, ‘Kommenartii diakona Andreia Kuraeva k sobitiam Surozhskoi eparkhii’ (author trans.). 
http://blagogon.ru/articles/156/  [Accessed 05.05.20]  
50Cf. Hirst, M., The Tablet, 26.05.06 




life started to criticise what he perceived to be Moscow’s ‘heavy hand’.52 
However, many of the supporters of Moscow, including Metropolitan Hilarion 
himself, claimed that Archbishop Anatoly, who had been sent to Sourozh from 
Russia in 1990 with a similar mission to that of Metropolitan Hilarion, had also 
been discriminated against by virtue of a tacit Russophobia among the leaders 
of the diocese.53 When the diocesan council expressed gratitude to Archbishop 
Anatoly in a public pronouncement during Metropolitan Hilarion’s tenure, he 
wrote that ‘it sounded more like offence and mockery, than a sincere 
expression of love and sympathy. When Vladyka Anatoly came to England he 
was offered the same cold welcome as me, if not worse’.54 
The charges of Russification were laid out in the document that was read 
out from the altar in the presence of Bishop Hilarion: ‘Bishop Hilarion … 
established contact almost exclusively with members of the Russian 
community, encouraging in them the impression that he was “their” bishop 
who would support “their” interests in the Diocese, which should become a 
purely Russian national Diocese’.55 Metropolitan Hilarion countered that he 
had been sent to Sourozh with the specific direction of helping with the much-
needed mission to his compatriots. At the inaugural address after his 
consecration in Moscow, his mission in Britain had been described by Patriarch 
Alexei as being, ‘in the field of “enchurching” and in the preservation of 
“Russianness” in belief, language and devotion to the Motherland’.56 A 
 
52 Cf. OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Thomas, Dr S. and Dean, A., Open Letter, 22.01.03 
53 There were many charges, the main ones being that he received a fraction of the wages of other English 
hierarchs and had to live in a damp basement and walk the long distance to the cathedral (though in his 
seventies) as he could not afford to take public transport. All these claims were repeated frequently during the 
troubles. Cf. Alfeev, H., ‘Sourozhskaia Smuta’, 2003, op. cit. [Accessed 05.05.20]  
54 Ibid.   
55 ‘Otkrytoe pis’mo mitropolita antoniia surozhskogo episkopu ilarionu alfeevu’, NG Religii, No.6, 21.08.2002.  
(author trans. and emphasis).] 
56  Mospat.ru, ‘Sviateishii Patriarkh Aleksii II sovershil khirotoniiu arkhimandrita Ilariona vo episkopa 
Kerchenskogo’, 11.02.02, https://mospat.ru/archive/2002/02/nr201141/ [Accessed 25.04.18]  
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statement made by Metropolitan Hilarion in June 2002 seemed to imply that 
this fear of Russification was at least partly located in paranoia: ‘whenever I 
mentioned Russians, these people accused me of trying to Russify the diocese. 
As soon as I gave a hint about the need to bring new priests to the diocese, 
including those speaking in Russian, they immediately spread the rumour that I 
was going to expel all British priests and replace them with Russians.’57  
The greatest driver of Russification was simply the huge demographic 
shifts in the diocese.58 After Bishop Hilarion’s arrival, there was an attempt to 
make parishes more welcoming for newly arrived immigrants with the 
introduction of English classes and Russian cultural events. Some parish 
members resented this drive as veiled Russification.59 Pro-Moscow supporters, 
however, were quick to point out that the ‘ethnic jibes’ they suffered at the 
hands of the supporters of Bishop Basil would not have been tolerated if they 
had been black or Asian. ‘In order to understand the absurdity of such 
statements it is sufficient to change the word Russian into blacks. Can you 
imagine what would happen to any bishop of a western country who dared to 
say, I do not want to pray in a church with these black migrants, with Arabs or 
with Africans etc? The politically correct media would tear him to shreds, but 
of course it’s ok to speak like this about Russians!’.60 This perceived double-
standard in dealing with Russians was, it was claimed, based on a Russophobic 
slant which permeated all the way down from the western media into the life 
of the parish, repeating cultural clichés and enforcing negative stereotypes.61  
 
57 Statement of Metropolitan Hilarion, 06.02. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 05.05.19]  
58 Cf. Collins, R., ‘Demographics and the Russian Orthodox Church in London’ in Goodhew, D. and Cooper, A.P. 
(eds.), The Desecularisation of the City (London, 2019)  
59 Cf. OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Marks J., ‘Compilation of Presbyters' Suggestions for the Diocese of 
Sourozh’, op. cit. 
60 Blagon.ru, ‘Kommentarii diakona Andreia Kuraeva k sobytiiam v Surozhskoi yeparkhii’, 
http://blagogon.ru/articles/156/ [Accessed 25.04.18] 
61 OCAD. Thomas, Dr S. and Dean, A., op. cit. Also, Tsygankov, A., ‘Psikhologicheskoe vospriatie velikikh derzhav 
v mire. Istoki rusofobii’, Vestnik RUDN, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2018), pp.186–96 
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A parishioner (herself Russian) wrote of the community being ‘under 
attack’ from the huge wave of ‘neophytes’ from Russia, people who militated 
for a Russian exclusivity ‘in the most disgusting ways, physically pushing the 
local people, insulting them to their face, not to speak of pouring hatred and 
lies over our community in print and on the Internet’.62 Even pro-Moscow 
parishioners conceded that some of the new arrivals constituted ‘a very motley 
and complex crowd’ (ochen' raznosherstnaia i ochen' slozhnaia publika).63 The 
testimonies of the new arrivals themselves were also emotive. Another 
parishioner wrote with sarcasm of the rejection by the locals of the ‘bare-faced 
girls’ and ‘young men with heavy-gold crosses who do not understand 
Florenskii or Berdiaev’, and warned the anti-Moscow activists to remember 
their ancestors ‘who had died in the Kuban and in the cellars of the Chekists’.64  
 The position of Bishop Basil in this area is not easy to define. His route to 
Orthodoxy had been ethnically varied (Greek and Syraic as well as Russian). His 
Russian was poor. He seems to have become more ambivalent towards 
Moscow as time went by. Accusations of Russophobia made against him were 
vigorously denied by the anti-Moscow parishioners.65 Alexander Shramko 
pointed out that Bishop Basil had ‘suddenly became scandalous’ to the Russian 
Church after his ‘betrayal’, in much the same way as the Church had ‘suddenly 
discovered’ multiple irregularities relating to Metropolitan Filaret Denisenko 
following his falling fall from grace (i.e. that he had a wife and other 
 
62 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. ‘From a Russian Sourozh parishioner of 45 years’ standing’ 
63 ‘Surozhskie nestroenia: vzgliad isnutry’, op.cit, 05.09.06.[Accessed 27.03.20] 
64 Krivoshein, N. ‘Kliriki i miryane o situatsii v yeparkhii’, 25.05.06,  
http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=17 [Accessed 27.03.20]  
65 Cf. Teterin, A., Letter to Prot. Peter Scorer, 2006. ‘Bishop Basil, who, judging by his words and deeds is 
increasingly “Russian hating”’. http://yakov.works/spravki/5_russia_ukaz/21_ru_bio/Teterin.htm [Accessed 
26.03.20] Also Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2082349, 24.05.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]. The author of 
this post published two documents, one from Radio Radonezh and the other from an open letter to the 
Commission of Inquiry. Cf. also Scorer, Prot. P., interview with Natalia Golytsina, Radio Svoboda, 13.06.06. 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/160895.html [Accessed 20.01.20]. For Fr Andrei Teterin’s understanding of the 
situation, cf. Tema: #53307, Soobshchenie: #1997523, 14.04.02 [Accessed 20.01.20].  
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scandals).66 A statement from pro-Moscow parishioners broadened the 
supposed Russophobia out from Sourozh: ‘The main target is the great and 
holy and especially revered Russian Church … The impression is given that the 
leadership of the Sourozh Diocese and the London cathedral have made it their 
goal to force the new arrivals here to forget that they are Russian and that 
their Church is Russian Orthodox.’67 
When the crisis finally came to a head, this issue produced deep 
emotions on both sides. After Bishop Basil’s announcement in church in May 
2006 about leaving the Moscow Patriarchate, several bloggers reported cries 
from the congregation: ‘Russians! Remember that you are Russians!’ and ‘We 
will not give up our church to foreigners!’.68 According to several reports, a 
long-serving member of the parish who had smuggled bibles into the Soviet 
Union, and for this received an award from the Patriarch, was verbally abused, 
spat at in the face and told ‘this is no longer your place’.69 The same blogger 
reported that the English were told they were there only ‘as guests’ of the 
Russians.70 All these claims were disputed by the pro-Moscow bloggers as pure 
fantasy.71  
Although the majority of the accusations of extreme behaviour were 
made by the anti-Moscow group, they were certainly not restricted to that 
side. An English pro-Moscow blogger, for example, wrote that some of Bishop 
 
66 Shramko, A., ‘Tserkov bez territorii: o nedavnikh sobytiakh v Surozhskoi eparkhii’, portal-credo.ru, Lenta 
novostei, 12.06.06  
67 Prikhozhane Londonskogo sobora, ‘Gliadia iz Londona’, 04.06. https://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/ 
[Accessed 20.01.20]  
68 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2239930, 08.08.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]. Cf. also ‘Otkrytoe pis'mo 
Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizhenia v Velikobritanii’, 07.02.06. http://www.religare.ru/2_25805_1_21.html 
[Accessed 28.09.19]. This interesting letter, a riposte to Fr Andre Teterin by the Russian Christian Movement, 
reflected many of the thematic issues of this thesis: the accusations of Soviet-style agitprop, the influence of 
the Russian State, the objective of control of the diaspora. It also critiqued the accusation that the anti-
Moscow group were determined to make ‘Russians forget they are Russians’. 
69 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2240007, 08.08.06 [Accessed 20.01.20] 
70 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2240317, 08.08.06 [Accessed 20.01.20]. Cf. also Kirillova, I., 
‘Mnenie’, portal-credo.ru, 2006. https://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=584 [Accessed 20.01.20] 
71 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshcheniе: #2240057, 08.08.06 [Accessed 20.01.20] 
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Basil’s supporters ‘took disrespect to another level’ during the diocesan 
conference that immediately followed the schism, shouting at Archbishop 
Innokenty, interrupting his speech, making gestures at him and calling him a 
KGB spy. For this parishioner, this behaviour was a great insult ‘to all those 
who have suffered under communism and held their faith’.72 Such events are 
disputed, but whether they really took place as described or not, the point 
here is that relations between the two sides were at such a low ebb that 
people felt they could have been true.  
Jeering, pushing, spitting; this may seem a surprising description of a 
modern church congregation in Britain. But such animosity is observable 
elsewhere in the Orthodox Church when jurisdictions and denominations 
collide. Physical battles involving both clergy and laity in the shared sites in the 
Holy Land are still an occasional problem, and the tense situation in Ukraine, 
where Latin Catholic, Uniate and various Orthodox jurisdictions overlap, often 
erupts into violence, some of it serious.   
 Reports of events such as those described above, coupled with the large 
numbers of the new arrivals, encouraged the anti-Moscow group in their fears 
of being ‘swamped’ and ‘invaded’. A blogger calling themselves ‘A Worried 
Orthodox Christian’ wrote, ‘The new Russians invaded the London Parish by 
sheer numbers, easily outnumbering the “older” parishioners by 50 to 1, and 
possibly double or even triple that. Suddenly the “older” parishioners realised 
they had been pushed aside and even pushed out.’73 Alexander Shramko wrote 
that that the Russification of Sourozh was inevitable and was happening across 
the diaspora through people who, though far from the Church at home, were 
drawn to it now they were abroad as a ‘national club’.74 He went on to make 
 
72 OCAD. The Times Online, 16.06.06 
73 OCAD. The Times Online, 03.06.06 
74 Shramko, A., ‘Russkie idut’, Tsarkva, 24.11.07. https://churchby.info/rus/164 [Accessed 19.05.20] 
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the link between nationality and Orthodoxy, stating that for these people, ‘the 
uncomplicated logic is developed, Russian means Orthodox and so if its “more 
Russian” so it must be “more Orthodox”’.75 An article on portal-credo.ru also 
emphasised that the neophytes in Sourozh were not generally churchgoers in 
the Motherland, but only sought out the church abroad as a familiar cultural 
support, stating, ‘And here one must speak clearly – they are precisely drawn 
to the Russian Church and not to Orthodoxy.’76 The poet Boris Kolymagin, 
commenting on the crisis from within Russia wrote of, ‘this new wave of 
Sadducees who see in the Church only a combination of ritualistic services and 
a cultural-nostalgic centre for “connection to the Motherland”’.77  
 Whether or not there was a deliberate policy of Russification of the 
diaspora by Moscow is difficult to ascertain. What is important is that this was 
felt to be the case by the anti-Moscow parishioners. As we shall see in 
Chapters 5 and 6, local events were coupled with strong rhetoric from the 
centres of power of Church and state, and while the term ‘Russification’ was 
itself avoided, there was much parallel terminology. ‘Russification’ is an 
emotive word with associations with late-Imperial Russian policy in the Baltic 
States and Ukraine, and the even more violent actions of the Soviet state in 
these areas. The aim in both cases was to supress local cultures deemed 
potentially harmful to the unity of the empire. Russification, especially under 
the Soviets, would result in millions of victims, and so for some in Sourozh, 
Russification had connotations of powerlessness in the face of an innumerable 
foe. In turn, those accused of Russification in Sourozh also felt outnumbered 
and on the defensive in a foreign land.  
 
75 Shramko, A., ibid. (author trans.) 
76 Cf. portal-credo.ru, ‘Mezhdunarodnaia Tserkov’ dlia russkikh’. http://www.portal-
credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=204 11.04.2003 [Accessed 20.01.20]    




Theme 4: Conspiracy Theories 
 
On 19 June 2006, a blogger called An Orthodox Christian wrote on The Times 
Online site, ‘Something exceptional happened on the website of the Diocese of 
Sourozh; since the middle of May 2006 when Archbishop Innokenty was 
appointed temporary administrator – A Russian flag suddenly appeared on its 
home page! What is it telling us?’. To which the response came, posted by 
webarchdeacon, ‘It is telling you that you are starting to read your Diocesan 
webpage in English. If you like to start reading in Russian, there will be a British 
flag proudly appearing next to the diocese name. Maybe it is a conspiracy too, 
and the “Hand of Moscow” trying secretly support British cricket team to get 
to you this way?’.78 It is an amusing anecdote but had a serious aspect, from 
the outset, the crisis was – on both sides – rife with conspiracy theories. The 
paranoia seemed to mushroom in the new and unregulated online 
environment where much of the debate was conducted. An interviewee 
remarked, ‘I had better to study the intricacies of group hysteria if I wanted to 
understand this crisis’.79  
 The behavioural psychologist Peter Kreko emphasised the role of 
conspiracy theories in simplifying chaotic and inconsistent events in times of 
crisis: ‘conspiracy theories are cognitive, as they aim to provide the group and 
its members with an often satisfactory and comfortable explanation of the 
social and political world, its events and mechanisms … They help to dissolve 
contradictions, inconsistencies and dissonances, and they give simple 
deductive explanations to a broad range of complex phenomena.’80 He also 
emphasised their importance in the creation and maintenance of group 
 
78 OCAD. The Times Online, 19.06.06 
79 Interview 1Ha 
80 Kreko, P., ‘Conspiracy Theory as Collective Motivate Cognition’ in Bilewicz, M., Cichocka, A. and Soral, W. 
(eds.), The Psychology of Conspiracy (London, 2015), p.65  
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identity, in the way they ‘[strengthen] group boundaries, provide an outlet to 
hostility and increase collective self-esteem, detect the threats against the in-
group and help interpret the past in a way that fits the group’s interests … and 
help manage the level of in-group anxiety when some unexpected events 
(crises, tragedies) occur.’81  
The presumption of behavioural psychology that all conspiracy theories 
are unfounded does not leave room for the possibility that some conspiracy 
theories may actually be true, at least to some degree. It is always difficult to 
sift out the justifiable fears and truths of conspiracy theories from paranoia 
and inflation. In Sourozh, accusations often went a long way back in time, 
making verification difficult. Sometimes the conspiratorial accusations of the 
two sides were remarkably similar (even identical) and heavily laden with the 
profound suspicions with which the opponents viewed each other. The pro-
Moscow group were ‘KGB spies’ bent on the destruction of the diocese; the 
anti-Moscow group were ‘a Masonic clique’ who had been plotting for years to 
remove themselves from Moscow’s grasp.82 Both sides focused on the 
supposedly mercenary interests of the other group. The pro-Moscow group 
spoke about the attempt to keep hold of (or seize, depending one’s viewpoint) 
the highly valuable property following the schism. They also cast doubt on the 
sale of Pushkin House, insinuating shady dealings, and the intention to deprive 
Russians of a cultural centre.83 The anti-Moscow group emphasised the ‘fiscal 
greed’ of Moscow in the reclamation of property abroad, stating that behind 
this plan lay the ever-present hand of the Russian State. 
 
 
81 Ibid.  
82 Cirota.ru, Tema #53307, Soobshenie #1907853, 03.07.06 [Accessed 05.05.19] 




Conspiracy theories of the anti-Moscow group  
The main conspiracy theory of the anti-Moscow group was that the crisis was 
an artificial creation of a small group of activists working in conjunction with 
the DECR and the Russian State.  The intention was to create a schism in order 
to purge the diocese of undesirable elements.84 This theory was reiterated in 
the contested open letter of Metropolitan Anthony that identified the DECR as 
the instigator of the crisis and claimed that Metropolitan Hilarion deliberately 
avoided contact with the diocesan management:  
For you, they became enemies when in fact they are the preservers of 
the structure of our Diocese, who defend us from the DECR 
management, which many Russians do not trust because of the complex 
relations which existed and perhaps still exist between the Church and 
the State. Evidently, through you the DECR wants to manage the entire 
Russian Diaspora.85  
Agreeing with this theory, one parishioner wrote on a Russian forum that, ‘The 
troubles were deliberately organised, with support from the outside and this 
became the real reason for the impossibility of solving the existing problems 
and disagreements’.86 In an earlier post, the same parishioner had been still 
clearer in writing that the pro-Moscow group were not at all interested in 
solving the crisis, but only in the creation of more problems and the further 
development of the troubles.87 He suggested that the pro-Moscow group had 
panicked, thinking that the troubles might be ‘on the brink of being solved’ 
with the formation of new parishes specifically targeted at the new arrivals. 
This had led Moscow to invent still more schemes for causing disturbances.88 
 
84 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshcheniе: #2226599, 01.08.06 [Accessed 05.05.19] 
85 ‘Otkrytoe pis’mo Mitropolita Antonia Surozhskogo…’ NG Religii, No. 6, 21.08.02, op.cit.  (author trans.).  
86 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2280662, 25.08.06 (author trans.) [Accessed 05.05.19] 
87 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshcheniе: #2226599, 01.08.06 (author trans.) [Accessed 05.05.19] 
88 Ibid. cirota.ru   
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Hand in hand with these theories went personal accusations that people 
were ‘fulfilling orders’ from ‘above’ (presumably the DECR or the Russian 
State) and that people were not who they said they were.89 Lists of names and 
‘key players’ were published by both sides, but especially by the anti-Moscow 
group.90 The online debates themselves came under suspicion, one blogger 
writing that, ‘I’m afraid that the discussion on the forum has again become an 
organised campaign like an “artillery barrage” preceding the arrival into the 
Sourozh diocese of Fr Mikhail Dudko before Easter as the “auditor” from the 
DECR.’91 The anti-Moscow group often used such militaristic descriptions with 
an obvious nod towards the Cold War and the KGB. A parishioner spoke of ‘the 
divisive activity of the “militant Russians” who follow the traditional 
techniques of Soviet propaganda professionals by encouraging the creation of 
enclaves of direct patriarchal rule.’92 
 Finally, there were insinuations of Russian mafia involvement in the 
crisis. London had become the second home of wealthy Russian businessmen, 
who were able to make donations to church funds well beyond the means of 
any of the locals. Vladimir Potanin was one donor and Roman Abramovich’s 
children were baptised in the cathedral.93 Oleg Deripaska’s donation of a 
million pounds to the Manchester church (a small local parish) was portrayed 
in the British media as a kind of stealth takeover by the Russians, in light of the 
fact that the parish had supposedly changed jurisdictions following the 
donation.94 Although this switch of jurisdictions turned out to have been 
mistakenly reported, nevertheless it does seem that towards the end of the 
 
89 E.g. cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2164250, 02.07.06 [Accessed 05.05.19] 
90 Cf. Kobelev, V., ‘Kto stoit za statei dvukh surozhian: russkaia partia v Surozhskoi eparkhii’. 
https://credo.press/36695/ [Accessed 08.02.20] 
91 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2082068, 23.05.06 [Accessed 05.05.19] 
92 OCAD..‘From a Russian Sourozh Parishioner …’, op. cit.  
93 Konovalov, V., Article, Trud, No. 186, 12.10.07 
94 Vallely, P., The Independent, 11.02.09 
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crisis, the Manchester parish did become the centre of pro-Moscow resistance 
to Bishop Basil in the UK.95 This attention to and fear of the new wealth was 
reflected in Bishop Basil’s letter to the Moscow Patriarch dated 1 May 2006.96 
He also claimed on the BBC that the crisis was a ‘premeditated plan’ of 
Moscow’s to ensure that the Diocese be ‘under their strict control’.97  
 
Conspiracy theories of the pro-Moscow group  
The pro-Moscow group also claimed that the schism had been prepared in 
advance and in fact long before the events of 2006. A ROCOR priest wrote that 
Bishop Basil had mentioned switching jurisdictions as early as 1982.98 The 
principal conspiracy theory of the pro-Moscow group was that the crisis was an 
artificial creation of a small but powerful clique centred around Bishop Basil, 
who would do anything to preserve their power and interests.99 Bishop Basil’s 
removal of the pro-Moscow supporters from the parish council was perceived 
as an attempt to amend the Trust deeds to ensure control of the property 
following any schism.100 A priest who remained in Sourozh commented, ‘It 
makes you wonder whether they were planning what happened when 
Metropolitan Anthony was called to his reward…the idea was that Basil would 
take over.’101 
 
95 Kirillova, I., ‘Mnenie’, portal-credo.ru, 2006. https://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=584 
[Accessed 19.01.19]  
96 OCAD. Documents from Dioceseinfo.org. Bishop Basil Osborne, Open Letter, 01.05.06   
97 Bishop Basil, BBC interview, op. cit.  
98 ‘In 1982 the then Fr Basil Osborne, whom I had first met when he was a young deacon in 1972, told me that 
the clear intention of the ruling clique of liberal academics in Sourozh (mainly convert clergy) was to “go over 
to the Greeks” as soon as Metr Antony was dead.’ Interview 1C. Cf cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: 
#2280530, 25.08.06. ‘The schism with the Moscow Patriarchate was prepared long ago and the decision about 
the move to the Patriarchate of Constantinople in any case would have been taken regardless of the 
development of events’. (author trans.)  
99 Interview 1A, ‘I think MA was manipulated, he was very old and ill.’ And interview 1C  
100 Cf. Chapter 2 on property disputes  
101 Interview 1A 
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A parishioner related in an interview how, as a relative neophyte to 
Sourozh at the time and as an Englishman, he was swept up in this air of 
intrigue while attending meetings in key parishioners’ houses.102 Later he 
wrote publicly, ‘Why was a pressure group of English and Old Russian 
parishioners formed? What was the purpose of these meetings? Was the 
purpose of the meetings to discuss how to manipulate parishioners?’.103    
Pro-Moscow supporters stated that many of the supposed complaints 
were actually false flag inventions. They said they had never demanded that 
the liturgy be only in Slavonic and that this was part of a conspiracy to discredit 
them, citing Fr Andrei Teterin’s offer to hold services in English.104 The pro-
Moscow group also published lists of names of supposed conspirators and 
their roles, and Metropolitan Hilarion himself wrote that in his view the crisis 
was a result of the activities of four or five people whose names he gave.105 In 
the blogs and unofficial media, the insinuation was made that Bishop Basil was 
a freemason, and this was repeated several times during interviews.106  
One cause for the generation of conspiracy theories on the pro-Moscow 
side was a feeling of exclusion from the centres of diocesan power.107 There 
was increasing frustration about remaining unrepresented on all the decision-
making bodies. Parishioners claimed they were not allowed to speak at parish 
meetings and that the labyrinthine web of English allegiances and social mores 
served to obfuscate and exclude Moscow’s supporters. A feeling of exclusion 
from the traditional channels of expressing grievances led to an increase in 
petitions, open letters and blogs. One such open letter to the Patriarch dated 
 
102 Interview 2D, ‘I used to go to the house meetings of 30 -40 people who would talk about how they could 
control the church.’ 
103 OCAD. The Times Online, 16.06.06  
104 cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2077328, 21.05.06 [Accessed 19.01.19] 
105 Cf. Alfeev, Hilarion, ‘Surozhskaia Smuta’, op.cit.  
106 Interview 2Ea 
107 Tserkovnyi Vestnik, No. 1–2 (Jan 2004), pp.278–9  
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12 January 2003 complained that over 90 percent of the parish council seats 
were still ‘English-speaking’ and ended, ‘We are tired of all kinds of secrecy at 
all levels of Church governance, craftily termed “confidentiality”’.108 It was not 
only ethnic Russians who had these feelings. An English priest, who could be 
described as perhaps the most ‘neutral’ in the crisis, complained about the 
opacity of some of the diocesan council’s activities.109 He noted how meetings 
had been called without his invitation, as well as inaccuracies in the reporting 
of events.  
 It seems that both sides were convinced of their own conspiracy 
theories (one pro-Moscow supporter wrote that ‘only a blind person couldn’t 
see what was really going on in the diocese”110) and this was partly because 
there was an element of truth in both sets of accusations. For example, it was 
true that both groups had a small but motivated group of activists and a much 
larger group of less committed fellow travellers. Both sides did appeal to 
higher powers beyond the borders of the UK (Constantinople and Moscow) 
and used their connections with the media and establishment as best they 
could.  
 Another reason why the conspiracy theories arose and seemed so 
credible was perhaps the problem with communication between the two sides. 
Firstly, of course there was the language barrier, and added to this was Bishop 
Basil’s reluctance or inability to communicate effectively what was happening.  
A parishioner wrote that the ‘arbitrariness’ of Bishop Basil was hard not to 
notice and that meetings called to discuss the situation were then cancelled 
 
108 ‘Pis’mo prikhozhan Londonskogo sobora sviateishemu patriarkhu Moskovskomu i vseia Rusi Aleksiu’, 
15.01.03. Reprinted in Khronika Suruzhskoi Smuty (SP, 2007) 
109 Armour, Fr R., ‘O deklaratsii chlenov Eparkhal’nogo soveta’, 01.02.02. 
http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=22 [Accessed 24.03.20]  
110 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2077328, 21.05.06 [Accessed 24.03.20] 
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without notice.111 Another wrote that he never really addressed what was 
going on, apart from in his two-minute statement after the liturgy about 
transferring the diocese to Constantinople.112 
 
 
Theme 5: The Media  
 
Most reports of the crisis that appeared in the British media took a negative 
view of the new immigrants and the supporters of Moscow. The crisis provided 
an opportunity for the media to discuss the Russian Church and most of the 
articles (even those in scholarly publications) included many sweeping 
generalisations and clichés. An article in the liberal Catholic weekly The Tablet 
is a typical example: ‘since the fall of Communism, the prevailing mood in the 
Orthodox Church in Russia has been increasingly inward-looking and 
exclusivist. It has attracted large numbers of new zealots, who often have no 
background in Orthodoxy, but are motivated by patriotism, a hankering after 
order and ritual, and conservative social and political values.’113   
The media battle was not confined to the UK but quickly broadened out 
into Europe, the USA and Russia. The European media compared Sourozh with 
often-similar experiences in Russian parishes in France, Switzerland, Germany 
and Italy. A long article by Dr Gerd Stricker, critical of Moscow and entitled 
‘Moscow’s Heavy Hand’, appeared in the Swiss academic journal Religion und 
Gesellshaft in Ost und West. It listed the now-familiar accusations of a 
‘Moscow takeover’ and suggested that Moscow had instigated the crisis for 
political gain.114 The article described a similar situation in Vienna, in which the 
 
111 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2281542, 26.08.06 [Accessed 13.05.20] 
112 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2164989, 04.07.06 (author trans.) [Accessed 13.05.20]  
113 Hirst, M., ‘Mutiny Against Moscow’, The Tablet, 27.05.06 
114 G2W, 20.10.02, p.23ff.  
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newly appointed bishop Paul Pomianov had promoted ‘post-Soviet crudeness’ 
(unkultur) and ‘tensions between old and new Russians’.115 It ended by 
describing the DECR as the catalyst for this Russification.116  
In France, where the diaspora battles were particularly bitter owing to 
the large number of Tsarist-era churches and parishes, Professor Nikita Struve 
became one of the leading spokesmen for the anti-Moscow campaign. His 
several articles on the crisis criticised Moscow’s ‘authoritarianism and 
clericalism’ and lack of sympathy in dealing with the diocese’s ‘unique path’.117  
In Russia, some liberal papers, such as Nezavisimaia Gazeta, came down 
on the side of Bishop Basil, but they were the rarity. The intellectual Deacon 
Kuraev, who had one of the most popular blogs in Russia, expressed pleasure 
that the Moscow Patriarchate had acted decisively and firmly with Bishop 
Basil.118 The crisis was seen more in terms of a power struggle in World 
Orthodoxy between Moscow and Constantinople, rather than as one between 
liberals and traditionalists at the local level. But however sceptical many clerics 
in the Russian Church may have felt about Metropolitan Anthony, overt 
criticism was muted owing to his fame and popularity.  
The Sourozh crisis, which took place in 2002–2007, emerged at roughly 
the same time as the exponential growth of the internet was beginning, 
although it is important to remember that internet usage in 2002–2003 was far 
below that of the present (2020) level and prior to the explosion of the 
smartphone. The International Organisation for Migration Mapping exercise 
for Russians in Britain (2007) stated that ‘More than 60% of respondents use 
 
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid.  
117 Struve, N., Interview with Vladimir Volynskii, portal-credo.ru, Lenta Novostei, 21.06.06. http://www.portal-
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the Internet on a regular basis’.119 However, the new medium was already by 
far the most active channel for receiving (and posting) updates. Reports also 
appeared in the established English and Russian daily papers, and there were 
several interviews and updates about the crisis on the radio in both the UK and 
Russia, including on the BBC. The story was at its most raw as it appeared in 
the unregulated online blog war, which is described below and provides an 
example of how the new technology impacted events. Sometimes the old and 
new technologies coincided, with one of the principal battlegrounds being the 
comments pages of online articles written by The Times newspaper’s religious 
correspondent Ruth Gledhill. 
 Only those who were bilingual could post on both Russian and English 
sites and this excluded a large proportion of the indigenous parishioners, 
regardless of their allegiance. Sometimes there were issues about incorrect 
‘translations’ being used to further the end of one side or the other. 
Metropolitan Hilarion posted a message correcting the translation of a speech 
he had made to the parish, writing, ‘I was not appointed here as the successor 
of Vladyka Anthony, but as his vicar to assist him in administering the diocese’. 
He notes, ‘Subsequently, these words, recorded on a tape recorder, were 
translated into English in such a way that it turned out that I came “to manage 
the diocese’.120 Many documents were translated from English for the main 
Russian Orthodox news blogs, such as portalcredo.ru and the Kuraev forum 
(subsequently cirota.ru), but there was less translation from Russian to English. 
Indeed, it could be suggested that communicating in Russian provided some 
‘cover’ for the Russian-speaking, pro-Moscow supporters, who often spoke 
‘more freely’ when on Russian-language media than in the English language. 
 
119 IOM Mapping Exercise, p.14. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/russia/iom_russia.pdf  
120 Alfeev, Metropolitan H., Statement. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 05.05.19] 
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An example is the interviews and articles by Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev 
after the crisis in 2002, which he complained were translated unofficially and 
not removed.121  
 At the eye of the storm were the diocesan websites sourozh.org and 
dioceseinfo.org. The second website only appeared after the forced 
resignation of Bishop Basil, because on 15 May 2006 he found he could no 
longer edit sourozh.org. The new website was speedily set up and provided the 
main platform for announcements from Bishop Basil and his flock.122  
The old Sourozh site continued with official pronouncements from the 
Patriarchate and the investigative commission, as well as updates and 
comments from parishioners.  What might be termed an information war then 
developed between the two websites, with the preferred medium being 
personal anecdotes and open letters, mixed in with practical information for 
the parish.123  
 
English-language media 
Prot. Peter Scorer mentioned in an interview in Russia that there was less 
interest in the Sourozh story in the UK, even though events took place there.124 
This was mainly the result of the very small number of Russians (or other) 
Orthodox living in the UK, but it also highlighted the secularisation of British 
society that had taken place since the war – religious stories of any kind were 
considered rather un-newsworthy.125 Nevertheless, the story did reach the BBC 
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and all the major broadsheets, and the stance was generally critical of 
Moscow.  
 The old dissident platforms such as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and 
the BBC Russian Service, and more recent channels such as Open Democracy 
published much about the crisis. As might be expected, this coverage was 
generally critical of Moscow. The anti-Moscow group had the advantage of 
long-standing connections with the BBC through Metropolitan Anthony and Fr 
Sergei Gakkel, who had both broadcast on the BBC’s airwaves, along with 
parishioners who had worked there. As with other British media outlets, the 
BBC’s stance on the crisis was generally anti-Moscow.  
Soon after his forced resignation, Bishop Basil was interviewed on BBC 
radio. His interviewer was antagonistic towards Moscow in a rather open 
way.126 The tone of the following examples was typical the questions posed:  
• ‘Why would Moscow be so interested in dividing the parishioners and 
the priests that had existed there for so many years, thus really 
undermining the life of the diocese? Why would they be interested in 
that?’  
• ‘This Father Andrei Teterin and sort of group of people … started writing 
and being rebellious, what happened?’ 
• ‘He [Father Andrei Teterin] wouldn’t dare do it in Russia?’  
• ‘Was he [Father Andrei Teterin] sent to you from the Moscow 
Patriarchate with this behaviour in mind? [To this question Bishop Basil 
 
[Accessed 20.01.20]. Ruth Gledhill, who did report extensively on the crisis for The Times, was the last full-time 
religious correspondent for a national newspaper in the UK. Now there are none.  
126 The interviewer had made no secret of her personal stance, writing on the website opendemocracy.com, 
‘It's about time the world was told the true story about the way the Sourozh Diocese of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in UK was butchered by the Moscow Patriarchate, and the way the priceless Russian Service of the 





was forced to admit that Fr Andrei had in fact been personally chosen 
and invited by himself.]  
Even on Russian portals, there were interviews in a similar vein. When 
Prot. Peter Scorer was interviewed for the Russian website portalcredo.ru, the 
interviewer asked him, ‘Perhaps the DECR also fanned the flames of discontent 
in the diocese?’.127  The pro-Moscow supporters could do nothing about the 
support given to their opponents by the BBC save likewise complain about it 
on Russian media channels. Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev wrote that Fr Sergei 
Gakkel, ‘has for many years whilst working at the BBC in his programs 
systematically poured mud upon the hierarchy of the Russian Church, 
reproducing the slander and lies spread by the Western media’.128 
 The broadsheets were more neutral, but a generally anti-Moscow 
perspective can be identified here too.129 Ruth Gledhill’s articles in The Times 
attempted to be even-handed and to give the opposing view, while at the 
same time employing language that sometimes undermined this neutral 
stance. For example, an article of 17 May 2006 wrote that, ‘The Moscow 
Patriarchate has set up a commission to look into what it is calling “a crisis” in 
the Russian Orthodox Church in Britain.’130 It is a minor point, but such nuances 
cast doubt on the purported impartiality of much of the British media. The 
language of all channels in the UK was heavily laden with such euphemisms 
and innuendos. The Russian channels were more direct in their partisanship, 
perhaps reflecting the cultural differences previously discussed.   
There was one other UK online source for information during the crisis 
and this was the blog of Fr Andrew Phillips, a parish priest in East Anglia, in the 
 
127 Intervieu: Protodiakon Petr, 19.06.2006. http://portal-credo.ru/site/print.php?act=news&id=44347 
[Accessed 28.09.19]  
128Cf. Alfeev, H., ‘Surozhskaya Smuta’, 2003, op.cit.  (author trans.).  
129 Mimo, C., The Independent, 18.05.06, and Petre, J., The Telegraph, 30.05.06 
130 Gledhill, R., The Times, 17.05.06 (author’s emphasis)  
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jurisdiction of ROCOR. He had the benefit not only of having known many of 
the protagonists personally, but also of being fluent in Russian and several 
other languages, having studied Russian at Oxford where he had met Bishop 
Basil and others of the British Orthodox intelligentsia. He had also lived in 
Moscow and Paris, so was acquainted with the day-to-day Church life in these 
places. It should be said that Fr Andrew did not at all hide his opinion of the 
anti-Moscow supporters of Bishop Basil. By way of example, a typical title of 
one of his essays was, ‘Sourozh: Russian traditions without the Russian 
Orthodox Faith’. Fr Andrew saw the anti-Moscow faction as a small group of 
intellectual converts and descendants of White émigrés, who had gathered 
around Metropolitan Anthony. Having previously controlled the diocese, they 
had been shocked and dismayed when the ‘real Church’ arrived en masse on 
the doorstep of their churches. In his view, their religion was not Orthodoxy, 
but rather a mixture of High Church Anglicanism mixed with French 
phenomenology.  
 The academic and religious press responded to the crisis with several 
articles that were generally hostile to Moscow, such as those of Xenia Dennon 
(previously mentioned) and Phillip Walters.131 When the court case took place 
in 2009, several years after the crisis, the story resurfaced. It has continued to 
reappear from time to time, usually because of external events affecting 
Anglo-Russian relations. For example, when the BBC closed the Russian Service 
of the World Service in 2011, an article by Irina Shumovitch appeared on the 
website opendemocracy.net. This article took perhaps the strongest of all 
stances against Moscow, beginning: 
 
 
131 E.g. Phillip Walters http://www.faithineurope.org.uk/power.pdf. [Accessed 28.09.19] 
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In 2006 London’s Russian Orthodox Cathedral was controversially taken 
over by Moscow Church authorities. The affair was typical of a wider 
strategy of infiltrating, appropriating, and/or destroying Russian cultural 
property abroad. Unfortunately, last week’s cuts to another Kremlin 
target — the BBC's Russian Service — send out a message that the 
saboteurs have won yet again.132  
 
It is interesting to note how this article immediately called forth another 
comment war on the internet, showing that the matter was far from dead.  
 
 
Russian-language media  
The internet media war in Russia was particularly intense and involved many 
clergy. In Russia, bloggers seem at first to have moved between websites, 
before each settling down at one site. This started to polarise the angle and 
debate of each website. The website portalcredo.ru (often shortened to 
credo.ru) did not have an open chatroom as at other sites, but instead 
published material collected from across the internet and elsewhere. It came 
under fire from pro-Moscow supporters for its supposed partisanship. Prot. 
Peter Scorer, however, who was interviewed by the website maintained that 
the reason why people complained was because it simply ‘tried to give both 
sides’ of the story and that ‘some people didn’t like that’.133 He stated in the 
same interview that there was much interest in the story in Russia.134 Largely, 
this was because of the great fame of Metropolitan Anthony in World 
Orthodoxy, but also because of the bitterness of the struggle and the near 
 
132 Shumovich, I., BBC Russian Service, ‘Farewell to Old Friends’, 31.01.11. op.cit.  
133  Interview with Prot. Peter Scorer, 19.02.06. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=44347 [Accessed 20.01.20]  
134 Ibid.  
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schism between Moscow and Constantinople that occurred as a result. 
Certainly, similar crises in Paris, Nice, Budapest and other cities did not call 
forth nearly the same degree of interest. In Russian Orthodox teaching 
manuals, the Sourozh crisis often appears as the example par excellence of 
enculturation versus newcomers.135 Even the sensationalist Moscow tabloid 
Moskovskii Komosomolets published articles on the crisis, linking it to Boris 
Berezovsky and other expat Russian oligarchs, whose lives fascinate the tabloid 
readership in Russia.136  
The liberal Orthodox site portal-credo.ru came under criticism from 
other bloggers both within Russia and without. A regular blogger spoke of 
portalcredo.ru as ‘a group of maniacs who hate the Russian Orthodox Church’ 
and who ‘should be the subject of attention of Russian special services’.137 
Another commentator noted that it was ‘simply not possible not to notice that 
they breathe malice towards Orthodoxy in general’.138 Another wrote that ‘on 
credo.ru is a lot of dirt’.139 Such comments typify the heightened passions in 
Russia and the variance with the British debate. While it was true that portal-
credo.ru published many articles critical of Moscow, such as the long article, 
‘An international church for Russians’140, they also published articles such as 
the much-reprinted and strongly pro-Moscow open letter, ‘Sourozh: a view 
from the inside’141, in addition to articles from the official MP organ and pro-
Moscow journal Tserkovnii Vestnik.142 
 
135 E.g. Koslov, Prot. M., Klir i Mir: kniga o zhizni sovremennogo prikhoda (Moscow, 2010), p.343 
136 Bychkov, S., ‘Pravoslavnye ushli po-angliiski: A mitropolit Gundiaev deistvuet po-berezovski’, Moskovskii 
Komosomolets, 20.06.06 
137 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2115888, 08.06.06 [Accessed 04.02.20]  
138 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2134249, 17.06.06 [Accessed 04.02.20] 
139 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2134249, 17.06.06 [Accessed 04.02.20] 
140 ‘Mezhdunarodnaia Tserkov’ dlia russkikh’, http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=comment&id=204 
[Accessed 04.02.20] 
141 Sourozh: Vzgliad iznutry’,  http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=17638 [Accessed 04.02.20] 




Some bloggers in Russia recognized the problems caused by their 
distance from the events in Sourozh and noted that it was ‘almost impossible’ 
to work out who was in the right, as both sides seemed to have grounds. But 
such even-handed comments were in the minority.143 Russian chatrooms and 
comments pages were also used by participants in the crisis, which resulted in 
online communities developing an expectation of news from those on the 
scene. There were frequent requests to bloggers in London to ‘tell us more 
news!’. One blogger, who passionately opposed Moscow, and was a frequent 
visitor to several blogs, stated that it was ‘practically impossible’ to understand 
this situation ‘from the outside’, and that in order to understand what was 
happening, ‘it is necessary to live here and to live long enough to understand 
what is going on’.144  
 The Russian media were concerned less with the specifics of the Sourozh 
crisis than its impact on the reunification of the two parts of the Russian 
Church: the Moscow Patriarchate and the Church Abroad (ROCOR). This was a 
historical event of great importance to Russia, and the two issues, 
interconnected as they were, were often discussed together.  
 Similarly, the later stages of the crisis (or rather the post-crisis 
developments) caught the attention of the secular Russian media to a far 
greater extent. A long article in the Moscow Evening News on the 16 June 2006 
led with photos of Bishop Basil, the Patriarch of Moscow and the Ecumenical 
Patriarch and the words, ‘The most powerful Orthodox patriarchs in the world 
– Moscow and Constantinople – for the last 15 years, balanced on the brink of 
war’.145 
 
143 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2067225, 16.05.06 [Accessed 08.02.20]  
144 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2282504, 26.08.06 [Accessed 08.02.20] 
145 Moskovskie Novosti, 16.06.06  
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 The official ITAR-TASS News Agency published a great many documents 
and updates on the development of the crisis. As might be expected from a 
state broadcasting company, the agency was rarely critical of the pro-Moscow 
group in Sourozh. Personalities whose comments were reported on the site 
included the Patriarch, Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev and Protodeacon 
Vsevolod Chaplin in Moscow. The latter’s comments sometimes went to the 
heart of the matter, stating for example on 31 May that the Church ‘will not be 
the Church unless she is able to combine different languages, cultures and 
private opinions’.146 He ended laconically that, ‘The Church would have died 
long ago if she had been transformed into a club for people who are nice to 
each other’.147 
The anti-Moscow Russian speakers criticised the media portal clustered 
around the Moscow radio station Radonezh. An article by Mikhail Pozdniaev 
entitled ‘Sourozh Destroyed’, which appeared in the newspaper Novaya 
Izvestia, came out strongly against the Moscow Patriarchate and complained 
about the ‘spirit of Radonezh’ that now reigned in the Church.148 The phrase 
was borrowed from an article by Prot. Peter Scorer, which stated 'They not 
only don’t need Metropolitan Anthony in Russia, from the point of view of the 
authorities he is actually dangerous. Soon his books will disappear from shops; 
his works will be forgotten, and in England, in London, the “Spirit of Radonezh” 
will reign’.149 The interview with Prot. Peter Scorer was only one of several 
such critical of Moscow.150 
 
146 ‘Protoierei Chaplin o konflikte Surozhskoi eparkjii’, 31.05.06 
https://www.newsru.com/religy/31may2006/chapline.html [Accessed 08.02.20]  
147 Ibid.  
148 Pozdiaev, M., ‘Surozh razrushen’, Novaya Izvestia, 19.06.06 
149 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2167405, 04.07.06 [Accessed 08.02.20] 
150 Cf. Kolymagin, B., ‘Saddukei na marshe’, 05.06.06. http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=fresh&id=483  
[Accessed 08.02.20]  
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 An interesting insight into the crisis was provided by Yuly Dubov, who 
was interviewed by the opposition paper Ezhenedel’niy Zhurnal. Dubov was a 
close business associate of Boris Berezovsky and had made London his home, 
where he wrote Russian bestsellers about oligarchs. One might have expected 
him to take a dim view of Moscow’s role in the affair, but instead he viewed 
the events as a simple human power struggle between individuals, writing ‘I’m 
inclined to think that what happened was the consequence of a thoughtless 
struggle for who will be top in the house – “We’re more numerous” say the 
“New Russians”, “and that means we will impose our will”. “But we were here 
first!” reply the “Old Russians”’.151  
 The Muscovite intellectual/academic press was largely against Moscow 
in the crisis – a classic example of this being the previously mentioned long 
article in the Russian Journal by Alexander Shramko entitled ‘The Russians are 
Coming! Are the Fears of Western Orthodox Justified?’.152 The article tied the 
events into the new search for Russian identity after the collapse of 
communism, locating it in the newly resurgent drive of neo-Slavophile 
internationalism. The article went on to criticise the conservative and 
traditionalist Orthodoxy of the Church in Russia while praising the liberal 
Orthodoxy of Metropolitan Anthony, open to modernity and pluralism.  
 The interest did not disappear after the events themselves had receded 
from the newspapers. On 26 September 2006, Nikolai Bobrinsky published an 
article in the journal My v Rossii i zarubezh’e entitled ‘Sourozh after Sourozh: 
Impressions of an Outside Observer’, in which he visited the cathedral on a trip 
from Moscow, noting that everything was much the same as it had been 
 
151 Dubov, Iu., ‘V raskole vinovaty vse, i vladika Vasilii ne iskluchenie’, 16.07.06, Ezhehedel’nyi Zhurnal, 16.06.06 (author 
trans.). http://www.ej.ru/vision/entry/4062/ [Accessed 20.01.20]  
152 Shramko, A., ‘Russkie idut’, Russkii Zhurnal, 25.10.07, op.cit.  
158 
 
before, but that there was a certain ‘upset and disquiet’ due to the fact that 
the schism had ‘divided close friends’ and ‘destroyed life’ in the parish.153 
 
Analysis of the Media  
In conclusion, it can be said that the reports in the Russian secular media 
reflected positions in Russian society at large and that religious media channels 
reflected divisions in the Church. In this respect, the debate in the Russian 
media was more diverse than that in the West which, as we have seen, 
presented a more unified anti-Moscow approach to the crisis. The reports that 
emerged in the Russian media also reflected the ‘media savviness’ and 
available resources of their authors. For example, in the religious media there 
were many articles taking an anti-Moscow and pro-Bishop Basil stance, 
because support for the latter came from the small but active group of liberal-
leaning Russian Orthodox intellectuals. The members of this Moscow-based 
group saw themselves as the spiritual children of Metropolitan Anthony and 
similar figures in Russia, such as Frs Alexander Men, Alexander Ogorodnikov 
and the Biblical scholar Fr Giorgy Kochetkov.154 The Moscow church of SS 
Kosmas and Damien is the spiritual centre of this group,155 which has been at 
odds with the conservative tendency in the Church ever since the 1990s in 
much the same way as the Sourozh parish of Metropolitan Anthony came into 
conflict with Moscow. The new arrivals in Sourozh who complained that the 
practices there were alien to those they knew in Russia need only have gone to 
the church of SS Kosmas and Damien to witness, in a Russian parish; 
 
153 My v Rossii i zarubezh’e, No. 4 (2006) 
154 Dudarev, A., ‘Smena Tserkovnoi Normy?’, http://www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/personalities/6435/ 
[Accessed 20.01.20]  
155 The church of SS Kosmas and Damien is also known as the artists and writers’ church and was where the 
spiritual mission of Fr Alexander Men was continued by his disciples. Cf. Burke, D., ‘The Russian Orthodox 
Church of Saints Cosmas and Damian’, Anglican and Episcopal History, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sept. 1994), pp. 401–407 
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experiments with the vernacular, a much greater emphasis on the role of 
women and the laity, along with ecumenical activity and a very developed 
program of social outreach. Several key figures in this parish were the spiritual 
children of Metropolitan Anthony and seminars on his legacy still take place 
there regularly.  
 A study of this group of Muscovite Orthodox intellectuals would be a 
thesis of itself. Some moved to the mainstream, conservative Church, but 
many drifted away from religion altogether or, like the dissident Fr Gleb 
Yakunin, left canonical Orthodoxy to join schismatic groups. Nevertheless, at 
the time of the crisis and even today they are still a force to be reckoned with 
in terms of their social activity and media presence. As many were writers, 
their media output was greatly disproportionate to their numbers and it would 
be easy, if evaluating the crisis on the evidence of the Russian media alone, to 
assume that much of the Church was against Moscow’s actions. In fact, it is 
probably fair to say that the great majority of churchgoers in Russia were 
either unaware of the crisis, and, if they had been aware, would have 
supported Moscow against Bishop Basil.  
The intellectual-liberal Orthodox in Russia took such an interest in the 
story because they themselves felt threatened by the Patriarchate. Although 
the parish of SS Cosmas and Damien has support from the head of the DECR, 
Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev,156 Fr Kotechtkov has been withdrawn from his 
parish and forbidden to teach. Other Orthodox intellectuals, sometimes critical 
of the official Church, such as the famous Deacon Kuraev, have been in 
constant trouble with the Patriarchate. There have been attacks on – even 
 
156 Cf., Metroplitan Hilarion’s 2012 sermon at the church of SS Kosmas and Damien in which he praised it as ‘a 
model parish’. ‘Mitropolit Ilarion sovershil bogosluzhenie v stolichnom khrame sviatykh Kosmy i Damiana v 
Shubine’, 07.04.12, http://www.hilarion.ru/temple/mitropolit-ilarion-sovershil-bogosluzhenie-v-stolichnom-
khrame-svyatykh-kosmy-i-damiana-v-shubine.html [Accessed 20.01.20]  
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murders – of such figures, most notably that in 2013 of Fr Pavel Adelheim, a 
Gulag survivor who had written a book critical of verticality in Church 
governance.157 In addition, there has been a low-intensity campaign against 
Orthodox intellectuals throughout the clergy and grassroots. On 5 May 1998, 
an (in)famous book burning took place in Ekaterinburg at the instigation of the 
local bishop. Works by Alexander Schmemann, John Meyendorff, Nikolai 
Afanasiev and Alexander Men were confiscated from teaching establishments 
and publicly burned as liberal and heretical texts. Most mainstream churches 
will contain multiple religious pamphlets deploring modernism, liberalism, 
ecumenism, modern dress, intellectualism, westernism, feminism and 
homosexuality. All of this has led to the Orthodox intelligentsia in Russia 
feeling embattled, and their coverage of the Sourozh crisis offered an 
opportunity to express those fears.  
 Finally, sometimes the press organs themselves attempted to affect the 
crisis through a careful editing of events. An example was the publication of 
the two pivotal open letters of Metropolitan Anthony and Metropolitan 
Hilarion Alfeev in the Russian newspaper supplement NG Religii.  Metropolitan 
Hilarion’s words speak for themselves:  
The editors of the newspaper NG-Religii received an open letter from 
Vladyka Anthony. The newspaper employees did not show me this 
letter, but they reported that they were preparing material on the 
conflict in the Diocese of Sourozh and that they already had material 
sent by the diocese, and asked if I would like to state my point of view 
on the situation. I provided them with material which they published 
with abbreviations. But in parallel, they printed a letter from Vladyka 
 
157 Krotov, Ia.,‘Ubiystvo pskovskogo sviashchennika Pavla Adel'geima - sluchaynost' ili 
zakonomernost'?’10.08.13,  https://www.svoboda.org/a/25067480.html [Accessed 20.01.20]  
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Anthony, with which I was not acquainted. It looked like Vladyka 
Anthony had written in answer to my material. In fact, neither he saw 
my text, nor I his. The dialogue was, if you like, ‘staged’. But the result 
was the way journalists wanted to see it.158  
As is often the case, journalism on both sides was interested in promoting the 
polarised drama and conflict of the events, rather than exploring the nuances 
of similarity and difference.  
 
 
158 Online Archive Caves Monastery Kiev. http://pml.org.ua. Interview with Metropolitan Hilarion, 02.20.02 
(author trans.). ‘Interv'iu episkopa Podol'skogo Ilariona (Alfeyeva),predstavitelia RPTS pri Yevrosoiuze 
ofitsial'nomu saitu Kievo-Pecherskoi Lavry’, 
http://pml.org.ua/userfiles/library/autors/%5Balfeev_ilarion%5Dintervyu_episkopa_podolskogo_ilariona_%28
alfeeva%29%2C_predstavitelya_rpts_pri_evrosoyuze_ofitsialnomu_sajtu_kievo-pecherskoj_lavry.pdf  
[Accessed 06.05.19]  
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Chapter 4 Enculturation and Preservation: Praxis and Devotion 
Differences between the two sides in Sourozh were perceivable in ‘ingrained’ 
behaviour and devotional habits. These themselves were sometimes related to 
background, education, and class. Some of these tensions already existed 
within Russia but were heightened by the diaspora situation. The insecurities 
of émigré life can accentuate and entrench customs and beliefs which are 
taken for granted in the Motherland.1  
Theme 1: Social Class  
In addition to divisions along ethno-linguistic and political (traditionalist versus 
liberal) lines, there were perceived differences of social class in Sourozh. 
However, participants in the crisis tended to refer to class only obliquely, as 
reference to it was uncomfortable for both parties.2 While it was true that 
Metropolitan Anthony had been a great missionary to the English, it was also 
undeniable that many converts came (in the words of a Sourozh priest) ‘from a 
very particular class from the British Establishment’.3 Converts were often 
Oxbridge-educated High Church Anglicans or Anglo-Catholics.4 These people 
mixed easily with the first wave of post-Revolutionary émigrés, but they were 
less attuned in behaviour and attitudes to the Russians arriving from the mid-
1990s.5 A Russian parishioner wrote in the comments page of The Times 
Online, ‘Bishop Basil and his supporters have always wanted their “British 
Church” free from things Russian and “foreign”. Unfortunately, this group has 
 
1 By comparison, several studies of Muslim and Hindu diaspora communities have noted how émigré life can 
emphasise conservative practices (such as Sharia law and the caste system) as communities resist the cultural 
pressures of their new homeland. Cf. Banerjee, Dr. C.,‘Identities, Diasporas, Cosmopolitanisms, and the 
Possibility of Global Humanities’, Contours Journal,  Issue 4: Summer 2014 and Gopal, P., ‘Dominating the 
diaspora’ , Himal.com, Apr 01, 2010 
2 Interview 2D 
3 Interview 1D and Interview 2Ea 
4 Interview 1A and 1C 
5 The close connections between the Anglican Church and the Russian Church over the previous seventy years 
had also laid the ground for this rapprochement. Cf. Kaznina, O.A., Russkie v Anglii (Moscow, 1997), pp.79ff  
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always had the support of the Russians who came here escaping the 
Revolution and who have always looked down on their “uneducated and 
peasant” compatriots who have come here during the past ten years’.6 A 
ROCOR priest, who closely followed the crisis in his blog, wrote more plainly: 
‘The snobs of Kensington and Oxford did not want to mix with Russian 
“peasants” (or English or Serbian or Greek “peasants” for that matter). The 
same was true of some of the children and grandchildren of the old émigrés, 
who had aristocratic attitudes, even though they had largely lost their Russian 
language and culture … It was in so many ways an aristocratic mafia.’7   
Differences were also identified concerning the educational backgrounds 
and interests of the various groups of émigrés. G.A. Bordyugov’s and A. 
Kasaev’s study of the Russian diaspora 1986–2000 pointed out that whereas 
the Church had been the absolute common denominator of the first wave of 
émigrés, the overwhelming majority of new émigrés (post the Soviet collapse) 
ignored the Church as well as cultural centres such as London’s Pushkin House 
in favour of Russian discotheques and restaurants.8 Having left Russia 
voluntarily and with no immediate desire to return, they were less interested 
in preserving Russian culture and more in economic betterment.9 
 
6 OCAD. Times Online.  
7 Phillips, Fr A. ‘On the Recent Troubled History of the Russian Church in London’, 
http://orthodoxengland.org.uk/londonl.htm [Accessed 20.01.20]  
8 Bordiugov, G.A. and Kasaev, A.Ch., Russkii Mir i Rossia: Formirovanie Novogo Tipa Otnoshenie (Moscow, 
2014), p.68. Also Bocharova., Z.S., Fenomen zarubezhnoi rossii 1920-x g.  (Moscow, 2014), pp.243ff. Also 
Byford, A., ‘The Last Soviet Generation in Britain’ in Ferandez, J. (ed.), Diasporas: Critical and Inter-Disciplinary 
Perspectives: ‘The Orthodox Church is no doubt an important focus of “community” for some migrants, but it is 
by no means capable of acting as a pillar of this “diaspora” as a whole. The establishment of a more stably 
funded, formally independent, Russian cultural centre (Pushkin House on Bloomsbury Square in London) is so 
far proving to be a success, but it is often perceived as somewhat elitist, while its size cannot compare with the 
state-funded cultural centres of other developed nations.’  
9 Cf. Lazarashvili, V., ‘At Home in Limbo: Understanding the Role of the Community of Russian Christian 
Orthodox Church in Amsterdam in Psychosocial Well-being of its Members with a History of Migration’, Thesis, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2006. The author remarks on the ‘cultural bereavement’ of the first two waves of 
émigrés, which distinguished them from the third.  
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This point was somewhat contradicted by the 2007 United Nations 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) mapping exercise on Russians 
in the UK, which stated, ‘most Russians arriving in this country are well-
educated and speak at least a little English. As a rule, they have no problems 
integrating into British society and participating fully in their domestic, social 
and economic environment’.10 Perhaps more surprisingly, the IOM mapping 
report also concluded, ‘The role of the Church, and the place of national 
holidays and celebrations were one of the recurrent subjects for discussion. 
The Church was commonly referred to as the centre of communal activity and 
the focal point for Russian society in the UK. The Church appears to be the first 
thing that comes to mind if people are asked to nominate the “first meeting 
place”’.11 Such a statement seems to run counter to the secular zeitgeist of the 
West and also points to why the Russian State, as well as Church, would be so 
interested in diaspora parishes. Perhaps a reason for the contradictions above 
is to be gleaned from a survey of the Russian Jewish diaspora in Brighton 
Beach. The study concluded that the way that immigrants identified 
themselves was heavily dependent upon the surrounding culture and so 
‘diasporas do not necessarily emphasize the most cherished elements in their 
identity repertoires’. Rather, they select those aspects of their culture which 
will prove most useful in their new environment.12  
A longstanding Sourozh parishioner singled out wilful departure from 
the Motherland as one of the main differences between the waves of 
emigration, distinguishing the earlier, forced ‘exiles’ from subsequent 
 
10 IOM Mapping Exercise, p.27  
11 IOM mapping exercise, p.27 
12 Laitin, D.D., ‘The De-cosmopolitanization of the Russian Diaspora: A View from Brooklyn in the "Far 
Abroad”’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 5–35 
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economic migrants.13 Statements from the Patriarchate and the Russian State 
sometimes bemoaned the fact that many of the most recent migrants were 
already losing their culture and their language, whereas third-generation 
émigrés often kept better ties to their roots.14 The first émigrés were driven by 
the pain of nostalgia to preserve the culture of the land that remained forever 
closed to them.15  But as the generations passed, even these people started to 
lose their Russian language and heritage. For von Schlippe, this was not to be 
too much mourned; enculturation was inevitable in order ‘to avoid the 
permanent pain and burden of living in two separate worlds’.16 Nothing could 
be further from the language of Patriarch Kirill and his ‘Russian World’.  
The shifts in social status of individual migrants, as well as of their 
Church, had traumatic as well as more positive effects on their lives in the 
Orthodox diasporas.17 This was especially true of the post-war émigrés, many 
of whom had left behind fortunes and personal status. Such people often 
found the Church anew in their exile, but it was very different from the Church 
they had known in pre-revolutionary Russia. Great names of the Tsarist court – 
Sheremetev, Golytsin and others – now found themselves in humble 
surroundings, working as parish priests and taxi drivers.18 Many looked back to 
the tradition of the Russian Church to uncover meaning in their new lives, far 
from the trappings of wealth and power.19 Diaspora theologians rediscovered 
 
13 von Schlippe, I., ‘The Crisis of Exile’, Sourozh magazine. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/history/?ID=18 
[Accessed 30.03.20] 
14 Kirill, Patriarch, ‘Vystupleniye Svyateyshego Patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseya Rusi Kirilla na Vsemirnom 
kongresse sootechestvennikov’, 01.12.09. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/955171.html  [Accessed 
20.01.20] 
15 Interview 2G 
16 Cf, von Schlippe, I., ‘The Crisis of Exile’, op. cit., p.99ff [Accessed 30.03.20]  
17 Cf.Haemmerli, M., ‘Orthodox Migrations to Western Europe: The Painful Transition from the Glory of 
National Church to the Meekness of Religious Minority’, G2W (Sept 2014) 
18 For Fr Giorgy Cheremeteff see: ‘Reliogioznie deiateli russkogo zarubezhia’ 
http://zarubezhje.narod.ru/tya/sh_042.htm and ‘Graf Giorgy Alexandrovich Sheremetev’ 
http://www.pravoslavie.ru/113783.html    [Accessed 30.03.20]  
19 Cf. Gorodetskaia, N., The Humiliated Christ in Russian Thought (London, 1938) 
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the works of Archmandrite Feodor (Alexander Buhkarev), who had emphasised 
the material poverty and humility of the Church. In the words of Paul Valliere, 
‘[for Bukharev] it is better for a church to be “weak but faithful” than 
outwardly grand but lacking in “active faith.”’ 20 This is a frequent criticism of 
today’s Moscow Patriarchate, where clergy can arrive at meetings in fleets of 
chauffeur-driven limousines, and wealth-related scandals regularly appear in 
the Russian media.  
The stoic readjustment to fate of these émigrés was one of their most 
notable qualities, and has been described by several writers, perhaps most 
movingly by Solzhenitsyn.21 But such readjustments of status also affected 
those who arrived in later migratory waves. Often this was experienced as a 
diminishing not so much of personal social standing, as in the status of their 
religion. As Haemmerli has pointed out, the transformation from worshipping 
in the national, state Church to an obscure denomination in the diaspora 
cannot but influence church life on the personal and social level.22 While the 
White émigrés were forever grateful to their host countries for taking them in, 
the post-communist migrants had to readjust to the minority status of their 
Church, having arrived from lands where the Church was resurgent and 
powerful. For them, this new status evoked resentment and a defensive 
attitude towards their ethnic identity.23   
The post-1991 economic émigrés were not entirely made up of the 
urban working classes. That they had arrived at the doors of the cathedral at 
Ennismore Gardens at all meant they had been self-selected from the 250–
 
20 Valliere, P., Modern Russian Theology: Bukharev, Soloviev, Bulgakov: Orthodox Theology in a New Key 
(Edinburgh, 2000), p.90   
21 Solzhenytsin, A., Gulag Archipelago II, (London, 1974) p.48 
22 Haemmerli, M., ‘Orthodox Migrations to Western Europe’, op.cit.  
23 Lebedeva, N.M., Novaia Russkaia Diaspora (Moscow, 1995), p.289 
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300,000 new Russian-speaking arrivals in Britain.24 Many of them were 
graduates of MGU and other prestigious universities, as several were keen to 
point out in their testimonies.25 The attitudes of young people and those in 
higher education in Russia still differ from those of their peers in the West. 
Irina Papkova noted that a survey of MGU students showed that 67 percent 
thought that ‘sects’ were harmful to Russia and 72 percent thought of 
‘Orthodoxy as the basis of Russian state and cultural traditions’.26 By contrast, 
a British Social Attitudes survey of young adults aged 18–24 in the UK showed 
that just 3 percent identified as ‘Anglican’.27  
In the eyes of many of the previous émigrés, they were not so much 
Russian émigrés as ‘sovietised people’ or, worse, ‘new Russians’.28  Both terms 
had condescending class implications.29 The sociology of class in Russia is 
complex, relating to the pre-revolutionary situation as well as the development 
of social class in the Soviet Union. In theory, the communist state had striven 
for a classless society – the ‘unbreakable union of workers, peasants and the 
intelligentsia’ enshrined in the Soviet Constitution.30 In practice, however, 
there was an intricate system of social stratification, which was polarised 
between the nomenklatura and the military and economic bureaucracy at the 
 
24 Cf. Byford, A., ‘The Last Soviet Generation in Britain’ in Ferandez, J. (ed), Diasporas: Critical and Inter-
Disciplinary Perspectives (Oxford, 2009)  
25 E.g. Statement of Sourozh parishioner 25.05.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=14 
[Accessed 20.01.20]. Also ‘Kliriki i miriaane o situatsii v yeparkhii’ 26.06.06. 
http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=3 [Accessed 20.01.20]  
26 Papkova, I., ‘Orthodox Religiosity among the Elite University Students in Russia and its Relationship to their 
Political Views’, Religion in Eastern Europe 2 (May 2008) 
27 BSA Report 34 (2017)   
28 The idea of a ‘Soviet mentality’ is analysed later in the chapter.  
29 One interviewee noted how dress and language overlapped in this confrontation, ‘The only Russian spoken 
by Metropolitan Anthony during some Sunday services was the announcement after the liturgy in Russian only 
not to wear stilettos in church.’ Interview 2Eb 




top, and wage-labourers and farmworkers at the bottom.31 Such a class system 
revolved mainly around renumeration and job security, but also to some 
degree around education, as the nomenklatura had access to the best schools 
for their children. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in the 
nomenklatura were able to retain their elite status through their control of the 
dismantling process of the Soviet system.32 The concept of ‘New Russians’ that 
was born in the early 1990s caricatured such people as both rich and vulgar. 
The Church inside Russia was also affected by these changes.  
The same accusations that surfaced in Sourozh were (and still are to 
some extent) to be found in Russia herself. Tobias Kollner and Detelina 
Tocheva researched the sometimes-strained relationships which can occur 
between those churches said to be built ‘with gold’ (postroena na zolote) – i.e. 
donations from businessmen – and those built ‘with tears’ (postroena na 
slezkakh) – i.e. painstakingly renovated by volunteers.33 In Sourozh, the 
question of money reared its head in various ways. Firstly, an issue arose when 
parishioners asked to be paid for their labour, when previously all the cleaning 
and other chores had been carried out by volunteers.34 Secondly, the new 
diocese became home to some very rich parishioners who were able to make 
substantial donations for renovation and even rebuilding, as in the case of Oleg 
Deripaska’s donation to the Manchester parish. For the anti-Moscow 
 
31 Zaslavskoi, T.I., Sotsietal'naia transformatsia rossiskogo obshchestva. Deyatel'no-strukturnaia kontseptsia 
(Moscow, 2002), p.96ff 
32 Cf. Pastukhov V.B., ‘Ot nomenklatury k burzhuazii: novyye russkiye’, Polis: Politicheskiye issledovaniya, No. 2, 
(1993) 
33 Cf. Köllner, T., ‘Built with Gold or Tears? Moral Discourses on Church Construction and the Role of 
Entrepreneurial Donations’ in Zigon, J. (ed.), Multiple Moralities and Religions in Post-Soviet Russia (New York, 
2011). Also, Tocheva, D., ‘The Economy of the Temples of God in the Turmoil of Changing Russia’, European 
Journal of Sociology (April 2014), pp.1–24 and Kollner, T., ‘Pravoslavie nravstvennost’ i raschet’ 
http://www.colta.ru/articles/raznoglasiya/11654 [Accessed 20.01.20]. Cf. also Nikula, J. and Chernysh, M. 
(eds.), Social Class in the Russian Society: Studies in the Social Classes and Social Change of Contemporary 
Russia (Saarbrücken, 2010)  
34 ‘In recent years, with numbers growing, the people doing the work were still the same old group, because 
the new Russian members wanted payment for it.’ High Court Case No: HC07C03107, Section 56/21.  
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parishioners, both examples were thought to be at the cost of holistic, 
independent parish life.35  
In reality, the new diocese was made up of rich and poor, educated and 
non-educated. This was undoubtedly so even if the overwhelming feeling of 
the locals was that the new arrivals came from the ‘lower echelons’ of society. 
The usually anti-Moscow journalist Sergei Chapnin noted that there were 
problems in Sourozh caused by a flood of neophytes into the diocese, but 
compared it to the situation in Russia in the early 1990s when parishes had 
worked to welcome the surge of new converts.36 At that time the reputation of 
the Church in Russia was extremely high. This was because it was one of the 
very few institutions which maintained a living connection with Russia’s deep 
cultural history. But it was also because she still held a certain moral integrity, 
despite the stories of ‘collaborationist’ bishops. Practically every village in 
Russia contained a ruined or dilapidated church. In towns, the plunder and 
destruction were even more obvious, so the suffering of the Russian Church 
was on display as a constant visual witness for all to see. The curious and 
unchurched masses poured into such decrepit buildings, often to be met by 
congregations of babushkas and elderly priests. The comparison with the 
1990s became a refrain of the Sourozh crisis and of other similar later 
episodes. The Patriarch himself wrote that, in the 1990s, ‘priests came face to 
face with a huge quantity of unchurched people, whose knowledge of religion 
was either rudimentary or zero.’ He used the example to highlight the need to 
overcome the ‘ghetto mentality’ of the Church which was driving the curious 
away.37  
 
35 Vallely, P., The Independent, 11.02.09   
36 Chapnin, S.,‘Kto po zabotitsia o russkoi pastve?’, Tserkovny Vestnik, May 2006 (author trans.)  
37 Kirill, Patriarch, Zhizn’ i mirosozertsanie (Moscow, 2009), p.85  
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The situation was further complicated by the fact that class distinctions 
cut through ethnic and linguistic parameters, although one priest conceded 
that, ‘a lot of people in the lower-skilled jobs are of course Russian-speaking’.38   
An English convert to Orthodoxy critiqued the anti-Moscow group on The 
Times Online with the words, ‘Do we want a Middle-Class ghetto?’.39 Social 
class was the subtext of many accusations on both sides. One English 
parishioner wrote disparagingly about the ‘sumo-like girth’ of ethnic Russian 
priests who spent their time at ‘vodka-laced feasts’.40 Very often the words 
‘club’ and ‘intelligentsia’ were used to denote social class, just as was the term 
‘new Russians’. A pro-Moscow parishioner wrote to Bishop Basil, ‘what you are 
doing now is constructing a Church which is a club for intellectuals and old 
émigrés’.41 Another parishioner commented on gazeta.ru about the ‘snobbish 
looks’ which the followers of Metropolitan Anthony gave to the ‘simple and 
rustic’ people.42  
Some of the tensions surrounding social class had existed long before 
even the revolutionary period. Far from disappearing because of the ‘classless’ 
Soviet epoch, they had in fact been accentuated. While the royal family have 
been rehabilitated in Russia and the reputation of the last Romanovs is high, 
the same is not true, in general, for the aristocracy, at least as regards 
Orthodox believers. Many Orthodox still blame the aristocracy and the 
intelligentsia for the westernisation of the country which, it is supposed, led 
ultimately to the Bolshevik coup. This mixed attitude mirrors that of the rural 
peasantry in the lead-up to the revolutionary period. It is also reflected in 
Putin’s popularity in contemporary Russia compared to that of state officials, 
 
38 Interview 1A 
39 OCAD. The Times Online, 16.06.06 
40 OCAD. The Times Online, J. Karras 
41 OCAD. The Times Online, 02.07.06 
42 Cirota.ru, Tema #58412, Soobshchenie #2081975, 23.05.06 [Accessed 01.05.20]  
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particularly regional governors. Perhaps it is true to say that for ‘ordinary 
Russians’ suspicions of the aristocracy persist, and it was with the descendants 
of these people that such Russians came into contact in Sourozh.  
The intelligentsia has had an even more problematic role in Russia, 
particularly within the Church. Public appreciation of the intelligentsia 
increased in the late Soviet epoch but has since decreased and not 
recovered.43 It could be argued that the position of the intelligentsia in Russia 
had always been unstable, caught as they were between the autocracy and the 
peasantry, and subsequently between the party nomenklatura and the Soviet 
people. Neither their affiliation to Western liberalism nor to Orthodoxy was 
able to bring them the acceptance of the regime, the narod or the Church.44 On 
the one hand, there were grassroots condemnations of ‘rootless 
cosmopolitans’, but on the other hand the Patriarch and the DECR frequently 
name-dropped Berdiaev, Kartashev and others. Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev 
himself represented the lineage of artistic-intellectual Orthodoxy stretching 
back to Khomiakov and Kireevsky. As regards the Sourozh crisis itself, the 
efforts of Moscow to retain this strand of Orthodoxy can be seen in the open 
letters of the Patriarch and in their readiness to send some of their highest-
achieving clergy to the diocese. Despite what might be claimed by certain 
hardliners, the mainstream hierarchy of the Church did not want to jettison the 
artistic-intellectual Orthodoxy of Metropolitan Anthony. On the contrary, there 
was and is a desire in the Church to claim well-known figures in the arts and 
sciences to bolster the Church’s intellectual prowess and to counter 
accusations of being a morbid and backward-looking institution. Such an 
 
43 Typical of the Church’s recent attitudes towards the intelligentsia is Karelin, Arch. R., Tserkov’ i intelligentsia 
(Saratov, 2009). Cf. also English, R., op. cit., and for a grassroots take on the question, Mozhno li otdelit’ 
tserkov ot zhizni? (Danilovskii monastir, Moscow, 2002), p.22 
44 Sabirov, V. Sh., Russkaia ideia spasenia (Saint Petersburg, 1995), p.77ff 
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impulse can be perceived in the frequent mention by Metropolitan Hilarion of 
figures such as Arvo Part and John Tavener, the two most famous Orthodox 
composers of recent times, and both diaspora converts of the artistic-
intellectual lineage.  
In Russia today, the literary-intellectual current is manifest within the 
major Orthodox teaching academies, such as the St Tikhon Orthodox 
University. But even conservatives who critique these institutions and their 
theologians are also often ready to name and praise Orthodox stars in the arts 
and sciences when they arise. The conundrum for the Church is that while it 
proclaims a desire to cast its cultural net wider, at the same time a very narrow 
and insular view of the arts and education in general predominates among 
actual regular churchgoers. In the words of Mikhail Suslov, the Church ‘wants 
to lower the entry barrier for cultural production to be considered as religious 
in order to claim that all Russian culture is essentially Orthodox, but by so 
doing, the Church has to admit that the best accomplishments of Russian 
culture gravitate away from religion’.45 In short, a view of Russian culture 
which excludes Tolstoy (and even Pushkin for some ultra-conservatives) is only 
ever going to be acceptable to a tiny fraction of Russians. For those trying to 
broaden the Church’s appeal, the Orthodox intellectuals of the Russian 
diaspora provide a way to extend the cultural remit beyond books by Tikhon 
Shevkhunov and Church music. Nevertheless, the small band of regular 
churchgoers both in Russia and in the diaspora remains in a kind of cultural 
ghetto in which actual Orthodox culture (Church music, icon paintings, 
religious literature) dominates at the exclusion of almost everything else, and 
 
45 Suslov, M., ‘The Russian Orthodox Church in Search of the Cultural Canon’, Transcultural Studies Vol. 12, 




attempts to broaden this out are met with resistance and accusations of neo-
renovationism. In fact, as with other ‘rigid’ practices mentioned in this study, 
this is a relatively recent phenomenon. Even the devout family of the last Tsar 
liked to read Tolstoy together, collect contemporary European art and listen to 
western composers. This newfound rigidity towards the arts is in some sense a 
corollary problem of the caricaturising and polarisation discussed in this study.  
 
Theme 2: Mentalities   
Accusations of a new ‘Soviet mentality’ were directed at the new arrivals in 
Sourozh, with allusions made to the KGB and militaristic behaviour. A Sourozh 
blogger spoke of this Soviet mentality as the ‘authoritarian desire to control 
everyone and everything’, continuing, ‘In Russia many parishioners like rigour 
combined with specific instructions for different occasions and frequently give 
up personal “freedom”’.46 The expression ‘Soviet mentality’ presumes that this 
mentality (or mentalité to expand the term into its historiographical sense) is 
different from the previous mentality of the people of the Russian Empire and 
posits it against something else – something ‘better and more refined’. It 
implies a mentality that is totalitarian, closed (fixed), ruthless and so on.47 Yet 
how much is such a notion a historiographical invention? Can a mentality 
indeed be transformed in just a few generations? Or does this Soviet mentality 
owe much (if not all) to some pre-revolutionary mentalities?48 It is easy to use 
a term like ‘Soviet mentality’ while assuming that everyone has a similar idea 
 
46 Cirota.ru, Tema: #53307, Soobshchenie: #1902718, Parfenov, Fr P., ‘Budushee russkogo Pravoslavia za 
rubezhom’, 04.03.2006. http://www.cirota.ru/forum/view.php?subj=53307&order=desc&pg=10 [Accessed 
05.05.19]  
47 Cf. Badmaeva, S.V., and Tmofeeva, E.K., ‘Vlianie “rossiiskogo mentalitéta” na stil’ rossiiskogo mendzhmenta’, 
Psikhologicheskaia nauka i obrazovanie, No. 5 (2010) 
48 Vilkov, A., Mentalityt krest'ianstva i rossiiskii politicheskii protsess, PhD Thesis, Saratov (1998)  
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of what it means, and while this may be true, a historical deconstruction of the 
term into its parts is less easy. A careful analysis of the term reveals that it 
reaches to the very heart of Russia’s post-communist dilemmas, referring to 
issues of continuity, class, guilt, power, and empire.  
Those who could not accept the idea of continuity between Russia and 
the Soviet Union came from both the left and the right of the diaspora, and 
both sides spoke of a new Soviet mentality that had little to do with the Russia 
of old. But did Soviet Russia really sever all connection with the pre-
revolutionary past? There is no doubt that this was at least the intention of the 
founders of the regime. As with other attempts at the creation of Marxist 
utopias in the last century, the aspiration was nothing less than a complete 
break with the old world and a transformation of human nature itself. Yet, 
even with the death and repression of millions of people, it seems that such 
attempts were doomed to failure. David L. Hoffmann in his study of Stalinist 
values concluded, ‘The majority of the population learned to live within the 
system without accepting its collective values’.49 It is true that many of the 
social mores of Soviet life came to ape those of traditional cultures, with 
prohibitions on abortion, same-sex unions and a strong promotion of the 
family and sobriety, but Hoffmann is also sceptical of attempts to marry Soviet 
and pre-revolutionary values stating, ‘To describe Stalinism as a return to 
traditional Russian ways is to mischaracterise it in a fundamental way’.50 Yet 
despite such a failure to engineer new humans, the brutal efforts of the regime 
to destroy the old Russian ways were not without success. For those who 
intimately knew the Russia of old, it seemed at the time that they had 
succeeded. From the liberal-intellectual side, this belief was exemplified in the 
 
49 Hoffmann, D.L., Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity (Cornell, 2003), p.187ff  
50 Ibid.  
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work of Nabokov, for whom, in the words of Henry Grosshans, there was ‘an 
historical rupture brought about by the Bolshevik Revolution. [Nabokov’s] 
Russia is no relation to the present-day Soviet Union, and for him the clock of 
native Russian culture does not strike in our time.’51 Instead there was a new 
‘Soviet man’ who had broken with Russia and now lived in a banal vacuum. 
Russia had vanished and could not be reborn, living on only in the minds of a 
few wandering émigrés.  
For those further to the right of Nabokov, true Russianness, which they 
agreed had been replaced by a Soviet mentality, was not preserved in the 
world of the émigré intelligentsia. For these people, the authentic Russian 
mentality was to be found only in ROCOR (and those groups that subsequently 
broke from it) and in the so-called ‘Catacomb Church’. An interviewee, a priest-
monk who had left ROCOR following the Union, quoted a conversation with an 
old woman in Russia who had said, ‘“It will take our people about two 
generations to get back to being human”’.  The priest continued, ‘It’s true of 
the people in the Church too, they have been schooled in a way which is 
different from other Orthodox confessions.’52 
The idea of a new Soviet mentality, born in the last century and still 
driving the Russian Church and society today, is common also for liberal 
thinkers. An essay by Petr Meshcherinov in 2012 castigated the Church for 
transforming Soviet patterns of thinking into Orthodox ones.53 He painted a 
bleak picture of contemporary Russia as consumerist, amoral, corrupt, secular 
and irreligious, but also accompanied by a kind of, ‘forced Soviet asceticism 
 
51 Grosshans, H., ‘Vladimir Nabokov and the Dream of Old Russia’, Texas Studies in Literature and Language, 
Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 1966), pp. 401–40 
52 Interview 2G 
53 Meshcherinov, P., ‘Sovremennoe Tserkovnoe soznanie i svetskie ideologemy iz kommunisticheskogo 




[and by the] unbridled development of all the supressed Soviet complexes’.54 
For Meshcherinov, the Church was at the epicentre of this conundrum, and 
along with Nabokov, he proposed that there had been a complete break with 
the past. ‘If we assume a certain presence of "Holy Russia" in pre-revolutionary 
times, then it is absolutely obvious that this "Holy Russia" was destroyed in the 
Soviet period so much so that not a trace of it remains in any apparent or 
hidden form.’55 In its place the new Soviet mentality mimicked real Orthodox 
values. Thus, sobornost’ had become collectivism, humility had become civic 
passivity, and obedience had become strictness and uniformity in the ‘fight for 
Orthodoxy’, and so on. Other commentators have stressed that, for some, the 
Soviet mentality is not at all a negative concept. According to Alexander 
Shramko, such elements within the Church reject ‘all that is not Soviet’ as 
untrue, leading to a defiant stand against all other Orthodox jurisdictions.56  
If we are to use and take seriously concepts such as ‘Soviet mentality’, 
they should be located within the broader stream of historiography. The 
history of mentalities has largely focused on pre-industrial belief systems in a 
consensual sense, for example, on the worldview of the medieval peasantry in 
the Mediterranean. The early Annales School historians, particularly Braudel, 
were interested in constructing mentalities as ‘closed ideologies’, over broader 
and deeper consensual cultural ways of thinking. But according to Peter Burke, 
‘there is no reason why a mentality should not be imputed to a social class or 
other group rather than to a whole society’.57 Taking that one stage further, is 
there any reason why the history of mentalities should not form part of our 
 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Shramko, A., ‘Tserkov’ bez territorii’, 09.06.2006. https://churchby.info/bel/54/ [Accessed 01.04.20] 
57 Burke, P., ‘Strengths and Weaknesses of the History of mentalities’, History of European Ideas, 7:5, pp.439–
451 (1986)  
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historical method for very recent and even contemporary events, especially 
when the clash of cultures is involved? Thus, when we use the term ‘Soviet 
mentality’, we might consider its journey from the pre-modern peasant 
mentality of the mass of the Russian population up to and beyond 1917 to its 
use in describing contemporary Russians in a negative way.  
 Some historians have suggested that while mentalities may seem to 
change over time, what is really happening is a replacement of one system by 
another, while emotional and subconscious paradigms remain the same. In the 
sense of the Russian (Slavic) peasantry it could work in broad terms like this: 
the schemata of the evil-outsider threat at the village-commune level in pre-
industrial Russia became the internal-enemy threat (parasite, kulak, rootless 
cosmopolitan, etc) of the Soviet era, and finally the foreigner threat in the 
post-communist era. In this way, Oksana Morgunova has traced Russia’s long 
tradition of ‘othering’ (ours – nashi – versus the rest) even in contemporary 
émigré discourse.58  
Another mentality of the Russian peasantry, which was even more 
essential to their weltanschauung, was mutual assistance (self-regulation) 
through the commune (obshchina), specifically through the communal holding 
and redistribution of land.59 As will be touched on in this study, this was seen 
by the Slavophiles as the tangible location of sobornost’ – almost as a way of 
life, hence its immense importance to Russians even today. Up to the very eve 
of collectivisation, over 95 percent of peasant land was held in commune (and 
over 85 percent of the Russian population up to collectivisation were 
 
58 Morgunova, O,, ‘Europeans, not Westerners: How the Dilemma “Russia vs. the West” is Represented in 
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peasants). The proposed reforms of Stolypin and even of the Bolsheviks had 
failed. The communal redistribution of land – the chernyi peredel – had 
become so deeply embedded in the life of the peasantry that it could only be 
changed by complete annihilation – collectivisation – of their way of life and 
culture. It is fashionable today for historians to paint a very bleak picture of 
Russian peasant life, but while it was certainly brutal and unfair in many 
respects, the truth probably lies somewhere between the dark depictions of 
Gorky and the golden age presented by the Russian Church today. To modern 
historians, the essential, striking feature of peasant life was its communality. 
Land was redistributed according to need (and often against self-interest) by 
village elders and the commune as a whole. This practice alone created and 
sustained a communal integration mentality far beyond the comprehension of 
today’s post-industrial West.  
In addition, the commune was also integrated by marriage, Church 
feasts, communal agricultural labour in accordance with the extreme Russian 
seasons, the production of foodstuffs and many other practices, not to 
mention serfdom, which for centuries tied the Russian peasantry to their 
locality. The Soviet mindset/mentality was superimposed onto this system but 
did not take its place. Thus, many of the cultural collisions mentioned in this 
study, from pushing and shoving in church to communal petitions, can be 
traced back ultimately to a pre-revolutionary past – perhaps even a pre-
modern past, because up to the eve of Revolution many parts of Russia were 
pre-modern. When the anti-Moscow group spoke of a ‘Soviet mentality’ were 
they in fact talking about a ‘Russian peasant mentality’? When Meshcherinov, 
as above, critiques the wariness and chauvinism of today’s Russian 
churchgoers as ‘Soviet’, is he in fact critiquing the Russian peasantry’s 
antipathy to the outsider? This is interesting because many of those using the 
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term ‘Soviet mentality’ in a derogatory sense were themselves Russians, 
though either the descendants of the White emigration or the intelligentsia, or 
both. Thus, the huge divide between a vast peasant mass beneath a tiny 
westernised elite, which had imperilled Tsarist society for centuries, could (in a 
rather crude way) be said to have resurfaced within some parishes of the 
Russian Church in the diaspora.  
Before we look at the term through the longue durée, what was meant 
(or rather intended) by it in ideological/historical terms? The Moral Code of the 
Builder of Communism unveiled at the Party Congress in 1961 focused heavily 
on mutual interdependence and support in its twelve ‘laws’. That being said, 
the very first rule was ‘Loyalty to Communism, and love of the socialist 
Motherland’. In Soviet lore, it was the Party that was infallible in the sense that 
it was self-correcting in a way not dissimilar to the Orthodox understanding of 
the indefectibility of the Church. So, while individual heresies might arise (be 
they Bukharinism or Uniatism), their downfall resided in their supposed 
rejection by the masses as well as by the infallible authority of the Party (or the 
Church). In Soviet terms, the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism had been laid out 
by Lenin in an unquestionable way. This black-and-white mindset was one of 
the most important accusations against the Soviet mentality. The ideal party 
member was at base a ruthless revolutionary who would not shrink from 
denouncing his own family (hence the cult of Pavlik Morozov) if they revealed 
counter-revolutionary leanings. In the march towards the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, there was no room for softer and more nebulous, intellectual 
interpretations of life and history. Similarly, when applied to Orthodox 
believers, Soviet mentality implies an intransigent and end-orientated mindset 
in which there is no room for ekonomia, debate or compromise. By its nature, 
such a mindset is anti-intellectual, but when the anti-Moscow group used the 
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term, they wanted also to exclude from it the pre-revolutionary peasantry who 
they considered to have had a much more flexible mindset than the Soviet 
Orthodox who had come to the Church in the later years of communism.  
 Another implied term of Soviet mentality is the notion of suspicion, or 
‘friend or foe’. The Soviet Moral Code also delineated a world of friends and 
enemies. Stalinism sought to elevate paranoiac suspicion to one of the chief 
virtues of a good communist. In addition to what the party was trying to do, 
the impact of Russian-Soviet history itself in the last century should also be 
considered. From 1900 to the 1960s, citizens of the Russian and Soviet empires 
endured an almost seamless march of traumatic upheavals: The Russo-
Japanese War (1904–5), the 1905 Revolutions (1905–6), World War I (1914–
17), the Revolution and Civil War (1917–22), Collectivisation (1929–33), the 
Great Terror (1937), World War II (1941–5), internal resistance wars in the 
Baltic and Ukraine (1944–mid-1950s), the Doctor’s Plot (1952–3), Khrushchev’s 
anti-religious campaign (1958–64). Each of these events was accompanied, in 
greater and lesser quantities, by physical hardship, mass repressions, famine, 
executions and other forms of death. Also common to all was the psychological 
trauma of social instability, fear, and polarising campaigns about ‘the enemy 
within’.  
How societies cope with such collective traumas has been the subject of 
much analysis, but it seems that even one such cataclysmic event can have 
deep and reverberating consequences, let alone the series of national 
tragedies that Russia experienced in the last century. Studies of how Cambodia 
has adapted to the legacy of the Khmer Rouge have noted the paradigm of 
‘demonisation followed by amnesia’ as the nation struggles to move on and 
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memory fades.60 Other studies of similar events have singled out the ‘search 
for meaning’ as one of the key drivers of the post-traumatic mindset.61 Both 
the search for meaning and demonisation/amnesia impulses can solidify into 
simplistic paradigms and dichotomies as people attempt to make sense of 
seemingly mindless suffering. Archpriest Vladimir Fedorov linked a 
blame/demonisation impulse to a flight from culpability: ‘Regrettably, in Russia 
it is still common to think that all negative changes are insinuated into our 
society by some foreign “enemies.” The psychology and ideology of hunting for 
somebody else to blame … means the inability to practise self-examination and 
repentance is a fundamental obstacle for missionary strategy.’62 Thus, in the 
Russian/Soviet case, the implication is that the Soviet mentality was a coping 
mechanism in response to collective traumatic events, which were not only 
multiple but sustained and even normalised. The ensuing defensive-aggressive 
mentality was thus a mindset in which external threats were located and 
subdued before they could unearth bitter memories.63   
The Jesuit priest Ignacio Martin-Baro developed his theories of collective 
mental health during the brutal civil war in El Salvador, through which he lived 
(and died).64 Most importantly for this study, he proposed five behavioural 
changes which resulted from the experience of war and other collective 
traumas: 
 
60 Chandler, D., ‘Cambodia Deals with its Past: Collective Memory, Demonisation and Induced Amnesia’, 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, Vol. 99:2-3, 355-369 (2008)  
61 Hirschberger, G., ‘Collective Trauma and the Social Construction of Meaning’, Frontiers in Psychology, (10 
August 2018). Cf. Igor Shafarevich’s statement in From Under the Rubble (London, 1974): ‘It is hard to believe 
that any country has ever suffered such а multitude of catastrophes as has been unleashed on Russia during 
the last half century. Surely, they cannot have been senseless and in vain? Involuntarily one looks for some 
purpose in them.’   
62 Fedorov, Archpriest V., Winds of Change: An Orthodox Point of View (World Council of Churches, 2010)  
63 Interview 2D 
64 Martin-Baro, I., ‘Political Violence and War as Causes of Psychosocial Trauma in El Salvador’, International 




1. selective inattention and a clinging to prejudices 
2. absolutism, idealization, and ideological rigidity 
3. evasive scepticism 
4. paranoid defensiveness 
5. hatred and the desire for revenge 
He suggested that ‘people living under continual fear often become 
desensitized to violence, increasingly rigid and conservative in their beliefs, 
paranoid, and obsessed with revenge. Pent-up anger, combined with the 
frequent rumours that helped reinforce paranoid fears … can strike innocent 
scapegoats just as easily as actual perpetrators (including attacks on “witches,” 
“heretics”, or anyone else perceived as an outsider).’65  
 Other daily experiences of Soviet life that were less traumatic but also, 
by their relentlessness, affected the people in various ways were collected by 
Dmitry Mikhayev under the term ‘humiliation’.66 These included shortages and 
low wages which forced people to steal from their workplaces, accept bribes as 
standard and cheat to secure accommodation, education etc. He proposed 
Soviet society as bitter struggle for survival that institutionalised suspicion, 
resentment, fear, and anger. The result was an ever-present fear of anarchy 
(proizvol) and the construction of a complex network of in-groups engaged in a 
constant low-level war.  
How was this Soviet mentality transformed as the new Russia emerged 
from communism? An interesting analysis of survey data in the study of Y. 
Levada compared changes in attitudes in the Soviet Union and Russia between 
 
65 Vitelli, R., ‘When the Trauma Doesn't End: How Can People Learn to Live with Chronic Traumatic stress?’, 
Psychology Today (29.05.2013)  
66 Mikheyev, D., ‘The Soviet Mentality’, Political Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Dec 1987), pp.491–523 
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the pivotal five years 1989 and 1994.67 In relation to the concept of fear, he 
observed little essential change in the top ten parameters. By 1994, fear of war 
had gone down from second place to seventh, but fear of the arbitrariness of 
the authorities [proizvol vlastei] had risen from seventh to fifth place, and fear 
of return to mass repressions had gone from nowhere to sixth place. In 
relation to the question ‘What do Russian people lack?’, 1989 saw a peak in 
self-criticism, with rude manners, laziness and lack of education being 
highlighted by survey respondents, but according to Levada’s analysis, this 
period of self-criticism was very short-lived: 
And then it passed, as society came under the blows of state and 
political collapse. There is no desire to engage in self-criticism right now. 
Although we have not gone through the phase of serious self-criticism 
and self-repentance and will suffer because of this for a long time. Now 
we have entered the phase when people like to boast, and in the most 
primitive way to brag and assert themselves. It worries me when most 
people repeat that we have ‘always had great achievements’, great 
‘soul’, ‘the greatest culture in the world’ and that we are ready to teach 
everyone … excuse me, it is a kind of complex.68  
Such a description could almost have been lifted from an anti-Moscow open 
letter or blog in the Sourozh crisis. One pro-Moscow Sourozh priest stated 
plainly, ‘The Russians have never known anything else. They’ve had this great 
gap of eighty years when everyone was absolutely dreadful to each other. Now 
they’ve all come into the Church not knowing any other sort of behaviour’.69  
 
67  Levada, Y, ‘Chelovek sovetskii: piat’ let spustia 1989–1994 (predvaritel’nye itogi sravnitel’nogo issledovania). 
http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/517/678/1219/034_levada.pdf [Accessed 27.05.20] 
68 Ibid.   
69 Interview 1A  
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The place of the Church in the notion of Soviet mentality represents a 
further permutation of the post-communist malaise. Soviet culture was atheist 
and secular, so an accusation of ‘Soviet mentality’ implied that faith was not 
religious but a political, secular ideology’.70 Accusations of having a Soviet 
mentality were most often made by those opposed to the Moscow 
Patriarchate, either from the left (Bishop Basil’s group) or the right (ROCOR). 
For both groups, the phrase was a useful tool denoting the negative 
connotations of all the themes discussed in this study: rigidity, the cult of 
power, corruption, hypocrisy, cronyism, secularism, Russification.  
 How far these ‘symptoms’ (if present at all) were a result of recent 
historical events as opposed to the longue durée is beyond the scope of this 
study and may be an impossible question to answer. But an awareness of the 
existence of this debate is useful to our understanding of events. The author’s 
opinion is that the concept of a Soviet mentality refers to a period that is of too 
short a duration. The great majority of studies of mentalities in the cultural-
historical sense conclude that it is a concept of the longue durée. Brutal and 
destructive though the Soviet epoch was to pre-existing socio-cultural 
structures, far more important to the mentality of the Russian people, even 
today, were the long years of peasant Russia, the weather, geography, the 
autocracy and the Church. A detailed and perceptive thesis by Galina 
Tsigvintseva into the Russian mentality concluded, ‘The worldview of Russians 
is still characterised by antimony and utopia … irrationalism and fatalism 
accompany the Russian on his life’s path’.71  
 
70 Interview 2G ‘ the new Russian mentality which has been formed by the state’  
71 Tsigvintseva, G., Osobennosti formirovania i funktionirovania mentalitéta russkogo naroda, (Perm’ 2005) 
(author trans.)  
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Finally, it should be said that not all the connotations of Soviet mentality 
were or are considered negative by Russians past and present. With the rise of 
Putin, the Soviet epoch was increasingly seen as a positive, even a golden age 
of camaraderie and security, in which a basic Christian morality prevailed. 
Putin has compared such things as the Moral Code of the Builder of 
Communism to the Sermon on the Mount or the Ten Commandments. Such a 
mixing of the Soviet and Christian was at the very heart of the problem for 
those who critiqued the Moscow Patriarchate both from within and without.  
 
Theme 3: Behaviour and Dress 
“There was an abundance of pious gesticulations, bowing and crossing, kissing 
the icons, prostrating and touching the ground with the forehead (sometimes 
with an audible thump), and bowing and crossing again and again, and by 
men, young and old, as well as by women ... there were a good many poor in 
and about the church, and beggars at the doors, to whom those passing in and 
out gave kopecks freely.” 72 
– William Palmer (1840) 
The English Slavophile William Palmer’s lively description of a church service in 
Russia in the nineteenth century is little different from those of today. 
Especially on the big feasts, or even on a normal Sunday in a big city, there can 
be a huge crush of people all pushing in one direction or another. It can seem 
rather alien to western churchgoers, as it was to Palmer, who are habituated 
to sitting in silence or singing hymns. In addition, the norms of Church 
behaviour and dress in Russia or Greece today can be quite different to those 
 
72 Quoted in Wheeler, R., Between East and West: The Anglican career of William Palmer of Magdalen 1811–
1849, PhD Thesis, Durham Univ (2003), p.103 
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that can be observed in diaspora parishes that have made concessions to 
modern life in the West. For diaspora worshipers some of this might even 
appear shocking, and this is what happened in Sourozh. There were frequent 
complaints of pushing and shoving in church, and of members of the 
congregation chatting loudly.73 The noise and hubbub were particularly at odds 
with the ethos that had developed under Metropolitan Anthony, who 
encouraged prayerful silence in church. As early as 1994, he was compelled to 
admonish parishioners in a statement which is worth quoting at length:  
Our church was a place where people could find quiet and silence; not 
only the silence of people who would not talk, but the deep silence of 
souls that were standing face to face with God. In the last year this has 
changed, and many people have told us – not only the old members of 
the congregation, but people coming from Russia have told us how 
disappointed they were at the change that had occurred here in the last 
couple of years. People come into the church, and instead of standing by 
the door and realizing where they are – being there like the publican 
who felt he was unworthy of entering the realm of God – they enter, buy 
candles and begin to walk about irrespective of the moment of the 
Liturgy. So, I not only make an appeal – I tell you with all the conviction 
and all the authority vested in me, that this is inadmissible.74  
The practices lamented by Metropolitan Anthony have been critiqued as 
representing a consumerist attitude to religion: laypeople arriving late, just in 
time for communion, an obsession with my confession, my communion, 
pushing ahead to light your candle, lighting candles between the cherubic 
 
73 OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org, ‘From a Russian Sourozh parishioner …’, op. cit. 
74 Metropolitan Anthony, Archpastoral Admonition, 06.11.1994, Newsletter 279, Dec 1994.  
http://masarchive.org/Sites/texts/1994-11-06-1-E-E-S-EM04-082SilenceAtTheChurch.html [Accessed 08.05.20]  
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hymn and the anaphora, and so on.75 To the anti-Moscow groups, these 
practices were another legacy of Soviet life, where forceful behaviour was 
necessary for survival. But a further aspect was noted in a paper by the 
Sourozh diocesan council member Irina von Schilppe.76 For the new arrivals, 
the function of the church as a social club was especially important. The 
noticeboards were filled with advertisements and appeals for work, lodging, 
language courses, etc. In her article, von Schlippe noted that such a function is 
a part of church life, and that this should be admitted and provided for, in 
order that it did not then need to bleed into worship and other areas. 
Nevertheless, the diaspora situation did not account for all the confrontation 
in this area. Whether the behaviours on either side were a result of 
enculturation or sovietisation, a difference of emphasis was perceived: the one 
side appearing disrespectful and the other aloof and cold.  
 One of the first differences that was obvious to the new arrivals 
concerned dress; some women did not cover their heads and wore jeans.77 In a 
well-known incident in the cathedral, someone had scolded a woman attired in 
such a manner. Metropolitan Anthony had then preached a sermon consisting 
of just a few sentences, commanding whoever had done this, ‘to pray for her 
and her child to the end of their days!’78 An article in The Independent 
newspaper stated that the new Russians were ‘demanding the compulsory 
wearing of headscarves for women’, something which was vigorously denied 
 
75 Cf. Shevshnikov, Fr S., ‘O potrebitel’stve v Tserkvi” Pravoslavie i mir’, www.pravmir.ru, 03.01.10 and 
Yannaras, C., ‘The Historical and Social Dimensions of the Church’s Ethos’, Chapter 11 of The Freedom of 
Morality (Crestwood, NY 1984), pp.195–229.  
76 von Schlippe, I., ‘The Crisis of Exile’, op. cit.  
77 OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs. Comments on the Current Situation. Bishop Basil does not insist that women 
wear headscarves in church, and he permits them to wear trousers. Cf. also ‘Tserkovnaia bor’ba v 
“Londongrade’, BBC Russia.com, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/press/newsid_5028000/5028644.stm   
,30.05.06. [Accessed 05.05.20] 
78 Serbian Orthodox Church Eastern America, ‘For whom must I pray?’ 
https://www.easterndiocese.org/news_180704_1 [Accessed 05.05.20]  
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by many in the pro-Moscow camp.79 One parishioner claimed that these 
‘pretended fears’ were all part of a choreographed campaign by Bishop Basil 
and the anti-Moscow group.80 There were even counteraccusations from the 
pro-Moscow supporters that in fact it was the anti-Moscow group that was 
being prescriptive in dress. An English pro-Moscow parishioner wrote, ‘A senior 
member of the laity has claimed that women look like Muslims in their head 
wear: how offensive is this statement? How cruel is this statement? … I hope 
you pray for your bigotry!’.81 To the charge that western secular dress was 
‘disrespectful’ and ‘against the canons of the Church’, the anti-Moscow group 
replied that one’s spiritual state was more important than the cultural 
trappings of Orthodoxy. They noted that it would be better for the new arrivals 
to maintain a respectful silence and especially not to ‘run about lighting 
candles’ during and after the cherubic hymn, as was mentioned in several 
testimonies.82  
What is so interesting are the claims again made by both sides of 
authenticity and continuity with pre-revolutionary practices. An interviewee 
described the conservatism currently displayed in the Russian Church within 
Russia as a ‘novelty’, emphasising that these practices were not at all prevalent 
in the pre-revolutionary Church.83 Such a view presupposes that local Church 
practice did not (and could not) have survived the communist onslaught of 
seventy years. The new Church practice in Russia, had, as with so much else, to 
be reinvented after 1991. Sergei Filatov put this theory succinctly, ‘Orthodoxy, 
not as an ideological doctrine, but as a real creed, is a new faith for most 
 
79 Cf. Milmo, C., ‘Russian community faces schism as Patriarch Alexis sacks London bishop’, The Independent, 
19.05.2006 
80 Cirota.ru, Tema: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2074581, 19.05.2006 [Accessed 05.05.19] 
81  OCAD. The Times Online, 16.06.2006 
82 Interview 2A  
83 Interviews 2A and 1D 
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Russian citizens’.84 This is a highly disputed point and one which may never be 
fully answered. It would require massive fieldwork on the ground in Russia, 
and the time for gathering such data has probably already passed.  
To what extent were Russian Church practices within Russia simply a 
continuation of the pre-revolutionary customs? And were the practices in the 
diaspora simply a continuation of those in the pre-revolutionary Church or did 
diaspora practice change over time? This is a fascinating subject and could be 
extended beyond religion into all aspects of daily life. Did the seventy years of 
communism represent a complete rupture from the past? Or (as the neo-
Slavophiles maintain) did the years of repression incubate and sustain 
traditional practices against the pressures of modern life in the West? 
 As regards the Church, the answer to these questions presupposes that 
the pre-revolutionary Church was itself cohesive in practice and behaviour. 
This was far from the case. The theory has been proposed that the schism that 
occurred in the diaspora Church in 1926 would have happened even without 
the Bolshevik Revolution, as the struggle between modernisers and 
traditionalists in the Great Sobor of 1917–18 eventually resulted in schism.85 
Yet in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when people were free to 
travel back and forth for the first time in seventy years, it appeared that 
Church custom in the Motherland had become stricter than was even the case 
in the ROCOR parishes – the most conservative part of the diaspora Church.86 A 
report from a ROCOR parishioner who experienced both situations was similar 
in tone to many other testimonies: ‘Somehow I never felt at home in the 
churches there [in Russia], because the minute you walked in … I don’t think 
 
84 Filatov, S., ‘Orthodoxy in Russia: Post-atheist Faith’, Studies in World Christianity, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2008), p.189 
85 Cf. Vorontsova, I.V., ‘Dvizhenie za tserkovnuiu reform v Rossii nachala XX v. i Pomestnyi Sobor 1917–18’, 
Istoricheskii Zhurnal: nauchnye issledovania. No. 4 (2017), pp.105–20  
86 Interview 2G 
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this is a particularly Russian trait, whether the Church Abroad was more 
tolerant, but you didn’t have anyone leaping at you saying “Why aren’t you 
wearing a headscarf?!” and “Why are you standing here?!” and “Why have you 
crossed yourself there?!” You think, “Maybe I should just go away and not get 
in the way of everybody who prays.”’87  
One theory accounting for this development was suggested by a 
Moscow Sourozh parishioner: ‘they [post-Soviet Russians] often don’t know 
what the tradition is’.88 According to this argument, communist persecution 
was so great and so destructive that Church custom was lost and there was a 
complete rupture with the past. After 1991, the resurgent Church reinvented 
custom along more severe lines in accordance with the conservative shift in 
the ROC as a whole. Anti-Moscow groups argued that this was the result of the 
sovietisation of all aspects of life discussed earlier in this chapter, which 
created a cult of power and a more rigid and legalistic Orthodoxy. One Church 
historian wrote that, ‘the disappearance of babushkas ironically made the 
worldview within the Church more Soviet-like. Babushkas were raised in a 
peasant environment in which Soviet cultural symbols and practices 
penetrated very slowly’.89 
Another suggested cause of rupture was that most parishioners in Russia 
post the millennium were not from families who kept the faith underground 
through the ‘babushka lineage’. They were instead recent converts, drawn to 
 
87 Kozhevnikova, A. ‘Invariably the “Russianness,” is Going to Dissipate With Every Congregation’ 
rocorstudies.org,  http://www.rocorstudies.org/interviews/2014/08/17/invariably-the-russianness-is-going-to-
dissipate-with-every-congregation/. [Accessed 09.03.20]  
88 Interview 2A  
89 Cf. Mitrokhin, N., ‘The Russian Orthodox Church in Contemporary Russia: Structural Problems and 
Contradictory Relations with the Government, 2000-2008. Social Research, vol. 76, no. 1, 2009, pp. 289–320 
Cf. also, Ethan-Davey, Al., ‘Russkaia Natsional’naia ideia v kontseptsii A.C. Panarina’. Politeks. Vypusk -2, 2005. 
The ‘Romantic Orthodoxy’ of men such as Likhachev and Panarin opposed the attempt to manage Russia 
(Church or society) with ‘legalism’. Perhaps they would also have opposed new rigidity of the Russian Church 
in the twenty-first century?  
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the Church for a multitude of reasons. Such people, it is proposed, 
demonstrated the zealotry of neophytes, with an obsessive attention to right 
belief, right worship (pravoslavie) and right practice.  A field study of Russians 
in the UK noted that this was now a phenomenon even within the diaspora. 
The following description is interesting for this study and worth quoting at 
length:  
This specific, ‘open’ attitude to religion expressed by the elderly people 
was noted by one participant who represents the later Russian 
generation. As he said, the older people who were born and brought up 
with the church are not so rigid about rules; at the same time, those 
who became religious after the ending of the Soviet Union are very strict 
and inflexible about their beliefs and judge others severely: ‘For those 
who have grown up in an Orthodox culture, who believe naturally, these 
things are natural and simple. But the people who became believers just 
recently want to follow everything to the utmost and over the top and 
sometimes you cannot say a word against it. People from the older 
generation can make a joke and say something like “oh if we sing like 
today we are not getting to heaven”. They can joke. But if I said 
something like that my wife would accuse me of blasphemy.’90  
Like the barbarian Franks of the Carolingian era, the post-Soviet neophytes 
became ‘more Roman than the Romans’ as an overcompensation and a cover 
for this anxiety. They reinstated customs that had in fact never been the norm 
in the pre-revolutionary Church: compulsory headscarves for women, very 
 




rigid interpretation of the fasting rules for the laity, non-attendance at any 
non-Orthodox services, and so on.91  
The problem with this theory lies in the abundance of evidence for the 
widespread use of most of these practices (although not all) before the 
revolution, and also in its total dismissal of the role of the ‘babushka lineage’. 
Although there were indeed very few families who remained Orthodox in 
private, some people did continue to attend services wherever possible, and it 
was from these small seeds that the post-communist Church would emerge. Is 
it to be supposed that these people also lost the practice and customs of their 
ancestors? This seems unlikely.  
 A second theory (proposed by supporters of Moscow) stated that it was 
the customs of the diaspora Church that had altered over time through a 
process of enculturation and through demographic change within the parishes. 
A comparison of studies of custom in the pre-revolutionary Church, such as 
that of Vera Shevzov, with current Church practices suggests that in the most 
important aspects – services, confession and the great fasts – the Church in 
Russia today is probably closer to the pre-revolutionary Church than the 
diaspora Churches.92 In post-Soviet Russia, many Orthodox women adopted a 
demure style of dress, a kind of ‘Orthodox uniform’ that can also be seen as a 
liberation from the all-pervasive oversexualisation of women’s fashion in 
Russia. Nadieszda Kisenko, who has researched this subject in some detail, 
states:  
 
91 With regards to headscarves Cf. Interview 2A: ‘Headscarves. This is a modern (post-Soviet) practice and was 
never current when I was in Morocco. Headscarves is a peasant Russian practice not related to religion but 
practical. It has been adopted by the strict Orthodox as a “badge”.’ 
92 Cf. Shevzov, V., Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution (London, 2004) p.73ff 
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The most striking form of rechurching, however, is a concern with 
women’s dress and appearance. This is something new in Russian 
Orthodoxy. Before the revolutions of 1917, women and men attended 
services either in the clothing they normally wore or in their Sunday 
best; both were ‘decent’. Believers considered it a sin to attend church 
in their work clothes. Women wore long dresses or skirts and covered 
their heads when they went to church, as they did any time they went 
out in public. Men wore trousers and long-sleeved shirts and removed 
their hats. In the Soviet period, church attendance itself prompted more 
concerns than the non-existent issue of how to dress for it. In the past 
twenty years, however, given the long rupture with previous tradition, 
changes in fashion, and the highly sexualized clothing worn by Russian 
women at the office, notions of what constitutes proper dress for church 
attendance (or, indeed, for living as a ‘true’ Orthodox Christian) now 
vary widely.93 
Kisenko goes on to describe the ‘Orthodox uniform’ of the devout woman, ‘not 
only is the head covered but so are the elbows and the knees, the skirt (never 
trousers) falls nearly to the floor, no makeup, nothing too tight, eyes are 
downcast, and shoes are flat’.94 The author likens this to the dress of Hassidic 
Jews, but perhaps it has more in common with that of extreme Evangelical 
sects, such as the Plymouth Brethren. Historically, this new ‘Orthodox uniform’ 
seeks to emulate and connect to the Russian past in a way still preserved 
among Old Believers; for women, forearms are never shown, the shirt is 
buttoned tight up to the neck, the head is always covered, female hair is never 
 
93 Kizenko, N., ‘Women in Contemporary Russia: A Thematic Cluster: Feminized Patriarchy? Orthodoxy and 
Gender in Post-Soviet Russia’, Signs, Vol. 38, No.3 (2013), pp.595–621 
94 Ibid.  
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cut.95 The concern with women’s dress reveals an anxiety over broken 
connections to the past and an aspiration to authenticity. This became a 
leitmotif of the Russian Church in general and of the Sourozh crisis in 
particular.  
As a side note, it is relevant to mention that Russia was the birthplace of 
many conservative religious dress styles, which sought to reify appearance at a 
particular point in time. The best-known examples of this tendency are the 
Russian Old Believers, whose dress was locked down in the seventeenth 
century, and the Hassidic Jews from the Pale of Settlement, whose dress was 
influenced by the Polish nobility and is little changed since the eighteenth 
century. Perhaps there is also, in this emphasis on headscarves, plainness, no 
make-up, something of a desire to reify female dress in the demure styles of 
Soviet epoch, in reaction to contemporary oversexualisation?  
 
Theme 4: Language 
The debate over language, which has been constant in World Orthodoxy for at 
least the last century and shows no signs of abating, centres around two basic 
questions. Firstly, whether the churches in the diaspora should move from 
using their national languages to that of the host country, both in services and 
in ancillary communications. Secondly, whether the mother churches should 
move from using archaic forms of liturgical language to the contemporary 
vernacular. Both questions concerned Sourozh, the first directly and the 
second indirectly, as an important driver of the ideology of the first. The point 
was made in several statements that, because the Church Slavonic used in the 
 
95 Scheffel, D., In the Shadow of Antichrist: The Old Believers of Alberta (Univ. of Toronto, 1991), pp.186–7 
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liturgy was in any case incomprehensible to many new ethnic Russian 
worshippers, moving to English would make the texts more accessible to them 
also.96 
 The Russian Church, of all the diaspora Orthodox churches (with the 
exception perhaps of the Antiochian Orthodox Church), has been the most 
open with regards to the introduction of local tongues. In Greek churches, for 
example, it is common not to hear even one word of contemporary Greek in 
the liturgy, let alone English.  This has been blamed as one of the reasons why 
the Greek Church in the diaspora has been haemorrhaging young people from 
its congregations.97 Connected to this situation is the ethnic segregation of 
Greek parishes in the diaspora as places where the curious indigenous enquirer 
has not traditionally been over-welcome, although this situation has been 
changing in recent years. The Russian Church in the diaspora, by way of 
contrast, has been more welcoming to converts, if not actually embracing 
missionary work. A Sourozh priest noted that some Russian parishes ‘have 
nothing to do with the local people, but I feel ours does and that’s because of 
the language’ [use of English]. He continued that because of the Greeks 
insistence on Greek ‘they have lost generations of people.’98 The parish 
minutes of the Moscow church in London show that there were not infrequent 
demands for more English in the liturgy. Even in the nineteenth century, the 
priest of the Russian Embassy church in London requested the Holy Synod to 
 
96 Interview 2A 
97 The proposed introduction of modern Greek into services in place of Koine Greek mirrors the Church 
Slavonic versus Russian debate. In 2002, the Greek Synod banned experimentation with modern Greek, even 
in the Gospel readings. Cf. https://zenit.org/articles/orthodox-church-bans-modern-greek-in-liturgy/ [Accessed 
07.03.20] and https://www.johnsanidopoulos.com/2010/04/greek-synod-condemns-liturgy-in-modern.html 
[Acessed 07.03.20]. Cf. also Roudometof, V., ‘Transnationalism and Globalization: The Greek Orthodox 
Diaspora between Orthodox Universalism and Transnational Nationalism’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational 
Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Winter 2000), pp.361–97 
98 Interview 1A 
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allow him to serve the liturgy occasionally in English.99 To my knowledge, 
Metropolitan Anthony never used contemporary Russian in the liturgy (apart 
from the readings, perhaps) but he did introduce English and the parish 
celebrates in both Church Slavonic and English to this day. Some of the new 
arrivals from Russia disliked this increasing use of English, seeing it as an 
encroachment into what should be a ‘Russian church’. Others, such as the 
biblical scholar Anna Schmaina-Velikanova, accepted it even though they could 
not understand it, on the assumption that they would have to learn English in 
any case if they wanted to live in the UK.100  
The introduction of English into the services became a flashpoint for 
various reasons. The possibility of the gradual abandonment of Church Slavonic 
was painful for many parishioners because of its deep spiritual significance as a 
sacred language. The move to (any) vernacular also had associations with 
modernism and renovationism. But perhaps first and foremost, the change was 
a perceived focal point of the ethnic struggle. Petitions were sent to Moscow 
demanding that parishioners need ‘to pray in their own language’.101 Slavonic, 
of course, is nobody’s mother tongue today, but the new arrivals expected the 
warmth of the half-understood familiar rather than the coldness of the half-
understood alien.  
The question of language went beyond the liturgy into that of the 
language used in meetings, lectures and notices.102 The great majority of the 
 
99 Cf Tugarinov., Y.S., Mitropolit Antoniy Surozhskiy. Biografiya v faktorakh sovremennikov, (Moscow, 2015) 
p.141ff 
100 Interview with Anna Shmaina-Velikanova, portal-credo.ru. http://www.portal-
credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=541 [Accessed 07.03.20]  
101 Cirota.ru, Tema #53307, Soobshchenie #1995088, 13.04.06 ‘Otkytoe Pis'mo prikhozhan londonskogo 
soboroa episkopu vasiliiu (osbornu)’  
102 Osborne, Bishop B., ‘Twenty-Five Years and One Hundred Issues’, Sourozh Journal, Issue No. 100, May 2005 
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English converts spoke little Russian.103 It might have been expected that 
people joining the Russian Orthodox Church would have an interest in all 
things Slavonic – including language – but Metropolitan Anthony’s open-door 
policy meant this was not necessarily the case. (By contrast, English converts to 
the Greek Church, such as Fr Ephraim Lash, Philip Sherrard and Metropolitan 
Kallistos Ware, appear in the main to have been Hellenists.) As Russian 
gradually reverted to being the lingua franca in the cathedral, the English 
started to feel isolated, especially those with no Russian and no Russian marital 
connections.104 A letter, which was posted on Bishop Basil’s website at the 
time of the crisis, is worth quoting at length as it encapsulates so many of 
these grievances:  
My experiences have included attending a Liturgy in the Cathedral at 
which the first half hour was entirely in Slavonic (how much more was 
Slavonic I don’t know as I left); attending a meeting in a room where the 
walls were pasted with many posters and notices which I did not 
understand; a service where words to communally sung prayers were 
handed out to Russians with no similar papers for the English; a Liturgy 
which was entirely in English having Slavonic parts added to it when 
nobody in the parish was Russian; a conference in the Diocese held 
entirely in Russian; a report on the work of the Diocese which appeared 
to consist wholly of  events and meetings with dignitaries from Russia 
and previous Russian states and almost nothing about establishing links 
within the UK; learning that a priest is likely to include Slavonic prayers 
in a Liturgy on the basis of there being one or two Russians in the 
 
103 Cf. Arefev, A.L., ‘Russkii iazyk na rubezhe XX–XXI vekov’, Dissertation, Ministerstvo obrazovania i nauki 
RF.(Moscow, 2012), p.269 
104 Dioceseinfo.org, Comment from Alexandra Milton, parishioner of the diocese, 19.05.06. 
http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=205 [Accessed 07.04.20]. 
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congregation when there are a dozen English who will not understand; 
the realisation that after over 40 years of Sourozh in the UK our 
Cathedral still does not have one service in English, amongst various 
other events.105 
Seen from the Russian side, such changes seemed inevitable as they mirrored 
the demographic shifts taking place. An open letter to the Patriarch 
complained that, ‘Bishop Basil tries to convince everyone that the cathedral is 
"international” and that there shouldn't be services in Slavonic. Even though 
we Russians are 85 percent!’.106 The relationship of the older Russian émigrés 
to the language question was complex, with probably the majority favouring 
some measure of English in the services. But there was also a subtle difference 
between the Russian spoken by the older émigrés and that of the new arrivals. 
Metropolitan Anthony himself related the story of a Russian woman who, after 
having gone to confession in the cathedral, questioned the priest; ‘Father, can I 
say something to you?’ – ‘Yes of course’– ‘Your advice is excellent, but your 
grammar is terrible’.107  
 It is interesting to compare Sourozh to the ROCOR parishes in the UK. 
ROCOR (‘the Church of aristocrats and peasants’108) had placed constancy to 
liturgical tradition at the absolute centre of Church life and for this reason, the 
main ROCOR cathedrals and churches in general maintained Slavonic as the 
language of services. Often the priests conducting these services were locals 
who simply had to learn Slavonic to serve. The question of liturgical language is 
 
105 Dioceseinfo.org, Letter from a provincial parishioner, 19.05.2006. 
http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/sminews/?ID=206 [Accessed 07.04.20]  
106 Cirota.ru, Tema #53307, Soobshchenie #1907853, ‘Budushee russkogo Pravoslavia za rubezhom’, 03.07.06. 
http://www.cirota.ru/forum/view.php?subj=53307&order=desc&pg=10 [Accessed 05.05.19]  
107 Interview with Metropolitan Anthony, Moskovskiy tserkovnyy vestnik: Sobornyi listok, Londonskogo 
kafedral'nogo sobora, No. 372, 2003. 
http://zarubezhje.narod.ru/texts/anthony_sourozh01.htm [Accessed 07.03.20]  
108 Interview 1D.  
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a sensitive one because of the multi-jurisdictional character of the Orthodox 
diaspora. The individual ethnic churches do not want to lose their identity with 
a wholesale adoption of the local language, and yet the halfway house of 
multilingual services also seems unsatisfactory. It is known that Metropolitan 
Anthony strongly disliked the mixing of different languages in one service, 
although he did acquiesce to it.109 It seems that this situation will settle down 
only with time.  
 It should also be noted that pressure for retention of Slavonic in the 
liturgy did not just come from Russophone parishioners. Some who had no 
understanding of either Russian or Slavonic preferred Slavonic as a sacred 
language untainted by the modern world. A parishioner stated in interview; 
‘Both the English and Russian laity were against the translation of the liturgy 
into English (or Russian). The laity always want to be “transported” – they do 
not want demystification; they do not want to understand the liturgy’.110 Such 
statements moved the linguistic question onto the theological battleground 
fought over by traditionalists and modernisers, the argument expanding 
beyond the ethnic one of Russian versus English into that of the sacred 
(Slavonic) versus the profane (the vernacular).  
I would propose that the arguments concerning the maintenance of 
Slavonic within the Motherland were pivotal in its abandonment/retention in 
the diaspora. The usage of contemporary Russian in the Russian Church has a 
somewhat complicated and painful history. As far back as the early nineteenth 
century, usage of the vernacular in sacred texts has been associated with 
modernism, syncretism and freemasonry. The Bible Society of Alexander I, 
which sought and succeeded in some measure in making the Bible available in 
 
109 Cf Tugarinov., Y.S. (2015), p.140. op.cit. 
110 Interview 2A  
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contemporary Russian for the masses, was viewed with suspicion by the 
majority of clergy and did not survive his reign.111 Subsequently, the vernacular 
came to be associated with renovationism, but the subject was also discussed 
at the All-Russian Sobor of 1917–18.112 In 1905, as part of the pre-conciliar 
commission process, Russian bishops were canvassed about the use of 
Slavonic; twenty-eight out of forty-eight bishops made critical comments about 
the incomprehensibility of Slavonic.113 At the same time, there were calls for a 
‘New Slavonic’ translation of texts, updating archaisms and making the texts 
more accessible. Brian Bennet, in his study of the subject, concludes that, ‘The 
basic idea (of the reformers) is that the Church was on the way to Russifying 
the liturgy if only it had been allowed to fulfil its mandate’.114 Indeed, one of 
the doklads of the conciliar subsections did allow for the partial introduction of 
Russian in certain readings, albeit only with episcopal permission.115  
 The debate about Slavonic versus Russian was intense in Russia in the 
1990s when the question was reopened after the collapse of communism. For 
traditionalists, according to Bennet’s study, ‘Slavonic is intelligible to people 
who attend church on a regular basis; it is only the neophyte intelligentsia who 
do not understand it and constitute a vocal minority advocating for change’.116 
 
111 Cf. Hosking, G., Russia: People and Empire (Harvard, 1998), pp.140ff. Also Batalden, S., ‘Printing the Bible in 
the Reign of Alexander I: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Imperial Russian Bible Society’ in Hosking, G. (ed.), 
Church, Nation and State in Russia and Ukraine (London, 1990) and Zacek, J.C., ‘The Russian Bible Society and 
the Russian Orthodox Church, Church History, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec 1966), pp.411-37, and Zacek, J.C., ‘The 
Russian Bible Society and the Catholic Church’, Canadian Slavic Studies, Vol. 1 (1971) 
112 Cf. Kravetskii A., ‘Problema bogosluzhebnogo iazyka na Sobore 1917–1918 godov i v posleduiushchie 
desiatiletia’, Zh.M.P , No.2 (1994), pp.68–86. On the liturgical reforms of the Living Church, including usage of 
contemporary Russian cf. Solovev, I., ‘Obnovlencheskii raskol i liturgicheskie reformy’, Tserkovny Vestnik, No. 
12 (385) 27.06.08. Also, Bennet, B., Religion and Language in Post-Soviet Russia (London, 2011), p.69: ‘Russian 
is “simply and unequivocally” associated with Renovationism’. Cf. also the seven liturgical reforms as they 
were proposed by the Sobor of the Living Church itself, Pravoslavnaia Obnovlencheskaia Gazeta, ‘Zhivaia 
Tserkov’’ No. 10 (1922), pp.17–18   
113 Bennet, op. cit., p.68 
114 Ibid., p.76 
115 Ibid., pp.68ff  
116 Ibid., p.73 
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Traditionalists and Slavists, such as Dmitry Likhachev, argued strongly for 
Slavonic as a sacred language not dissimilar to Latin in the West or Ancient 
Hebrew in Judaism (‘Jesus spoke in Aramaic but prayed in Hebrew’). They 
maintained that Church services were not about imparting information, which 
was a Protestant concept, and defended Slavonic against the ‘philistinism’ 
(Likhachev) and corruption of everyday Russian.117 They also pointed out that 
everything in church was different from the everyday: clothes, buildings, 
behaviour and that language formed part of difference. Likhachev also made 
the point that Church Slavonic had in any case never been a vernacular idiom 
as that is understood today.118  
 Moreover, and of especial importance for this study, Slavonic is deeply 
connected to the concept of the ‘Russian World’ and pan-Slavism. Saints Cyril 
and Methodius Day (24 May) is now a national holiday in Russia, when Slavonic 
is celebrated across the land. A typical modern panegyric referenced the 
memory of Khomiakov and Kireevsky and called on believers to defend the 
‘universal and priceless jewel’ of the Slavonic language against the ‘wicked 
attempts’ to tamper with it.119 Even small suggested changes to the status quo 
have brought forth a passionate response from those who see them as the 
‘first step … on the road to renovationism’.120 Church Slavonic has been 
described as ‘the Soul of the Russian people, Defender of her national roots 
and the living witness of her history’.121 Language is thus seen as a 
 
117 Likhachev, D.S., ‘Russkii iazyk v bogoslovskoi mysli’, (1998) 
http://www.golubinski.ru/ecclesia/liturgika35.htm [Accessed 08.02.20] 
118 Petrukhina, E.V., ‘O pol’ze tserkovnoslavianskogo iazyka kak iazyka bogosluzhenia dlia sovormenogo 
russkogo iazyka’, Slovo, (Dec, 2011) 
119 ‘Slavyanskii yazyk kak natsional'no svyashchennii’ drevglas.ru. http://www.drevglas.ru/troick.html 
[Accessed 20.01.20]  
120 Pravdoliubov, Prot. S., ‘Radi mira tserkovnogo proekt o tserkovnoslavianskom iazyke sleduet sniat’ s 
rassmotrenia’, bogoslov.ru, 22.08.2011. https://bogoslov.ru/article/1902908. Also cf. Firsov, S.L., Vlast’ i ogon’ 
:Tserkov’ i sovetskoe gosudarstvo 1918 – nachalo 1940-x gg, (Moscow, 2014), pp.238.ff 
121 Pravdoliubov, op. cit. 
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battleground in the new Cold War and the ‘clash of civilisations’. Those 
opposed to the vernacular point to the small changes that preceded the 
watershed of the Second Vatican Council and the quick descent into folk 
masses and other vulgarisations that followed the Catholic Church’s 
abandonment of Latin.  
 As a result, promoters of contemporary Russian in Church services are 
regarded with suspicion by many of the faithful in Russia today; a recent poll 
on whether the Church should translate parts of the liturgy into contemporary 
Russian polled only 18 percent in favour.122 This is far from being a niche 
debate; the 2011 Inter-Council document on Church Slavonic received 1,198 
online reviews, while a document on the organization of social work in the 
Russian Church received 8 reviews.123  In recent times, the derogatory term 
‘new renovationsists’ has been applied to priests who have sought to 
introduce the vernacular, such as Fathers Giorgy Kochetkov and Alexander 
Borisov, the former a liturgical scholar and the latter a priest of the liberal-
leaning Moscow parish of SS Kosmas and Damian.  
The ‘new renovationists’ of post-Soviet Russia also sought (tentatively it 
must be said) to introduce some of the other reforms of the Living Church into 
the liturgy.124 The liturgist Fr Georgy Kochetkov started to use contemporary 
Russian in his Moscow parish church in the 1990s, attracting a large 
congregation of intellectuals. Later he was moved to a smaller church and then 
banned from serving publicly altogether. Along with his use of contemporary 
 
122 ‘Sredi zhitelei Rossii net yedinogo mneniia o predpochtitel'nom yazyke pravoslavnogo bogosluzheniia’ 
23.09.11, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1630066.html [Accessed 01.03.20] 
123 Velikanov, P., ‘Opyt internet-obsuzhdenia dokumentov Mezhsobornogo prisutstvia’, 29.01.2012. 
https://www.pravmir.ru/opyt-internet-obsuzhdeniya-dokumentov-mezhsobornogo-prisutstviya-video/ 
[Accessed 01.03.20]  
124 Ivanov, S.N., ‘Khronologia obnovlencheskogo "perevorota" v Russkoi Tserkvi po novym arkhivnim 
dokumentam’, Vestnik PSTGU 3 (58) (2014), pp.24–60 
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Russian came a host of other practices which the Church considered to be 
modernist. The usage of contemporary Russian has also sometimes been 
accompanied by a proposed, or actual ‘cleansing’ of the liturgy of historically 
‘difficult’ passages. The removal of these in modern translations has been seen 
as an attempt to rewrite sacred texts to satisfy modern political correctness.125   
 The abandonment of Slavonic for the vernacular in the diaspora was 
often a case of simple necessity, rather than a result of the theological 
differences mentioned above, as it is difficult (though not impossible) for 
clergy to serve in a language they do not understand. Nevertheless, it was also 
true that those parishes and jurisdictions that were quick to abandon Slavonic 
often introduced other modernising or ecumenical practices. Slavonic (and 
other archaic languages) doubtless served as a cultural barrier to the 
incremental pressures from western society. Once English became the 
liturgical language, parishes immediately became more attractive to 
indigenous converts, which in turn opened them to wider societal influences.  
 
Theme 5: Devotional Practice 
Church services 
At least some of the liturgical practices that developed in the Sourozh diocese 
were seen by the pro-Moscow group as verging on neo-renovationism. An 
article by some ‘parishioners of the cathedral’ stated, ‘Sourozh priests simply 
do not know the liturgical statutes and the correct procedures for holding 
liturgical services’.126 They complained that services were shortened and 
 
125 E.g. Fr Innokenty Pavlov of the Moscow Theological Academy proposed excising perceived anti-Semitic 
passages from the Good Friday prayers. Likewise, the contemporary Catholic Church has removed references 
to ‘the perfidious Jews’ from the same services.  
126 Prikhozhane Londonskogo sobora, ‘Gliadia iz Londona’, April 2006. http://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/ 
[Accessed 20.01.20]  
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‘gutted’ to the extent that any true Russian theological student would be ‘in 
despair’.127 Metropolitan Anthony was well known for his dislike for what he 
regarded as needless ‘pomp and ceremony’ in liturgical practice, and in this he 
differed from the custom of the Mother Church, as evidenced, for example, in 
the episcopal liturgies of Metropolitan Hilarion.128 
As with all the flashpoints in the crisis, the battle of words over 
ceremonial practice at Sourozh contained behind it a wealth of historical and 
political conflicts. In recent times, the Church within and without Russia has 
been criticised for what is perceived as indulgence in the ‘trappings of 
splendour’ over, for example, social and educational projects. Church 
construction and renovation – the so-called ‘gilding of the cupolas’ – has 
become a matter of some controversy in Russia, not only between the Church 
and those opposed to it, but also within the Church.129 Likewise, the majesty 
and formalism of (especially episcopal) celebrations of the liturgy has its 
supporters and detractors. So it was also in Sourozh, the pro-Moscow camp 
supporting the resurgent Church’s desire to inspire and impress with grand 
celebrations after years of ghettoization, and the anti-Moscow camp including 
those who preferred simple, less ostentatious services. Metropolitan Anthony 
only celebrated a full episcopal service once a year, on the feast of All Saints. 
He told Metropolitan Kallistos, ‘I’m not against ceremony if it possesses 
spiritual meaning but I can’t see the point of rigid formality’.130 After the 
departure of the anti-Moscow group following the schism, the ritual in the 
 
127 Ibid.  
128 Tugarinov., Y.S. (2015), op. cit., p.144 
129 Most recently there has been controversy surrounding the ‘forty times forty’ project of the Moscow 
Patriarchate to build 200 new churches in the Moscow suburbs. E.g. ‘Bozh’ia volia 
V Moskve stroiat sotni khramov, nesmotrya na gnev zhiteley. Komu eto vygodno?’, 15.08.19, 
https://lenta.ru/articles/2019/08/15/church/  [Accessed 20.01.20] 
130 Cf. Tugarinov., Y.S. (2015), p.144, op.cit. 
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London cathedral became more formal and choreographed. An interviewee 
commented that because of this change, ‘If I were a parishioner in London I 
probably wouldn’t go to the cathedral’.131 He saw such ‘composed’ services as 
artificial and off-putting.  
On the other hand, one English priest (who remained with Moscow) 
pointed to the fact that although Metropolitan Anthony’s episcopal liturgies 
were very modest, he himself was actually far more ‘the centre of attention’ 
than in a standard episcopal liturgy, where ‘the spotlight was diffused’ among 
all the deacons, servers and splendour.132 Criticisms can be made of both 
positions; what’s interesting here are the subtexts. On the surface, to a 
western audience the situation can look clear cut: the sincere, simple 
Orthodoxy of Metropolitan Anthony’s Sourozh rejected the ‘grandiose 
posturing’ of the resurgent mother Church and this was reflected most tellingly 
in the way they both chose to celebrate the liturgy. Yet the anti-Moscow group 
perhaps failed to understand that after seventy years of intensive persecution, 
the Russian Church was at last relishing her moment of freedom and this was 
reflected in a desire not to hide the liturgy away in a secret house church, but 
to present the most magnificent and public displays imaginable.  
For the pro-Moscow parishioners, the standardisation of liturgical 
practice with that of the Mother Church was natural and simply a restoration 
of order. One parishioner commented, ‘When Bishop Basil gave his blessing to 
read the hours before vespers, for many of the old parishioners it was taken as 
“Russian revanchism” and they demanded that he shorten it’.133 In contrast, 
 
131 Interview 1D 
132 Interview 1Ha 
133 Cirota.ru, Tema #58412, Soobshchenie #216746, 04.07.06 [Accessed 28.03.20]. Cf. also Sarni, M. and 
Peregudov, M., ‘Surozhskaia Eparkhia: vzgliad iznutry’, Tserkovnyi Vestnik, Nos. 1–2 (Jan, 2004), pp. 278–9. 
http://www.tserkov.info/numbers/commentary/?ID=828 [Accessed 28.03.20] 
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the ROCOR priest Fr Andrew Phillips wrote, ‘There was no danger at all of 
Russification – the danger was “Orthodoxification” that is being forced to 
abandon the “comfortable” Anglican practices [e.g. shorter services] which 
Metr Antony’s converts were used to’.134 One of the great differences in 
liturgical practice dividing Orthodoxy from Roman Catholicism and 
Protestantism is length of services. Following the Protestant Reformation and 
the Catholic Counter-Reformation, Church services and attendant practices in 
the West became greatly shortened. The Tridentine Mass, which became the 
universal liturgy for most of the western Roman Catholic Church from the 
Council of Trent (1545–63) up to the liturgical reforms post Vatican II (1970), 
greatly standardised and shortened existing liturgical practices, making 
universal the use of the Roman Rite.135 The Protestants of course went much 
further in their drive towards simplification of services. In the Catholic Church 
iIt became possible to say a ‘low’ Mass (liturgy) in about forty-five minutes. The 
standard Orthodox liturgy will last approximately twice that, but this does not 
include the hours and post-liturgical prayers and other practices. In addition, 
the evening services are often much longer, Vespers and Matins frequently 
being combined. These practices are very ancient and reflect Orthodoxy’s 
much greater connection with monasticism, or rather the lack of divide 
between monastic and lay liturgical practice. Monasticism is central to all 
Orthodox jurisdictions in a way that has disappeared in the West. Indeed, it is 
impossible for an Orthodox jurisdiction to continue without a healthy monastic 
current because the episcopacy is drawn from the celibate monastic (black) 
clergy. Even the fasting rules, which seem very prescriptive for westerners new 
 
134 Phillips, Fr Andrew, ‘On the Recent Troubled History of the Russian Church in London’ (2008) 
http://orthodoxengland.org.uk/londonl.htm [Accessed 08.02.20]  
135 The Eastern Catholic (Uniate) Churches continued with their liturgies, as did some religious orders and other 
communities with liturgies dating back over 200 years prior to the Council, such as the Carthusians.  
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to Orthodoxy (well over half the year is a mostly vegan fast), are based on the 
monastic rule and there does not exist a separate one for the laity. All of this 
means that shortening of services and simplification of ritual is viewed by 
traditional Orthodox as a secularisation and westernisation (the two are largely 
synonymous) of liturgical practice.  
There was one confrontation in Sourozh that was particularly painful to 
indigenous converts to Orthodoxy and this related to the prayers offered for 
the non-Orthodox. During the Orthodox liturgy, the faithful write the names of 
their loved ones, living and departed, on slips of paper to be read out by the 
clergy before the liturgy. According to the strict interpretation, prayers for the 
non-Orthodox or inoslavie (heterodox) cannot be offered during the liturgy 
proper. In Russia, some churches have signs which inform people, ‘The 
unbaptized, people of other faiths, unbelievers and suicides are not 
commemorated in the church’.136 The practice of praying for non-Orthodox 
had grown up in the diocese as a natural process of enculturation due to the 
large number of people whose families remained outside the Orthodox 
Church.137 This practice was deemed to be transgressive for some in the pro-
Moscow clergy, as it broke with Church tradition and encouraged a nebulous 
idea of the Church’s  boundaries. Theologically, practices relating to the 
heterodox are sensitive, owing to the rigid interpretation of the dogma of the 
impossibility of salvation outside the Church (extra ecclesiam nulla salus). To 
the anti-Moscow parishioners, not being able to pray for their deceased loved 
ones as they had always done seemed particularly cruel.  
 
136 Luehrmann, S., ‘The Politics of Prayer Books: Delegated intercession, names, and community boundaries in 
the Russian Orthodox Church’, Journal of Religious and Political Practice, 2:1, 6–22 (2016), p.14 
137 OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org, Comments on the Current Situation, op. cit. ‘[Bishop Basil] does not forbid 
parishioners to include the names of non-Orthodox on the prayer slips they send into the sanctuary at the 
beginning of the Divine Liturgy’.  
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The growth of the ecumenist movement in the last century gave rise to a 
conservative counter-revolution in the Orthodox Church.138 This resulted in a 
more rigid and defined belief about the boundaries of the Church;, who is 
inside and who is outside, and what services and prayers can be offered for 
them (if at all). Different jurisdictions within World Orthodoxy have likewise 
aligned themselves broadly with either the liberal (Ecumenical Patriarchate, 
OCA) or the conservative (Russia, Georgia) tendencies. This additional 
ideological complication has been added to the multiple ethnic struggles that 
increasingly plague the Orthodox Church. For example, the 2018 schism 
between Moscow and Constantinople ostensibly concerned ecclesiology and 
power, but the new Ukrainian jurisdiction founded by Constantinople has felt 
pressure to align itself with those liberal and ecumenist movements in the 
Church that Moscow opposes. 
 
Confession and communion 
A gradual relaxation of mandatory confession before communion had grown 
up in Sourozh as part of the general enculturation of the diocese.139 The long 
queues for confession that the new arrivals were now forming before and 
during services thus represented a novelty for many indigenous converts. 
Regular face-to-face confession with a priest had never become established 
even in the highest Anglican traditions. Many priests relate that confession is 
particularly difficult for Protestant converts to Orthodoxy or even to traditional 
Catholicism (where the sacrament is administered through the anonymity of 
 
138 Baranov, S., ‘An Analysis of the Basic Principles of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Attitude 
Towards Heterodoxy’, Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies, Cambridge, UK [No date]. 
https://www.academia.edu/25589076  
139 OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs, Comments on the Current Situation, op. cit. ‘[Bishop Basil] does not insist on a 
one-to-one correlation between confession and the receiving of communion.’  
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the confessional).140 For the pro-Moscow group and traditionalists in the 
Russian Church, regular communion without confession verged on scandalous, 
and they argued that a practice should not be abandoned simply because it 
was more challenging in our modern age.141 For the anti-Moscow group, 
however, mandatory confession before communion was an archaism that 
interfered with man’s personal repentance before God. For some, it 
represented an obsession with a literal letter-of-the-law observance, which 
was also in danger of promoting ‘the illusion of purity’. In any case, it was 
suggested, the practice had often been abandoned in other local Orthodox 
churches such as the Greek.142 In an open letter, Fr Andrei Teterin countered 
these arguments: ‘There is the steadily enforced idea of the “unnecessary and 
old-fashioned” sacrament of penance and related confession (especially before 
communion). When … I spoke about this, one of our West-European fellow 
clergymen jumped up and cried, “With these words you are throwing a stone 
at Metropolitan Anthony!”’.143 In opposition to Fr Andrei, Bishop Basil posted a 
website notice stating that confession was not deemed to have a direct 
correlation with receiving communion.144  
 Within World Orthodoxy, over the course of the last century, there has 
been a movement towards increasing regular communion by the laity. The 
desire was to increase the spiritual life of workers and peasants to counter the 
ever-greater threats and temptations of modernity. In the Russian Church in 
the diaspora, there was criticism of the pre-revolutionary practice of 
 
140 Phillips, Fr Andrew, ‘On Becoming and Remaining an Orthodox Christian: A Talk given at the Orthodox 
Pilgrimage to Felixstowe in August 2001,  http://orthodoxengland.org.uk/brorthoc.htm [Accessed 03.02.20]  
141 Cf. Maksimov, Fr. Giorgy, ‘Neobkhodimia li ispoved pered prichastiem?’, 06.11.18,  
 http://www.pravoslavie.ru/117000.html [Accessed 03.02.20]  
142 On the jurisdictional divergence, Cf. Pastoral Committee of the Pan-Orthodox Assembly 
of Bishops with Churches in Great Britain and Ireland, Report on the work: January - June 2011 
http://dioceseofsourozh.squarespace.com/pastoral-committee-2011/ [Accessed 03.03.2020]  
143 Quoted in ‘Gladia iz Londona’. Op.cit. https://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/print [Accessed 20.01.20]  
144 OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs, Comments on the Current Situation, op. cit.  
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infrequent communion, which often took place only on the great feasts or 
even just once a year in accordance with the State law. However, as Vera 
Shevzov has shown, this infrequency belies the actual depth of religious 
feeling: ‘It is important, therefore, not necessarily to equate the perceived 
importance of the Eucharist with the frequency of its reception. Many 
believers partook of the Eucharist relatively rarely not because they considered 
it unimportant or insignificant but precisely because of the sense of awe and 
holiness with which it was associated’.145  
Accompanying the drive for regular communion was an emphasis on 
correct preparation. In post-Soviet Russia, this has come to include not only 
confession but sometimes stringent fasting rules, along with lengthy 
preparatory prayers. As a result, the practice of regular (weekly) communion is 
starting to decrease in Russia. Nadieszda Kizenko in her study concluded that, 
‘Confession in Russia today has much in common with pre-revolutionary 
practice. People are still expected to fast before going to confession and 
communion; they still often schedule those sacraments for the four seasonal 
fasting periods of the year. The Orthodox Church still publishes large-
circulation guides to train penitents to confess properly’.146 Regular 
communion without confession is now a rarity in the Russian Church within 
Russia, and in the diaspora Church it is not uncommon to see notices stating, 
‘Anyone approaching the altar MUST go to confession at the vigil service on 
Saturday or if this is not possible, on Sunday morning’.  
 A word should be said here about the practice of general confession as it 
was practiced by Metropolitan Anthony. The concept of general confession, by 
which a parishioner may ‘privately confess before God’ and consider him or 
 
145 Shevzov, Russian Orthodoxy, op. cit., p.77 
146 Cf. also Kizenko, N., ‘Women in Contemporary Russia’, op.cit.  
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herself to be absolved with a general absolution before the liturgy, does not as 
a rule exist in the Orthodox Church. Such a practice was piloted, albeit in a very 
different context, at the end of the nineteenth century by St John of 
KrondstadtKronstadt, who in practice simply could not hear the confessions of 
all the tens of thousands of souls who beat a path to his door. Before the main 
liturgy, the church would be filled with people weeping and crying out their 
sins one to another, before St John would read out a general absolution.147 The 
Sobor of 1917–18 also discussed the issue of general confession and made 
some provision for it in specific circumstances (such as for soldiers before 
battle) and requiring certain actions (such as the reading out of questions 
about the most serious sins lying on the conscience of the penitents).148 Using 
St John’s example, some diaspora parishes started to introduce the practice of 
general confession, but of a different kind to that of St John. For Metropolitan 
Anthony, the practice was usually accompanied by a lengthy conversation with 
a group of people, and absolution was not simply read out to the assembled 
congregation while they privately confessed their sins in silence.149 
Nevertheless, the practice seeped into many communities in the Sourozh 
diocese, especially where there was a high level of indigenous converts. In 
some parishes, one-to-one confession with a priest became almost a rarity, 
and regular communion the norm. For the newly arrived Russians, this practice 
seemed close to what was done in Anglican services and far removed from the 
Orthodoxy they knew.  
 
147 Cf., Grisbrooke, W.J., The Spiritual Counsels of Father John of Kronstadt (New York, 1967), pp. xxiiiff. Also, 
Kizenko, N., A Prodigal Saint: Father John of Kronstadt and the Russian People (Pennsylvania State Univ. 2000), 
pp.64ff  
148 Kravetskii, A., ‘Problema bogosluzhebnogo iazyka na Sobore 1917–1918 godov i v posleduiushchie 
desiatiletia, Zh.M.P, No.2 (1994), pp.68–86  
149 For a description cf. Tugarinov., Y.S. (2015),p.158ff. op.cit. Also, Surozhskii, A., Nabliudaete kak vy slushaete 
(Moscow, 2004), pp.515ff 
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 At Sourozh there was also less emphasis on the stringent rules around 
fasting, which owing to their complexity can become a virtual obsession among 
devout Orthodox. An open letter complained that the custom of fasting on 
Saturdays in preparation for communion on Sunday was considered to be 
‘outdated’.150 The problem lay in the cumulative effect of all these seemingly 
minor divergences. The more easy-going attitudes to dress, confession and 
fasting, the shortening of services and introduction of the vernacular – all 
pointed to an Orthodoxy that was somewhat easier to practice than that of the 
Church in the Motherland. For the anti-Moscow group, it was not about an 
easing of restrictions to make the Church more acceptable, but a re-emphasis 
on the things that were really important (and in fact more difficult), such as 
alms-giving and love of one’s enemies. But the pro-Moscow group pointed to 
the fact that the relaxation of rules and jettisoning of tradition in other 
denominations (notably the Catholic Church) had led to neither a renewed 
spirituality, nor a resurgence in Church attendance. In fact, it represented a 
capitulation of the Church before the secular world, with a resultant 
haemorrhaging of the faithful.  
 
Icons 
On (Old CalendarOrthodox) Christmas Eve 2006, an icon of St Nicholas was 
moved from the centre of the London cathedral into the cathedral kitchen 
area. The icon had an interesting history, having belonged to Russian troops 
during the Russo-Japanese war who kept it with them when they were saved 
by the British Navy. It even had bullet holes as testimony to its provenance and 
had recently been restored at some expense. The moving of the icon may not 
 
150 Sarni, M. and Peregudov, M., ‘Surozhskaia Eparkhia: vzgliad iznutry’, Tserkovnyi Vestnik, Nos. 1–2 (Jan, 
2004), pp.278–9. Kommentarii. http://www.tserkov.info/numbers/commentary/?ID=828  [Accessed 28.03.20] 
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have been a deliberate act to humiliate the pro-Moscow group, but it was 
perceived as such.151 Even if the icon had been moved thoughtlessly, this 
perhaps even more shows the depth of the cultural divide. Western audiences 
should understand the intense devotion to St Nicholas that is one of the 
hallmarks of Russian spirituality. There is probably not a major city in Russia 
without a church dedicated to this saint. Every year on the saint’s feast days, 
Bari in Italy (where the relics have been held since 1087) is inundated with 
Russian pilgrims. The grandest of all Russian krestny khod, from Kirov to 
Velikoretskoe, is in honour of St Nicholas. Every year over 100,000 pilgrims 
walk for days and nights behind the icon of St Nicholas, each with their special 
requests and petitions to the saint. The removal of the icon of St Nicholas to 
the pantry is mentioned several times in the letters and witness statements of 
the pro-Moscow group. It was seen almost as a declaration of war and elicited 
an open petition to the Patriarch. One parishioner wrote that, ‘This action 
really characterises the present relations towards the Russian spiritual legacy 
which is taking shape in our church – that is, latent Russophobia!’.152 The 
incident also illustrates the great importance of icons in the Orthodox Church 
and that events surrounding them can be of national importance. 
 The previously mentioned attitude of the White émigré Iulia de 
Beausobre to icons – ‘aids to prayer for beginners’ – was at variance with the 
devotion of the new arrivals. Western converts, often steeped in the 
transcendence of God, can feel very uncomfortable with the practices 
associated with icons and relics in the East and especially in Russia: kissing and 
touching icons, full prostrations (repeatedly kneeling and bowing one’s head to 
 
151 Cirota.ru, Tema #53307, Soobshchenie #1995088, ‘Otkytoe Pis'mo prikhozhan londonskogo sobora episkopu 
vasiliiu (osbornu)’, 13.04.06 [Accessed 05/05/19]    
152 Ibid.  
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the floor) before icons, the blessing of food, of water, full immersion in holy 
springs and wells, and so on. These practices have all but disappeared from the 
West, even in Catholic countries, where they were also once common. Icons of 
course are perceived as ‘windows on the Divine’ and objects of beautiful 
transcendence, but less as sacred objects in themselves, which in their very 
essence can elicit miracles.  
This difference in perspective goes to the heart of the East–West divide: 
the West’s so-called ‘banishment of God’ from daily life to the heavens, 
resulting in a dichotomous way of thinking.153 And to the East’s (especially 
Russia’s) ability to mix the sacred with the material, the imminent with the 
transcendent, in the incarnational and cosmological aspect of the universe.154 
Charles Lock, in his study of Bakhtin, noted how western dichotomies found 
themselves collapsed in Orthodoxy as a result of the theology of Christ’s 
incarnation: ‘The Neoplatonic divisions and dichotomies – matter/spirit, 
body/mind, time/eternity, form/image, figure/ground, etc. (in each pair the 
privilege belonging to the immaterial and transcendent) – are perpetuated 
within the Western Church. Eastern Christianity, surrounded by Neoplatonism, 
found those dichotomies to have been challenged and possibly invalidated by 
the Incarnation’.155  
Icons hold such immense significance not only because of their 
provenance and history (though this is indeed a major factor) but also because 
of their miracle-working qualities: icons weep and produce myrrh, icons are 
miraculously renewed, icons are lost and miraculously reappear, icons travel 
 
153 Cf. Yannaras, C., ‘Orthodoxy and the West: A paper read at the Inter-Orthodox Conference in 
Brookline, Mass., in September 1970’ , Eastern Churches Review 111, No. 3 (1971) 
154 Cf. Steenberg, M.C., Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of Redemption (Leide, 2008), 
pp.138ff  
155 Lock, C., ‘Carnival and Incarnation: Bakhtin and Orthodox Theology’, Journal of Literature & Theology Vol. 5, 
No 1. (March 1991) 
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miraculously from place to place, icons have a life of their own and are 
definitely not just the symbolic devotional devices that westerners often taken 
them for.156 Icons have still more animate qualities in that they ‘pay visits’ and 
‘meet’ people and other icons. Because of this, icons have an important role to 
play in the national consciousness, hence the outrage at the removal of the 
icon of St Nicholas and the suggestion of Russophobia.  An event illustrating 
the huge importance that an icon can play in national life was the return visit 
of the Kursk-root icon to back to Kursk in 2009. The occasion was especially 
relevant to this study as it represented the meeting of the two separated parts 
of the Russian Church (the two Russias), as the icon had long been the symbol 
of the Russian Church Abroad (ROCOR), residing as it did in the ROCOR 
Jordanville Monastery in New York. Close on half a million people turned out to 
welcome the icon back to Kursk.  
The Kazan icon of the Theotokos is perhaps the most ‘politicised’ of all 
Russian icons, being associated with both the liberation from the Tartar-yoke 
and the defence against Poland in the Time of Troubles. A copy of the icon was 
even processed through the streets during the siege of Leningrad. With these 
stories in mind, one should note the appearance of the reigning (derzhava) 
icon of the Theotokos in the Sourozh diocese at the end of the crisis in 2006, 
the icon having been sent from Moscow to the London cathedral. This icon had 
long been an important symbol for Russian monarchists and nationalists due to 
its interesting history.  It had been discovered by a peasant woman after its 
location had been revealed to her in a dream on the day of the Tsar’s 
abdication in 1917. In addition to its history, the icon depicted the Theotokos 
 
156 One of the factors in the canonisation of the Romanovs was a series of myrrh-streaming icons of the Holy 
Royal Martyrs. As is often the case with such events, several were simply cheap paper copies of existing icons 




in the Imperial crown and holding the sceptre and orb and cross (globus 
cruciger), the symbols of regal authority. For all these reasons, the appearance 
of the icon in Sourozh at this time was seen by some as the coup de grâce by 






Chapter 5 Sourozh and the Russian World: Church and State 
 
Interest in the concept of the Russian World grew after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, with both pro- and anti-Moscow sides in Sourozh referring to it 
as creating the momentum behind events.1 The term is a typically broad and 
amorphous neo-Slavophile concept, encompassing both universalist 
aspirations and a nationalist (exceptionalist) ideology.2 The concept defined 
Russia as a meta-territorial entity, and placed a concomitant focus on the 
Russian diaspora. The collapse of the Soviet Union – the Russian Empire in its 
final form – created almost overnight the fourth-largest diaspora in the world, 
as ten million ethnic Russians found themselves outside the borders of the 
Russian Federation. As a result, the power and influence of the Russian Church 
increased. Not only were the Church’s borders not contiguous with those of 
the newly reduced Russian State, spilling out into Ukraine, the Baltic States, 
and elsewhere, but in addition the Church possessed a vast worldwide network 
of dioceses and parishes. Such parishes were often in the centres of western 
cities and in possession of prime real estate and symbolic prestige. The British 
diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate (Sourozh) was thus inescapably connected 
to the renewed interest in the Russian World.  
 Sergei Chapnin, previously the editor of the Journal of the Moscow 
Patriarchate, linked the Sourozh crisis to the Kremlin’s foreign policy and ‘the 
strategic objectives of the Patriarch towards the diaspora’. He connected it to 
an increased tendency towards vertical power within the Moscow Patriarchate 
and concluded, ‘The life of the Diocese of Sourozh is now organized the very 
 
1 Interview 1B 
2 Cf. Laruelle, M., ‘The Russian World: Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination’, Centre on Global 
Interests, May 2015. http://globalinterests.org/2015/05/26/the-russian-world-russias-soft-power-and-
geopolitical-imagination/ Laruelle focuses on the non-ethnic character of the new Russian World project and 
views it a global ‘meta-project’.     
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same way as the church in Russia. Dioceses and parishes are just cells of Putin’s 
“Russian world”. Organized uniformly, they are conveniently arranged for 
centralized management from Moscow. The Cathedral in London is now just 
one of these cells. The new Bishop of Sourozh invited the Patriarch to 
personally make sure this is so. No more rebels, no more dissent’. 3 To be able 
to assess this critique, it is necessary to grasp the multiple viewpoints and 
overlapping concepts associated with the idea of the Russian World and assess 
how they affected events in Sourozh.  
The language surrounding the new Russian World doctrine mixed 
political and religious concepts. The World Russian People’s Council, founded 
in 1993 and headed by the Patriarch, became the foremost promoter of the 
idea of the Russian World. Delegates were drawn from the political, business, 
cultural and religious life of Russia, both at home and in the diaspora. Putin 
and Lavrov were frequent attendees. The themes of the annual gatherings, 
which took place in the new Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, ranged 
from the Orthodox mission to and conservation of the Russian people through 
to health and environmental issues.  
The Sourozh Diocese was affected by these developments in various 
ways. Firstly, the remote management of the Soviet years was replaced by an 
increased interest in and control by the Mother Church. The growing 
interdependence of the Russian Church and State (the ‘new symphonia’) 
meant that the State had a greater stake in Moscow’s diaspora parishes. The 
talk increasingly concerned the ‘consolidation of the Russian diaspora’ and the 
Church’s role in that. The funding power of the State was far greater than that 
 
3 Chapnin, S., ‘Kak RPTs demonstriruet tserkovnoe nasledie russkoi emigratsii’, June 2016. 
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/66170 [Accessed 02.05.2020] 
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of the Church and, in the words of Bishop Basil, ‘money is also expected to 
bring with it control’4. 
Secondly, the neo-Slavophile ideology that lay behind the concept of the 
Russian World promoted a hierarchical centralising of Church governance. This 
mirrored the new vertical power and sovereign democracy promoted by the 
State. These changes were at odds with the ethos of the Sourozh Diocese and, 
in particular, the Statutes of the Diocese of Sourozh that had been formulated 
by Metropolitan Anthony and his entourage with an emphasis on devolving 
power to the white clergy and laity.  
Thirdly, the diaspora assumed greater importance due its role as a soft-
power tool in the culture wars between Russia and the West. Foreign parishes 
of the Russian Church, and especially those with the fame and pedigree of 
Sourozh, were posited as ‘islands of Holy Rus’ which were to shine as beacons 
of Christian tradition in the ever more secularised West. 
Fourthly, the influence of Russian World rhetoric and neo-Slavophile 
thought was often perceived as a form of Russian ethnic nationalism and so, 
for the anti-Moscow group in Sourozh, the Russian World became synonymous 
with aggressive ethnic Russification. In fact, the genealogy of the Russian 
World ideology was more complicated, being associated with Russian 
universalism as well as exceptionalism.  
Finally, the Russian World concept developed due to the tensions within 
globalisation, between transnationalism (glocalism) and enculturation 
(cosmopolitanism). These more recent phenomena possessed a longer genesis 
within the Orthodox Church in terms of the relation between jurisdictional 
 
4 OCAD. Letter of Bishop Basil to the Moscow Patriarch, 01.05.06  
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space and territory. For some, the Sourozh crisis was a representation of a new 
transnational ecclesiology, in which jurisdictional territory collapsed under the 
pressures of the new interconnected world. 
 
The Russian World: An Erastian or Symphonic Ideal? 
 
The growth of the concept of the Russian World affected the Russian Church 
and State in different but complementary ways. For some sceptics, it 
represented a deepening intrusion of the secular state into the life of the 
Church. Paradoxically, this was deemed by some to be more invasive and 
insidious than the power that the Soviet State had held over the Church. To 
such critics, the 1980s and early 1990s appear as a brief period of comparative 
freedom for the Church. The crisis in Sourozh, on the other hand, was 
represented as a watershed in the steady march of state control, an episode in 
a time of transition when the various affiliations within the Church were 
jostling for the upper hand. In terms of Church–State relations, the position of 
Metropolitan Anthony and the Sourozh Diocese was somewhere between that 
of the official Moscow Patriarchate and the dissident movement. Although 
connections between dissident diaspora organisations, such as the Keston 
Institute, and Metropolitan Anthony were not strong, supporters of both were 
largely drawn from the same intellectual wing of the Church. On his visits to 
the Soviet Union, Metropolitan Anthony became especially beloved of the 
Muscovite Orthodox intelligentsia who sought to free the Church from its 
centuries-long subjugation to the Russian State (Tsarist or Soviet).  
 Considering this, it was all the more paradoxical that the catalyst of the 
crisis was Bishop Hilarion Alfeev, a man steeped in the dissident milieu. A few 
years prior to his arrival in Sourozh, the then Father Hilarion Alfeev had vividly 
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described life within the blossoming Church in Russia in the 1980s and early 
1990s. He noted how at that time it was the younger generation who flocked 
to the Church while the elderly stayed away.5 For a few brief years, the Church 
seemed to be moving away from the Erastian tendency to which it later 
returned. Writing at the millennium, he noted that ‘Many of those who now 
actively come out in the name of the Church under the banner of patriotism or 
nationalism and who speak about the “rebirth of Russia” and “spiritual values” 
were at that time leaders in the Komsomol or party officials who held the 
Church at bay through the barrel of a gun’.6 As the Church moved from the 
periphery to the mainstream, from Soviet samizdat to state Church, it lost a 
great deal of the attraction it once held for the young (and not only the young). 
Many students who might once have been found discussing Berdiaev and 
Florovsky and printing liturgical texts were soon joining anti-Putin groups.7 A 
Sourozh parishioner summed this up with a comment on Bishop Basil’s 
website, ‘many Russians I know are searching for depth and real worship in 
their Church and do not desire a Church that is just an extension of Russian 
state power or the propagator of an aggrandizing national myth’.8 
The ‘golden age’ of the Church in the late 1980s was distinguished by its 
sense of community and authenticity. Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev recalled his 
time as a priest at the church St Ekaterina on the Ordynka in Moscow: ‘we lived 
soul-to-soul, and there were no conflicts or disagreements of any kind’.9 In 
those years, intellectual dissidents and conservative patriots co-existed more 
or less amicably, united against their common enemy – the atheist State.10 The 
 
5 Alfeev, I., Pravoslavnoe bogoslovie na rubezhe epoch. Stati, doklady (Moscow, 1999) (author trans.)  
6 Ibid., Alfeev, I., Pravoslavnoe bogoslovie 
7 Papkova, I., Interview, Budapest, 01.05.10 
8 OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs. Statements from Sourozh Parishioners  
9 Alfeev, Mitropolit I., Besedy (Moscow, 2012), p.55 




reputation of Metropolitan Anthony and the Sourozh Diocese was high both 
within and without Russia. Again, in the words of Metropolitan Ilarion Alfeev:  
The atmosphere in the Church then was very different from the present: 
there was a sense of community, solidarity, people supported each 
other. At that time priests were not divided into ‘right’ and ‘left’ or into 
‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’, they didn’t accuse each other of ‘not being 
Orthodox’ ... I think that many of those who came to the Church at that 
time would agree that the atmosphere in the Church was then lighter, 
warmer and cleaner. In those years hardly anyone would have thought 
to search for some kind of ‘deviation from Orthodoxy’ in the works of 
Metropolitan Anthony, he was simply read and loved.’ 11    
As the common threat of Soviet repression was finally lifted from the Church, 
the truce between the various factions also started to fall away. In the end, the 
victorious faction was neither the liberals nor the ultra-conservatives, both of 
which were far too numerically small, but more the ‘institutionalists’ and the 
rank-and-file churchgoers.12 But the experience of the Church in the nineties 
was seminal, both within the Motherland and beyond. The Church now found 
herself as just one Christian denomination among many, as the Catholic Church 
started to re-open churches en masse and western evangelicals, often with 
robust financial support from the USA, built impressive missionary outposts in 
the New Russia.13 
 
11 Ibid., Alfeev, I., Pravoslavnoe bogoslovie (author trans.)  
12 Cf. Della Cava, R., ‘Reviving Orthodoxy in Russia. An Overview of the Factions in the Russian Orthodox 
Church, Cahiers du Monde Russe, Vol. 38, No. 3 (July–Sept. 1997), pp. 387–413 
13 Caridi, C., ‘Ideology or Isolationism? Russian Identity and its influence on Orthodox–Catholic Relations: Part 
1, Orthodoxy and Russian Identity’, Religion in Eastern Europe, XXVII, 1 (Feb. 2007). Also, Sebentsov, A.E., 




The hope and expectation of the Sourozh liberals quickly turned into 
disappointment and finally despair as the Church in Russia turned her back on 
the open Orthodoxy of men such as Metropolitan Anthony. Instead, as the 
unstable nineties progressed, believers turned once again to the anti-western 
and messianic rhetoric of neo-Slavophiles.14 The arrival of new, more 
conservative émigrés in the Diocese of Sourozh was thus compounded by the 
rise of national-Slavophile thinking in the Russian Church and State. If 
Metropolitan Hilarion was right, the surge in Russian immigrants in Sourozh 
that occurred from the mid-1990s onwards was more likely to be made up of 
those who saw the Russian Church as an extension of the State and who had 
previously ‘held the Church at bay through the barrel of a gun’. If so, conflicts 
between the new arrivals and the existing parishioners, many of whom had 
been supporters of the dissident movement, might seem to have been 
inevitable. The backing of the State created a feeling of powerlessness in those 
who opposed Moscow, as one parishioner put it succinctly: ‘The writing is on 
the wall for the diocese, as we have known it. As soon as the Metropolitan 
dies, the Patriarchate will install a hierarch, with presbyters and deacons, and 
financial backing. All that we have worked for will be swallowed up!’.15 
In the 2000s, as Putin took the helm, the Russian World became the 
central, overarching political concept with which Church and State approached 
the diaspora in both the near and far abroad.16 The new Russian State was 
interested in the Church as a provider of continuity through Russia’s turbulent 
 
14 At the end of the millennium, Robert English wrote that, ‘The resurgence of a Russian national “neo-
Slavophile” current should come as no surprise. As I have frequently emphasized, the “neo-Westernizing” 
politico-philosophical current was always in a minority – even among Soviet intellectuals, much less educated 
society more broadly, and certainly among the general public … The wonder perhaps, is why Russian opinion 
and Russian policies have not turned more sharply anti-Western’. History was to prove him right. English, R., 
Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the end of the Cold War (Cambridge, 2000), 
p.235 
15 OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Fr John Marks, op. cit.  
16 Cf. Putin, V., ‘Pis’mennoe interv’iu Prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina’, Russkaia Mysl’, 24.11.06 
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history and also because of her prestige and global reach. The Church was 
interested in the State because of the financial and legal backing it could 
provide, but also because it provided a certain patriotic legitimacy through 
Russian-Soviet history. These aspirations were exemplified in the rebirth of the 
idea of Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’, a political-religious concept that posits 
Moscow as both the spiritual and temporal successor to Constantinople and 
Rome. The promotion of Moscow as the Third Rome as a tool of wartime 
propaganda by Stalin and Eisenstein has been well documented.17 But as one 
study noted, what is more unusual ‘is that the same ideas have continued to 
develop in a "peaceful" post-war Soviet era’.18 As recently as November 2014, 
a conference in Moscow dedicated to the Third Rome theory drew many of the 
major neo-Slavophile thinkers: Prof Alexander Dugin, Natalia Narochnitskaya 
and Metropolitan Tikhon Shevkunov.19 Kirill Frolov, president of the Union of 
Orthodox EU Citizens, stated in 2006 (the year of the Sourozh crisis), ‘Moscow 
the Third Rome is not a historical archaism, but a contemporary political task 
for Russia’.20 Similarly, an article by E. Lashchenova published in the official 
journal of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expanded on the political 
dimensions, speaking of how, ‘Orthodoxy and the Byzantine traditions of 
Russia’s state order predetermined its mission in the world; this mission 
liberated Russia from national egotism’ and how consequently Russia was 
‘called upon to head the Orthodox-Slavic civilization’.21 This melding of the 
contemporary Russian State with the Church was highly problematic for anti-
 
17 Halperin, C.J., ‘Le metteur en scène athée et le tsar orthodoxe : Ivan le Terrible de Sergei Eisenstein’, 
Revue des études slaves, LXXXVIII-3 (2017), pp. 515–26 
18 Blyumin and Rudntzky, ‘The concept of "Moscow the Third Rome" in the Art of Stalin’s Time’, Summer 2013, 
CES 650 
19 Shevkunov, Arkhimandrit T., ‘S Bozh’ei pomoshch’iu vozmozhno vse: o vere i otechestv’e, Texts of the Third 
Rome conference papers, 11.11.2014 (Moscow, 2015), pp.102–33 
20 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_5337000/5337122.stm (author trans.) [Accessed 08.10.19] 
21 Lashchenova, E., ‘National Archetypes of Russia’s Foreign Policy’, Russian Journal of World Politics, 
Diplomacy and International Relations, Issue 2 (2013), p.112 
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Moscow voices in Sourozh.22 For Bishop Basil, it was represented by the fact 
that pro-Moscow parishioners and clergy had turned to the Russian 
Ambassador for assistance.23  The anti-Moscow clergy and parishioners viewed 
it as an unholy alliance of the spiritual and secular powers, working together 
for purely mercenary interests. It was the undercurrent of many of the 
accusations and tensions in Sourozh, from the militaristic allusions levelled at 
priests who had come from Moscow to accusations of a Soviet cult of power.24   
The anti-Moscow element in Sourozh was not the only part of the 
diaspora Church in the UK that was uneasy about the new symphonia of 
Church and State. Archimandrite Alexis of the ROCOR monastery in Brookwood 
wrote an open letter in 2003 in which he listed multiple concerns with the 
Moscow Patriarchate, stating ‘According to many commentators, the present 
socio-political situation in Russia is even more deleterious than it was under 
the Soviets, and it appears that the Church is deeply involved in many aspects 
of what seems to be a “Gangster State” in a way that is less excusable than its 
subservience to the Soviets, which after all was a totalitarian tyranny’.25 This 
pattern of both the left (Sourozh) and the right (ROCOR) of the Church 
criticising the centre (Moscow) was a leitmotif of the Sourozh crisis. Perhaps no 
issue united these two poles as much as the question of Erastian or Sergian 
tendencies in the Moscow Patriarchate. Both liberal and conservative elements 
perceived that the Church was in danger of being transformed into secular 
cultural institution.  
 
22 Cirota.ru, Tema #58412, Soobshenie #2088395, 26.05.06 [Accessed 26.05.20] 
23 OCAD. An Open Letter from Bishop Basil to the Members of the Diocese of Sourozh, 16.05.06  
24 OCAD. Documents from OCL Archive. Suggestions from Presbyters for the More Efficient Working of the 
Sourozh Diocese, 08.12.02  




A particular manifestation of this was deemed to be the promotion of 
the idea of non-proselytism, or the notion that there were ‘Orthodox lands’ 
and ‘Catholic lands’ over which a pragmatic inter-religious détente reigned. In 
the new Russian World, parishes were to concentrate on their own kind. This 
was the antithesis of the ethos of Metropolitan Anthony, who, as we have 
seen, did not have this luxury in the immigrant-poor years of the Cold War. 
While Sourozh had not been overtly missionary as a diocese, the fact remained 
that Metropolitan Anthony’s frequent appearances in the British media and at 
top universities amounted to a missionary appeal. As head of the DECR, 
Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev was at pains to condemn Orthodox proselytism in 
the West.26 He stated emphatically, ‘Our parishes in the west do not n’t have 
any proselytising purpose and they are not en’t there to convert Anglicans and 
Catholics to Orthodoxy. Of course, individual cases of conversion to Orthodoxy 
take place, just as there are examples of conversion from Orthodoxy to 
Catholicism on our own “canonical territory”, but we do not have a 
proselytising strategy in relation to the west and we are not trying to convert 
England or France to Orthodoxy’.27 The supposition behind this was that 
personal belief was less important than place of birth and ethnicity. An 
interesting article that appeared on portal-credo.ru soon after the Hilarion 
affair, entitled ‘Sourozh tears’, perceived in the troubles an unlikely ‘liberal-
conservative synthesis’.28 The author proposed that this was a means by which 
to reconcile the two secularist tendencies in the Church: ‘extreme nationalism 
 
26 Alfeev, Metropolitan H., ‘Printsip "kanonicheskoi territorii" v pravoslavnoi traditsii’, Budapest Catholic 
University, 10.02.05. Also, Kirill, Patriarch, Zhizn’ i mirosozertsanie (Moscow, 2009), p.185    
27  ‘Interviu Ep. Ilariona Alfeeva’, 21.09.03, http://www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/meetings/239/[Accessed 
02.04.20]. It should also be noted there are at least some academic voices that propose that the ROC’s recent 
expansionism into Western Europe is in retaliation to Catholic proselytism in Russia. Cf. Rousselet, K., ‘L'Église 
orthodoxe russe et le territoire’, Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, Vol. 1 La Russie: Géographie des 
Territoires (2007), pp.63–85 




and extreme ecumenical liberalism’. He concluded, ‘At the heart of this 
“synthesis” is a banal materialism, the servant of which is religion … as a 
cultural add-on. If religion is determined by birth and cultural identity, then 
such a religion is “programmed” genetically, laid down culturally, and Divine 
Revelation in it is only a beautiful literary trope’. It was a simple argument, but 
a convincing one.  
 Thus, the Church’s involvement with the Russian World concept has 
been critiqued from both right and left. An interesting interview with 
Archimandrite Savva from Belarus attacked the Patriarch’s talk of ‘the Russian 
World’ as ‘essentially a form of idolatry … This is the main nerve of the 
“Russian world”: the hidden disbelief in God, whom Russia has overshadowed 
as an object of faith’.29 He went on to criticise the notion of any such ‘worlds’, 
be they Greek, Russian, or other. A priest-monk of from ROCOR in the UK 
stated that such ‘Russian nationalism’ was one of the reasons why he 
eventually left the jurisdiction, singling out worship of the Russian state as a 
secularist project.30 Metropolitan Anthony had likewise promoted a non-ethnic 
Orthodoxy in which ‘there was neither Jew nor Greek’.31 Many of the converts 
under his jurisdiction felt little or no connection to Russia, and thus the 
concept of the Russian World meant almost nothing to them.32 
The Church’s decision to promote the doctrine of the Russian World was 
grounded in her long subservience to the state. Nevertheless, the Church 
sought distinction as the centre and arbiter of Russianness within that concept. 
 
29 Mazhuko, Archimandrite Savva Mazhuko, ‘Neskol’ko voprosov o “Russkom mire”’. Interview Kievskaia Rus’, 
24.06.14. http://www.kiev-orthodox.org/site/churchlife/5345/ [Accessed 20.05.20]. There are echoes here of 
the words of Dostoevsky’s Shatov in The Devils: ‘”Do you believe in God?” “I believe in Russia … I believe in her 
Orthodoxy … I believe in the body of Christ … I believe that the new advent will take place in Russia … I believe 
…” Shatov muttered frantically.’ 
30 Interview 2G  
31 Cf., Interview 2D on the multi-ethnic nature of the ROC in general in the UK 
32 OCAD. Statements from Sourozh parishioners. Letter from a provincial parishioner.  
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Some of the more perceptive western commentators, such as Luke March and 
Marlene Laruelle, emphasised this tension. Luke March stated, ‘the most 
fundamental break from Tsarist “official nationality” is that the view of 
nationality proffered is profoundly secular. Russian Orthodoxy is not part of 
the contemporary triad’.33 He described the ‘new national idea’ (i.e. of the 
State) as essentially non-ideological and pragmatic, a nostalgic conservatism in 
which a kind of Russian sonderweg is vaguely implied. Likewise, Marlene 
Laruelle portrayed Putin’s role as that of ‘an arbitrator among different 
stakeholders, as well as between different ideological factions.’ 34 A bland 
avoidance of anything that might be utilised by extremists was exemplified in 
the new words given to the old Soviet National Anthem. Whereas the previous 
lyrics had been supremely ideological (and emotive for that), the new version 
spoke in a rather banal way only of Russia’s ‘forests and fields’ and ‘brotherly 
friendship of peoples’. It was notable, too, that restoration of the pre-
revolutionary anthem, Bozhe Tsaria Khrani, with its Orthodox monarchist lyrics 
was not seriously considered.  
 It might be said that the anti-Moscow groups in both ROCOR and 
Sourozh saw themselves as opposing this secularist or Sergian tendency in the 
Moscow Patriarchate. They felt themselves to be tapping into a rich seam of 
Russian spirituality that ran from the possessors and non-possessors and Old 
Believer schisms through to the Josephite and Catacomb Church of Soviet 
times.35 It is a history of unequal struggle in which the state has more often 
 
33 March, L. ‘Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications of the new “Russian Idea”’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 64:3 (April 2012), pp.401–25. ‘This quasi-ideology sees Russia as part of European 
geography and culture, although politically and historically distinct. Its “nationalism” is moderate in terms of 
its emphasis on modernisation not anti-modernism, Europe not Eurasia, secularism not the Third Rome and 
pragmatism not ideological conflict. Officially, the emphasis is on a civic nationalism with an emphasis on 
Russian citizenship in a multinational state rather than on ethnic or cultural heritage.’    
34 Laruelle, M., ‘In search of Putin's philosopher: Why Ivan Ilyin is not Putin’s Ideological Guru’, Intersection 
Project EU, 03.03.17 
35 Cf. Fletcher, W., The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917–1971 (London, 1971) 
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held the reins of power. This is despite the supposed clericalisation of Russian 
society feared by some today within Russia and much publicised in the West. 
John D. Basil noted, ‘The authority of the federal government may well be the 
final arbiter on this issue. It has not yet supported any one point of view, 
contrary to the hasty and often hyperbolic conclusions drawn by some 
Western media outlets’.36 Likewise, John Burgess has suggested that the 
influence of the Church in Russia is often greatly overestimated by western 
academics, framing Russia much as any modern, secular society in which 
Orthodox Christianity is just ‘one subculture among many’.37 This does seem to 
be born out in the oft-repeated statistic that over 70 percent of Russians 
identify themselves as ‘Orthodox’, but only between 2 and 5 percent regularly 
attend services.38 Orthodoxy’s cultural importance to Russians is high, but 
actual religious participation is low.  
 The reasons for the post-communist interdependence of Church and 
State in Russia are more nuanced than Chapnin, Blitt, Dennon et al propose. 
Nowhere is the Sloterdijkian cynical paradigm more prevalent than in debates 
concerning Church–State relations.39 Mercenary interests of power and fiscal 
gain are presumed to be the prime motivating factors. This was certainly the 
feeling among the anti-Moscow group in Sourozh, and it was (and is) prevalent 
within the Russian Church and society at large. But it is not the whole story, 
because ideologies seldom seduce purely for reasons of material gain. The 
recent history of both Church and State in Russia would probably be very 
 
36 Basil, J.D., ‘Problems of State and Church in the Russian Federation: Three Points of View’, Journal of Church 
and State, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Spring 2009), pp. 211–235. For an opposing view, cf. Blitt, R.C., ‘How to Entrench a 
De Facto State Church in Russia: A Guide in Progress’, BYU Law Review, Issue 3, Article 2 (2008) 
37 Burgess, J.P., ’Orthodox Resurgence: Civil Religion in Russia’, Religion in Eastern Europe, XXIX, 2 (May 2009) 
Cf. also Sokolov, M., ‘Novye pravye intelektualy v sovremennoi Rossii’, Ab Imperio, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2006), pp. 
321–54 
38 East-West Ministry Report, Vol. 5, No. 3, Summer 1997 
39 Cf. Sloterdijk, P., Critique, op.cit.  
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different were it not for the major shift of neo-Slavophile ideas from the 
periphery to the centres of power from the late 1970s onwards. Particularly 
important was the rebranding of the security services (FSB) from a Marxist to a 
conservative-nationalist ideology.40 Interestingly, even the reborn Communist 
Party of Zuganov jettisoned its seminal opposition to the Russian Church, 
which it now considered a respected pillar of the Russian State.41  
This process had begun a long time before, as the writings of Soviet-era 
Slavophiles such as Gumilev and Shafarevich became more widespread. 
Gorbachev’s reforms simply expedited the process. The Church historian 
Pospielovsky vividly described how this transition affected the intimate life of 
the elites: ‘There is also the nomenklatura, the KGB and the party nationalism. 
These also understand that the old ideology needs renovation … I am familiar 
with young Christian converts, some ten years my junior [i.e. born between 
1955 and 1960], who are sons of generals. You enter their flats. The corridors 
are hung with portraits of Marshal Zhukov and all sorts of official diplomas. 
Then you go into the son’s room. There is an icon in the corner and portraits of 
Nicholas II and Konstantin Leontyev’.42 In 2001, the Patriarch blessed a 
 
40 Cf. Nedostup, A., ‘Russkaia ideia i pravoslavie’, in Russkii Mir: o nashei natsional’noi idee (Moscow, 2014) 
41 Medvedev, R., Post-Soviet Russia: A Journey Through the Yeltsin Era (Columbia, 2000), pp.249–51. Cf. also 
Tolz, V., Russia: Inventing the Nation (London, 2001), p.122: ‘Gorbachev’s reforms galvanized the debate over 
Russia’s attitude towards the West. The clear Westernizing aim of Gorbachev’s policies provoked strong 
opposition on the part of many Communist Party officials, who rejected Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” in favour 
of a Stalinist amalgam of Leninism and the glorification of pre-revolutionary Russia. At the same time, a 
number of neo-Slavophiles of the 1960s and 1970s decided to join forces with the communists and set up a 
united electoral bloc for the 1990 election to the Russian parliament. Such formerly uncompromising anti-
communists as the mathematician Igor Shafarevich no longer opposed alliance with communists. The 
communists, in their turn, now accepted the Slavophile tradition as important to the Russian national 
consciousness. Both camps were united by the rejection of the West as a suitable model for Russia.’  
42 Pospielovsky, D., ‘Russian Nationalism and the Orthodox Revival’, Religion in Communist Lands, 15:3 (1987), 
pp.291–309. Cf. also Laruelle, M., ‘Inside and Around the Kremlin's Black Box: The New Nationalist Thinktanks 
in Russia’, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm Paper (Oct. 2009), p.68. Marlene Laruelle 
has noted how this obsessiveness around the Russian national idea permeates all levels of Russian society in a 
way that it does not in the West (at least perhaps until recent crises in Europe). She describes how even in the 
pro-Western opposition, ‘the Other Russia’, Kasparov rubs shoulders with Limonov, but also how the new 
Russian nationalism is moving away from its traditional literary and theological bases into the world of 
economics and political science – ‘a modernised messianism for the future’.    
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renovated church in the centre of the Lubyanka complex, which had been 
restored with FSB donations.  
The quest for continuity in Russian history manifested itself in Church 
and State in different though overlapping ways. A key event was the reburial of 
the remains of the White general Anton Denikin in the Donskoy Monastery in 
Moscow on 3 October 2005, just before the final episode of the Sourozh crisis. 
The event was attended by Putin, the Patriarch and numerous neo-Slavophile 
luminaries, such as the film director Nikita Mikhalkhov. It provoked anger and 
despair from the old guard in ROCOR, and from the western media, strangely 
united against their common enemy. The ex-KGB spy and ROCOR parishioner 
Konstantin Preobrazhensky wrote of this incident in his book, KGB v Russkoi 
Emigratsii, ‘And soon general Denikin will be reburied under the red flag! And 
Putin will not deny himself the pleasure of playing the Bolshevik party anthem 
over his grave, as the current Stalinist Russian national anthem was originally 
called. So, the diminutive red-haired boy from a poor working-class family will 
at last be able to fully quench his class hatred’.43 Both political and Church 
voices increasingly glorified the stability, security and sacrifice of Soviet times, 
even linking it to Christian morality. This was not for always mercenary gain, 
but rather in a sense necessitated by Russia’s disjointed history. This was the 
bogeyman for both conservative ROCOR and the liberal Exarchate [in the UK 
the Vicariate and later Deanery]. An active pro-Moscow parishioner noted that 
long after the end of the crisis, he attended a funeral at which all sides were 
again present: ‘The funeral service gathered together the two parts who split 
in 2006 - there was about 1 1/2 dozen people from Holborn [the Deanery]. 
There was less enmity this time round, and I was greeted in the choir with 
 
43 Preobrazhensky, K., KGB v russkoi emigratsii (2006), p. 86ff 
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smiles. The Exarchate crowd is just the same as some of the ROCOR crowd in 
1970s and 80s - they were full of loathing for the 'Red Church' – and these now 
hate the 'Moscow church'.44 
A new breed of conservative students and intellectuals, pro-Soviet and 
pro-Church, thus arose in Russia in the 1990s.45 This meant that the liberal-
minded, dissident intellectuals represented by Sourozh and the Parisian 
Exarchate were no longer the only Russian Orthodox intelligentsia. As we have 
seen, veiled criticisms of the education and class of the newcomers to Sourozh 
were fiercely countered by pro-Moscow parishioners who laid out their MGU 
credentials. The new Orthodox intelligentsia was largely composed of the 
younger Soviet elite described by Pospielovsky. They were also joined by some 
of the older generation dissidents, such as Solzhenitsyn, who stated that Putin 
‘was helping Russians to rediscover who they were’ after the Yeltsin years.46 
Solzhenitsyn was only one example of those dissidents whose innate anti-
westernism forced them to rethink the Soviet era. This divide was not 
necessarily defined along the lines of diaspora (liberal dissident)–Motherland 
(conservative patriot). The subtle shift was typified by the Paris-based poet 
Yuri Kublanovkskii. Once a dissident and anti-regime liberal figure, he became 
a devout Orthodox patriot who published critiques of pro-western intellectuals 
inside Russia.47 The development of a pro-regime, pro-patriarchate Orthodox 
intelligentsia further marginalised the Sourozh ethos. Whatever might have 
been said about the Putin regime, it was not the atheistic communism that had 
 
44 Interview 2Eb  
45 Cf. Sorchak, V., ‘Messianstvo kak sotsiokul’turnyi I ideologicheskii fenomen Rossii’, Thesis (Moscow, 2013) 
46 ‘US embassy cables: Solzhenitsyn praises Putin’, 04.04.08, The Guardian, 
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/148516 [Accessed 25.05.20]  
47 Kublanovskii, Y., ‘The liberal intelligentsia does not understand the country we’re living in’, Kultura Gazeta, 




persecuted the Church almost to extinction. Therefore, the continued hostility 
towards it of Sourozh dissident intellectuals and ROCOR hardliners assumed 
the appearance of a Cold War recidivism.  
 The reclamation of the Soviet epoch as a positive model becamewas a 
hallmark of the Russian World as the use of this concept by Church and State 
developed. Patriarch Kirill himself devoted a whole book to the concept of the 
Russian World48. It was a book in which the Church’s relationship to the State 
(both Tsarist and Soviet) loomed large. It was this concordat with the past that 
more than anything else angered the anti-Sergian tendencies in Sourozh and 
ROCOR. Pragmatists and pro-Moscow Slavophiles argued that the Church–
State symphonia was necessary for the ‘consolidation’ of the Russian people, 
both at home and abroad – and this became the new byword of the Russian 
World. Andy Byford noted that, ‘During 2007–2009 the main stated objective 
of “compatriot” mobilisation in Britain was the so-called “consolidation and 
unification” of the Russian Diaspora in the UK’.49 This applied neo-Slavophile 
ideology had been a constant theme of both Church and State since the 
millennium.50  
Such a policy could not but have an effect on Church life in the diaspora, 
especially for an anomalous diocese such as Sourozh. It meant stronger ties to 
the Mother Church, more episcopal visits and an increased flow of information 
and clergy between Moscow and the diaspora, along with a centralisation of 
decision-making (verticality) and an emphasis on the preservation of Russian 
 
48 Kirill, Patriarch, Sem’ slov o russkom mire (Moscow, 2015)  
49Byford, A., ‘The Russian Diaspora in International Relations: Compatriots in Britain’, Europe-Asia Studies 64:4 
(01.03.12), p.727  
50 Cf. ‘Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, Point 1:j ‘to consolidate the Russian-speaking Diaspora’,  
Point 45:f ‘to further the consolidation of compatriots living abroad so as to enable them to better realise their 
rights in the countries of residence, and to facilitate the preservation of the Russian diaspora’s identity and its 
ties with the historical homeland’ 
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culture.51 It signalled greater uniformity between parishes and dioceses and 
meant a retreat from local variations that had grown up organically via 
enculturation. It also meant a steady Russification of the liturgy and Church 
communications. For the anti-Moscow parishioners, these changes were 
experienced mostly as negative. But for the pro-Moscow parishioners, it meant 
the rectification of what were seen as unorthodox practices, while the closer 
ties to the Mother Church were to be welcomed after years of separation.   
The 2000s saw the apogee of the impetus towards consolidation within 
and without the Church.52 Putin became president, and at the same time the 
rise in crude oil prices and sensible economic policies in Russia were at last 
creating a little stability and middle-income wealth. The plethora of Russian 
Diaspora organisations that had been founded in the nineties started to gain a 
new impetus (and funding) for their mission to consolidate and export the 
Russian World beyond the Motherland.53 Although the concept of the Russian 
World had appeared in the nineteenth century as analogous to the term Slavic 
world, when it was reborn in the early 1990s its boundaries were more tightly 
linked to the Russophone world and the talk was more of compatriots 
abroad.54 The Church gradually took up the idea and added to it the notion of 
Russia as a civilisation, broadening it out from its ethno-linguistic base. 
Whereas the promotion of Russia as an empire was politically taboo in a 
contemporary context, the idea of Russia as a civilisation – a conceptual 
 
51 Kirill, Patriarch, Zhizn’ i mirosozertsanie (Moscow, 2009), p.187 
52 Cf. Suslov, M., ‘“Russian World”: Russia’s Policy towards its Diaspora’, Notes de l’ifri. Russie. Nei. Visions 103. 
Russia/NIS Centre 
53 Alfeev, Metropolitan H., ‘Mitropolit Ilarion otvetil na voprosy saita “Pomniu Rossiu”’, 12.02.12. 
https://mospat.ru/ru/2012/02/17/news58335/ [Accessed 25.05.20]    
54 Cf. Zevelev, I., ‘The Russian World in Moscow’s Strategy’, 22.08.16. 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-world-moscows-strategy  [Accessed 16.04.18] and Fokina, K. ‘Voprosu o 
russkom mire’, Orlovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet. Thesis, 2014. 
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euphemism for empire – was not.55 In the words of Kirill Govorun, ‘the concept 
of “civilisation” became the key in the construction of the “Russian World”.56 
The idea of Russia as a civilisation fed into the global ‘clash of 
civilisations’ rhetoric of the post-communist world. The events in Sourozh from 
1990 to 2009 should be situated during these currents, which affected the 
tone and manner of the debates whatever the conscious intentions of the 
participants. An essential difference in approach to Church–State relations lay 
at the heart of the pro- and anti-Moscow positions, in Sourozh as in the wider 
Church. For those opposed to Moscow, the new symphonia signified a 
secularisation and banalisation of religion into a merely cultural and political 
entity. The alternative they promoted (such as the Sourozh of Metropolitan 
Anthony) was non-ethnic and pan-Orthodox, with no direct connection or 
funding from any state. Metropolitan Anthony had been resolute in refusing 
funding from the Russian State, Soviet and post-Soviet. When the cathedral 
was purchased from the Anglicans in the 1970s, for example, all the money 
was raised by donations. The supporters of Moscow countered that the close 
relationship of Church and State was pivotal in the history of Orthodoxy in 
general and signified the sacralisation of the state rather than the 
secularisation of the Church. If Orthodoxy was a totalising belief system, then 
the state could not be said to lie outside its remit. Particularly with regards to 
Russia, they looked back into Russian history, and at renewed concepts such as 
the Third Rome, to find political imperatives for the Church.  
 
 
55 Kirill, Patriarch: Rossia – eto strana-tsivilizatsia. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3334815.html  [Accessed 
11.01.9]. And Kirill, Patriarch, ‘Russkii Mir: osobaia tsivilizatsia, kotoruiu neobkhodimo sberech’. 
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3730705.html  [Accessed 11.01.19] 
56 Govorun, K., ‘Interpretiruia “russkii mir”’, Russkii Zhurnal (2014) http://www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-
povestka/Interpretiruya-russkij-mir [Accessed 25.05.20] 
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The Russian World: Vertical Power and Sobornost’  
 
The long view of the history of the Russian Church might see the Sourozh crisis 
as a manifestation of tensions that had existed since earliest times. It is true 
that the tendency to centralisation and clericalisation of power and authority 
in the Church was much older than the devolvement of power to the local level 
and the laity. Sometimes dormant, sometimes explosive, the struggles 
between the Church and State ran deep and were reflected in both the 
Nikonian and possessors versus non-possessors episodes.57 In Sourozh, 
Metropolitan Anthony and his entourage aspired to a much greater 
involvement of the white clergy, laity and women in the decision making and 
daily life of the diocese. Yet, in the view of many in Sourozh, the post-
communist Russian Church seemed to be moving in the opposite direction, 
with power being ever more concentrated in the Patriarchate and its organs – 
the Synod and the DECR.  
A pivotal event for Metropolitan Anthony and his disciples was the Sobor 
of 1917–18, which was cited as a counterweight to the increasingly vertical 
tendency in the Church. Irina von Schlippe, a member of the Diocesan Council 
and also the anti-Moscow camp, wrote, ‘One essential feature of our life in 
Sourozh is that we are continuing the stream of renewal of the Russian 
Orthodox Church which came from within the country at the beginning of the 
20th century and culminated in the Sobor of 1917’.58 The Statutes of the 
Diocese of Sourozh were an attempt to implement some of the decisions of 
the Sobor in the context of the existing diaspora situation.59 Moreover, 
 
57 Cf. Kostiuk, K., ‘Formirovanie i evoliutsia “bogoslovia vlasti” v Moskovskom gosudarstve v XIV–XVI vv, 
Gosudarstvo, religia, tserkov’ v Rossii i za rubezhom, No. 3 (2014), p.42ff 
58 OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org. ‘Some purely personal thoughts on the situation in the Diocese of Sourozh’, 2006 
59 Cf. Bloom, Metropolitan A., Letter on the need for statues for the Diocese of Sourozh, in Report to the 
Diocesan Conference at Effingham, on the Meeting of the Diocesan Assembly, 27.05.79 
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Metropolitan Anthony could claim (although to my knowledge he did not) that 
the original post-revolutionary London parish had been founded on the ustav 
of the 1917–18 Sobor.60 Bishop Basil was to regularly refer to these statutes in 
his dealings with the Patriarchate and as confirmation of his rights in the eyes 
of his supporters.61 The statutes emphasised the role of the diocese in the 
election of its own bishop. This was a very democratic process, in which 
nominees could be put forward if they had the support of just fifteen 
parishioners.62 The statutes also confirmed the roles of the elected diocesan 
and parish councils, the two bodies that were to play such a vital role in the 
troubles. But the battle over ecclesiology went much further than the statutes 
and control of the diocesan and parish councils, to the very heart of the debate 
over the role of the Church in the modern world. Was the Church to capitulate 
before the secular democratic zeitgeist or entrench itself as a reactionary and 
conservative vertical power, mirroring the secular trajectory of the 
contemporary Russian State? 
As one priest in Sourozh commented, ‘The fullness of Orthodoxy is found 
at the local level. This is what I experienced when I first encountered the 
Church. Therefore, my loyalty is first to the Parish, second to the Diocese, and 
third to the Patriarch – whoever he may be’.63 In response to this remark, a 
parishioner replied in a Russian-language chat-room that it was a ‘truly 
divisive’ approach to Church discipline in which a parish priest could consider 
himself of greater importance than the bishop or the patriarch. Punning upon 
the priest’s name (John Marks), the parishioner called this a ‘Marxist’ 
 
60 NA. RG8/292.26, op. cit. 
61 Tserkovnyi Vestnik, Nos. 1–2 (Jan. 2004), pp.278–9 
62 OCAD. Statutes of the Diocese of Sourozh, Article II: 5–7. Details the procedure for the election of the bishop 
based on nominees: ‘Nominations must be signed by fifteen individuals on the Diocesan Electoral Roll, of 
whom at least three must be presbyters and 6 lay members of the Assembly. 
63 OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Fr John Marks, op. cit.  
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ecclesiology (‘марксистская’ экклеcиология).64 On the other hand, the 
contrary tendency, towards the centralising of Church power, was suspicious in 
the eyes of the anti-Moscow group because it seemed to relate to secular 
authoritarianism at a time when Putin was talking of ‘vertical power’ and 
‘sovereign democracy’ and making showy displays of power. Likewise, the 
Church began to emphasise patriarchal pre-eminence along with rich 
ceremonial.   
The arguments of Church and State were not dissimilar. The post-Cold 
War world demanded strong, central governance if the Russian World was not 
to descend into chaos. For the Church, with its vast diaspora, the idea was 
even more compelling. The extension of control beyond its canonical borders 
and the consolidation of previously disparate groups necessitated a 
strengthening of vertical power. But, as the above blogger expressed, other 
aspects of this debate were more ideologically driven. Democratisation of 
ecclesiology was seen by some in the Russian Church as a secular western 
import, opposed to all things Eastern, Orthodox and even Christian. Promoters 
of democratisation countered that it was is in fact the autocratic, centralising 
ecclesiology that was a western import, and secular in the sense that it apeds 
worldly power and the centralised Caesaropapism of the Catholic Church.65 In 
order to grasp how these opposing views operated in the Sourozh crisis, it is 
necessary to understand the key role of the Sobor of 1917–18, on which the 
Sourozh Statutes – and the whole Sourozh ethos – were based. The Sobor was 
frequently mentioned during the crisis by the anti-Moscow supporters, who 
considered themselves to be implementing its decrees. In February 2003, 
 
64 Cirota.ru. Temа: #58412, Soobshchenie: #2164989, 02.07.06 (author trans.) [Accessed 25.05.20] 
65 Tsygankov, A., ‘Assessing Cultural and Regime-Based Explanations of Russia's Foreign Policy; “Authoritarian 
at Heart and Expansionist by Habit”’, Europe-Asia Studies 64:4, pp.695–713   
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Bishop Basil issued a statement concerning the importance of the Sobor of 
1917–18 to the diocese of Sourozh:  
It seems absolutely clear to me that the only way forward is to follow 
the path shown us by Metropolitan Anthony, and to combine loyalty to 
the Patriarchate with internal autonomy. If we do not do this, the ‘fault 
lines’ that exist elsewhere in the Russian diaspora will appear here as 
well and the Diocese will split up. This does not have to take place. The 
past 40 years have shown that it is quite possible to maintain local 
autonomy within the Patriarchate. We have demonstrated this very 
clearly here in Britain. If we become truly aware of what we must do if 
we are to stay together, we can achieve this, in spite of the fact that 
even today, nearly twelve years after the fall of communism, it has not 
yet been possible to implement the decisions of the 1917–18 Sobor in 
Russia.66 
In the decades preceding the February Revolution, the Church had been 
debating structural reforms with some passion, culminating in the Great Sobor 
of 1917–18. It began in the revolutionary atmosphere of the Provisional 
Government in August 1917 and ended in September 1918 with the onset of 
the Bolshevik Red Terror. Although cut short, the proceedings of the Sobor 
itself (leaving aside those of the long preparatory process) were vast and are 
still not fully published even today. The Novospassky monastery in Moscow is 
nearing completion of a thirty-four-volume series of protocols and documents.  
Each volume is well over a thousand pages and the project has been a 
Herculean undertaking.67 In broad terms, it can be said that the Sobor gave 
 
66 OCAD. Statement by Bishop Basil of Sergievo at the London Cathedral, 16.02.03  
67 Cf. http://sobor1917.ru/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/sobor_2016_01.pdf. The decrees of the Sobor were 
recently translated into English as appendices in the first full-length study of the Sobor in English: Destivelle, H 
O.P. The Moscow Council 1917–1918 (Notre Dame, 2014) 
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voice to the more liberalising or democratising tendencies within Church 
governance. As the Sobor ended in the Bolshevik coup and a wholesale 
onslaught on the Church, opinion in the diaspora Church concerning the 
legitimacy of its proposals and even its very existence was divided.68 
Conservative critics claimed that the Church had been under pressure to be 
seen to act in line with the revolutionary zeitgeist.69 The legacy of the Sobor 
was complicated by the attack unleashed on the Church by the new Soviet 
State – a persecution almost without parallel in Church history.70 This meant 
that the Church inside the Soviet Union was in no position to enact the decrees 
of the Sobor as they had been intended. Two outcomes relating to Church 
administration, however, were to prove pivotal for both the Church in the 
Motherland and the diaspora. The first was the election of the first patriarch 
since the time of Peter the Great, which gave the Church a steady hand in 
terrible times in the person of Patriarch (later Saint) Tikhon of Moscow. This 
election enabled a certain loosening of rigid Church administrative structures, 
as Tikhon quickly realised that there would be times when local jurisdictions 
 
68 To counter the accusations that the Sobor had been compromised, it should be said that the preparations 
for the Sobor had begun over twelve years earlier and still highlighted the same areas of reform. The Tsar 
himself had given his backing to the Sobor and was known to be in favour of some of the reforms. 
Nevertheless, today many in the Russian Church consider the Sobor to have been modernist and even 
heretical. Cf. Vasilik., Protodiakon Vladimir, ‘Sobor predstavlyal sobori dostatochno slozhnoie iavleniie’ 
http://ruskline.ru/news_rl/2017/05/05/sobor_predstavlyal_soboj_dostatochno_slozhnoe_yavlenie/ 
‘It was attended by various elements, including revolutionary and radical ones, at times proposing completely 
unsustainable things that might simply destroy the Church. For example, a married episcopate and the 
complete Russification and reforming of worship was seriously proposed. The most ardent modernist projects 
that could destroy our Church were advanced’ [Accessed 25.05.20] 
69 Cf. Pavlov, D.B., Otechestvennaia i zarubezhnaia istoriografia gosudarstvenno-tserkovnykh otnoshenii 1917–
1922 gg (Moscow, 2011), p.3ff, and Shevzov, V., op.cit., p.47 
70 The destruction of the Church in Russia is still a neglected subject in Western academia. Cf. Lupinin, N., ‘The 
Russian Orthodox Church’ in Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, op. cit., p.20: ‘The intensity of the attack on 
the ROC and on religion is entirely unprecedented in the annals of the world and the history of the Church … 
Curiously most (Western) textbooks on the history of the Soviet Union barely mention this phenomenon nor 
do many more specialised studies on government policies or on specific Soviet leaders. This strange omission 
unfortunately indicates a mix of ignorance, thematic prejudice and imbalanced historical analysis and needs 
scholarly emendation’. Also Bouteneff, V., Father Arseny 1893–1973 (London, 2001) p.vi: ‘From 1917 to 1991 – 
600 bishops, 40,000 priests, 120,000 monks and nuns were killed. Many died in the harsh conditions of labour 
camps, others were shot or buried alive.’ A good concise history of the persecution is still Vladimir Rusak’s 
Sviditel’stvo obvinenia (Vols. I–III, Jordanville, 1986).  
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and even parishes would become cut off from the existing hierarchal lines of 
command. Secondly, the Sobor highlighted and placed greater emphasis on the 
roles of the laity and women in the Church. This gave renewed energy to 
parishes and allowed the Church to survive even through the darkest years of 
collectivisation and Stalinism when the Church hierarchy and clergy were 
almost completely destroyed. During this time, it was largely lay women who 
kept the Church alive underground. The words of Mikhail Shkarovskii are worth 
quoting for their vivid description of how the Church survived her Soviet 
nightmare:  
The fact that the Church in this period was able to survive was due in 
some respects to the special significance of the fruits of the Sobor of 
1917–1918, because of the revival of parish life and an increase of the 
role of women. Paying no heed to mortal danger, parishioners 
everywhere resisted the closure of churches. And the overwhelming 
majority of people in the parish councils in the 1930s were women. They 
demonstrated an amazing fearlessness and resilience in self-sacrificing 
service to the Church. It was these women who went into exile to 
support and save the lives of their priests, they gave shelter to the 
persecuted and guaranteed the underground life of Church services. 
Many ascetics [подвижницы] appeared, not as monastics, but living like 
monastics, so hundreds of such ‘monasteries in the world’ appeared. All 
of this allowed the Church not only to survive but to be reborn as soon 
as external circumstances changed.71 
The example of the bravery of such women under the totalitarian regimes of 
the last century was often referenced by Metropolitan Anthony with a view to 
 
71 Cf. Shkarovskii, M.V., ‘Vlianie Vserossiiskogo Pomestnogo Sobora 1917–1918 gg. v sovetskuiu epokhu’, 
Tserkov’ i Vremia, 4 (25), 2003. 164-188 (author trans.) 
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inspiring a rethink of attitudes within the Church. In the diaspora, the 
loosening of administrative structures ‘in times of need’ helped the Higher 
Church Administration (which was to become ROCOR, the Russian Church 
Abroad) to gain independence.  All this considered, it might be thought that 
the Sobor would be held in high esteem in post-Soviet Russia and that the 
Church would be desirous to enact freely its decrees, so long delayed. But this 
is not the case at all and the reasons for this are complex.  
Firstly, the Church in the diaspora was free to discuss the decrees of the 
Sobor and many of the theologians who had drafted its proposals now found 
themselves in Paris and Berlin.72 The Paris School that developed under the 
guidance of such figures as Fr Sergei Bulgakov was viewed with suspicion by 
the Church Abroad and the monarchist wing of the Church. The Paris School 
was to publish much about the Sobor and reforms to Church administration 
and emphasised sobornost’ over hierarchal power. The school later came 
under the Exarchate of the Russian Tradition and the omophorion of 
Constantinople, and although it included some of the most famous names in 
twentieth-century Russian theology (Schmemann, Afanasiev, Bulgakov)  they 
were in the liberal and ecumenist tradition from which the post-Soviet Church 
has now moved away. Although Metropolitan Anthony was under the Moscow 
Patriarchate, his influences and background were very much of the Paris 
School.  
Secondly, and this is something that is often overlooked by western 
commentators, all liberalising tendencies in the Russian Church are viewed 
with suspicion in relation to the history of renovationism. The derogatory term 
‘neo-renovationists’ was sometimes used by hardliners to describe the 
 
72 On the influence of the Sobor on the theology of the Russian Diaspora cf. Destivel’, I. ‘Reaktsia bogoslovov 
russkoi emigratsii na sobor 1917–1918 g.’, Thesis 
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‘liberals’ of Sourozh.73 In fact, the proposals of the rRenovationist movement 
were largely rejected by the Sobor of 1917–18, which took a much more sober 
line on reforms, but any talk of increasing the role of the laity, and similar 
initiatives, often stands accused of neo-renovationism.74 The Renovationist 
schism of 1922–44 was extremely important to the subsequent trajectory of 
the Russian Church. The movement had its genesis in several reformist streams 
that fed into the preparations for the 1917–18 Sobor, with extremist elements 
seeing the Revolution as an opportunity to realise radical changes in the 
Church.75 The result was the emergence of the Living Church, an attempt by 
liberals in the Church, supported by the Bolsheviks, to introduce revolutionary 
reforms into Church governance, pastoral theology and the liturgy.  As the 
Bolsheviks had intended, the movement was highly divisive and caused a 
schism throughout the country between those who supported Patriarch 
Tikhon’s condemnation of the movement and the followers of Fr Alexander 
Vvedenensky, who led the Living Church until its final demise in the 1940s. 
While some White clergy and bishops initially supported the new movement, 
the laity largely rejected the reformers, seeing them as ‘stooges’ of the atheist 
state76. The leaders of the Living Church proposed, among other reforms, 
elimination of ‘pagan’ accretions into the Liturgy, a return to the simpler style 
of worship of the early church, permanent opening of the royal doors during 
services, and translation of certain parts of the liturgy into contemporary 
 
73 Cf. ‘The Sourozh Schism and the Last Christians’, 15.05.06. 
http://www.orthodoxengland.org.uk/sourozh2.htm [Accessed 05.05.18]  
74 On the renovationists and the Sobor, cf. Firsov, S.L., Vlast’ i ogon’: Tserkov’ i sovetskoe gosudarstvo 1918 – 
nachalo 1940-x gg. (Moscow, 2014), pp.224 and 238ff.  
75 Cf. Golovushkin, D.A., ‘Fenomen obnovlenchestva v russkom pravoslavii pervoy poloviny XX veka’, Thesis. 
VAK.RF. 2020.  
76 Ivanov, S.N., ‘Khronologia obnovlencheskogo "perevorota" v Russkoi Tserkvi po novym arkhivnim 




Russian.77 The Renovationists are remembered in the Russian Church today as 
traitors by laity and clergy alike, seen as having sought favour and signed 
agreements with the very persecutors who forced their fellow priests to 
submit to the bullet and the Gulag. In one incident, Vvedensky was called to 
give evidence against his own mentor, Metropolitan Veniamin of Petrograd. 
During his statement he was nearly killed by a rock thrown by a peasant 
woman.78 Daniel Payne, in his brief analysis of the Sourozh crisis, noted that 
resisting the spectre of renovationism was high on the agenda of the Russian 
Church, ‘not only is the issue regarding the Diocese of Sourozh and the 
Western Exarchate in Paris associated with the spread of Russian nationalism, 
it also pertains to the issue of spiritual security with the ROC attempting to 
consolidate its own influence against that of renovationism and secularism’.79  
Later Church persecutions under Khrushchev in the early 1960s again 
tried to create schisms in the Church at the parish level by demanding an 
increased role for the laity and in particular for parish lay representatives to act 
as a counterweight to the clergy.80 As a result of these Soviet State 
interventions, initiatives for democratisation and lay involvement in Church 
 
77 For a broad outline of the liturgical and linguistic reforms of the Renovationists, cf. Solov'iev, Iierei Il'ia 
‘Obnovlencheskiy raskol i liturgicheskiye reformi’, TSV № 12 (385) June 2008/27 July 2008 g. 
78 Cf. Firsov, S.L., Vlast’ i ogon’: Tserkov’ i sovetskoe gosudarstvo 1918 – nachalo 1940-x gg. (Moscow, 2014), 
p.217ff  
79 Payne, D., ‘Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration 
or Cooptation?’, Journal of Church and State, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 2010), pp.712–27  
80 Cf. Shkarovskii, M.V., ‘Vlianie Vserossiiskogo Pomestnogo Sobora 1917–1918 gg. v sovetskuiu epokhu’ 
Tserkov’ i Vremia, 4 (25), 2003, pp. 164-188. In relation to the Khrushchev persecutions: ‘The “Reform” [ie 
Khrushchev’s reform] largely attempted to destroy traditional Church governance, whilst her juridical 
organisation was subdivided. Priests were separated from the parish life and had to be appointed by the 
community under contract for “the fulfilment of religious needs”. The clergy were not allowed to attend 
meetings of the elected church council in which the authorities possessed the legal right to challenge 
appointees and gradually install its own people. In fact, the leaders of parish life became these “elders”, often 
completely unchurched and even unbelieving people of morally dubious character. Without their agreement 
the priest or bishop was not able to conduct any work or even to sack the cleaner from the church. The legal 
status of the bishops and Patriarch was not stipulated anywhere as if they didn’t exist and possessed no lawful 
form of communication with parish life.’ (Author trans.)  
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administration are today met with opposition in Russia, which has increasingly 
returned to a vertical power structure.  
The arguments that were debated during the Sobor of 1917–18 (and 
many years previous to it) continued on in the diaspora. Some of the more 
liberal-leaning jurisdictions, such as the future OCA in America, the Parisian 
Exarchate and the Diocese of Sourozh in London, decided to implement some 
of the decisions of the Sobor independently. In the broadest of terms, this was 
done through a greater emphasis (or, it might be argued by their opponents, 
misunderstanding) on the concept of sobornost’ as permeating all aspects of 
Church life, especially ecclesiology.   
 This is not the place for an in-depth analysis one of the most complex 
terms in Russian theology, but a few words need to be said about sobornost’ as 
a concept. Both sides in the conflict claimed to have a better grasp on the real 
meaning of sobornost’. The critique of the pro-Moscow parishioners was that 
Bishop Basil and his entourage represented it as a dry ‘collegiality’ or 
‘democratisation’, and this was displayed in their ‘coldness’. A pro-Moscow 
parishioner complained that Bishop Basil did ‘not understand what sobornost’ 
is. But sobornost’ is a very important concept! A very important business! 
Sobornost’ is when we are all together. But he failed to understand this!’81 But 
for those opposed to Moscow, sobornost’ was a key weapon to use in their 
arguments against vertical episcopal power. 
Sobornost’ is usually translated into English as ‘conciliarity’ or 
‘collegiality’, but such definitions fail to capture the full meaning of the term. It 
 
81 ‘Surozhskoe nestroenia: vzgliad iznutry’ pravoslavie.ru,  op.cit.. http://www.pravoslavie.ru/4693.html 
[Accessed 26.05.20]  
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has ancient roots which go back to a pre-modern – perhaps even pre-Christian 
– worldview, as G.V. Stel’mashuk points out:  
The term sobornost’ is understood as a complete set of psychological 
attitudes and existing practices of Church life and of unwritten rules for 
the conduct of the laity. Sobornost’ is a certain mentality, permeating all 
levels of society in the pre-industrial era and a characteristic of all 
Russian Orthodox people. The principles of sobornost’ as a special 
worldview go back into the mists of time. They appear in parallel with 
the emergence of the territorial community in the pre-State period of 
history. The self-governance of the city and likewise of the village were 
so constructed on the principle of sobornost.82  
The philosopher Ivan Ilyin, in his study of Hegel, attempted at points to define 
this concept phenomenologically: ‘the singular is permeated by the Universal 
and included in it; the Universal grasps the individual and constitutes its inner 
substantial nature. In such an immediate identity they constitute a single 
“grasping” or “genus”’.83 It was this diversity in the unity of the collective that 
characterised the first Slavophiles’ countering of the atomisation of western 
European industrialised society with the ideal of the Russian narod and the 
peasant commune.84 Indeed, Khomiakov himself is often regarded as the 
coiner of the noun sobornost’.85 Furthermore, the adjectival variant sobornaia 
had been chosen for the translation into Slavonic of ‘universal’ in the Nicene 
Creed (Εἰς μίαν, Ἁγίαν, Καθολικὴν καὶ Ἀποστολικὴν Ἐκκλησίαν / Et unam, 
 
82 Stel’mashuk G.V., i Nikolaeva, O V. Sobornost’ kak vazhneishaia cherta russkogo pravoslavia v kontekste 
perspektiv ego razvitia, vypusk 3: Sbornik materialov konf. SP Fil. Obsh. (St Petersburg, 2005) Intro.  
83 Ilyin, I., The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of God and Humanity: Volume One: The 
Doctrine of God (Illinois, 2010), p.109  
84 Cf. Gorelov, A.A, ‘A.S.Khomiakov: uchenie o sobornosti i russkaia obshchina’, Znanie, Ponimanie, Umenie, 
No. 2 (2017), MGU 
85 A discussion of the etymology of the word sobornost’ in relation to Khomiakov’s writings can be found in 
Shevzov, V., op. cit., pp.30–35 
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sanctam, catholicam et apostolicam Ecclesiam / Во едину святую, соборную 
и Апостольскую Церковь / And in One, holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church), 
when there are other words that would have equally sufficed. This choice 
seems to encapsulate the opposing worldviews of the individualist West versus 
the collectivism of the East. The nineteenth century Slavophile Konstantin 
Aksakov used the metaphor of a choir to depict sobornost’, describing a unity 
in which each individual becomes ever more part of the group, yet ever more 
themselves.86 This idea was developed with great insight in the twentieth 
century by the literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin in his concepts of polyphony 
and dialogism, both of which emerge from Slavic sobornost’.87  
From this short description it can be seen that sobornost’ is not only a 
pivotal Orthodox concept, but a peculiarly Russian one as well. For this reason, 
issues around its (mis)appropriation were extremely sensitive. I would here like 
to posit a link between the debates around sobornost’ and the seminal work 
on nationalism by Benedict Anderson and subsequent studies.88 Anderson’s 
concept of the imagined (national) community was resolutely modern and 
secular and in some respects defined against the ancien regime, so it might 
appear mischievous to apply it to the religious sphere. There are two reasons 
why this may be fruitful. Firstly, in the Russian case, the emergence of 
nationalism (if such it can be called) was – and is – still very connected to the 
Church (‘Russian was his language, Orthodoxy his identity’89). Secondly, while 
Anderson’s conception of the pre-modern religious-cosmological worldview as 
‘hierarchical and centripetal’ seems to hold true in its essence when applied to 
 
86 Aksakov, K., ‘O sovremennom cheloveke’ IIff. (Saint Petersburg, 1876)  
87 Cf., Esaulov, I.A., ‘Polifonia i sobornost’’, The Seventh International Bakhtin Conference, Book 1 (Moscow, 
1995)   
88 Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: op. cit. (1983, 2006) 
89 Petro, N., The Rebirth of Russian Democracy op.cit.  
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Western Europe, it is less applicable to the Orthodox East.90 One of Anderson’s 
key ideas about the ‘imagined community’ of the nation is that of the 
horizontal: ‘Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.’91 Western academics steeped in 
the history of the Western Empire and especially the emergence of the Papacy 
should take account of the subtle distinction between that and the sobornost’-
driven ecclesiology (and subsequent social structures) of the Orthodox East, 
especially Russia. Anderson’s ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ does seem to go 
part of the way to providing an adequate description or translation of 
sobornost’. As the Sourozh parishioner wrote, Bishop Basil did not understand 
that sobornost’ ‘is when we are all together’. This is not to propose Russian 
sobornost’ as analogous to modern nationalism, but rather to utilise 
Anderson’s imagined community as a useful concept in the national or rather 
hyper-national manifestation of the Russian Church.  
 In what ways did the re-emphasis on sobornost’ at the Sobor of 1917 
play out in practical terms in Church administration? In particular, the Sobor 
emphasised the independence of each diocese and proposed that dioceses 
should elect their own bishops from a list of candidates compiled by local 
clergy and confirmed by the Synod. These elective principles for the diocesan 
clergy coupled with the formation of proposed elected diocesan and parish 
councils were rather revolutionary and the debate on this issue was more 
heated than on any other. As Vitali Petrenko writes: ‘Another breakthrough 
was represented by the adoption of the “Temporary Statute of the Parish”. It 
 
90 ‘The fundamental conceptions about “social groups” were centripetal and hierarchical, rather than 
boundary-oriented and horizontal’, Anderson, ibid., p.15 
91 Ibid., p.50 
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conferred “extraordinary powers’ on the parish, including the right to elect 
local clergy and enabled the parishioners to organise the Church-parish 
councils and to exercise control over the Church's affairs on the local level. The 
course was set to organise ecclesiastical life in line with the ideals of 
Khomiakov's principle of sobornost', which would limit the “vertical” 
hierarchical authority of the black clergy, bringing and re-enforcing the 
principle of power-sharing on to a horizontal level which would involve a 
greater participation of the white clergy and laity in the ecclesiastical life of the 
Russian Orthodox Church’.92 As noted, this was a pivotal instruction of the 
Sourozh Statutes.93 The process was covered in detail in sections 4–8 with 
much emphasis on an explanation of the transparent electoral procedure. In 
the new Sourozh Statues introduced in 2010, there was practically no mention 
of this procedure.94 The diocesan election was to become a specific matter of 
contention after the death of Metropolitan Anthony.  
The anti-Moscow group consistently made the connection between 
Putin’s vertikal’ vlasti and the increasingly hierarchical tendencies in the 
Russian Church. The words of a statement of the diocesan council on 16 June 
2002 stated that the Russian Church ‘heavily traumatised by the violence and 
cruelty of more than 70 years of communism, is now trying to regain her 
national character and it seems is in need of a display of hierarchical power as 
opposed to communal authority’.95 The anti-Moscow group saw in the Moscow 
Patriarchate’s tendency towards hierarchal or vertical power the legacy of a 
‘Soviet cult of power’.96 A parishioner wrote that the Russians of the first wave 
 
92 Petrenko, V., ‘The Development of the Concept of Authority Within the Russian Orthodox Church’, PhD 
Thesis, Durham, 2005  
93 OCAD. The Statutes of the Diocese of Sourozh (Metropolitan Anthony version), Sections 4–8  
94 OCAD. The Statutes of the Diocese of Sourozh (Metropolitan Anthony version) 
95 Khronika Surozhskoi Smuty, op. cit.  
96 Cf. Kostiuk, K., ‘Formirovanie i evoliutsia “bogoslovia vlasti” v Moskovskom gosudarstve v XIV – XVI vv' in 
Gosudarstvo, religia, tserkov’ v Rossii I za rubezhom,  № 3 (32) 2014. Also Wallace L.D., ‘Alexander Men and 
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and the English converts were ‘sickened by the cult of power and strength, 
they feel in the face of the clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate. They [ie the 
English and old émigrés] have never been Soviet citizens, it is alien and 
strange’.97 Irina von Schlippe linked the cult of power directly to the secular 
vertical power structure writing, ‘The State autocratic manner of governing, 
more pronounced at the moment than of late, is affecting the Church as 
well’.98 One parishioner wrote that it was ‘ultimately a question of the Moscow 
hierarchy exerting power simply because it has power and wishes to be seen to 
exert it whatever the consequences’.99 This is an interesting and sometimes 
overlooked point, but beyond the remit of this study. The display of power 
plays a different role in Russia compared to the rest of Europe (including 
Eastern Europe). Even in ecclesiastical matters, ostentation and public shows 
of power do not necessarily have negative connotations; on the contrary, 
modesty and compromise can be seen as weaknesses.  
In practical terms, the power dynamic did draw the Church and the State 
together and Metropolitan Hilarion made no secret of his close contact with 
the Russian Foreign Ministry. He viewed such activity as completely benign: 
‘First of all, our important partner in the business of the support of our 
compatriots [in the diaspora] is the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs … The 
DECR has become more focused on its work with foreign countries – in fact it 
has become analogous to the secular Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.100 Similarly, 
Lavrov has spoken about the importance of collaboration between the Church 
 
Russian Orthodoxy: The Conflict between Freedom and Power’, Religion in Eastern Europe XXIX, 4 (November 
2009). Both articles take the concept of the cult of power much further back into Russia’s past, the first 
relating it to the theology developed especially under Tsar Ivan Grozny, and the second into Russia’s pagan 
past. For the notion of a Soviet mentality, see Chapter 4.  
97 Cirota.ru, Tema #58412, Soobshenie #2088395, 26.05.06 [Accessed 26.05.20]  
98 Von Schlippe, op. cit.  
99 OCAD. Dioceseinfo.org docs. An Open Letter and a Personal Observation 
100 Alfeev, Metropolitan H., ‘Mitropolit Ilarion otvetil na voprosy saita "Pomniu Rossiu"’, 12.02.12. 
https://mospat.ru/ru/2012/02/17/news58335/ [Accessed 26.05.20] 
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and embassies working together to consolidate the Russian World.101 Yet seen 
from the anti-Moscow side, the involvement of the Russian Ambassador in the 
Sourozh case was highly disconcerting, let alone the new emphasis on secular 
emblems and holidays of the Russian State.102 A by-product of this new 
centralisation of power was a concentration on actual power and the trappings 
of power; hence the reclamation of property at home and abroad, the usage of 
black limousines by the higher clergy, previously associated with the party 
nomenklatura, etc. Some commentators on the Sourozh crisis linked this 
tendency to the legacy of years of Soviet infiltration, in which the Moscow 
Patriarchate was the soft-power arm of the Soviet State abroad.103 A Moscow 
priest wrote in relation to the Sourozh crisis that, ‘”Sergianism” in the post-
Soviet conditions is a rigid “vertical” of Church-administrative authority, spliced 
with corrupt secular power, exploiting the “symbolic capital” of the national 
spiritual tradition in order to transform it into physical capital, used for 
personal earthly purposes. Any attempt at sobornost’, even the most pitiful … 
undermines such a “vertical” and its monopoly on “symbolic capital” and is 
therefore doomed to forceful eradication’.104 Proponents of this view had 
multiple examples to cite as evidence. One of the most notorious concerned 
the priest Fr Sergei Taratukhin, who was tried and sentenced by an 
 
101 Cf. Opening Remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at Press Conference After Tenth Meeting of 
Working Group on MFA-Russian Orthodox Church Interaction, Moscow, 20.11.07. 
http://www.mid.ru/en/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/356698  
[Accessed 16/04/18] 
102 Although it should be pointed out that meetings with the Russian Ambassador were also conducted by 
Bishop Basil. Cf. Letter from Bishop Basil to Patriarch Aleksei, 03.03.06. 
http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/134490.html  
103 Zherebiatiev, M., ‘Lenta novostei: I beglii episkop Vasilii’, portal-credo.ru, 24.06.06. http://www.portal-
credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=45528 [Accessed: 05.05.19] ‘The announcement of Bishop Basil as a foreign 
‘‘runaway bishop’’ was announced on NTV, the State Broadcasting channel ‘’in true Soviet style’’ … ‘Without a 
doubt, the ROC MP in the 2000s has taken upon itself the role as the ideological and spiritual guide of Russian 
foreign policy.’ (author trans.)  
104 Maliutin, A., ‘Surozh ostaetsia sobornym’, 09.06.06. https://credo.press/67626/ [Accessed 15.08.18] 
(author trans.)  
252 
 
ecclesiastical court after referring to Khodorkovsky as a political prisoner.105 
This event happened at the same time as the Sourozh crisis, and to the anti-
Moscow group represented the lengths that the Church would go to in its 
concordat with the State.106  
This was the damning critique of the Church represented in the Russian 
art-house film Leviathan in which Church and State work together to exploit 
honest people for mercenary gain. An English commentator on the Sourozh 
crisis noted this view as a subtext of anti-Moscow opposition: ‘Vladyka Vasily 
[favoured] the preservation of the “style” of administration of the diocese, 
setting him in opposition to the situation in Russia, where, as it seems to him, 
the church hierarchy is absolutely despotic and completely corrupt’.107 Another 
blogger was glad that the conflict was not an ethnic one but ‘one of a different 
understanding of ecclesiology’.108  
The greatest practical concern for the anti-Moscow camp relating to 
these differences over ecclesiology was the succession within the diocese. 
People were aware that in 1996 there had been a schism in the Russian Church 
in Estonia, when the local candidate for the diocesan bishop had been rejected 
by Moscow.109 Similarly, people knew that following Metropolitan Anthony’s 
death, Bishop Basil had only been confirmed as the administrator of the 
diocese and not (yet) the ruling diocesan bishop, despite his selection by the 
diocesan council. Moscow countered that the diocesan council was a small and 
self-interested body concerned with maintaining independence from Moscow 
 
105 Korobov, P., Kommersant’, No. 51, 24.03.06, p.7  
106 Cf. Maliutin, op.cit.   
107 Thomas, Dr S. ‘What is canonically wrong with what Bishop Basil Osborne & the Patriarch of Constantinople 
have done with the Diocese of Sourozh?’, 07.2002. http://old.hilarion.ru/2010/02/26/1240 [Accessed 
05.05.19] 
108 Cirota.ru, Tema #58412, Soobshenie #2307454, 05.09.06 [Accessed 26.05.20] 
109 Cf. Crow, G. This Holy Man, op.cit., p.220ff 
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at all costs, and that it did not represent the great mass of parishioners. In any 
case the actual right of a diocese to choose its own bishop over and above the 
wishes of the central Church administration had not been agreed even in the 
Sobor of 1917.110 On the other hand, it might be said that the diocesan council 
with its anti-Moscow majority might propose Bishop Basil’s name, but he 
would probably have lost a full election, in accordance with the Sourozh 
Statutes, due to the demographic shifts in the diocese and the commitment of 
the pro-Moscow parishioners. 
The anti-Moscow group presented the democracy and sobornost’ of 
Sourozh as opposing the autocracy and verticality of Moscow. This was an 
over-simplification. Recently, the Metropolitan of Nizhny Novgorod was asked 
to make the distinction between the increasingly used terms tserkovnaia 
vertikal’ versus sobornost’. 111 He replied that the straightforward transference 
of secular terminology into ecclesiastical affairs was problematic for the 
Church, as it had never been a democratic organisation. In fact, how could it 
have been, formed as it was hundreds of years before the emergence of such 
concepts? He concluded, ‘To compare the Church with the secular state, a 
political party or a commercial organisation, even in the level of terminology, 
when such concepts as вертикаль власти or демократическое устройство 
become completely acceptable, means that we don’t understand her nature 
and we don’t possess a vital sense of belonging to her blessed life … For people 
outside the Church this is completely incomprehensible, they measure 
everything by worldly standards and are trying to force this position on 
others.’112 This position was confirmed by one of the most ‘open’ and liberal 
 
110 Cf. Destivelle, op. cit.  
111 ‘Interviu mitropolita Nizhegorodskogo i Arzamasskogo Georgi’, 13.04.16 




modern Russian theologians, Fr Alexander Schmemann. In his article ‘The 
Church is Hierarchal’, Schmemann wrote, ‘When in the “clergy-laity 
controversy” the terms “government”, “administration”, “controlling 
authority” are used, are all those who use them aware that when applied to 
the Church, they must of necessity mean something different from what they 
mean in a purely secular context? The Church is not a secular society and, 
therefore, all definitions and descriptions of its life and functioning to be 
adequate must necessarily be transposed and adjusted to its nature’.113 
Schmemann went on to critique the understanding of sobornost’ as a synonym 
for the political term ‘democracy’. Anti-Moscow communications in Sourozh 
frequently used this term and its derivatives, a custom that was derided by 
their opponents.  
What was also problematic in the Sourozh crisis was the transference of 
the term vertikal into ecclesiology. This also contained within it the notion of 
the worldly entering the Church in the form of an aping of the new autocracy 
of the regime. This was – and is – a common accusation made against the 
Church within Russia and without.114 Simply put, the argument states that as 
power became centralised in the state, this was mirrored in the Church in a 
symbiotic process, as the Church sought to ‘keep up’ with the state. This 
simplistic view of Church–State relations in Russia was criticised even by anti-
Moscow analysts such as the academics Veera Laine and Iiris Saarelainen, who 
suggested, ‘The interests of Church and state are not always fully congruent. 
The Church is not merely the Kremlin’s puppet; it functions as its own, 
 
113 Schmemann, A., ‘The Church is Hierarchal: An Answer to Ralph Montgomery Arkush, Esq’, St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1959), pp. 36-41. Author’s emphasis.  
114 E.g. Patriarkh Kirill, ‘I vertikal vlasti’, 28.01.2010 http://inosmi.ru/russia/20100128/157843524.html 
[Accessed 013.16.17]  
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sometimes internally divided entity’.115 Nevertheless, it was felt by the anti-
Moscow group that Moscow was compelled to make an example of Sourozh 
lest other dioceses follow her lead in invoking the proposals of the 1917–18 
Sobor and deciding to elect their own bishops, or secede from Moscow’s 
sphere of power in other ways. Pro-Moscow supporters countered that it was 
the anti-Moscow group who had misunderstood the true meaning of 
sobornost’. For the pro-Moscow group, sobornost’ was in many ways the 
opposite of democracy (‘one person, one vote’) as it was not based on 
individualism, but on the collective. Such arguments had raged during the 
Sobor of 1917–18. Vera Shevzov writes, ‘The debates in the Sobor over the 
concept of sobornost’ were some of the most lively. For Bishop Efrem of 
Selengina the debate concerned two opposing worldviews; the democratic and 
the theocratic. He rejected what he saw as an attempt to bring protestant 
democratisation to the Church under the banner of sobornost’.116  
The Sourozh crisis represented a continuation of the battle of 
worldviews mentioned by Bishop Efrem. Both sides argued over the 
significance, or rather, the true meaning of the Sobor, but here the position of 
the pro-Moscow group was on shakier ground. It is difficult to view the Sobor 
as devoid of reformist and liberalising tendencies. The very make-up of the 
Sobor, with its majority of lay participants, had itself been revolutionary.117 It 
was paradoxical for Sourozh that Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev was himself 
situated at the more liberal end of the debate and himself often promoted a 
horizontal emphasis in church governance, stressing a multicentred view of the 
structure of the Church: ‘The Church historically appeared and developed 
 
115 Saarelainen, I. and Laine, V., ‘Spirituality as a Political Instrument: The Church, the Kremlin and the Creation 
of the Russian World’, 98 FIIA Working Paper (Sept. 2017). Cf. Interview 1C  
116 Shevzov, V., op. cit., p.51 
117 Cf. Destivelle, op. cit. 
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under conditions of pluralism, and by its internal structure and nature it is not 
and cannot be a totalitarian organization with the unification of all and 
everything’.118 Regarding the perspective of the laity, it is worth noting that an 
academic study by Christopher Marsh found that churchgoing Orthodox 
Christians were ‘somewhat more favourably inclined toward democracy than 
are other Russians’. He concluded that, ‘religious belief and practice have 
virtually no impact on democratic values, suggesting that Orthodoxy may not 
be the obstacle to democracy that some have made it out to be’.119 
A further arena in which the horizontal–vertical tension was played out 
should be mentioned in brief. There was a difference in the practical 
application of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in small provincial parishes compared 
to its realisation in the big London cathedral. In both cases there were divisions 
between the two sides, but the London cathedral was a special case because 
metropolitan cathedrals are by their nature ‘glocalised’ (to use the term coined 
by Roudometoff120), with peripatetic and often multi-ethnic mass 
congregations. There is a gulf between the daily life and atmosphere in a big 
cathedral compared to that of a church in a small town or a village. Yannaras 
wrote an extensive critique of urban cathedrals, which for him promoted 
atomisation in place of sobornost’ and dilettantish consumerism in place of 
eucharistic synaxis: ‘[A cathedral] contains thousands of people, often tens of 
thousands, and there is no personal communion or sense of being a body.’121 
The inclination towards vertical power was greater in such a situation, where 
 
118 Alfeev, Metropolitan H., ‘Rol' svetskikh i khristianskikh tsennostei v sovremennon mul'tikul'turnom 
obshestve’, 02.06.14. https://mospat.ru/ru/2014/06/04/news103601/ [Accessed 013.16.17]  : 
119 Marsh, C., ‘Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 13, Issue 3 
(Summer 2005), pp.449–62 
120 Roudometof, V., ‘Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization’, Current Sociology, Vol. 53 (1) (Jan. 
2005), pp.113–35. Cf. Chapter 6 of this study.  
121 Yannaras, C., The Historical and Social Dimensions of the Church’s Ethos, Chapter 11 of The Freedom of 
Morality (Crestwood, 1984), pp.195–229 
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multiple groups and individuals vied for precedence. In this sense, the 
comment posted by John Marks (‘my loyalty is first to the parish …’) becomes 
more understandable. The ideals of sobornost’ were more realisable in smaller, 




Chapter 6 Sourozh and the Russian World: A Global Mandate 
The Russian World was by its nature a diaspora concept. It posited that 
Russians in the Motherland and in the near abroad and far abroad were linked 
together spiritually, culturally and (in terms of the Church) jurisdictionally. 
After 1991, there was impetus towards consolidation, in other words pulling 
the parishes and dioceses of the far abroad, such as Sourozh, into a cohesive 
whole.1 The problem was that the multiple jurisdictions of the Russian Church 
in the far abroad were not cohesive, but rather represented the various 
strands of the diaspora’s history over the twentieth century. The ethos of 
Sourozh was different from that of ROCOR, which was different again from 
that of the Parisian Exarchate.  
The creation of the Russian diaspora affected the concept of the Russian 
World concept both ideologically and practically. Firstly, after 1917, it was 
increasingly seen by the White émigrés as a providential event, scattering 
Russian Christians to across the world. Secondly, in its applied realisation of 
the ideals of Russian universalism, it created a sense of a global mission for the 
Russian Church and people.2 And when, after 1991, yet another wave of 
emigration developed the diaspora further in the near and far abroad, the idea 
of the diaspora’s spiritual significance became central to the new Russian 
World concept. At the same time, the secularisation and liberalisation of 
western society was increasingly being resisted by Russia’s promotion of 
traditional values. This shone a new light on parishes in the far abroad, such as 
Sourozh, which the Church and State now sought to use as soft-power tools in 
 
1 Interview 1B. Cf. Innokenty of Korsun, Bishop, ‘The Unification of the Russian Orthodox Church in Western 
Europe’, Sourozh Journal, Issue 102, 11.05  
2 Shchedrovskii, P., ‘Russkii mir i transnational'noe russkoe’, Russkii Zhurnal, 02.02.00 
http://old.russ.ru/politics/meta/20000302_schedr.html       
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the new culture wars.3 This meant that both sides in Sourozh were to claim 
victim status. Anti-Moscow parishioners resented what they saw as the 
promotion of conservative traditional values by the new regime. The pro-
Moscow side felt themselves at odds with western liberal values as understood 
by Bishop Basil and his supporters.4 This is a rather simplistic dichotomy, but it 
was important in at Sourozh. In this chapter, we will examine the development 
of the missionary idea in the Russian diaspora, as well as the effect of the new 
‘culture wars’ on diaspora parishes in the West, such as Sourozh. To do this, it 
is necessary first to understand the gestation of the diaspora ideology within 
the Russian World concept.  
 
The Significance of the Diaspora  
The years immediately following 1917 saw an outpouring of books and articles 
on the meaning and destiny of Russia as émigrés struggled to come to terms 
with the cataclysmic events. In Paris, Berdiaev, Kartashev, Bunin, Bulgakov and 
others wrote extensively on the meaning of the new Orthodox diaspora, while 
in Oxford, the Zernovs explored the ecumenical significance of the diaspora, 
forging links with the Anglicans and other Christians. They founded the Society 
of St Alban and St Sergius, an organisation with close links to the Parisian 
Exarchate and the Sourozh of Metropolitan Anthony. The society invited many 
of the famous diaspora thinkers mentioned above to speak in Oxford, London 
 
3 Cf. March, L., ‘Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications of the new “Russian 
Idea”, Europe-Asia Studies, 64:3 (April 2012), pp.401–25. Cf. p.419: ‘Russia is moving from defensive reaction 
to Western initiatives to a more assertive position that at least potentially might act as an alternative “value 
centre” to Western liberal democracy.’ Also Alfeev, Metropolitan H., ‘Rol' svetskikh I khristianskikh tsennostei 
v sovremennon mul'tikul'turnom obshestve’, 04.06.14. https://mospat.ru/ru/2014/06/04/news103601/ 
[Accessed 24.05.20] 
4 Cf. Branford, B., ‘Bitter rift in UK Orthodox Church’, 13.05.06. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4764833.stm [Accessed 24.05.20]. Also Walters, P., ‘The Power 
Struggle in Orthodoxy’, Church Times, 26.05.06 
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and at the various Sourozh conferences. The abiding meaning of the 
emigration for all factions was one of divine providence.5 Berdiaev’s 1925 
essay ‘On the Spiritual Tasks of the Russian Emigration’ is worth quoting at 
length for its codification of many of the hopes and fears that surfaced in the 
Sourozh crisis and are still involved in the Russian World concept to this day – 
the historical world mission of the Russian people, the fear of enculturation 
and dissipation, the threats of modernism and secularism:  
It is not by chance that Russian Orthodox people have been brought into 
physical contact with the Western world, with the Christian West. 
Orthodoxy has a universal significance and it cannot continue to settle 
into a nationally-restrictive and isolated condition, it ought to become a 
spiritual force, active in the world. Russians, remaining faithful to the 
faith of their fathers, are compelled to live amidst a foreign world, or a 
world godless and irreligious, or a world that is Christian, but confessing 
a different Christianity … By the will of God’s Providence we have been 
sent forth into a community with the Western spiritual world, and we 
ought to strive to get to know it and enter into brotherly relations with 
it, associating with it in the name of the struggle against anti-Christian 
forces. But there can also be the bad in this relationship. Russians can 
gradually lose the uniqueness of their own spiritual type, they can be 
torn away from their own national-religious roots, can dissolve away 
into Western life, having adapted, entering into compromise.6 
 
5 In his book Missia russkoi emigratsii (Moscow, 1994), the neo-Slavophile Mikhail Nazarov distinguished three 
functions of the Russian diaspora. Firstly, that of preserver of the pre-revolutionary national consciousness; 
secondly, that of spiritual aid to the suffering motherland; and thirdly, ‘Creative: the understanding of the 
tragic experience of the revolution in universal terms … The discovery of the new Russian Idea as the Orthodox 
synthesis of the universal man’. Nazarov, M., Missia russkoi emigratsii, tom 1, ‘raznie missii’ 
6 Berdiaev, N., ‘On the Spiritual Tasks of the Russian Emigration’ 
http://www.berdyaev.com/berdiaev/berd_lib/1925_302.html [Accessed 10.01.18] 
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While Berdiaev may be considered to be at the liberal end of neo-Slavophilism, 
his thoughts were echoed by all, including the renowned ROCOR bishop, St 
John of Shanghai, who likewise issued a grave warning. If the Russian diaspora 
did not live up to its responsibility, it would ‘remain in banishment, persecuted 
by everyone, until gradually it will degenerate and disappear from the face of 
the earth’.7 Perhaps it is a mistake to ascribe too much import to these 
impassioned appeals. For the life of the average White émigré was a desperate 
struggle for survival and most were less concerned with messianism than in 
finding work and lodgings. The Sourozh parishioner Irina von Schlippe, a 
member of the diocesan council at the time of the crisis, deflated some of this 
rhetoric in her article ‘The Crisis of Exile’, stating that, ‘Russians brought 
Orthodoxy to the whole world without meaning to, not as missionaries, but 
simply by settling there, making a church, worshipping in it and opening their 
Church to their environment’.8 In 2006, in the midst of the Surozh troubles, 
Bishop Basil Osborne appeared on the BBC and spoke about the legacy of 
Berdiaev, and of émigré figures such as Alexander Shmemann and John 
Meyendorff.9 This provoked the ire of one the pro-Moscow parishioners, who 
wrote in a letter to the Patriarch, ‘It is interesting that Bishop Basil in his BBC 
interview did not also add the philosopher Ivan Ilyin to these thinkers? 
Probably that is because he is too Orthodox and not liberal enough. Ivan Ilyin 
wrote, “Wherever we are scattered, we Russian émigrés must remember that 
other peoples do not know us and do not understand us, and that they fear 
Russia, do not empathise with her and in fact are happy only with her 
 
7 ‘Report to the All-Diaspora Sobor, 1938’  http://orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/meaning_diaspora.aspx 
[Accessed 10.01.18] 
8 Cf. von Schlippe, I., ‘Krizis izgnania: poiski sotsial’nikh i dukhovnikh reshenii v emigratsii’, 28.05.2006 
http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/history/?ID=18 [Accessed 30.03.20]. Author’s emphasis.  
9 Interviu u episkopa Vasiliia (Osborna) religioznoi programme russkoi sluzhby Bi-Bi-Si "Vera i vek". 23.05.06, 
http://www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=7&id=6440 [Accessed 10.01.18]  
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weakening. It is not a new phenomenon’”.10 Ilyin was often caricatured as the 
eminence grise behind the new Russian Idea as it was portrayed in the western 
media and academic press.11 Such caricatures did little justice to his complex 
philosophy.12 Ilyin’s supposed influence on the post-communist regime has 
also been rejected by some western academics, such as Andrei Tsygankov, who 
noted that Ilyin did not even make the top ten important thinkers of a survey 
of Russian international relations students.13 In addition, Marlene Laruelle 
noted that Putin had only cited Ilyin five times and that these were ‘rather 
bland’ quotations.14 Nevertheless, it was true that the anti-Moscow analysts 
tended to emphasise the liberal Paris School thinkers, while conservatives 
quoted Ilyin and Leontiev. The diaspora was significant to both left and right, 
but with differing emphases.  
In broader terms, some have traced a messianic imperative through the 
very notion of ‘scattering’, of diaspora and of exile. Marc Spindler noted in his 
study that ‘in the sense of being disseminated throughout the world, all 
Christians can be considered as a missionary diaspora as far as all in each place 
dare to bear witness to the Gospel. Dissemination is somehow synonymous 
with mission’.15 For believers, the concept has Biblical foundations in the 
 
10 Statement of Parishioner, 25.06.06. http://www.sourozh.tserkov.info/voxpopuli/?ID=14 [Accessed 10.01.18]  
11 E.g. Snyder, T., The Road to Unfreedom (New York, 2018) 
12 Ilyin was a polymath, exiled along with Berdiaev and others by Lenin on the famous ‘philosopher’s ship’. He 
was analysed by Freud, studied with Husserl, and had to flee from the Nazis to Switzerland, where he died. Cf. 
Ljynggren, M., ‘Freud’s Unknown Russian Patient’ in Poetry and Psychiatry: Essays on Early Twentieth-Century 
Russian Symbolist Culture (2014). He repeatedly stressed his opposition to nationalism of the ethnolinguistic 
model and he particularly singled out his dislike of beliefs that placed peoples into hierarchies, stating ‘the true 
patriot is simply unable to hate or scorn other peoples’. See Kutuzov, B.P., Russkaia istoria s pozitsii 
staroobriadchestva (Moscow, 2013), pp.103–108. Ilyin’s magnum opus, The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine 
of the Concreteness of God and Humanity (Ill, 2010) has recently been translated into English by Philip T. Grier 
in two volumes: http://www.nupress.northwestern.edu/content/philosophy-hegel-doctrine-concreteness-
god-and-humanity  
13 Tsygankov, A., ‘In the Shadow of Nikolai Danilevsky: Universalism, Particularism, and Russian Geopolitical 
Theory’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 69, Issue 4 (2017 ) 
14 Laruelle, M., ‘In search of Putin's philosopher: Why Ivan Ilyin is not Putin’s Ideological Guru’, Intersection 
Project EU, 03.03.17 
15 Spindler, M., ‘The Impossible Quest for a General Theory of the Diaspora’, Exchange 21.1 (1998), p.3 
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scattering of the apostles and the exile and wandering of the Israelites. All of 
this means that the Russian diaspora – its formation, existence and meaning – 
has increasingly fascinated the Russian Church and this preoccupation shows 
no sign of abating.  
At the time of the Sourozh crisis, the view of the formation of the 
diaspora as a messianic event predominated in many of the pronouncements 
coming from the Patriarchate and the DECR. To take just one example, the 
then Metropolitan Kirill stated that ‘The values which the Russian Orthodox 
Church holds more and more represent a worldwide witness. It is exactly upon 
this witness that the sole spiritual justification of our worldwide scattering 
rests, from the Revolution down to our times’.16 But this Slavophile-nationalist 
view of the diaspora was not the only one. Metropolitan Anthony also saw the 
diaspora in messianic terms, but in a different way from both ROCOR and 
Moscow. For him, although the Russian emigration was providential, it was not 
linked to the manifest destiny of the Russian people. Instead, he saw it as a 
God-given opportunity for Russians to rediscover the non-ethnic Christianity of 
the early Church, in which there was ‘neither Jew nor Greek’.17 Some anti-
Moscow parishioners suggested that the neo-Slavophile view of the Russian 
diaspora was dangerously close to the heresy of ethnophyletism.18 Indeed, the 
jurisdictional consequence of promoting the Russian diaspora as a providential 
imperative of the Russian people was that Church governance should remain 
within the Russian Church, wherever it might be found.  
 
16 Kirill, Mitropolit, ‘Doklad na Arkhiereiskom Sobore RPTs’, 24.06.08 g. 
http://sobor.patriarchia.ru/db/text/427253.html [Accessed 10.04.20].  
17 Beliakova, E.V., ‘Kanonichskie osnovy ustava surozhskoi eparkhii’ in various authors, Dukhovnoe nasledie 
Mitropolita Antonia Surozhskogo: materialy pervoi mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii 28–30 sentiabria 2007g. 
(Moscow, 2008), pp.84–5 
18 OCAD. Statements of Sourozh Parishioners. A. Milton 
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Before the early modern period, the very notion of a national church 
was virtually non-existent. Instead, jurisdictions were delineated in terms of 
territory (usually cities) rather than ethnos (hence the Pauline epistles to the 
Church of Corinth and others).19 With the rise of European nationalism in the 
nineteenth century, the newly founded Orthodox states in the Balkans started 
to demand their own national churches along the lines of the western national 
churches. The issue came to head with the Bulgarians’ unilateral declaration of 
autocephaly in 1872. What made this episode so contentious was that the 
Bulgarian Church claimed administration over all ethnic Bulgarians, wherever 
they were – and this included territory administered by the Patriarch of 
Constantinople. Thus, a transnational, ethnic jurisdiction was proposed which 
was not territorial as such and not even national in the sense of that having 
borders contiguous with those of any existing state. The 1872 Synod 
condemned this as ‘an event without precedent’ in Church history.20 In reality, 
inter-ethnic strife had been the plague of Eastern Christianity from the time of 
the first universal councils. The earliest splits in the Church were ostensibly 
dogmatic, but essentially communities divided along ethnic lines. This problem 
is still unresolved to the present, and in fact has only grown, to the extent that, 
Fr Alexander Schmemann spoke of a gradual ‘disintegration of universal 
consciousness’ within Orthodoxy and its replacement instead by ‘national 
consciousness’.21 
These tendencies of the Russian Church prompted the Greek-Catholic 
academic Fr Jarolav Buciora to write, ‘One of the more unusual concepts of 
 
19 Cf. Getcha, Fr J., ‘Can One Justify the Notion of a ‘National Church’ from an Orthodox Point of View?’ 
Sourozh, Issue 83, 05.01 
20 Payne, D.P., ‘Nationalism and the Local Church: The Source of Ecclesiastical Conflict in the Orthodox 
Commonwealth’, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 35, No. 5 (Nov. 2007) and Getcha, Fr J., ibid.  
21 Meerson, M., ‘The Orthodox Church in America’ in Ramet, P., Eastern Christianity and Politics (Durham, 
North Carolina, 1988), p.116 
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pan‐Slavism is put forward by Bishop Hilarion Alfeyev. He describes the 
Moscow Patriarchate as “trans‐national”, and this term has become an 
international slogan under which (it is claimed) the Moscow Patriarchate is 
attempting to create a new concept of transnational political influence in the 
context of its ecclesiological realm’.22 Bishop Innokenty, soon before he took 
over the interim administration of the Sourozh diocese following Bishop Basil’s 
departure, wrote an article in journal Sourozh Journal that was critical of the 
position of Buciora above. He related examples in which the ROC had 
embraced enculturation and concluded, ‘Thus one cannot say that the Russian 
Church ignores the birth of local Orthodoxy and is characterised, as one can 
hear from time to time, by a new ecclesiology founded on national and ethnic 
principles’.23 Nevertheless, transnational ecclesiology is often celebrated by 
Moscow, rather than being denied. Olga Tserpitskaia stated in her study of 
Russian foreign missions stated, ‘Having also acquired the numerous Orthodox 
diaspora in the Far Abroad, the Russian Church herself became truly 
transnational. As a consequence, on the international stage she pursues not 
only her own interests, but she also represents her interests to those states 
who enter into her canonical territory in those areas allowed by the Church 
statutes’.24 A visual representation of this policy can be seen in the 2013 film 
The Second Baptism of Rus,25 presented by Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev. The 
film narrates the story of the rebirth of the Russian Church at the end of the 
Soviet period and into the twenty-first century. It contains a long and famous 
interview with Vladimir Putin and concludes with a view of the globe with rays 
 
22 Buciora, J., ‘The Canonical Territory of the Moscow Patriarchate’. http://www.orthodox-christian-
comment.co.uk/canonical_territory_of_the_moscow_patriarchate.htm [Accessed 20.01.20]  
23 Innokenty of Korsun, Bishop, ‘The Unification of the Russian Orthodox Church in Western Europe’, Sourozh 
Journal, Issue 102, 11.05 
24 Tserpitskaia, O., ‘Missii i predstavitel’stva v sisteme zarubezhnikh uchrezhdenii RPTs’, Nauchno-analiticheskii 
Zhurnal Obozrevatel’, Vypusk 4, St Petersburg, 2011, p.42 (author trans.). Author’s emphasis.  
25 http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=1107643 [Accessed 01.05.20]  
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of light coming first from Moscow, then from the Slavic world and finally from 
parishes and dioceses of Moscow spreading out over the whole earth. In some 
respects, the scene is not dissimilar to depictions of the spread of world 
revolution over the globe from Moscow via the Communist International. Such 
a Russocentric position was at odds with those on the ground in Sourozh, who 
wanted to loosen the ethnic connection to Russia and instead to promote an 
indigenous Orthodoxy.26  
The position of Moscow’s western parishes was further complicated by 
another development, also regarded as providential. At a time of rapid 
secularisation in the West, the ROC had experienced a surprising rebirth at 
home.27 For neo-Slavophiles, this gave to the Church a world-historical task as 
the ‘keeper’ of the spiritual realm and the ‘witholder’ (katehon) of the 
apocalypse. The outcome of this position was that it was seen as natural and in 
fact incumbent upon the Russian Church to reach out beyond its geographical 
or canonical borders and to place more emphasis on the Russian Church 
parishes in the West. In 2009, the Patriarch stated, ‘We need to clearly 
understand the uniqueness of the Russian way of life and to reproduce it not 
only in those countries with a dominant Russian culture, but to bear witness to 
it far beyond their borders, especially in the conditions of the spiritual and 
moral crisis of contemporary human civilisation’.28 While other churches in the 
West existed ‘under an information blockade, under a very hard diktat from 
 
26 OCAD. Statements of Sourozh Parishioners. K. Greenhead 
27 Much has been written both for and against the rebirth of the ROC after the collapse of communism. Even 
accepting the low figures for actual regular church attendance, the statistics remain surprising, especially those 
relating to the number of Russian monasteries which increased from just twenty in 1988 to 972 at the end of 
2019. In 1988, there were 8,500 parishes, and at the end of 2019 over 40,000. This at a time when 
monasticism in the West is rapidly disappearing. https://sinfo-mp.ru/statisticheskaya-informaciya [Accessed 
12.01.20]  




secular society’,29 to use the words of Metropolitan Hilarion, the Russian 
Church, it was argued, was under no such pressure. Thus, parishes abroad 
received relatively high levels of funding from the Mother Church and Russian 
State for renovation and cultural centres. But the aim, it seems, was not so 
much to attract new western converts (at least in the first instance) as to 
maintain the resilience and Orthodoxy of the diaspora in a hostile 
environment, while at the same time also acting as ‘beacons’ of Russia’s new 
ideological struggle against the West.30 
This position resulted in some success for the Russian Church, with new 
networks being forged with traditionalists and conservatives in the West. The 
World Congress of Families chief Larry Jacobs went as far as to state that, 
‘Russia is the hope for the world right now’.31 The idea was that Russian 
parishes would promote a positive view of Russia to all those opponents of 
liberalism and secularism, who were invited, in Professor Blitt’s words, to ‘join 
us’.32 Parishes such as Sourozh were to become Russia’s new ‘windows in the 
West’.33 In 2009, the third Russian Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad was 
dedicated to the question of the consolidation of the diaspora. In his keynote 
speech, Patriarch Kirill stated that the Church’s western parishes were ‘little 
 
29 Hilarion, A.,Metropolitan., Tserkov i Mir (Moscow, 2014) author trans 
30 Cf. Vasilenko, K., ‘Vozvrashchenie Tret’ego Rima’, Vremia Novostii, No. 229, 14.12.01  
http://www.vremya.ru/2001/229/4/17563.html [Accessed 02.04.20]  
31 Stroop, C., ‘A Right-Wing International? Russian Social Conservatism, the World Congress of Families, and 
the Global Culture Wars in Historical Context’, 16.02.16. https://www.politicalresearch.org   
32 Cf. Blitt, Professor C., ‘Russia’s “Orthodox” Foreign Policy’, op. cit., p 431.Cf. also, from The Journal of the 
MP, cited in Petrenko, V., ‘The Development of the Concept of Authority’ op.cit., p. 205: ‘Moscow is a beacon, 
a beacon not only for us Orthodox, but also for those seeking true, unclouded civil, national and religious 
freedom. Moscow is a beacon for all of toiling humanity, for all who seek religious and social truth.’ Cf. also 
Verkhovsky, A., ‘“Kirill’s Doctrine” and the Potential Transformation of Russian Orthodox Christianity’ in 
Tolstaya, K. (ed.) Orthodox Parodoxes (Leiden, 2014), p.75. ‘It must be noted that this is a very broad target 
group. It can include people who consider themselves neither Russian nor Orthodox, but who share wholly or 
in part, the ideas of Russia’s greatness as a nation, the key role of the Church in its history, the ‘’clash of 
civilisations’’ in the modern world, the evils of ‘’liberal’’ innovations, and the values of tradition etc.’  
33 Cf. Poloskova, T., ‘Iskushenie “Diasporal’noi” Polemikoi’, Zagranitsa, 28.02.11. 
http://world.lib.ru/k/kim_german_nikolaewich/2016.shtml [Accessed 25.05.20]   
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islands of historic Rus abroad’ and ‘the natural concentration of spiritual and 
cultural life of our compatriots’.34 The island metaphor was mentioned both at 
the highest level and by parishioners in Sourozh, with an anti-Moscow 
participant writing of the ‘Russian party’ as ‘people, who, living continually or 
for the most part in London, all the same feel a living connection to Russia (or 
with Russian Church life), and they desire that Sourozh, whilst retaining a 
minimal level of its own character, is nevertheless an island of “Russianness” 
and of “Russian Church life” in England’.35 It should be noted that island 
imagery has a long history in Russian folklore that is intimately connected to 
Orthodoxy and Russia’s liminal landscape of forests and lakes. From the 
mystical island of Kitezh to the fortified island monasteries of the Russian 
north, the concept of the island as an ark or bastion of the sacred in a hostile 
environment has deep cultural reverberations. Whether conscious or not, the 
repeated use of island imagery to denote foreign parishes connected with this 
narrative. 
The idea of a kind of union of resistance or new Holy Alliance to combat 
western liberal humanism affected inter-Church dialogue just as it affected 
inter-state relations.36 As with the Holy Alliance of Tsar Alexander, the new 
imperative under Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev and the DECR was controversial 
 
34 Kirill., Patriarch, ‘Vystuplenie Sviateishego Patriarkha Moskkovskogo i vseia Rusi Kirill na Vse mirnom 
kongresse sootchestvenikov’, 01.12.09 (author trans.). http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/955171.html 
[Accessed 29.12.18]. Cf. also Tserpitskaia, O., Missii i predstavitel’stva v sisteme zarubezhnikh uchrezhdenii 
RPTs, op. cit. ‘The diaspora, for instance, in certain cases can be an influence on the political life of the country 
of arrival and facilitate the creation of a certain image of their country in the eyes of the local population, 
which is why the Russian authorities today pay so much attention to the support of the diaspora.’ (author 
trans.) Also, Kirill, Patriarkh, Zhizn’ i mirosozertsanie (Moscow, 2009), p.187 and Alfeev, Mitropolit I., Tserkov’ 
otkryta dlia kazhdogo (Minsk, 2011), p.32 
35 Kobelev, V., ‘Kto stoit za statei dvukh surozhlian?: russkaia partia v Surozhskoi eparkhii’, 30.01.04 (author 
trans.). https://credo.press/36695/ [Accessed 25.05.20]     
36 Alfeev, Metropolitan H., ‘Mitropolit Ilarion otvetil na voprosy saita “Pomniu Rossiu”’, 12.02.12. 
https://mospat.ru/ru/2012/02/17/news58335/ ‘We are looking for traditional allies ... to promote Christian 
values in the world.’ Cf. also, Curanovic, A., ‘The Religious Diplomacy of the Russian Federation’, Report IFRI 




for some in the Russian Church who saw him (paradoxically from the 
perspective of liberals, who saw him as a hardliner) as a liberal ecumenist. In 
particular, Metropolitan Hilarion reached out to the Catholic Church in its 
embattled state in western Europe and the US.37 He emphasised both 
churches’ common ground in defending Christian heritage and morality, 
stating ‘the collaboration between Catholics and Orthodox acquires a special 
meaning in the business of defending Christian morals. We do not have 
Eucharistic communion, we are divided by dogmatic questions, we have a 
different ecclesiology, but we have the same views on all the general moral 
questions’.38  
All of this was conducted in the language of the geopolitical ‘clash of 
civilisations’ which became ever more the lingua franca of the times. Kravchuk 
and Bremer noted the often-unsung influence of Huntingdon’s article in Russia, 
stating that it was the Church that developed this paradigm in the media.39 At a 
dinner at the Anglican Nikean club in London in 2010, Metropolitan Hilarion 
stated: ‘All current versions of Christianity can be very conditionally divided 
into two major groups – traditional and liberal. The abyss that exists today 
divides not so much the Orthodox from the Catholics or the Catholics from the 
Protestants as it does the “traditionalists” from the “liberals”.’40 41 In Sourozh, 
 
37 Alfeev, Mitropolit I., Besedy, op. cit. p.144 and pp.312–13 
38 http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3667639.html (author trans.) [Accessed 24.05.20]. Cf. also Alfeev, 
Metropolitan H., Tserkov i Mir (Moscow, 2014), and Alfeev, Metropolitan H., ‘European Christianity and the 
Challenge of Militant Secularism’ Ecumenical Review.57:82, 2005, and Alfeev, I., Tserkov’ otkryta dlia kazhdogo 
(Minsk, 2011), p.12 
39 Cf. Kravchuk, A. & Bremer, T., (Eds.) Churches in the Ukrainian Crisis (London, 2017) 
40 Full text of speech, ‘Metropolitan Hilarion Address to the Annual Nicean Club Dinner’ 09.09.10, 
https://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=9399 [Accessed 16.04.18] 
41 Cf also. Mezhuev, B., ‘Russkii mir prikhodit v Evropu’, Izvestia, 17.04.14  
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liberal anti-Moscow parishioners were pitched against more traditionalist pro-
Moscow ones; it was in so many ways a battle of worldviews.42  
It should also be noted that the clash of civilisations was seen by some 
pro-Moscow analysts of the Sourozh crisis to be a ‘trap’ or a ‘temptation’ set 
by the opposition. Vladimir Mozhegov promoted this idea as he viewed the 
polemical language invoked by the Sourozh crisis as a western attack on 
Russian universalism.43 Anti-Moscow parishioners in Sourozh also rejected the 
‘culture wars’ narrative as far too simplistic, as did anti-Moscow conservatives 
in ROCOR. For both, the idea of Russia’s mission to the West was another piece 
of grandstanding, which also misunderstood the West. Professor Makrides 
described this recent manifestation of Russian thought as ‘a kind of quasi-
messianic, salvation syndrome aimed at helping the West to overcome its 
numerous deadlocks and impasses’.44 He noted that the West today ‘neither 
wants to be saved nor needs such self-declared saviours. It acknowledges its 
own limitation, mistakes, and weaknesses, expresses a strong self-critique and 
is ready to learn from others. Today, we no longer hear only the voice of a 
triumphalistic West, as in previous periods, but also a self-critical awareness of 
enduring problems and challenges lying ahead.’45 Likewise, the Lesna Convent 
in France (which had previously been one of the most revered ROCOR 
institutions in the world, but had left ROCOR after the union) repeatedly 
attacked the idea of a holy war between East and West. They pointed to the 
million people who had marched in France against same-sex marriage as 
 
42 Scorer, D.P., Interview on Radio Free Europe, ‘Teper, kogda Tserkov' osvobodilas', ona dobrovol'no stala 
rabom gosudarstvo’, : https://www.svoboda.org/a/160895.html, ‘So the tension that arises is not between the 
Russians and the English but between different worldviews’     
43 Mozhegov, V., ‘Tri glubyny odnogo raskola’, Agentstvo Politicheskikh Novostei, 19.07.06 
https://www.apn.ru/publications/article10050.htm [Accessed 16.04.18] 
44 Makrides, V.N., ‘“The Barbarian West”: A Form of Orthodox Christian Anti-Western Critique’ in Krawchuk A., 
Bremer, T. (eds.), Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Otherness (London, 2014) 
45 Makrides, ibid.  
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opposed to abortion rates in Russia, which were among the highest in the 
world.46  
Perhaps unfortunately for Sourozh, the anti-Huntingdon narrative (if 
such it can be called) was in the minority because both the western and 
Russian media preferred to concentrate on Russia’s ‘cultural conservatism’ 
versus the West’s ‘egalitarianism’.47 It is indeed true that so divisive have been 
the culture wars taking place across the world over the last twenty-five years 
that even some of Russia’s traditional enemies have started to align with her, 
at least in some cultural spheres, as societies have become polarised at all 
levels.48 On his visit to Poland in 2012, the Patriarch again spoke about a ‘union 
of all traditional religious cultures’ and how Poland and Russia face the same 
onslaught against their similar moral and religious positions.49 Such statements 
have drawn support for Russia from the right in Church and state in Poland, 
Hungary, Austria, Italy and elsewhere. At the same time, as Alicja Curanovic 
has noted, the statements from the Moscow Patriarchate have gradually 
moved from a traditional East versus West paradigm to the battle between 
‘globalized transnational secular elites and societies attached to traditional 
values all over the world … it is no longer the West vs. the non-West, but 
secular liberals vs. adherents of traditional values. The dividing line thus cuts 
through civilizations and adds an anti-establishment dimension to Russia’s 
 
46 Lesna Convent, ‘Sovremenye Rossia, Ukraina i Zapad: dukhovnyi smysl segodniashnikh konfliktov’. 
http://www.monasterelesna.org/dokumenty-i-stati/teksty-i-stati/sovremennye-rossija-ukraina-i-zapad/ 
[Accessed 16.04.18]  
47 Cf. Rar, A., Rossia-Zapad: kto kogo?, Glava XI: konflikt tsennostei (Moscow, 2016), p.267ff 
48 Cf. Petro, N., Russia's Orthodox Soft Power, Carnegie Council, 23.03.15 
49 Both Poland and Hungary have been under pressure from the European Parliament because of their 
positions on LGBT and immigration. Cf. News, European Parliament, ‘ Parliament strongly condemns ‘‘LGBTI-
free zones’’ in Poland’, 18.12.19, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-
room/20191212IPR68923/parliament-strongly-condemns-lgbti-free-zones-in-poland [Accessed 20.05.20]  
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moral leadership’.50 For Curanovic, such a position was consciously not a 
national-ethnic one.  
After the ending of Bishop Innokenty’s temporary administration in 
November 2006, Archbishop Elisey was confirmed as the new Archbishop of 
Sourozh. He spoke at a conference on globalisation in London in 2013 and 
strongly critiqued its utopianism and secularist morality, naming the familiar 
touchstones of LGBT and bioethics.51 The conference was an opportunity to 
showcase Russia’s resistance to the globalist narrative in the heart of a western 
capital. As one cannot envisage either Bishop Basil or Metropolitan Anthony 
delivering such an address, it was a concrete example of the soft-power 
leverage of the ROC abroad and the success of Moscow’s policy. The culture 
wars meant that transnational locations of all kinds became involved in the 
new ideological struggle. Western embassies in Russia flew the rainbow flag of 
the LGBT movement, while ROC parishes in the West presented a united 
display of traditional values.  
Andrei Tsygankov has distinguished between two of the West’s ‘phobias’ 
about Russia: fear of geographical expansionism and of the threat posed by 
Russia to western values. It is interesting to consider why the West has 
become so fixated on an economically and demographically weak Russia. 
Perhaps some of the reason lies in the ideological threat that Russia seeks to 
promote, and which the West anxiously views as a potentially destabilising 
force.52 That Russia poses a geographically expansionist threat to Europe at the 
 
50 Curanovic, A., Russia’s Mission in the World, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 66, Issue 4 (2019), p.6  
51 Zapesotsky, A., ‘Ethnos. Norms and Values in the Era of Globalisation’, Rossotrudnichestvo, London, 
14.10.13. https://www.rusemb.org.uk/opinion/27 [Accessed 24.05.20] 
52 Tsygankov, A., ‘Nauchnye Shkoly: Psikhologicheskoe vospriatie velikikh derzhav v mire. Istoki rusofobii. 
Interviu s professorum mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii I politicheskikh nauk universiteta Can Frantsisko 




present time seems unlikely. On the other hand, a huge spotlight is turned by 
the West’s media and governments on Russia’s position re: traditional values, 
LGBT rights and so on. In doing so, the western media paradoxically also draws 
attention to Russia’s role in the global culture wars that the Russian Church 
and State wish to promote.53  
 
Universalism and Exceptionalism  
The new concept of the Russian World had both universalist and exceptionalist 
aspects, with long antecedents in Slavophile thought. The two tendencies had 
a symbiotic and non-exclusive relationship.54 The anti-Moscow group in 
Sourozh emphasised the nationalist and xenophobic ideology of Moscow, 
claiming that talk of universalism was a fig-leaf for Russification. Supporters of 
Moscow claimed that such an assessment was based on an incorrect and 
western understanding of Russian nationalism. They looked back into Russia’s 
multi-ethnic and imperial past to distinguish Russia’s universalism from the 
nationalisms of modern Europe.  
 In Britain, in particular, a small number of highly educated literary and 
religious Russophiles had adhered in whole or in part to the idea of Russia’s 
universal mission. This was important for the development of Russian 
Orthodoxy in Britain, and of the Sourozh Diocese itself. Of the several 
outstanding personalities who were drawn to Russia and her Church in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, two names especially stand out: 
William Palmer (1811–1879) and William John Birkbeck (1859–1916). Both 
 
53 Cf. also Mezhuev, B., ‘Russkiy mir prikhodit v Evropu’, Izvestia, 17.04.14. https://iz.ru/news/569452  
54 Dmitry Likhachev noted this ambivalent nature of Russian universalism: ‘How paradoxical it is that such 
bright universalism can give rise to dark shadows …’. Likhachev. D., Izbrannie trudy po russkoi I mirovoi kul’ture 
(St Petersburg, 2015), p.57ff 
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men became fluent in Russian and Slavonic, translating many liturgical and 
historical texts. Palmer’s six-volume history of the Nikonian schism is still the 
most comprehensive history on the subject in English to this day.55 Birkbeck’s 
Russophilia has been labelled ‘a virtual obsession’ by one author, painting as 
he did a bucolic picture of devout Russian peasants on the eve of the 
Revolution.56 Birkbeck was a firm believer in Russia’s (or rather the Russian 
people’s) universal spiritual destiny and in the renewal of world Christianity. 
Other such fellow-travellers included the writer Maurice Baring (1874–1945), 
who expounded on some of the truisms of Russian messianism in his book The 
Russian People (1911), writing at length about ‘the Russian soul’ and describing 
expounding on the centrality of Orthodoxy in the lives of the common people. 
The traveller and spiritual seeker Stephen Graham (1884–1975) also fell under 
the spell of the ideal of Russia as an agrarian counterweight to modernity.57 
While a liberal-leaning, literary-philosophical Orthodoxy was inspired 
under the auspices of the SS Alban and Sergius Society of the Zernovs in 
Oxford, Russophiles such as Fr Nicholas Gibbes, tutor to the last Tsarevich and 
a devoted supporter of the monarchy, had a more conservative emphasis. 
These differing strands of Russophilia can be traced in Britain right up to and 
through the Surozh crisis and were both important in the formation of the 
Sourozh ethos. Fr Nicholas Gibbes especially seemed able to combine a 
conservative Orthodoxy with a non-ethnic and missionary outlook. He 
envisaged his Oxford Orthodox society as one that would attract people 
‘regardless of racial origin or nationality’ and thus carry Orthodoxy ‘to the chief 
intellectual and cultural centre of the British Empire [Oxford]’.58 More recently, 
 
55 Palmer, W., The Patriarch and the Tsar, Vols. I–VI (London, 1871–6) 
56 Hughes, M., ‘The English Slavophile: W. J. Birkbeck and Russia’, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 
82, No. 3 (July 2004), pp.680–706 
57 Hughes, M., Beyond Holy Russia: The Life and Times of Stephen Graham (London, 2014) 
58 Private Papers of Nicholas Gibbes, Bodleian Library. Letter to Prof de Smitt, 04.07.49 
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characters as diverse as the art critic John Innes Stuart (1940–2003) and Father 
Andrew Phillips (1956–) were to fall in love with Russia while still at school, 
learn the language and join the Russian Orthodox Church. John Innes Stuart 
was a flamboyant biker who wrote books on punk rock and was a parishioner 
at Sourozh, while Father Andrew was an ROCOR priest who wrote critically of 
the diocese.59 The diverse mix of British converts and Slavophiles was one of 
the unique qualities of Russian Orthodoxy in Britain, and especially of the 
Sourozh Diocese.  
 The concept of Russian universalism was also important to ethnic 
Russians in Sourozh. Some located it in Russia’s multi-ethnic imperial and 
Soviet past, with a parishioner stating, ‘In the course of these years I saw that 
the Russians were not opposed to the arrival of the English, but even on the 
contrary, that they were a bit kinder and more patient to the English. Russians 
are used to living amongst people of different nationalities and over the last 85 
years in Russia, children from their schooldays have been inspired about the 
brotherhood of all peoples’.60 Along with the multi-ethnic concept of Russia 
came an expansive definition of ‘Russianness’ itself, promoted by Church and 
State alike after 1991. In the Putin years, the emphasis on universalism 
increased, and as early as 2001 he stated, ‘The concept of the Russian World 
long ago ceased to be constricted by the geographical borders of Russia and 
even by Russian ethnicity’.61 Putin was concerned about the post-Soviet 
 
59 ‘John Innes Stuart 1940-2003’, http://russianartconsultancy.com/John_Innes.html and ‘Biography’, 
http://orthodoxengland.org.uk/biog.htm [Accessed 16.01.18] 
60 Khronika Surozhskoi Smuty, op. cit. ‘Nik O. Moi lichnyi opit’  
61 Putin, V., ‘Vystuplenie na otkrytii Kongressa sootechestvennikov’, 11.10.01 (author trans.). 
 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21359 [Accessed 16.01.18]  
Cf. Fokina, A.V., ‘K voprosu o russkom mire’ op. cit. and Batanova, O.N. Russkyi Mir i problemy ego 
formirovania. R.A.G.S. (Moskva 2009): ‘The Russian World … is a global cultural-civilisational phenomenon in 
which Russia plays the role of the Mother-state for the Russian emigration, uniting people who, in spite of 
their nationality, consider themselves Russians, as the carriers of Russian culture and language, with a spiritual 
connection to Russia and are not indifferent to her dealings and her fate.’ (author trans.) Also, Nazarova, G.F. 
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independence movements that had been constantly bubbling up during the 
nineties as regions sought autonomy and even independence. When he said 
that the Russian World was not constricted by Russia’s geographical borders, 
he was probably talking about the near abroad, but for the Church, this 
concept really did mean the whole world.62 Thus, parishes in the far abroad, 
such as Sourozh, became the focus of a new universalist aspiration for the 
Church.  
In 2004, the then Metropolitan Kirill of the DECR gave an address at the 
8th World Russian People’s Congress. The theme of the event was ‘Russia and 
the Orthodox World’. Metropolitan Kirill covered most of the major themes of 
neo-Slavophile thought, mentioning by name many of the early and the 
diaspora Slavophiles – I. Kireevsky, A. Khomiakov, V. Solovev, N. Danilevskii, 
Leontiev, Fr Sergei Bulgakov, S. Frank, Florensky and Berdiaev – and laying 
emphasis on Russia’s non-ethnic, even multi-faith world mission:  
But for Russia, for the Russian world, this is not an ethnic concept. The 
Russian World includes within it all peoples, those who belong to other 
religions but who share the same values in their social life together with 
the Russian people. It was precisely Russia, who aware of herself as 
Orthodox was yet able to support different cultures in unity. For 
centuries Russia developed the mechanism of co-existence of different 
 
and Fokina, A.V., ‘Russkii mir: obnovlenie podkhodov k konseptsii. Uchenye zapiski’,  Orlovskogo Gos Uni, No. 6 
(69) (2015) 
62 Igor Zevelev noted that, while the focus on a kind of ‘limitless and “universal” Russia’ was useful when 
emerging from the Soviet Empire, these attempts ‘have been in constant conflict with particular aspirations of 
neighbouring peoples who largely did not want to become “universal”, seeing Russification behind such 
universalism and seeing it as a threat to their existence’. Zevelev, I., ‘Russian National Identity and Foreign 




cultures and religions who accepted one system of social values whilst 
preserving their religious identity.63  
This Russian universalism became the driver for what might be called the 
global mission of the Russian Church, compelling the Church’s renewed 
interest in, and consolidation of, the diaspora parishes. The Patriarch referred 
to a ‘blossoming chain of foreign parishes and foundations’, noting that not 
only were the Soviets not interested in contact with their émigrés but even 
supressed these contacts.64  
Only the Russian Church, it was argued, with her multi-ethnic parishes 
throughout the world, could overcome the abiding ethnicity problem of 
Orthodoxy. But were these emotional declamations about universalism and 
the brotherhood of peoples simply a cover for an exceptionalist Russian 
sonderweg? For an anti-Moscow think-tank such as the Cicero Foundation, the 
idea of a global mission for the Russian Church was not a benevolent, but a 
cynical Erastian project: ‘The goal of the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate 
is much more ambitious: it is about founding a truly global church under the 
aegis of Moscow – where Moscow means both the Kremlin and the 
patriarchate’.65 Moreover, we have seen in chapters 3 and 4, intense 
controversy surrounded Moscow’s policy of consolidation of the diaspora – as 
seen in the reaction to the move to Russian as the lingua franca in the London 
cathedral. Russia’s soft-power networks have focused on the promotion of 
Russian as a global language. New diaspora organisations, such as Russkiy Mir 
 
63 Kirill, Mitropolit, ‘Doklad mitropolita Smolenskogo i Kaliningradskogo Kirilla na VIII VRNS’, 03-15.02.04, 
https://vrns.ru/documents/61/1222 [Accessed 29.12.18] (author trans). Cf. also, Kirill, Patriarkh, Zhizn’ i 
mirosozertsanie (Moscow, 2009), pp.187–8: ‘Russian culture it is not a religious conception. Within it are 
Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and other confessions … It is essentially the aggregate of certain values and historical 
experiences, which inform the personal and everyday life of a people, who include themselves within it.’  
64 Kirill, Patriarkh, Zhizn’ i mirosozertsanie (Moscow, 2009), p.394 
65 van Herpen, M., Putin's Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy,(London, 2016), p.157 
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and Rossotrudnichestvo, emphasised the importance of Russian, and the 
Church also had a role to play.66 This was a wise and necessary initiative by 
those seeking to preserve the Russian World in whatever sense. All the major 
languages of the world are engaged in similar battles against the global 
hegemony of English.67 The ROC with its expanse of diaspora parishes provided 
a ready-made Russophone network in the far abroad.68 Many such parishes, 
including Sourozh, started to run Russian-language courses, along with courses 
on Russian culture and history.  
Alexander Verkhovsky has pointed out that the Church’s interpretation 
of the Russian World represented a far softer and more inclusive nationalism 
than pure Russian ethnic nationalism: ‘what we have here is an extremely 
inclusive model of ethno-cultural nationalism; Russian culture is defined as 
involvement in Orthodox Christianity. This is probably the most inclusive 
existing model of Russian nationalism’.69 Indeed, proponents of the new 
Russian World, from Patriarch Kirill to the intellectuals of the Izborskii Club, 
have been at pains to distinguish their doctrines from those of the narrower 
European nationalisms that emerged following the Napoleonic period.70 In this, 
they agree with some Western historians such as Geoffrey Hoskings who 
paradoxically regarded the weakness of a Russian nationalism of the European 
model as being the cause of Russia’s burdensome post-imperial malaise.71 
Some Sourozh commentators might have referred to Moscow’s policies as 
 
66 Saunders, R.A., ‘The Geopolitics of Russophonia: The Problems and Prospects of Post-Soviet “Global 
Russian”’, Globality Studies 40 (14.07.14) 
67 Cf. Phillipson, R., ‘The lingua nullius of global hegemony’ in The politics of multilingualism: linguistic 
governance, globalisation and Europeanisation (Geneva, 2014) 
68 Gorham, M., ‘Virtual Rusophonia: Language Policy as “Soft Power” in the New Media Age’, Digital Icons: 
Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media, No. 5 (2011), pp.23–48   
69 Verkhovsky, A., ‘“Kirill’s Doctrine” and the Potential Transformation of Russian Orthodox Christianity’ in 
Tolstaya., K. Orthodox Parodoxes op.cit., p.73 
70 Cf. also Ilyin, I., Belaia ideia (1926). For Ilyin, true ‘nationalism’ was a religious sentiment not a secular one. It 
was not about a people, or even land.    
71 Cf. Hosking, G. Russia: People and Empire: 1552–1917 (London, 1998) Introduction, pp.xix.ff.  
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xenophobic and even antisemitic, but Russian ‘fascism’ along European lines 
(racialist and anti-Christian) is a relatively new phenomenon.72 Anastasia 
Mitrofana’s study of fringe Orthodox far-right movements noted the demotion 
of ‘universalism’ as a leitmotif for these groups: ‘This loss of Orthodox 
universalism naturally leads to the rejection of the traditional idea of Russia’s 
universal mission to save the whole of humankind. Many extreme Orthodox 
fundamentalists have openly converted to the nationalist position, abandoning 
the idea of Russia as the Third Rome that preoccupied Russian Orthodox 
political thought of the last four centuries. Denying the Third Rome concept 
appears to be a significant step for fundamentalists’.73 As a result, figures 
considered by the West to be extreme nationalists and even fascists have 
rejected ethnic Russian nationalism. Metropolitan Ioann Snychev of St 
Petersburg, a pivotal figure of the neo-Slavophile right, stated that the Russian 
World ‘includes anyone who recognizes that to take part in serving the Russian 
people has a divinely established aspect to it, anyone who identifies himself 
with the Russian people in the spirit, goal and meaning of their existence, 
regardless of their national origins.’74  
Likewise, John D. Basil noted the impact on the ROC of parishes such 
Sourozh, situated in the far abroad. Such movements signified the 
transformation of canonical territory into ecclesiological space, guiding the 
 
72 OCAD. Documents from the OCL Archive. Fr John Marks. Suggestions from Presbyters for the More Efficient 
Working of the Sourozh Diocese, 08.12.02 
73 Mitrofanova, A., Politicisation of Russian Orthodoxy, (Stuttgart, 2005) p 74. This tension exists not just in 
Orthodoxy but is also very strong in many countries such as France, where the Catholic Front National and 
L’Action Francaise is scorned by New-Right intellectuals like De Benoist. Marlene Laruelle has noted that ‘Dugin 
never concealed his disdain for the monarchist nostalgia and politicized Orthodoxy embodied by Rodina 
leaders such as Rogozin and Narochnitskaya’. Lauruelle, M. ‘Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the 
European Radical Right?’, Occasional Paper 294, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 28.06.01. 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/OP294.pdf. Cf. also Sudo, J., ‘Russian Nationalist Orthodox 
Theology: A New Trend in the Political Life of Russia’, Political Theology 6.1 (2005), pp. 67–86  
74 Dushenov, K. (ed.), Pastyr’ Dobryi., Venok na mogilu mitropolita Ioanna. Dlia menia zhizn’ – Khristos, i smert’ 
– priobretenie’ (Moscow, 2011) (author trans.) 
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Church away from territory and ethnos and back into a universalist 
imperative.75 The Belarussian priest Fr Alexandr Shramko, writing about the 
Sourozh crisis from abroad, suggested that even the notion of canonical 
territory was starting to collapse under pressure from globalisation. More 
important than physical location for Shramko were ideas of communal space, 
such as on the internet, that brought liberal or conservative groups closer to 
each other.76 He posited that the Orthodoxy of Metropolitan Anthony was 
much closer to many in Russia than the conservative-political Orthodoxy 
available at home.77 Thus, the transnational ecclesiology associated with the 
ethnophyletism discussed earlier was further developed by the technological 
revolution. If such an ecclesiology was not to be constrained by territorial 
borders or ethnicity, then the jurisdictional boundaries were extremely 
flexible. In fact, the ROC has recently started to set up parishes even in lands 
under other Orthodox jurisdictions, such as in Turkey and Africa. These 
decisions have caused some consternation.  
The call to disparate and even non-Christian peoples to find unity in the 
Russian World had been a hallmark of Slavophile thought from the time of 
Dostoevsky, who promoted the idea of the Russian as the ‘universal man’.78 
After 1991, officials in both Church and State started to talk of the peoples of 
the Russian World and to emphasise its inherent diversity. The expansive 
definition of Russianness also allowed the Church to protect the interests of 
Russians in the diaspora while combatting accusations of ethnic nationalism. 
 
75 Basil, J.D., ‘Problems of Church and State in the Russian Federation, Three Points of View’, Journal of Church 
and State, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2009)  
76 Transnationalism and localism are discussed in the final section of this study  
77 Shramko, A. ‘Tserkov' bez territorii, 09.06.06. http://churchby.info/rus/54  
78 Dostoevsky, F.M., ‘Ob’iasnitel’noe slovo po povodu pechataemoi nizhe rechi o Pushkine’. Dnevnik Pisatelia 
III, 1880. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii 26 (Leningrad 1984), p.129ff. Cf. also Laruelle, M., ‘The “Russian World”: 
Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination’, CGI (May 2015)  
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This was especially important for inter-Orthodox relations. Gradirovsky, one of 
the framers of the Russian World concept in the nineties, had specifically 
deconstructed the notion of ethnic diaspora politics: ‘So, if we accept the 
thesis that the identification of Russia on an ethnic basis is evil, then we must 
recognize that ethnic diaspora politics is a continuation, the realization of this 
evil’.79 But a problem arises: if the definition of the Russian World is so vast, 
what then is it? And how can such an amorphous notion be meaningful? As we 
have analysed in chapter 3, one implication was that non-ethnic Russians could 
‘become Russian’ and that ethnic Russians could ‘lose Russianness’. Taken to 
extremes, the loss of Russianness was viewed as an act of betrayal 
(predatel'stvo), a more loaded term to Russians, perhaps, than it is in the West. 
This implied that although the concept of the Russian World was nebulous, one 
of its defining boundaries was not. The question of betrayal of the Motherland 
surfaced from time to time in the Sourozh crisis and was a latent theme of 
many of the open letters.80 Gradirovsky himself, although he proposed a very 
extensive definition of the Russian World, also singled out those who were 
traitors to it. He laid particular emphasis on those Russians who had become 
westernised, living abroad, who said, ‘Become civilised at last! Become like 
everyone else! Stop being yourself!’81 
The new concept of the Russian World was proposed as non-ethnic and 
even multi-confessional.82 In the political sphere, it posited a multipolar world 
 
79 Gradirovsky, S., ‘Rossia I postsovietskie gosudarstva: iskushenie diasporal’noi politiki’, 06.02.11. 
http://world.lib.ru/k/kim_german_nikolaewich/5002.shtml [Accessed 20.05.20]    
80 E.g. Parishioners of Sourozh. Open Letter, ‘Blagodatnyi Ogon' Gliadia iz Londona’, 01.04.02. 
https://www.blagogon.ru/articles/153/print  [Accessed 20.05.20] and Cirota.ru,’ Otkrytoe pis'mo’, Tema: 
#53307, Soobshchenie: #1995088, 13.04.06, [Accessed 20.05.20] 
81 Gradirovsky, ibid.  
82 The director of the organisation Russkiy Mir stated, ‘When our fund was established, a lot of people asked - 
why russkiy and not rossiskiy? How to define Russianness? Genes, passport, belief? Obviously, the Russian 
World is not confined by the borders of the Russian state – this concept is not geographical, religious or 
ethnic.’ Nikonov, V., ‘Filosofy, politologi I antropologi ishchut sposoby ob'edineniua Russkogo mira’, 19.03.10. 
http://fedpress.ru/28/polit/society/id_176409.html [Accessed 20.05.20] 
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order in place of presumed Western cultural and economic hegemony.83 
Multipolarity had a long history as a political concept in Russia, being perhaps 
particularly suited to sprawling land empires with multiple ethnicities.84 Any 
multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state must have recourse to a supra-
national mission (in however broad terms) in order to build a cohesive 
society.85 The new Russian World was distinctly neo-traditionalist, anti-
globalist and promoted Russia as the central locus of that multipolar 
resistance. But it was not so universalist as to accede benignly to the loss of an 
important western diocese such as Sourozh to Constantinople and the sphere 
of western influence. Nor were pro-Moscow individuals so universalist as to 
welcome the perceived western liberal values of Bishop Basil and his 
supporters.  
For anti-Moscow parishioners and analysts, the universalist concept of 
the Russian World was a cover for a baser Russian ethnic nationalism. This 
accusation also had deep roots in the history of Slavophile thought. Dostoevsky 
may have emphasised an expansive idea of Russian culture, but he was also 
prone to bouts of extreme anti-westernism and xenophobic nationalism, as 
noted by Soloviev and others.86 A key concept in this regard was the promotion 
of Russia as the ‘New Israel’, a messianic theory almost as old as that of the 
 
83 Cf. Mezhuev, B., ‘Amerikanskii fundamentalizm i russkaia konservativnaia revoliutsia’, Logos 1 (36), 2003. 
Also, Silvius, R., ‘The Russian State, Eurasianism, and Civilisations in the Contemporary Global Political 
Economy’, Journal of Global Faultlines, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (April 2014), pp. 44–69. Also Chebankova, E., 
‘Contemporary Russian conservatism’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 32:1 (2016), pp. 28-54. Also, Papkova, I. and 
Gorenbur, D. ‘The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian Politics’, Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 49, No. 1, 
(Jan.–Feb.) 2011, pp. 3–7 
84 Cf. Chebankova, E. ‘Russia’s Multipolar World Order’, Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 33, Issue 3 (2017) 
85 Cf. Tsygankov, A., ‘Finding a Civilisational Idea: “West”, “Eurasia”, and “Euro-East” in Russia's Foreign Policy’, 
Geopolitics, 12 (2007), pp.375-399. Cf. also Nikolayevna, O., ‘Russkiy mir i problemy yego formirovaniya’, 
Ros. akad. gos. sluzhby pri Prezidente RF (Moscow, 2009)   
86 Cf. Soloviev, V.S., ‘Russkii natsional'nii ideal’, Novosti i Birzhevaia gazeta, Nos. 23, 26 (Jan 1891), and 
Natsional’nyi vopros v Rossii (1891), Gl. Idoly i idealy. In Soloviev’s time, the Russian Church was divided over 
the question of nationalism, which was still a relatively new ideology with connotations of revolution, making 
it suspicious to many conservatives in the Church. Cf. Ivanov., A and Chamakin, A.,  ‘Pravoslanoe dukhovenstvo 
i russkii natsionalizm v nachale XXv’, Voprosy Istorii 9 (2018), pp.153–66 
283 
 
Third Rome. In 1888, in a speech on the 900-year anniversary of the baptism of 
Rus, Archbishop Nikanor proclaimed, ‘Who is this new Israel in our days? 
Between the many other heterodox peoples, it is the Orthodox Christian 
Russian people. We are the new Israel! We are the chosen people. We are the 
seed of God on earth!’.87 Moving quickly on from this statement of ethnic 
nationalism, he continued, ‘What is more, warm sympathy is conveyed to us 
from other countries by fellow Orthodox, by members of our race living 
beyond the boundaries of the fatherland, and even by countries that are not 
connected to us by the confessional faith’.88 Although this emphasis on Russia 
as the New Israel was a hallmark of Russian Orthodox nationalists leading up to 
the Revolution, it became less prevalent afterwards.89 Perhaps this was 
because of its innate ethnic connotations. But some academics, such as 
Jennifer Wasmuth, still place importance on the analogy and do not see a 
contradiction: ‘Furthermore, the ROC necessarily stresses its universal and 
supranational structure because it is truly a multinational church. Its members 
include Karelians, Komi, Mordovians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Chuvash, 
Yakuts, Armenians, Tatars and Buryats … In practical terms the idea of Russia 
as the “New Israel” has been far more important than the idea of Moscow as 
the “Third Rome”.’90  
A final messianic concept that was gathering adherents in the ROC at the 
time of the Sourozh crisis was the idea of Russia as the ‘witholder’ (katehon) of 
the apocalypse.91 This was an anti-universalist and divisive concept that 
 
87 Brovkovich, Arkhiepiskop N., Besedy i poucheniia (Odessa, 1884) Available at: 
https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Nikanor_Brovkovich/besedy-i-pouchenija/#0_2 [Accessed 12.04.20]  
88 Ibid.  
89 On Russia as the New Israel, cf. also Shevzov, V., op. cit., p.67 
90 Wasmuth, J., ‘Russian Orthodoxy between State and Nation’ in Krawchuk, A., and Bremer, T. (eds.), Eastern 
Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Otherness Values, Self-Reflection (London, 2014), p.20 
91 The concept of the katehon (“the one who restrains”) is developed from 2 Thessalonians 2:6–7. Shnirel’man, 
V., ‘Antikhrist, katekhon i russkaia revoliutsia’, Gosudarsvo, Religia, Tserkov’, Nos. 1–2 (37) (2019). Also 
Engstrom, M., ‘Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy’, Contemporary Security 
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borrowed much from the conservative German theorist Carl Schmitt, positing 
‘us’ against ‘them’.92 It was more prevalent at the fringes of Church, but its 
basic tenets were present in a more subdued way in all areas of Church 
discourse. It was is interesting how statements of Romantic Orthodox 
universalism made during the Sourozh crisis could suddenly move to 
combative and polarised language, sometimes within the same 
communication.93 Such schizophrenic utterances were entwined with the neo-
Slavophile view of Russia as essentially antinomic. Lurching from katehonic 
eschatology to eirenic universalism. Neo-Slavophile philosophers promoted 
contradiction and antimony as intrinsic characteristics of existence and the 
desire for ‘resolution’ an impossible human malady, doomed to failure.  The 
philosopher V. N Makrides thus describes the attitude of the East in general, 
‘The abolition of all contradictions is considered by them [Neo Orthodox 
philosophers such as Christos Yannaras] to be a Western neurosis, which has 
led to an uncritical social optimism, to the creation of ‘great mythologies’ and 
finally to their tragic fall. On the contrary, the Orthodox East has always been 
more moderate and from the very beginning recognised the inherent 
contradictions in all things and situations’94. Pavel Florensky, who in his 
magnum opus, The Pillar and the Ground of Truth wrestled with the antimonies 
and paradoxes of the theodicy, not in order to impose a false resolution on 
them, but in order to show that ultimate truth is essentially antinomic, a 
 
Policy (2014), pp.356–79. The concept of Russia as ‘the world's “shield” against the apocalyptic forces of 
chaos.’ There is also the Church’s notion of “Atomic Orthodoxy” in which Russia's development as a nuclear 
power is providential and holy (the A bomb was created at Sarov). Cf. Neigebauer, Z., ‘Korni rossiskogo 
“atomnogo pravoslavia”: geopolitika i novyi irratsionalizm’, Diskurs (Aug 2019) 
92 Cf. Kurylo, B., ‘Russia and Carl Schmitt: The Hybridity of Resistance in the Globalised World’, Palgrave 
Commun 2, 16096 (2016), and Auer, S. ‘Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: The Ukraine Crisis and the Return of 
Geopolitics’, International Affairs 91:5 (2015), pp.953–68 
93 E.g. Cirota.ru, Tema: #53307 Soobshchenie: #1907853, Otkrytoe Pis’mo, 07.03.06 [Accessed 05.05.19] 
94 Makrides., V and Uffelman., D ‘Studying Orthodox Anti-Westernism: the Need for a Comparative Research 




theory which has been seized upon with interest by today’s logicians95. Thus, 
benevolent universalism and narrow exceptionalism walk together in the 
Russian World concept and were typified in Dostoevsky above all. Bakhtin in 
his study on Dostoevsky noted how he possessed an ‘extraordinary artistic 
capacity for seeing…many ambiguous, complex…things where others saw only 
one, hearing two contending voices in every one, hearing in every expression 
the readiness to go over to the contrary.’96 For the supporters of Moscow, the 
universalist and the exceptionalist imperatives implied in the Russian World 
could both be true.  
 
 
Transnationalism versus Enculturation  
 
The Sourozh crisis came to a climax at a time when massive technological 
change was reshaping diaspora communication and integration. Traditional 
theories of enculturation and ghettoisation were starting to break down in the 
wake of globalisation. Even in 2000, Petr Shchedrovsky noted that the borders 
were collapsing ‘between the external and internal market. Between the 
population living “inside” the country and in the diaspora’.97 In 2009, Oksana 
Morgunova wrote an article about the British Russian diaspora that highlighted 
the predominance of a transnational approach (if not mindset), in which 
modern technology coupled with ease of travel meant that émigré life no 
longer equated to abandonment of the Motherland. Instead, it was possible 
for émigrés to still ‘incorporate the native country into their life plans.’ She 
stated that ‘migration movements have reached such a level of intensity that a 
 
95 Cf., Rojek., P, ‘Pavel Florensky’s Theory of Religious Antinomies’. Log. Univers. 13 (2019), 515–540 
96 Bakhtin., M. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics., p.277 
97 Shchedrovskii, P., ‘Russkii mir i transnational'noe russkoe’, Russkii Zhurnal, 02.00 
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continuous link is somehow formed, with those living abroad permanently 
involved in the life of both countries’.98 This was an important change and a 
new phenomenon at the time of the Sourozh crisis. The daily flow of 
information between Russia and the UK seemed to undermine both Bishop 
Basil (it was outside his control and remit, practically and linguistically) and the 
enculturation that had become a symbol of the diocese. It seemed as if 
émigrés did not have to really commit to the Sourozh ethos, because Russia 
was ‘only a click away’. In the words of Bishop Basil, many of those opposing 
him appeared to be people who ‘have hardly left home’.99 
More recently, commentators on this phenomenon have pitted 
cosmopolitanism (globalism) against transnationalism (localism).100 
Roudometof and others have pointed out that transnationalism does not 
necessarily lead to greater cosmopolitanism and have introduced the concepts 
of transnational localism and glocalism. As a result, the dichotomy does not 
necessarily relate to location (émigrés versus indigenous), but rather concerns 
mindset. Previously, ‘cosmopolitans’ were conjectured to be represented by 
the middle and upper-class diaspora intelligentsia, while ‘locals’ were the 
uneducated working class. The ideological implications of cosmopolitanism 
versus localism were laid out by Roudometof: ‘Living in a transnational world, 
individuals can adopt an open, encompassing attitude or a closed, defensive 
posture. In the first case, individuals are labelled cosmopolitans; in the second 
case, they are labelled locals’.101 This paradigm is somewhat contentious. 
While analysts of cosmopolitanism are generally in favour of the concept as 
 
98 Morganova, O., ‘Den’ segodniashnii: britanskie russkie ili russkie britantsy?’, Russkoe Prisutstvie v Britanii 
(London, 2009), p.37ff 
99 Interview with Bishop Basil, BBC Radio 4 Sunday, 21.05.06  
100 Cf. Hannerz, U., ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture’, Lechner., F & Boli, J., (Eds) The Globalization 
Reader (New Jersey, 2014) 
101 Roudometof, V., ‘Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization’, Current Sociology, Vol. 53 (1) 
(January 2005), pp.113–35     
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denoting a vague system of values – pro opennesspro-openness, rights based 
and opposed to any form of nationalism – the term ‘localism’ is more 
problematic. In Sourozh, however, all the ‘positive’ connotations of 
cosmopolitanism and localism were ‘negatives’ to the other side. This again 
highlights the importance, for Sourozh and other similar disputes, of worldview 
over ethnicity, local origin or class. In Sourozh, there was an additional 
overtone. Some pro-Moscow parishioners complained about the ‘spirit of 
cosmopolitanism’ among certain of the anti-Moscow Russians, evidently seeing 
no positive implications: ‘They welcome only those Russian speakers who have 
no churching, or feel no loyalty to their mother Church. Such people often feel 
hostility towards the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russians. They are 
sometimes characterized by the spirit of dissent and cosmopolitanism’.102 
Some western academics might not pick up on the distinctly Soviet reference 
here: cosmopolitanism was a signifier for certain recalcitrant bourgeois 
tendencies and was even a crime during the Stalin years. It was often put 
together with the term ‘rootless’ – ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’ and 
tuneiardstvo (parasitism).103 In such an understanding, the oft-mentioned 
openness of cosmopolitanism becomes a negative rootlessness, i.e. a 
disparagement, a betrayal, even a denial of the existence of one’s own culture, 
resulting in an artificial syncretism or a relativistic dilettantism. 
Sourozh presented a further deconstruction of the local-cosmopolitan 
paradigm in relation to the notion of openness, with cosmopolitans 
characterised as more open to different cultures than locals.104 Yet, as we have 
seen, it was often the newly-arrived pro-Moscow parishioners who accused 
 
102 Cirota.ru, Tema: #53307, Soobshchenie: #1907853, Otkrytoe Pis’mo, 07.03.06 [Accessed 05.05.19] 
103 In the late Stalin period, the phrase also developed anti-Semitic overtones though the Sourozh accusations 
are unlikely to relate to this.  
104 Cf. Phillips, T., ‘Imagined Communities and Self-Identity: An Exploratory Quantitative Analysis’, Sociology, 
Vol. 36, Issue 3 (August 2002), pp.597–617 
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the cosmopolitans of erecting barriers and even latent racism. The accusation 
was that the anti-Moscow cosmopolitans were willing and able to welcome 
their own (or those very similar), but that the ‘other’ (in this case Sovietised 
Russians) represented a threat to the in-group.  
Church parishes of all kinds in the West started to present a challenge to 
the cosmopolitan–local paradigm. On the one hand, many urban parishes were 
increasingly multi-ethnic, but were often at-odds with the dominant culture 
surrounding them. Catholic parishes frequently contained more Polish, Indian 
and African transnationals than indigenous English. Moreover, the incomers 
were often characterised by a less open, more conservative mindset. In this 
sense, the crisis in Sourozh was part of broader tendencies in western 
Christianity and the migratory movement of peoples. The situation was further 
complicated in Orthodoxy by an ambivalent attitude towards western 
converts. Whether they liked it or not, western Orthodox converts were the 
products of the globalising forces many of them deplored. Globalisation, in its 
shrinking of both time and space, resulted in an increased pluralism of cultural 
encounters. This peeled away previous local and community methods of social 
control to reveal a potentially dizzying choice – not least in the religious 
marketplace. This sometimes resulted in an anti-convert mentality in the 
Orthodox diaspora. Conversion to Orthodoxy was seen as a sign of a 
suspiciously pluralistic attitude to religion, and of not following the faith of 
one’s fathers (‘you are English, you should be an Anglican, like your queen!’ 
was a common supposition). A Sourozh parishioner wrote, ‘Converts have not 
always been readily encouraged. Too often the various national groups simply 
cannot see why anyone from a different ethnic and cultural background should 
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want to join them’.105 Such an attitude could be directed at converts regardless 
of any liberal versus traditionalist tensions. Ultimately, the suspicion of 
western converts as having betrayed their own national religion in order to 
become Orthodox was a form of ethnophyletism and a secularist approach to 
religion.  
 On the ground, such attitudes could translate into two types of anti-
convert mentality. From the nationalist side, there was the ‘betrayal of the 
fathers’ mentioned above, and there was also the suspicion that converts 
would prove to be the advance guard of liberalism and modernism. However 
traditionalist converts might appear, they could rarely be trusted to have 
completely made the journey over into Orthodoxy. Instead they forever carried 
with them a residue of their western cradle. Blog articles about such matters 
run into the hundreds.106 The thesis of Victor Livtsov on the ecumenist 
movement concluded specifically in relation to the UK, ‘The ecumenical activity 
initiated by the Russian Orthodox Church was supported by representatives of 
the West European Exarchate [joined by Bishop Basil Osborne], who had ties to 
the Anglican-Orthodox Commonwealth of SS. Alban and Sergius. However, the 
community and exarchate became more and more western due to the 
transition to Orthodoxy of representatives of other confessions’.107 If such a 
situation ethnic-only Orthodoxy continues indefinitely the position of all 
Orthodox jurisdictions in the West is precarious. Even those diasporas whose 
ethnic-religious link is very strong, such as the Armenians, have found it 
difficult to embed regular church attendance in the young. Neither is complete 
 
105 Lambouras, M., ‘Some Reflections on the Question of Nationalism and Orthodoxy’, Sourozh No. 105, 2009 
106 E.g. Phillips., Fr Andrew, othodoxengland.org, ‘On the Failure of Anglican Converts to Produce an Orthodox 
Culture’ 26.04.14.   http://www.events.orthodoxengland.org.uk/on-the-failure-of-anglican-converts-to-
produce-an-orthodox-culture/ [Accessed 05.05.19] 
107 Livtsov, V., ‘Anatol’evich, Istoria vzaimodestvia Russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi s ekumenicheskim dvizheniem: 
konets XIX – nachalo XXI v’, Dissertatsia po VAK RF, 2013.   
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ghettoization and the prevention of intermarriage possible or desirable, as it is 
for some Hassidic and Muslim groups. As the ethnic link starts to weaken, and 
migrants move on or return home, it seems that only the birth of local western 
Orthodox jurisdictions will ultimately work, both practically and canonically. 




 The foregoing analysis of the Sourozh crisis began in terms of 
established narratives, looking in particular at the cultural dichotomies of East 
and West. These old-world, sometimes rather caricatured interpretations of 
events were used as justifications at the time of the crisis and certainly held 
true for many. The failure of either side to understand the other had deep 
cultural-theological roots. The differences were heightened by the diaspora 
setting, which represented a type of ‘extreme borderland’ situation. That 
Russia as a nation and Russians in general felt and feel threatened by the West 
is observable in many spheres, whether or not it is true in reality. As Luke 
March put it, ‘I certainly agree that if there is a “Russia problem”, then there is 
a “West problem” too. Western policies have certainly created an environment 
where the Russian elite can readily portray the nation as isolated, victimised, 
and threatened, even if this an impression which the Kremlin milks 
opportunistically.’1  
For the post-1991 Russian émigrés, there were two paths: gradual 
assimilation to the local culture or ‘fiercely clinging to one’s own’. Because of 
the perceived antagonism towards Russia in the West, assimilation carries 
heightened connotations of rejection of the Motherland – and some diaspora 
Russians have embraced this. On the other hand, ‘fiercely clinging’ involves a 
far less critical attitude to the Russian State than might have been the case at 
home. The Church of course, was and perhaps will always be, at the epicentre 
of questions concerning Russian culture, even for relatively secular people. 
Moreover, this ‘clinging to one’s own’ in the Russian context was and is often 
ill-understood by western analysts and others. The clashes between Russia and 
 
1 March, L. ‘Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign Policy Implications of the new “Russian Idea”’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, 64:3, April 2012, pp 401–25    
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the West, from the Battle on the Ice (1242) to Borodino (1812) and the Siege of 
Leningrad (1941–4) are deeply embedded in the worldview of Russians from 
an early age, whilst consciousness of equivalent foundation histories is 
diminishing in western countries. Such events, along with clashes in the 
spiritual domain, such as the Union of Brest (1590), are still seen (rightly, in 
some ways) as aggressive cultural wars of expansion, even extermination. 
Perhaps this is why it was the pro-Moscow side that made greater reference to 
the East–West dichotomy; it was part of their internal narrative in way that 
was not true of the anti-Moscow parishioners.  
 In addition to the hyper-reality of being ‘an island of Holy Rus’ adrift in 
the urban West, the actual cultural-philosophical divergence between the two 
sides was real and ancient in origins. Again, it was the pro-Moscow side that 
made the most appeals to these differences. This was a result of both the 
diaspora situation and the embattled feelings arising in response to the 
seemingly inevitable creeping dominance of western technology, culture and 
values. A sense of embattled retreat is a mark of many diaspora communities 
and Sourozh was no different, with the preservation of language and customs 
being a major concern. A priest who remained with Moscow stated his 
concerns that as a result of the events of 2006, the diocese ‘was in danger of 
becoming like a Russian chaplaincy…and the Church can’t really be the Church 
if it is a chaplaincy. It becomes as irrelevant as those Anglican parishes in the 
South of Spain with their Matins and sherry on a Sunday, but it isn’t really the 
Church.’2 
Language, especially, provided both an obstacle to assimilation as well as 
an opportunity for cultural preservation, heightening in-group cohesion and 
out-group exclusion. This was the backdrop that set the scene in which events 
 
2 Interview 1A 
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that might appear relatively obscure to an outsider could have great 
importance. Relations between the two sides were made all the worse when 
such concerns were played down by one side or the other. The pro-Moscow 
reaction to the perceived threat could appear impassioned and strange to the 
anti-Moscow locals, the severity of the former’s reaction being increased by 
the sense of existential threat described above, and also by fundamental 
behavioural differences.  
 The overriding explanation from western academia for the Sourozh crisis 
(and for other similar events in the west3) was one of renewed Russian 
nationalism along with a confrontation between two diverging worldviews. On 
the one hand were the western diaspora parishes that had become encultured 
with western liberal values; on the other was the Moscow Patriarchate, which 
was on an opposite trajectory with its conservative, Slavophile-nationalist, 
centralising drive. These two poles of World Orthodoxy were reflected in the 
positions of Constantinople and Moscow, embedding an ancient rivalry with 
contemporary geopolitical implications. Such an explanation holds true in its 
overall assessment of the situation, but the problem with such 
oversimplifications is that they entrench polemic and in so doing close down 
the potential avenues of reconciliation, or at least understanding. The 
importance of this point is reflected in the large amount of space given in this 
study to an analysis of the Slavophile-nationalist drive. It was certainly true 
that this imperative, coupled with Slavophile historiography, resulted in a 
rebirth of Russian universalism and the formation of the concept of the Russian 
World in which more emphasis was put on the diaspora parishes in the world’s 
great capitals. This development occurred at the same time as the rise of the 
so-called culture wars between a West that was rapidly secularising and 
 
3 Cf. Chapter 2. The Property Battle in Context.  
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rejecting its Christian past and a Russia that (in public at least) was positioning 
itself as the ‘withholder’ (katehon) of such forces. This gave birth within Russia 
to a heady mix of both Russian exceptionalism and universalism, which were 
two sides of the same doctrine. Perhaps this drive towards Russian 
universalism was, and is, related to anxiety about the much more successful 
spread of Western universalism, the culture wars thus representing a battle 
between the two. Danilevskii had recognised this in the nineteenth century 
when he proposed a Slavic universalism in opposition to the Western kind, 
which even then was spreading over the globe with great rapidity. This is why 
the secular and ecclesiastical leadership in Russia were, and are, at pains to 
stress a broad and rather vague ‘union of traditionalist peoples’. Paradoxically, 
multipolarity is proposed as a universalism in itself.4  
Few Western commentators have really understood what this means. 
This has been partly the result of blind spots that can appear in any discourse 
where there is a hegemonic tendency. As noted, one of the by-products of 
recent western historiography is the prevalence of a certain Sloterdijkian 
cynicism that elevates pragmatic-mercenary motivations to the exclusion of 
others. This is especially problematic in questions relating to religion and 
Russia. While some neo-Slavophile thought may be grandstanding and a fig-
leaf for Russification and old-world nationalism, much of it is more subtle and 
certainly sincere. This was reflected in Sourozh, and in other similar crises, by 
the support of multiple fellow-travellers, who can be seen as a manifestation 
of the ideas promoted in the speeches of Patriarch Kirill. Moreover, Sourozh 
was only one small part of a global pattern in which communities and 
individuals were no longer divided along national, geographic or even ethnic 
 
4 Cf. Tsygankov, A., ‘In the Shadow of Nikolai Danilevsky: Universalism, Particularism, and Russian Geopolitical 
Theory’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 69, Issue 4 (June, 2017) 
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lines, but by the culture wars. As this polemic has gathered pace, so the 
concept of the Russian World has grown broader and broader, to include 
almost any community fighting to preserve tradition against globalism.  
All sides in the culture wars have been unashamed in their use of 
caricature, simplification and polemic. Sourozh was not the usual battleground 
for such tensions, as both sides could be considered as conservatives by wider 
society, but this only shows how far the delineation of such groups had come 
even by that time. The crisis was an early manifestation of the power of the 
internet to increase tribal allegiances, as participants confirmed and 
entrenched their positions in the echo-chambers of the blogosphere. It could 
be countered that the stakes in religious conflicts are usually extremely high, 
which partly explains the passions and polemic they arouse. This was noted by 
the judge in the 2009 trial when the pro-Moscow barrister tried to downplay 
the significance of certain events. But the conflicts in Sourozh do not appear to 
have been primarily of a doctrinal or theological nature, although the stress-
points often revealed themselves as accusations of ‘not being Orthodox’. In 
effect, they were based more on openness or resistance to the zeitgeist – to 
globalisation’s breaking down of difference, and its syncretic imperative in 
moral values, culture, religion. Fear of this powerful and pervasive force helped 
to embed defiance in the pro-Moscow group.  
 For this reason, older explanations of East versus West and Russian 
nationalism do not hold true for all events in Sourozh. The crisis came at a 
transitional time in geopolitics. The influx of economic migrants (rather than 
exiles), plus the exponential growth of the internet at the time, meant that the 
nature of diaspora life was changing from the old émigré and cosmopolitan 
diaspora way of being to a new transnationalism.5 New arrivals were able to 
 
5 Cf. Chapter 6  
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continue in constant contact with the Motherland, and an increase in media 
battles and conspiracy theories online also reflected these changes. The ability 
of every participant in the crisis to broadcast their theories daily was novel at 
the time and, as has since become commonplace, led to overheated and 
polarised debates that were the result but also the cause of the troubles.  
 The rise of the neo-Slavophiles cannot be laid entirely at the door of the 
culture wars, renewed East–West tensions and the polarised resistance 
to/embracing of globalisation. Russia’s internal dialogue also had a huge role 
to play in her renewed interest in the diaspora. After the Revolution, diaspora 
intellectuals, from Ilyin to Berdiaev, continued to obsess over Russia’s destiny 
in the light of the Bolshevik victory and these thinkers would provide the 
foundation of much neo-Slavophile thought after 1991. The post-war period 
saw the rebirth of neo-Slavophile thought within the Soviet Union, with writers 
such as Solzhenitsyn and Shafarovich being the forebears of later neo-
Slavophile intellectuals such as Dugin. Russian intellectual, political and 
religious life is still immersed in questions of Russia’s place in the world and 
her relationship with the West. Each year sees a plethora of new books and 
articles on these themes. This is a phenomenon not to be found in any other 
European nation. The 1990s were the heyday of such debate, as multiple 
voices within Russia jostled for power, but by the 2000s one main narrative 
was emerging: a policy of continuity that sought to reconnect with and 
consolidate Russia’s history, geography and place in the world. 
 The influence of the rise of Putin on the debate both within and without 
the Church is certain, though difficult to assess. The drive of the young 
president to re-establish Russia as a world power and to unite the country 
internally had far-reaching implications for the Russian Church and her 
diaspora. Both cultural westernisation and extreme nationalism were rejected 
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(at least internally) and continuity with Russia’s past was elevated to 
paramount importance. The president, an avid reader of history, poured much 
energy into the reunification of the estranged parts of the Russian Church.6 To 
many he was the king-maker of a process that would have seemed a minor 
sideshow to Yeltsin. Similarly, the DECR formed a close relationship with the 
MFA, firstly under the yet-to-be Patriarch Kirill and subsequently under 
Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeev, striving to consolidate Russian parishes abroad as 
‘beacons’ and ‘islands’ of Holy Rus.  
The language used by the president and the Church was not the 
language of old-fashioned ethnic nationalism for which it was sometimes 
mistaken. Instead, a heady new universalism promoted the Russian Church as 
the global guardian of Orthodoxy. With other Orthodox Churches in the West 
increasingly under pressure from secularism, the Russian Church argued that 
she alone had the secure base and global reach to provide the inspiration for 
the whole Orthodox (and not only Orthodox) world. Russia’s multi-ethnic and 
multilingual parishes across the globe were spread over several jurisdictions 
and represented both an opportunity and a threat to the Patriarchate. As all 
these jurisdictions are now again part of the Mother Church, Moscow’s policy 
can be said to have been a resounding success. ROCOR and Moscow reunited 
in 2007 and the Exarchate in 2019; there were small departures in both cases 
as a result of the unions. One notable casualty of the 2019 union was the 
parishes of the English Deanery, which had left Sourozh in 2006 with Bishop 
Basil. For many, the events described in this study were simply too fresh to 
contemplate a reunion. 
 
6 ‘Putin ob’iasnil, pochemu liuubit chitat' knigi po istorii’, 01.01.18  https://rueconomics.ru/299332-putin-
obyasnil-pochemu-lyubit-chitat-knigi-po-istorii [Accessed 04.12.20]  
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 These undoubted successes of the Moscow Patriarchate were critiqued 
by a small minority of intellectuals within the Church and by the majority of 
academics external to the Church. They were deemed to have been possible 
only with the suppression of democratic voices within the Church and the 
promotion of vertical episcopal power, mirroring developments in the State. 
The new symphonia of the Russian Church and State was viewed as a cynical 
marriage between the spiritual and temporal powers, in which the real power 
lay with the State. This was a dangerous game for the Church to play, 
according to the critics, who cited Russia’s turbulent history in support of their 
views. One commentator noted that Russians ‘had a long history of turning on 
their Church’, and that, for the State, the Church was simply another weapon 
in her soft-power arsenal.7 But as far as the diaspora was concerned, the 
benefits certainly did not all go one way. Much of the money that poured into 
diaspora Church projects, such as the new cathedral in Paris, came from the 
State. In addition, the Church was at the forefront of the new battle for hearts 
and minds beyond Russia’s borders, and this new mission to the West was 
important to the Russian Church’s prestige and self-image as a global church. 
The Russian Church is a major player in a loose worldwide coalition of 
Christians opposing the liberal-secular imperative in many western (and non-
western) countries. Just one example is the role of the Russian Church in the 
World Congress of Families, a large Evangelical-founded US organisation with 
strong links to Russia.  
 It should be noted that criticism came not only from the liberal 
intelligentsia. The right within the Russian Church (especially ROCOR) attacked 
both the new symphonia and the Church’s entry into the global culture wars. 
Such voices regarded Putin’s motives as at best cynical and criticised the 
 
7 Interview with Irina Papkova, Budapest, 01.05.10. www.rocorstudies.org  
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liberalism of certain sectors of the Moscow Patriarchate, particularly the 
Sourozh Diocese. They regarded the Russian Church’s focus on the culture 
wars as a diversion from Russia’s own burdensome issues of corruption, 
poverty and inequality, marriage breakdown, abortion rates, alcoholism and so 
on. These competing communities illustrate how the Church has been unable 
to escape the divisions increasingly encountered in public life over the world.  
That the Russian Church came to think of herself increasingly in global 
rather than purely geographic terms was the result of a coalition of forces 
ranging from the philosophical (Slavophile universalism), the theological (Third 
Rome) and the providential (the diaspora), through the geographical-political 
(the burden of Empire) to the globalised geopolitical (the culture wars). While 
the Russian Church was propelled to a global mission, Constantinople 
increasingly claimed jurisdiction over the entire Orthodox diaspora, and the 
stage was set for further confrontations. In addition, the Russian Church 
increasingly represented traditional Orthodoxy as opposed to the liberal 
Orthodoxy of Constantinople. The liberal Orthodox may have criticised 
Moscow’s assertive policies in the diaspora, but they were popular with many 
parishioners as the Church won property battles in Nice, Budapest, Rome, 
London and other cities.  
Since the Sourozh crisis of 2006, the tensions between Constantinople 
and Moscow have broken out into a schism that has been compared to the 
Great Schism of 1054 between the Latin West and the Greek East. The Church 
crisis in Ukraine has split World Orthodoxy, but not simply along ethnic or 
geopolitical lines. These divisions exist on the surface, but allegiances akin to 
those of the Sorouzh crisis run far deeper. Orthodox clergy have supported 
either Constantinople against Moscow or vice versa, regardless of their 
jurisdictions; traditionalists referring to the troubles as ‘the pruning of the 
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vine’, and liberals framing them as a refusal of zealots to face the real 
problems of the modern world. Wherever tensions have flared up in World 
Orthodoxy since 1991, the undercurrents have been the same, as the pressure 
to align with either conservative Moscow or liberal Constantinople increases.  
 In a broader sense, the experience of the Russian Church in the diaspora 
was not unique. Events similar to those at Sourozh occurred in the Armenian 
diaspora after 1991. There were major differences of course, but the 
appearance there of new parishioners with, it was claimed, a ‘Soviet mentality’ 
is particularly analogous.8 The notion of a conflict of mentalities is an 
interesting, though probably ultimately inconclusive, line of enquiry. It relates 
to the idea that communism was able, within the lifespan of an individual, to 
reform the ways of thinking of an entire people. The fact that such a theory has 
not been restricted to the Russian situation implies the existence of common 
differences of social comportment. Such a situation was probably related more 
to previously existing praxis within, for example, social class, which the 
Revolution heightened, rather than to a complete rupture with the past.  
The crisis in Sourozh is interesting precisely because it showed the 
symbiotic relationship between so many micro and macrocosmic forces. The 
stage was small, but the themes were large. Geopolitical tensions presented as 
ideological divergence were both a cause and a result of the minutiae of 
dissonance at the parish and individual level. This was partly because of the 
way individual lives were increasingly and inescapably connected to the 
pressures of world-historical forces. Whether they liked it or not, in an age of 
hyperbolic and omnipresent media saturation, parishioners were increasingly 
at the centre of macrocosmic struggles between various forces and it became 
 
8 Petrosyan., L., ‘The Armenian Apostolic Church in Contemporary Times (1991-2011): Political Changes In 
Armenia and Social Challenges of the Last Three Catholicoi of Etchmiadzin. Part I: Vazgen I and Garegin I’ 
Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies, vol. 24 (2015):81-111 
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less and less easy to remain neutral. This in turn led to a battle of worldviews 
being played out at the parish level, often sublimated into conflicts about 
praxis rather than expressed as overt ideological confrontation.9 The disputes 
over dress, confession, icons etc were thus semiotic confrontations in which a 
small act or gesture could carry behind it the whole weight of history. It is 
interesting how, after the events, official channels in the Russian Church 
sought to downplay this aspect of the crisis, often stressing that there was not 
a difference in worldview or ecclesiology,10 while unofficial pro-Moscow 
channels continued to vocalise against ‘the westernised Sourozh liberals’.  
But how much influence could neo-Slavophile thought really have had 
on the minutia of events? The answer, it seems to me, is that the rhetoric was 
both symptomatic and causal. Thus, the diaspora was both the subject and the 
instigator of new Slavophile thought. The Sourozh crisis, and similar events, 
revealed the growing power of Orthodox diasporas to influence the politics of 
their Motherlands. A commentator at the time went so far as to state that, 
‘today’s Orthodox consciousness tends to be held captive by the needs and 
requirements of the Orthodox diasporas’.11 This is a growing trend in the 
world, as transnationalism becomes a global phenomenon. In western Europe 
alone there are perhaps some eight million Russophones, most of whom 
consider themselves, at least nominally, Orthodox.12 Such transnationalism is 
seen by some as a backward move in Orthodoxy in general. A priest noted that 
the Sourozh crisis was itself partly to blame for this, with the result that other 
jurisdictions became more wary of local converts. He stated that, ‘what 
happened [In Sourozh in 2006] has set the possibility of any union of 
 
9 Cf. Scorer, Deacon P., Interview by Natalia Golytsina, Radio Svoboda, 13.06.06 
10 Lipich, O., Interviu Mitropolita Kirilla, RIA Novosti, 14.10.06  
11 Kishkovsky, Fr L., ‘UK Diocesan Crisis Tests Church’s Mission to All’, The Orthodox Church News Magazine, 
Vol. 42, Nos. 5–6 
12 Koksharov, N.V., ‘Kul’tura russkogo zarubezh’ia’, Credo New, No. 2 (2007), pp.48–59 
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Orthodoxy in Britain back 50 years…Everyone will look and say “you can’t trust 
these Brits, they’ve got no real attachment to the Church.”’13 The implication 
being that as soon as things happened which you didn’t like, that you could 
pack up and move jurisdiction.  
In addition, even in the 2000s, it became impossible for diasporas to 
escape the tendency to fall into camps: modernist versus traditionalist, 
globalist (cosmopolitan) versus transnational (localist), conservative versus 
liberal, East versus West. The geopolitical theories of Huntingdon and others 
seemed to reinforce these dichotomies and provide them with a world-
historical narrative. The new arrivals into the Sourozh parish also reflected a 
concrete manifestation of these ideas. These arguments were in many ways 
grounded in the tensions of our era: tradition versus the jettisoning of 
tradition; anxiety and defence against globalisation versus the welcoming of 
the new world; the rise of the secular versus the reaction to it; fear of cultural 
syncretism versus its acceptance. Such instinctual predilections are deeply 
ingrained and have little to do with rational thought, being based more on 
experiences and inclinations rooted early in life. This is partly why it is 
impossible to break down the Sourozh crisis on purely class, ethnic or even 
theological lines. 
 The battle of worldviews, polarisation between East and West, 
enculturation versus transnationalism: all these took place against a backdrop 
of deep, emotional homesickness (toska po rodine) which was a factor for 
émigrés on both sides. Towards the end of his life, Fr Sergei Bulgakov, the 
diaspora theologian, equally beloved and scorned by ‘liberals’ and 
‘conservatives’, wrote a brief essay about the long shadow that Russia had cast 
 
13 Interview 1A  
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over his life, concluding: ‘The older I get, the more my life experience expands 
and deepens, the clearer the meaning of my homeland becomes for me. There 
I was not only born, but germinated as a seed, in my very being, so that all my 
later, broken and complex life, is only a series of shoots from this root. 
Everything, which is mine comes from there. And dying, I will return – to the 
same place, the same gate – of birth and death.'14  
Despite the war of words between the Moscow Patriarchate and the 
various diaspora jurisdictions that had departed from her orbit, the thirst for 
the Motherland, both real and romanticised, was immensely powerful. This 
was seen after World War II, when many parishes in the Exarchate (including 
Surouzh) and even ROCOR parishes and monasteries decided to return to 
Moscow. It was also a major driver in the ROCOR–Moscow Union in 2007, and 
again in 2019, when most of the Exarchate parishes decided to return home as 
well. Despite all the protestations that the new Russia had broken connection 
with the Russia of old, that Soviet Russia had buried the Russia of Tchaikovsky 
and Levitan under an industrial heap, and that the brash post-Soviet Russia 
was a rude imposter, for many of the émigrés, old and new, their rowan tree 
was never very far from view. Even in an age of globalised communications, 
nostalgia remains the deepest layer of all.  
Each house is strange, each altar bare. 
And I don't care. It doesn't matter. 
But if, beside the autumn road, I see 
a rowan tree …15 
 
14 Bulgakov, S., ‘Moia Rodina’ (1939) author trans.  
15 Tsvetaeva, M. (trans. Paul Schmitt), Toska po Rodine 
Всяк дом мне чужд, всяк храм мне пуст, 
И все — равно, и все — едино. 
Но если по дороге — куст 
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